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Jordana Silverstein and Rachel Stevens1
During the Academics for Refugees National Day of Action on 17 October 
2018, Behrouz Boochani – ‘a Kurdish writer, film maker, scholar and 
journalist’ – issued a statement calling on academics across Australia to act:
academics have a really important role in researching this policy 
of exile and exposing it. What I believe from living through this 
policy and experiencing this prison camp firsthand is that we are 
only able to understand it in a philosophical and historical way. 
Definitely Manus and Nauru prison camps are philosophical and 
political phenomena and we should not view them superficially. 
The best way to examine them is through deep research into how 
a human, in this case a refugee, is forced to live between the law 
and a situation without laws.2
In May 2013, Boochani had fled his homeland, Iran, to seek asylum 
in Australia. As a politically active Kurdish journalist, Boochani 
faced persecution from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and likely 
imprisonment. Once in Indonesia, Boochani embarked on the treacherous 
sea crossing to northern Australia. His first attempt failed; in his second 
attempt in July 2013, his boat was intercepted by the Royal Australian 
Navy and he, along with 60 other asylum seekers, was transported and 
detained on Christmas Island, a ravaged 135 km2 Australian territory in 
the Indian Ocean that is far closer to Indonesia than mainland Australia. 
1  This chapter was written with funding provided by the Australian Research Council Laureate 
Research Fellowship Project FL140100049, ‘Child Refugees and Australian Internationalism from 
1920 to the Present’.
2  Behrouz Boochani, ‘Statement from Behrouz Boochani in Support of the Academics for 





After one month, in August Boochani was relocated to Manus Island, Papua 
New Guinea. These precise dates are important. By virtue of Boochani’s 
decision (or forced decision) to seek refuge in Australia in mid-2013, he 
inadvertently became ensnared in the Machiavellian machinations that 
characterised the Australian domestic political landscape throughout the 
2010s and an increasingly punitive government approach to assessing – or 
refusing to assess – refugee claims.
How did we get here?
The detention of asylum seekers who arrived by boat has been a feature 
of Australian Government policy for more than 30  years. When 26 
Cambodians arrived in Australia in 1989 without prior authorisation, 
on a boat codenamed the Pender Bay, the Hawke Labor Government 
invoked the discretionary detention provision under the Migration Act 
1958 (Cth). These asylum seekers would spend the next two-and-a-half 
years incarcerated at former migrant hostels in suburban Melbourne 
(Maribyrnong) and Sydney (Villawood) before their refugee claims were 
rejected and they were forcibly repatriated. In 1991 Gerry Hand, the 
minister for immigration, local government and ethnic affairs, declared 
that all subsequent asylum seekers who arrived by boat would be detained 
in an inhospitable former miners’ camp at Port Hedland, in the north-
west of the country. The following year, the Labor Government passed 
with bipartisan support a number of legislative changes to the Migration 
Act that codified retrospectively the detention of asylum seekers and 
made mandatory the detention of all people who subsequently came by 
boat, which came into effect in 1994.3 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
the conservative Howard Government established more immigration 
detention centres, often in former military sites and typically in extremely 
hot and isolated locations, far removed from the assistance of their 
communities, immigration lawyers, human rights activists and journalists. 
These detention centres, although distant from population hubs, were on 
the mainland of Australia. This, however, would change in 2001.
As Kathleen Blair explores in Chapter 6 of this volume, the arrival of the 
MV Tampa off the coast of Australia in August 2001 served as a lightning 
rod for an incumbent government unpopular with voters in an election 
3  Rachel Stevens, Immigration Policy from 1970 to the Present (New York: Routledge, 2016), 121–22.
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year. When a boat carrying 438 asylum seekers began to sink en route 
to Australia, the nearby Norwegian freighter, the MV Tampa, rescued 
the stranded passengers, and in doing so, prevented a likely catastrophe. 
The Howard Government threatened the Norwegians with prosecution 
if they tried to land on Australian territory, specifically the neighbouring 
Christmas Island, and they were ordered to dock in Indonesia. The mostly 
Afghan and Hazara asylum seekers resisted the rerouting to Indonesia, 
which is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, leading to 
a diplomatic deadlock between the Norwegian, Australian and Indonesian 
governments. After days drifting at sea, the impasse ended when the New 
Zealand Government agreed to resettle 150 asylum seekers, while the 
Micronesian island-state of Nauru detained the remaining 288 individuals 
at a processing centre in exchange for Australian foreign aid.4
The opportunistic Howard Government used the Tampa incident to 
legislate a suite of reforms with the intention of transferring asylum 
seeker processing to countries outside Australia, which is meticulously 
documented by Savitri Taylor in Chapter 9 of this volume. In September 
2001, the Howard Government introduced the ‘Pacific Solution’, which 
excised Christmas Island and Ashmore Reef from the Australian Migration 
Zone. This migration excision would be extended in 2005 to include 
all Australian territories except the mainland and Tasmania, while the 
mainland and Tasmania were excised in 2013.5 The excision of territories 
from the migration zone in 2001 marked the beginning of the Australian 
Government refusing asylum seekers the ‘state of having arrived’.6 This 
legal exclusion is important as it denied asylum seekers protections under 
Australian law and, later, access to legal challenges in the courts.
In addition to territory excision, the Australian Government delegated the 
detention of asylum seekers to two of its client states, both of which 
are recipients of Australian foreign aid.7 Immigration detention centres were 
established on Manus Island, Papua New Guinea and Nauru. Although 
asylum seekers were physically detained offshore, the management of the 
4  Kathleen Blair, Chapter 6, this volume.
5  Karen Barlow and staff, ‘Parliament Excises Mainland from Migration Zone’, ABC News, 
17  May 2013, available at: www.abc.net.au/news/2013-05-16/parliament-excises-mainland-from-
migration-zone/4693940.
6  Stevens, Immigration Policy, 132.
7  In the late 2010s, the Australian Government provided over AU$500 million in ODA (official 
development assistance) to Papua New Guinea; during the same time period, Nauru received 
approximately AU$25 million per year. Though this figure may seem small, it is equivalent to 25 per 
cent of Nauruan GDP. See: www.dfat.gov.au/aid/where-we-give-aid/Pages/where-we-give-aid.
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centres and the adjudication of the asylum claims remained under the 
control of the Australian state. Since 2001, so-called offshore processing 
and the long-term incarceration of asylum seekers has for the most part 
been the modus operandi of the Australian Government. There was a brief 
(in relative terms) respite between early 2008 and mid-2012, which Savitri 
Taylor dubs ‘the false spring’.8 The incoming Rudd Labor Government 
swept to power in December 2007 with an 18-seat majority and an election 
pledge to replace offshore processing with onshore mandatory detention of 
asylum seekers, albeit on the remote Christmas Island.
Arguably, the suspension of offshore processing was contingent on two 
transient contextual factors: first, the small number of asylum seekers 
arriving by boat in 2007–08. According to government sources, only 
21 individuals arrived by boat seeking asylum in 2007–08; in 2006–07, 
there were 23 applicants. These figures were a fraction of the 2,222 asylum 
seekers who arrived by boat in 2001–02 when the Pacific Solution was 
introduced. With few boat arrivals and resulting media coverage, the issue 
of asylum seeker policy faded into the background and lost its political 
salience.9 Consequently, the Rudd Government was in a secure political 
position to reform asylum seeker policy with little practical impact. 
Second, after nearly 12  years in power, there was discontent with the 
incumbent government and a general desire for generational change at 
the top. The Rudd Government came to power with a moderate reform 
agenda on a range of issues, including industrial relations, climate change, 
education and internet infrastructure. There was therefore an electoral 
appetite for change, even if the reforms only moderated the excesses of the 
Howard years. This public desire for change, once satisfied, proved fickle. 
Coupled with a marked increase in the number of asylum seeker arrivals 
– 4,597 individuals arrived in 2009–10 – Rudd felt that his position 
against offshore processing, as well as his leadership of the Labor Party, 
became untenable.
8  Savitri Taylor, Chapter 9, this volume.
9  Unfortunately, the Australian Election Study did not include a question on the importance of 
refugees and asylum seekers as an election issue in 2007, perhaps indicative of a lack of interest in the 
issue at the time. Furthermore, there was no mention of refugees and only a passing reference to asylum 
seekers in Paul D Williams’s reflective commentary on the 2007 election, see ‘The 2007 Australian 
Federal Election: The Story of Labor’s Return from the Electoral Wilderness’, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History 54, no.  1 (2008): 104–25. doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2008.00487.x. John 
Wanna similarly omitted any reference to asylum seeker policy in his summary of the 2007 election, see 
‘Political Chronicles. Commonwealth of Australia. July to December 2007’, Australian Journal of Politics 
and History 54, no. 2 (2008): 289–341. These collective silences in political commentary and analysis 
suggest that the issue of asylum seeker policies simply did not register with voters or political scientists.
5
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Since 2008–09, the number of asylum seekers arriving by boat steadily 
increased, peaking in 2012–13 with 18,365 arrivals. Furthermore, in 
2011–12 the number of asylum seekers arriving by boat eclipsed the 
number of asylum seekers arriving by air for the first time.10 Although 
both boat and air arrivals requested onshore asylum (as distinct from 
applying for refugee status offshore, typically in a third country), air 
arrivals have never triggered a public frenzy simply by virtue of their 
successful passage through immigration and customs at their port of entry. 
Conversely, since the first boats of Vietnamese asylum seekers reached the 
shores of northern Australia in 1976, these migrants have been the subject 
of hostility, politicking and incarceration, predicated on racist fears of 
contagion, imaginary threats to security and alleged criminality.11
Compounding matters further, between 2010 and 2013 there were 
a  series of high-profile tragedies in which asylum seekers drowned at 
sea and many more had to be rescued during their journey to Australia. 
For example, on 15 December 2010, a boat carrying 90 asylum seekers 
from Iraq and Iran crashed into rocky cliffs at Christmas Island during 
a monsoonal storm. Fifty people – 35 adults and 15 children – died, the 
most significant asylum seeker disaster (in terms of lives lost) to occur on 
Australian territory at that time. Images of distressed bodies and rickety 
boats floating in choppy waters blanketed TV and print news coverage. 
Sensational reporting dominated tabloid newspapers and articles were 
mostly written from the perspectives of local Christmas Islanders, not 
the surviving asylum seekers. For instance, The Daily Telegraph reported 
anecdotes from locals: ‘We witnessed people actually drowning. To see 
people die and not to be able to do a darn thing is one of the worst 
things you can possibly do’.12 The next day, Melbourne tabloid The Herald 
Sun similarly reported on the experiences of helpless witnesses. One local 
10  This data is sourced from the Parliament of Australia research paper, ‘Asylum Seekers and Refugees: 
What are the Facts?’, Research Paper Series 2014–15, last updated 2 March 2015, available at: www.
aph.gov.au/about_parliament/parliamentary_departments/parliamentary_library/pubs/rp/rp1415/ 
asylumfacts#_Toc413067443.
11  For further discussion, see Rachel Stevens, ‘Political Debates on Asylum Seekers during the 
Fraser Government, 1977–1982’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 58, no. 4 (2012): 526–41. 
doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2012.01651.x; Katrina Stats, ‘Welcome to Australia? A Reappraisal 
of the Fraser Government’s Approach to Refugees, 1975–1983’, Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 69, no. 1 (2015): 68–87. doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2014.952707.
12  Alison Rehn, ‘Now 50 Feared Dead After Asylum Boat Crashes off Christmas Island’, Daily 
Telegraph (Sydney), 15 December 2010.
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woman described the scene of the accident: ‘It was horrible. They were 
screaming and yelling for help and falling into the ocean. We just felt so 
hopeless, there wasn’t anything we could do’.13
Within a month, there was another tragedy at sea in which 17 asylum 
seekers drowned off the coast of Java, Indonesia, en route to Australia. 
In December 2011, an overcrowded vessel sank, resulting in the deaths 
of at least 160 mostly Afghan and Iranian asylum seekers. Between June 
and October 2012, there were five separate incidents in which collectively 
287 people perished.14 The Opposition, then led by conservative hardliner 
Tony Abbott, seized the opportunity to capitalise politically on the asylum 
seeker tragedies. The conservatives reframed the debate over onshore 
versus offshore processing, arguing illogically that interdiction and 
offshore processing saved the lives of asylum seekers. Thus, the Abbott 
Opposition cloaked their anti-asylum seeker policies in the language of 
humanitarianism. The hollowness of the conservatives’ rhetoric was plain 
to see; however, by late 2010, the Labor Government had a new leader, 
Julia Gillard, and was clinging onto power in a hung parliament. Insecure 
and reactive in leadership, and long holding less sympathetic views 
about refugees, Gillard sought to quash debate around asylum seekers 
by reversing Rudd’s reforms and reinstating offshore processing in Nauru 
and Manus Island in late 2012.
Over the last 20  years, politicians of both major parties have used the 
arrival of asylum seekers to try to gain a political advantage in some way. 
As a divisive issue, polling data indicates there are sizeable minorities on 
both sides who are sufficiently galvanised, making a major policy change 
unlikely in the present environment. The Australian Election Study (AES) 
has been measuring political attitudes among a nationally representative 
sample of voters since 1987. Questions about asylum seekers and refugees 
began in 2001 and have continued in every election year except 2007. 
The longitudinal nature of this survey, as well as the use of exact question 
wording, enable comparisons over time, and the data presents a very 
muddled picture.
13  Staff writers, ‘Christmas Island Tragedy: Screams, Yells and then they Drowned’, Herald Sun 
(Melbourne), 16 December 2010.




In the AES surveys, there are three questions that address political attitudes 
towards asylum seekers and refugees. One, what is the most important 
non-economic election issue for you? Two, which is your preferred 
political party policy on refugees and asylum seekers? Three, should boats 
carrying asylum seekers be turned back or not turned back? The results 
from the survey are compiled in Table 1.
Table 1. Compilation of AES survey questions that relate to asylum 
seekers (in percentages)
Year of survey 2001 2004 2010 2013 2016 2019
Most important non-economic issue
Refugees and asylum seekers 13 3 6 10 6 3
Preferred party policy
Coalition 46 36 38 41 34 35
ALP 15 22 21 19 19 25
No preference 27 22 27 27 34 22
Attitudes towards asylum seekers
Boats should be turned back 52 54 51 49 48 50
Boats should not be turned back 20 28 29 34 33 28
No response/undecided 28 18 20 17 19 22
Source: Data compiled by authors from data in Sarah Cameron and ian McAllister, Trends in 
Australian political opinion: Results from the Australian Election Study, 1987–2019 (Canberra: 
Australian National University, 2019) . Downloaded from australianelectionstudy .org .
From the data in Table 1, it is evident that public attitudes are divided on 
the mandatory detention of asylum seekers. Since 2001 there has been 
a consistent majority or near majority of respondents who support the 
turning back of boats containing asylum seekers, despite it constituting 
refoulement and thus being illegal, as well as immoral and deeply violent. 
But there has also remained a steady group of opponents, ranging from 
one in five to one in three respondents. Furthermore, when asked whether 
boats should be turned back, between 17 and 28 per cent of respondents 
did not provide a response or were undecided. The presence of so many 
undecideds speaks to the intractability of a pernicious and long-lasting 
debate within Australian politics, which has left many unwilling to engage 
or care about refugees. On the question of preferred political party policy, 
no political party has received a majority, although the policies of the 
Coalition parties (generally viewed as more restrictive than the Labor 
Party), have been the most popular among respondents. Importantly, 
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on  average, approximately one-third of respondents had no party 
preference on asylum seeker policy, which reinforces the argument that a 
substantial minority of voters are disengaged.
Voter apathy on asylum seeker policy is also evident when respondents 
were asked to select the most important non-economic issue. In the 
full AES report, results showed that respondents consistently selected 
health as the most important non-economic issue, closely followed by 
environmental/global warming. The data in Table 1 reveals voter volatility 
on the proportion who nominated asylum seekers/refugees as the most 
important non-economic issue, with response rates ranging from 3 to 
13 per cent. Heightened attention to asylum seekers typically coincided 
with high-profile events, such as the Tampa incident in 2001 and the 
drownings of asylum seekers from December 2010 through to  2013. 
As of 2019, asylum seeker policy has once again been relegated to the 
background, with only 3  per cent declaring the issue as their most 
important. In conclusion, the data from the AES provides compelling 
evidence that Australian voters are deeply divided on how to respond to 
the arrival of asylum seekers by boat, and that this issue will not influence 
voting behaviour for the vast majority of Australians. These findings have 
been replicated over the past 12 years in the annual Scanlon Foundation 
Survey on Mapping Social Cohesion. These reports – which can be 
viewed online – consistently show that, while a small minority believe 
asylum seekers are poorly treated under current policies, only 2 per cent 
of respondents identified asylum seekers as the most important issue 
facing Australia.15
The decision of the Labor Government to reinstall offshore mandatory 
processing was more than a retreat to the policies of the Howard years; 
it signalled the beginning of an increasingly aggressive and militarised 
approach to asylum seekers. When Kevin Rudd seized the leadership of 
the Labor Party, thus beginning his brief second term as prime minister, his 
approach to asylum seekers had no resemblance to his 2007 commitment 
to end offshore processing. In July 2013, Rudd announced that any 
asylum seeker who arrived without a visa – that is, by boat – would not be 
eligible for asylum in Australia. Instead, intercepted asylum seekers would 
be taken to Manus Island and have their refugee claims adjudicated by 
the Papua New Guinean (PNG) Government. Should they be successful, 
15  Andrew Markus, Mapping Social Cohesion: The Scanlon Foundation Surveys, 2019 (Melbourne: 
Monash University, 2019), 37, available at: scanloninstitute.org.au/research/surveys.
9
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asylum seekers could resettle in PNG but never make a claim for asylum 
against the Australian Government. In return for their cooperation, the 
Australian Government offered the PNG Government financial aid. 
The  blanket refusal of the Rudd Government to consider claims for 
refugee status among asylum seekers marked yet another turning point 
in the Australian Government’s increasingly hostile approach to asylum 
seekers: from onshore mandatory detention in cities, then in remote 
desert towns, to the Pacific Solution and, finally, forced resettlement in 
a poor neighbouring nation.
It is at this time in July 2013 that Behrouz Boochani arrived in Australia, 
albeit on Christmas Island. Boochani was one of the first to be subject to 
the Rudd Government’s new policy, and, in August 2013, he was relocated 
to Manus Island processing centre. In effect, Boochani was imprisoned 
indefinitely, languishing on an impoverished island with no prospect 
of resettlement in Australia. During his incarceration, the Coalition 
(conservative) parties came to power in September 2013. For the most part, 
the incoming government continued the policies of their predecessor, but 
also added a mix of hysterical rhetoric under their new strategy, Operation 
Sovereign Borders, along with tightened media access to government 
information on this policy. Boochani remained incarcerated at Manus 
Island processing centre until October 2017, at which point the centre 
officially closed. He, along with the other male asylum seekers imprisoned 
there, was forcibly moved to ‘another prison camp’ on the island, living 
a precarious existence among violence, hunger and protests.16 At the time 
of writing, Boochani is living in New Zealand having been granted refugee 
status, while hundreds of other refugees and asylum seekers remain living 
precarious and unsupported lives in Port Moresby (PNG), Nauru, and 
Australia awaiting medical treatment, unable to either leave or re-establish 
themselves in the manner that they would choose.
Amidst government secrecy on the execution of a brutal government 
policy, incarcerated asylum seekers filled the vacuum, providing firsthand 
accounts of life on Manus Island and Nauru. Boochani is perhaps the most 
well-known asylum seeker-cum-activist in Australia, and has published 
16  ‘A Message from Behrouz Boochani – Kurdish Refugee and Independent Journalist’, Asylum 




widely in a variety of media, including his award-winning memoir, 
No Friend but the Mountains.17 During the October 2018 Academics for 
Refugees National Day of Action, Boochani urged academics:
to do research that unpacks where these [asylum seeker] policies 
stem from, why they are maintained and how they can be undone. 
It’s the duty of academics to understand and challenge this dark 
historical period, and teach the new generations to prevent this 
kind of policy in future.18
This book in part is a response to Boochani’s call. Academics, activists and 
refugees have a duty to dissect the history and current state of affairs on 
refugees and asylum seekers. In the context of tight government control 
of information and, at present, minimal media coverage, the edited 
collection makes an intervention into academic and public discourses, 
opening a new space to think about the histories, presents and possible 
futures for refugees and asylum seekers. These are important public 
and political discussions to have and will have relevance well beyond 
Australia’s borders, as Western countries around the world continue to 
tighten their borders and institute ever more violent controls over people 
seeking asylum.
Aims
At its heart, Refugee Journeys: Histories of Resettlement, Representation and 
Resistance understands refugee policy and asylum-seeking movements as 
a process: refugees undertake physical journeys between countries, and 
then face the journey of settling and integrating – whether permanently 
or temporarily, with full or partial social support – in a new place. Those 
journeys are shaped by a multitude of personal, governmental, social 
and political forces. What then are those forces? This book provides an 
exploration of some of them. It presents stories of how governments, the 
public and the media have responded to the arrival of people seeking 
asylum, and how these responses have impacted refugees and their 
lives. The chapters within mostly cover the period from 1970 to the 
present, providing readers with an understanding of the political, social 
17  Behrouz Boochani, No Friend but the Mountains: Writing from Manus Prison, trans. Omid 
Tofighian (Sydney: Picador, 2018).




and historical contexts that have brought us to the current day. Refugee 
Journeys also considers possible ways to break existing policy deadlocks, 
encouraging readers to imagine a future where we carry vastly different 
ideas about refugees, government policies and national identities.
With contributions from academics and activists from a diverse range 
of backgrounds, Refugee Journeys is unique as it provides space for 
multiple perspectives. Where public discourse often prioritises flattened 
and simplistic stories and solutions – such as the idea that all boats 
must be stopped, or that there is a queue that some jump, or that newly 
resettled refugees do not deserve financial and material support – this 
book encourages readers to think outside the box. By offering an edited 
collection, rather than a single-authored monograph – many of which 
exist and make important contributions to public discussion – we hope to 
present readers with a much-needed cacophony of different approaches, 
with multiple speakers and writers jutting up against each other, creating 
the space for new ideas to thrive. Against singular narratives, there is 
an urgent need in the Australian landscape for diverse interpretations. 
Other recent texts have focused on particular questions, such as detention 
systems, or temporariness, or refugee testimonies. Refugee Journeys is 
able to span a broader range, thereby offering readers the opportunity 
to understand the fuller social, political, cultural and historical contexts 
in which refugees and asylum seekers navigate their journeys and the 
repressive governments with which they interact.
Themes of the book
One of the central methods, or approaches, of this book involves the 
exploration of some of the different ways that histories and stories are, 
and have been, used by refugees and asylum seekers, researchers, writers, 
social workers, community workers and policymakers. Some chapters 
explore personal histories, whether narrated by refugees and asylum 
seekers themselves, or refracted through the words of social workers, 
anthropologists, community workers or historians. Other chapters 
explore national or community histories, thinking about how they 
have been understood by newspapers, politicians and historians. Many 
chapters demonstrate the interplay between individual and communal, 
private and public, stories. This volume thus responds to anthropologist 
Miriam Ticktin’s recent call for scholars, and the public, to pay attention 
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to the histories that people carry, and to do so in a way that evades the 
stereotypical discourses of vulnerability and loss that are often understood 
to be carried by refugees and asylum seekers. Rather than producing 
a reductive humanitarianism that sees rich nation-states in the role of 
‘saviour’ to vulnerable and crisis-laden refugees and asylum seekers, the 
histories and stories that people write need to contain greater subtlety and 
complexity. As she writes:
humanitarianism provides little room to feel and recognize the 
value of particular lives (versus life in general), or to mourn 
particular deaths (versus suffering in general); and little impetus 
to animate political change.19
Instead, this humanitarianism buttresses a binary of racialised rescuer and 
rescued, of asylum seekers as incapable of determining their own futures, 
and of the white nation-state as the subject who must always be in control. 
As Melanie Baak highlights in her chapter in this book, it is necessary to 
write histories, and create understandings, that avoid the ‘deficit model’, 
representing the place of refugees and asylum seekers in the world not as 
loss or crisis or impossibility.
Similarly, anthropologist Liisa Malkki writes of the ways in which refugees 
have been too often understood by Western authorities and actors as 
‘speechless emissaries’, incapable of speaking for themselves, or determining 
their own futures. ‘Such forms of representation’, she argues, ‘deny the very 
particulars that make of people something other than anonymous bodies, 
merely human beings’.20 In this book, successive chapters write against 
such forms of representation, presenting explorations of, and critical 
engagements with, the histories that refugees carry in all their multiplicity, 
individuality and communality. This collection of essays is concerned with 
thinking about how people label and understand themselves, how they are 
understood by others and the impacts these labels have.
This deliberately interdisciplinary book seeks to write new histories of 
Australia and the world’s relationships with refugees and asylum seekers, 
and of refugees and asylum seekers’ relationships with Australia and the 
world. We seek to write new histories of ideas and practices of generosity 
19  Miriam Ticktin, ‘Thinking Beyond Humanitarian Borders’, Social Research: An International 
Quarterly 83, no. 2 (2016): 256.
20  Liisa H  Malkki, ‘Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization’, 
Cultural Anthropology 11, no. 3 (1996): 388. doi.org/10.1525/can.1996.11.3.02a00050.
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and humanitarianism, interrogating the often-triumphalist popular 
histories of Australia’s past that currently exist.21 There is not one past 
but many being narrated in this book: these are temporally and spatially 
different pasts, but they also differ depending on who is the author and 
their positionality and relationality to the pasts that are being described, 
analysed and critiqued. This volume, then, seeks to make accessible and 
approachable the complexity of what is at stake in the possibilities of 
researching, writing and narrating these histories.
State of current research
As Klaus Neumann, Sandra M.  Gifford, Annika Lems and Stefanie 
Scherr made clear in a 2014 article that explored trends and approaches 
in research on refugees in Australia from 1952 to 2013, there has been an 
‘exponential’ increase in the publication of research on this topic since the 
end of the 1970s.22 This trend has continued, as demonstrated in Ruth 
Balint and Zora Simic’s 2018 State of the Field review essay. Their review 
explores the large body of literature on histories of migrants and refugees 
in Australia and notes that, ‘for those of us who work in the field, there 
has always been enough scholarship to sustain and inspire us’, with many 
‘exciting’ publications coming from researchers at all levels of academia 
and from across the country.23 As Neumann et al. note, the sheer number 
of research institutes, grants, and workshops and conferences around the 
country in the 2010s further testifies to this large and growing body of 
research and writing.
There are, however, numerous gaps in the scholarship, which they identify: 
intersections between histories of the border and settlement processes, 
and between categories of refugee, asylum seeker and permanent resident, 
as well as histories of humanitarianism.24 They conclude their survey 
by noting:
21  Klaus Neumann, Chapter 10, this volume.
22  Klaus Neumann et al. ‘Refugee Settlement in Australia: Policy, Scholarship and the Production 
of Knowledge, 1952–2013’, Journal of Intercultural Studies 35, no. 1 (2014): 2. doi.org/10.1080/072
56868.2013.864629.
23  Ruth Balint and Zora Simic, ‘Histories of Migrants and Refugees in Australia’, Australian 
Historical Studies 49, no. 3 (2018): 378. doi.org/10.1080/1031461X.2018.1479438.
24  Neumann, Gifford, Lems and Scherr, ‘Refugee Settlement in Australia’, 12–13.
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Australian scholarship on refugee settlement needs to reinvent 
itself by taking stock of its past, and firmly situating new inquiry 
within the broader contexts of migration, humanitarianism and 
globalisation, to ensure that it does not uncritically endorse 
current thinking and practice but contributes to charting new 
approaches to responding to and understanding refugees in 
Australia and elsewhere.25
The large increase in scholarship examining refugees and asylum seekers 
in and around Australia and the world makes a full exploration of this 
literature impossible. However, there are four key areas of recent scholarship 
with which we are engaging here. Firstly, we are engaging with texts that 
think about the broad historical contexts in which current refugees and 
asylum seekers today live. Following on from the path set by texts such as 
Klaus Neumann’s Across the Seas: Australia’s Response to Refugees: A History, 
Madeleine Gleeson’s Offshore: Behind the Wire on Manus and Nauru, 
Claire Higgins’s Asylum by Boat, William Maley’s What is a Refugee? and 
Jane McAdam and Fiona Chong’s Refugee Rights and Policy Wrongs, various 
chapters in this volume explore the policy settings, influence of politicians 
and roles of officials in controlling refugee and asylum seeker journeys 
to Australia and through the labyrinthine processes that determine how 
they will live.26 In both their individual work and their collective work 
with others on the Deathscapes project, Suvendrini Perera and Joseph 
Pugliese outline the racial and colonial histories and presents in which 
refugee and asylum seeker controls are instituted.27 As these books and 
projects collectively make clear, there are a wide variety of bureaucratic, 
social, cultural and political histories that combine to determine how 
25  Ibid., 13.
26  Klaus Neumann, Across the Seas: Australia’s Response to Refugees: A History (Melbourne: Black 
Inc., 2015); Madeleine Gleeson, Offshore: Behind the Wire on Manus and Nauru (Sydney: NewSouth 
Publishing, 2016); Claire Higgins, Asylum by Boat: Origins of Australia’s Refugee Policy (Sydney: NewSouth 
Publishing, 2017); William Maley, What is a Refugee? (Brunswick: Scribe Publications, 2016); Jane 
McAdam and Fiona Chong, Refugee Rights and Policy Wrongs (Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 2019).
27  Suvendrini Perera, Australia and the Insular Imagination: Beaches, Borders, Boats, and Bodies (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), doi.org/10.1057/9780230103122; Suvendrini Perera, ‘White Shores 
of Longing: “Impossible Subjects” and the Frontiers of Citizenship’, Continuum 23, no.  5 (2009): 
647–62. doi.org/10.1080/10304310903154693; Suvendrini Perera and Joseph Pugliese, ‘White 
Law of the Biopolitical’, Journal of the European Association of Studies on Australia 3, no.  1 (2012): 
87–100; Joseph Pugliese, ‘Migrant Heritage in an Indigenous Context: For a Decolonising Migrant 
Historiography’, Journal of Intercultural Studies 23, no.  1 (April 1, 2002): 5–18. doi.org/ 10.1080/ 
07256860220122368; Joseph Pugliese, ‘The Incommensurability of Law to Justice: Refugees and 
Australia’s Temporary Protection Visa’, Law and Literature 16, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 285–311. doi.org/ 
10.1525/ lal.2004.16.3.285; Suvendrini Perera and Joseph Pugliese, ‘Deathscapes: Mapping Race and 
Violence in Settler States’, 2016–2020, available at: www.deathscapes.org/.
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refugees will be thought of, and affected by, national and international 
systems of regulation. They also make clear that the refugees themselves 
play an important role in determining their own histories, pushing back 
and resisting the controls placed on them where necessary, narrating and 
enforcing their own self-determination where desired.
Secondly, there is a growing and important body of research that 
addresses Australia’s broader refugee and migrant community histories. 
We have recently seen the production of Jayne Persian’s Beautiful Balts: 
From Displaced Persons to New Australians, Albrecht Dümling and Diana 
K. Weekes’s The Vanished Musicians: Jewish Refugees in Australia, Alexandra 
Dellios’s Histories of Controversy: The Bonegilla Migrant Centre, and Joy 
Damousi’s Memory and Migration in the Shadow of War: Australia’s Greek 
Immigrants after World War II and the Greek Civil War.28 These accounts, like 
many of the chapters in the current volume, explore smaller communities, 
examining their experiences of migration and settlement, the histories that 
brought them to Australia and the larger Australian histories into which 
they were thrust. This literature points us to the importance of thinking 
beyond the level of the nation-state, reminding us of the everyday ways in 
which lives are lived and journeys are negotiated. Individual people and 
their histories – as Miriam Ticktin and Liisa Malkki argue – need to be 
narrated in order for their full humanity to be recognised.
As such, biographical accounts and memoirs of refugee journeys and 
resettlement in Australia are a third area of scholarship with which this 
volume engages. Partly as a result of the Australian practice of mandatorily 
detaining asylum seekers who either attempted to, or successfully came to, 
Australia, from the late 1980s – a practice that, coupled with other punitive 
regimes, continues to exist – as well as the practice of autobiographical 
and memoir writing in Australia and internationally, among other factors, 
there has been a growth in publications written by people who identify as 
being, or having been, refugees. These publications tell individual stories, 
but they also tell broader, larger stories of refugee journeys. Books such 
as a Teresa Ke’s Cries of Hunger, Carina Hoang’s Boat People: Personal 
28  Jayne Persian, Beautiful Balts: From Displaced Persons to New Australians (Sydney: NewSouth 
Publishing, 2017); Albrecht Dümling, The Vanished Musicians: Jewish Refugees in Australia, trans. 
by Diana K.  Weekes (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 2016); Alexandra Dellios, Histories of Controversy: 
The Bonegilla Migrant Centre (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2017); Joy Damousi, Memory 
and Migration in the Shadow of War: Australia’s Greek Immigrants after World War II and the Greek Civil 
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781316336847.
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Stories from the Vietnamese Exodus, 1975–1996 and the reissue of Colin 
McPhedran’s White Butterflies, among others, have opened these stories 
and these modes of narration up to new audiences.29
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, there is an increasing 
emphasis in the Australian scholarly and public sphere on highlighting 
refugees writing and speaking in new formations. There are a range of 
projects, often co-produced by refugees and asylum seekers and Australian 
citizens, that have influenced this volume. Indeed, as the chapter here 
by André Dao and Jamila Jafari explores, projects like Behind the Wire 
– through which people who have been imprisoned by Australia as part 
of its mandatory detention regime share their experiences – provide 
an important new method of narrating histories and exploring refugee 
journeys. Similarly, Behrouz Boochani’s No Friend but the Mountains, the 
Facebook page Free the Children NAURU and The Messenger, a podcast 
by Abdul Aziz Muhamat and Michael Green, provide spaces for speaking 
out in the midst of these journeys through Australian carceral and 
bureaucratic regimes.30 All of these books and projects provide important 
background to the present volume, and we seek to build on the ideas and 
knowledge that these others have produced.
Outline of the book
This collection is divided into three sections, with each section containing 
a series of chapters that provide snapshot explorations of the histories of 
different aspects of the journeys that refugees take, and the settlement 
processes and modes of control – juridical, narratorial, cultural and 
political – that governments, states, bureaucracies and others have 
exerted over refugee and asylum seeker peoples’ journeys. From ‘Labelling 
refugees’ to ‘Flashpoints in Australian refugee history’ to ‘Understanding 
refugee histories and futures’, each section of this book contributes to 
exploring the argument that ‘refugees’ are made in part through strict 
controls on the movement of populations and the delineation of borders 
and construction of identities, but also through self-description and 
29  Teresa Ke, Cries of Hunger (Fremantle: Vivid Publishing, 2017); Carina Hoang, Boat People: 
Personal Stories from the Vietnamese Exodus, 1975–1996 (Fremantle: Beaufort Books, 2013); Colin 
McPhedran, White Butterflies, updated edition (Sydney: NewSouth Books, 2017).
30  Boochani, No Friend but the Mountains; Free the Children NAURU available at: www.facebook.




self-determination. This book offers reflections on the very nature of 
this  storytelling, arguing that the histories that are told, and those that 
are forgotten, fundamentally shape how people and journeys will be 
understood and made known by those witnessing them.
Beginning with the notion of ‘labelling’, this volume will introduce 
readers to histories of the ways that governments, settlement procedures 
and bureaucracies have worked to name, control and, at times, demonise 
displaced people. In the first chapter, an overview of the state of Australian 
and international legal and governmental approaches from World War II 
to the present is provided by legal scholar Eve Lester. Lester demonstrates 
that there have been various shifts and turns in how the national and 
international community labels and understands refugees and asylum 
seekers. In the next chapter, Melanie Baak, a refugee education researcher, 
comments: ‘the question becomes, when, if ever do people who have been 
refugees, stop being refugees (with all of the frames of recognition this 
entails)?’ That is, what is the temporal, emotive and descriptive quality 
of these labels? Baak explores how Dinka women from South Sudan, 
among others, narrate themselves and their histories in the face of such 
labelling. In the following chapter, historian Jordana Silverstein offers 
an exploration of labelling from another side, exploring the ways that 
those social workers and government employees who controlled the lives 
of refugee children in the late 1970s and early 1980s labelled, described 
and thus imagined unaccompanied Vietnamese and Timorese refugee 
children. While Baak and Silverstein explore the international coming 
to the national – refugees coming to Australia – historian Ann-Kathrin 
Bartels examines the resonances in Germany of the Australian context, 
providing further evidence of the idea that what happens in Australia 
is not merely contained within our national borders. Bartels explores 
newspaper instantiations of public discourses of asylum seekers as ‘bogus’ 
or ‘economic refugees’ that denigrate them for being criminals and focus 
on their ‘cultural differences’. These histories from outside Australia 
thus shed light on the ways that similar projects of the construction of 
national identity, and the labelling of refugees as Other, are promulgated 
within Australia.
In the second section of this volume – ‘Flashpoints in Australian refugee 
history’ – three snapshot histories are provided that offer readers an 
excursion through the different ways that refugees and asylum seekers 
have been understood within Australian history, thus providing a greater 
sense of the national context. In her chapter, historian Rachel Stevens 
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shows the ways in which Australians responded to the 10 million refugees 
who emerged from the Bangladesh Liberation War against West Pakistan 
in 1971. This chapter thus provides an opportunity to reflect on the gap 
between government refugee policy and community attitudes in 1971, 
with many in the community supporting refugees in ways that the 
government did not. This issue of public and governmental approaches 
is further developed by social scientist Kathleen Blair in her exploration 
of the media messaging around the 2013 federal election campaign in 
Australia. Blair’s chapter responds to Bartels’, providing the Australian 
experience of such narratives of demonisation. Finally, in writers André 
Dao and Jamila Jafari’s chapter, Dao interviews Jafari as they work 
together to understand what it was like for her to share her story through 
the Behind the Wire project. Through this interview we are able to get 
a more complex understanding of the ways that stories can be told and 
people can make a claim to narrating their own pasts. This chapter speaks 
to many of the other chapters in the book, pointing out the necessity of 
people controlling their own stories and modes of narration, determining 
how they themselves will be represented.
The third and final section of this volume is called ‘Understanding refugee 
histories and futures’, and it moves readers towards grasping the ways 
that histories of this past can be, and are being, written, prompting 
a consideration of how refugee pasts shape future possibilities from the 
perspective of both refugees and policymakers. What are the stories 
being told? What narratives do they put forward? It is these questions 
that animate this section. Sociologist Laurel Mackenzie’s chapter opens 
the section, as she documents the various impacts – both practical and 
emotional – of Australian Government policy at the grassroots level, 
focusing on the transition experiences of a group of Afghan Hazaras in 
Australia. Through her fieldwork, Mackenzie works to understand how 
these Hazara refugees understand themselves and their journeys. With 
this new understanding of the ways that individuals narrate their lives 
and histories, this section then turns to a chapter by legal scholar Savitri 
Taylor, who examines the ‘incremental steps’ taken on the journey 
to Australia’s current asylum seeker policy settings and considers the 
implications of that history for the next 25 years. Taylor argues for the 
central role that the White Australia policy has played in shaping all 
future immigration policies, and explores this through a focus on two key 
features of contemporary asylum seeker policy – mandatory detention, 
introduced in 1992, and offshore processing, initially introduced in 2001. 
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This racial history is, indeed, a thread that runs throughout the chapters 
in this volume. Finally, this section concludes with an exploration of the 
histories that have been told by Klaus Neumann, a historian. Neumann 
argues against certain orthodoxies in Australian refugee and asylum seeker 
historiography, suggesting that, by examining little-known stories and 
bringing them into prominence, and by considering new ‘genealogies of 
current policies and practices’, we can imagine new ways of understanding 
the past and present, as well as conceptualising viable possible futures.
Together, this book highlights the role of individual, communal and 
governmental stories. Woven throughout the volume is a series of new 
explorations of the different aspects of the journey across land or water or 
by air, through bureaucracy and imprisonment and settlement processes, 
and into representation in government, public and media discourse, that 
refugees and asylum seekers have taken and continue to take. Through 
these chapters, we gain a sense of the vital role that history-writing, and 
thinking historically, can play in discussions about the place of refugees 
and asylum seekers in Australia and internationally. At this moment, 
when Australia’s borders are hardened and support services are being 
retracted – as in many other places around the world – it becomes ever 
more crucial to understand these histories anew and reconceptualise how 









Matters of perspective and context
Eve Lester1
Since 1945, more than 9  million people have migrated to Australia.2 
Of these, some 1 million were refugees and displaced people,3 although in 
the 1950s and 1960s institutional distinctions were not drawn between 
refugees and migrants.4 In 1954, Australia provided the signature that 
brought the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee 
Convention’) into force.5 To some, whether supporters or opponents of 
refugee policy, these figures and the decision to accede to the Refugee 
Convention tell the story of refugee resettlement to Australia as a proud 
and generous history of leadership and humanitarianism dating back to 
1  The author would like to thank Gabriel Smith for very helpful research assistance for this chapter.
2  Department of Home Affairs (‘DHA’), Fact Sheet: Key Facts About Immigration (undated), 
archived webpage available at: webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/20181010074801/www.homeaffairs.gov.
au/ about/corporate/information/fact-sheets/02key; DHA, Visa Statistics, relating to the migration, 
asylum and humanitarian programs available at: homeaffairs.gov.au/research-and-statistics/statistics/ 
visa-statistics.
3  DHA, Fact Sheet; DHA, Visa Statistics. Figures vary, even on the DHA website. By one account, 
the resettlement figure now stands at 880,000 people; see: immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/what-we-do/
refugee-and-humanitarian-program/about-the-program/about-the-program; Klaus Neumann, Across 
the Seas: Australia’s Response to Refugees: A History (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2015), 141.
4  Neumann, Across the Seas, 141; see also Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence, Parliament of Australia, Australia and the Refugee Problem (1976), 47.
5  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 
(entered into force 22 April 1954), art 31 (‘Refugee Convention’).
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the postwar period.6 To others, the utilitarian undertones of the story 
complicate the narrative of generosity and humanitarianism, not least 
in the context of post-arrival treatment.7
There is no doubt that there is good in this story. After all, thousands upon 
thousands of refugees have been resettled to Australia and have seized 
the chance to rebuild their lives. Yet, when seen in context, the reality 
is more nuanced and it becomes clear that the narrative of generosity 
that accompanies this story is a fulsome one with some significant blind 
spots.8 And, as we will see, it is one in which the refugee appears to be 
a secondary consideration, regarded as merely incidental or instrumental 
in fulfilling geopolitical interests and priorities.9 It is as a result of this that 
there is a need to ensure that Australian histories of the refugee journey 
are both told and understood in global perspective and context, legally, 
politically and statistically.
With this in mind, this chapter gives an overview of this very context, 
showing how politico-legal interests and traditions of much longer 
standing have informed the development of the modern refugee protection 
framework. There are several important points to note here. First, while the 
Refugee Convention is commonly presented as a global instrument giving 
protection to refugees, when it was drafted, geographical and temporal 
restrictions were included in order to exclude major groups of refugees from 
outside Europe. Second, there was an underlying assumption driven by 
geopolitical dynamics of the Cold War period that Convention refugees10 
would be provided with permanent settlement outside their country of 
origin. This assumption gave rise to the ‘exilic bias’ that characterised 
6  Barry York, ‘Australia and Refugees, 1901–2002: An Annotated Chronology Based on Official 
Sources’ (Information and Research Services, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, Chronology 
No 2, 2002–2003), 1.
7  Alexandra Dellios, Histories of Controversy: The Bonegilla Migrant Centre (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 2017).
8  For two insightful studies of postwar refugee resettlement that describe a more complicated history 
than the popular narrative of humanitarianism, see Dellios, Histories of Controversy; Jayne Persian, 
Beautiful Balts: From Displaced Persons to New Australians (Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 2017).
9  Guy S Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Politics of Refugee Protection’, Refugee Survey Quarterly 27, no. 1 
(2008): 8–23, 9, doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdn003.
10  A refugee is defined as a person who, ‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside his 
country of nationality [or former habitual residence] and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country’: Refugee Convention art 1A(2).
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postwar approaches to refugee protection.11 Third, the decolonisation 
movement of the 1960s and the emergent 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (‘1967 Protocol’), which removed the geographical and 
temporal limitations, opened up the possibility for significantly increased 
refugee numbers, many of whom were non-European. Their permanent 
presence in countries of the liberal West was, however, not necessarily 
perceived to be of economic benefit or strategic interest. This dynamic 
and, later, the end of the Cold War would therefore produce several major 
policy effects. In the first instance, it would produce a shift in policy (and 
discursive) focus from permanent solutions with the aforementioned ‘exilic 
bias’12 to a durable solutions discourse and an accompanying state-centric 
preference for voluntary return.13 In the second, it led to a lifting of barriers 
to exit by refugee-producing countries that had hitherto served as the main 
point of resistance to refugee-hood. This in turn led to new and increasingly 
elaborate and strident regulatory barriers to entry into countries of asylum 
(or non-entrée policies). Finally, it led to a new politicisation of the policy 
(and discourse) of refugee resettlement. This background frames Australia’s 
evolving response to the refugee and her journey, and at once explains 
the genesis of Australia’s current claims that its refugee resettlement policy 
positions it as a global leader in refugee protection at the same time as it 
undermines the credibility of those claims.
Part I of this chapter, ‘A prehistory’, looks at responses to refugee movements 
in early international law and selected responses through to the interwar 
period that are illustrative of a situation-specific approach to refugee 
protection. Part  II, ‘The Refugee Convention’, analyses key geopolitical 
drivers behind the drafting of the Refugee Convention following World 
War  II and the context for Australia’s accession to it in 1954. Part  III, 
‘The 1967 Protocol’, examines the shifts in international law and policy 
in the context of decolonisation and other developments during the Cold 
War. Part  IV, ‘The Cold War et seq.’, considers approaches to refugee 
protection and effects on the international legal and policy framework of 
11  Gervase J  L  Coles, ‘The Human Rights Approach to the Solution of the Refugee Problem: 
A Theoretical and Practical Enquiry’, in Human Rights and the Protection of Refugees Under International 
Law, ed. by Alan E Nash (Conference Proceedings, Montreal, 29 November – 2 December 1987), 
195, 209.
12  That is, local integration in the country of asylum and resettlement to a third country.




the Cold War and the events that marked its end. Part V, ‘Charting a way 
forward in the twenty-first century’, looks briefly at present-day responses 
to the so-called global migration crisis.
Part I: A prehistory
At its heart, the refugee’s journey is integral to the story of humanity, 
whether as a product of conflict or internecine struggles, poverty or natural 
disaster, persecution or expulsion. Flight and requests for hospitality and 
asylum are concepts as old as life itself. This flight–hospitality dynamic 
long predates the emergence of the nation-state as the dominant governing 
structure. In turn, the manifestation of this dynamic in international 
society in the person of the ‘refugee’ is as old as the state system, and it 
will remain for as long as the state system remains.14 So, while the focus 
of this volume is on a particular place (Australia) and a particular period 
(1970  to the present), we need to situate the refugee and her journey 
within a much longer historical trajectory and in global context.
The refugee journey in early international law
From its earliest conceptions, European international legal theory 
contemplated and legitimised the refugee journey as a right of mobility 
consequential to an individual right of self-preservation.15 By the same 
token, the nation-state has also recognised that there is potential for the 
encounter between the foreigner and the sovereign to be hostile and 
therefore a threat, triggering exclusion measures. So, a tension arises 
in this border encounter, represented by competing acts and interests 
of self-preservation.
Early international legal writers such as Vattel resolved this tension by 
recognising that there would always be situations where the duties 
of humanity should prevail over the sovereign power of exclusion; 
situations in which peaceful entry, passage and stay (including the 
possibility of a permanent asylum) should be permitted to ‘those whom 
14  Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 209.
15  Eve Lester, Making Migration Law: The Foreigner, Sovereignty and the Case of Australia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018), 68, 70–73, discussing the work of Samuel Pufendorf.
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tempest or necessity obliged to approach their frontiers’.16 In other 
words, while exclusion measures may also reflect the claim of the state 
to a right to self-preservation, early international law understood such 
measures as permissible only to the extent necessary for the purposes of 
self-defence.17 As I have argued elsewhere, we know that early (European) 
international law’s refugee was conceptualised as a European insider, 
rather than a non-European outsider.18 In other words, notwithstanding 
the racial and imperialist power interests and dynamics that shaped the 
making of international law and ideas about who should benefit from 
its protections,19 we can still educe from early treatises recognition that 
refugees flee out of necessity and that the duties of humanity give rise to 
concomitant obligations of hospitality.20
Situation-specific responses to 
refugee movements
As we have seen, the concepts of asylum and exile and the corresponding 
obligation to respect the duties of humanity are longstanding.21 
Nevertheless, historically, responses to refugee movements have tended 
to be ad hoc and situation specific. So, for example, there were situation-
specific responses to the plight of the Huguenots (seventeenth century)22 
– the displaced population to whom the term ‘refugee’ was first ascribed23 
– as well as a range of ad hoc responses to the Jewish pogroms in Russia 
16  Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the 
Conduct of Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns, trans. and ed. Joseph Chitty (Lawbook Exchange, first 
published 1854, 2005 ed.) [trans of: Le Droit des gens; ou Principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la 
conduit et aux affaires des Nations et des Souverains (first published 1758)], bk II ch VII § 94, bk II 
ch VIII § 100, bk I ch XIX § 231.
17  See Lester, Making Migration Law, 99–101, discussing the interpretation of ‘self-preservation’ 
in the treatises of Vattel and Sir Robert Phillimore.
18  Ibid., ch 2.
19  On the inextricable relation between imperialism and the making of international law, including 
in the ‘post-colonial’ era, see, generally, Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising 
International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139048200.
20  Lester, Making Migration Law, 76–77.
21  Vattel, The Law of Nations, bk II ch VIII § 100; Ibid., 76.
22  The Edict of Potsdam (1685), for example, provided for the safe passage of French Protestants 
(Huguenots) to Brandenburg-Prussia and accorded them religious freedom denied through the 
revocation of the Edict of Nantes (Edict of Fontainebleau, 1684) by Louis XIV: John Stoye, Europe 
Unfolding: 1648–1688, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 272; Lester, Making Migration Law, 69–70.
23  Haddad, The Refugee in International Society, 51–52.
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(nineteenth century).24 In the early twentieth century and in the wake 
of World War  I, pressure to protect large numbers of Russian25 and 
Armenian refugees26 also produced situation-specific responses, whether 
through national governments or coordinated international responses in 
the interwar period under the auspices of the League of Nations.27
After World War II, the emergence of an international protection regime 
might suggest that situation-specific responses would become a thing of the 
past. However, as we will see in the next section, even with the emergence 
of an international protection framework, situation-specific responses 
continued to characterise the way in which the ‘international community’ 
responded to many refugee crises. Indeed, even as it was framed as an 
international instrument, we will see that the Refugee Convention itself 
was a situation-specific response to the absence of protection for the vast 
numbers of displaced people in Europe.28 In contrast, the issue of mass 
displacement of non-Europeans in the early postwar years was sidelined by 
the ‘international’ protection framework as it was considered to be both 
strategically marginal and overwhelming in its enormity.
Part II: The Refugee Convention
In the wake of World War  II, the Refugee Convention secured the 
commitment  and cooperation of states parties to accord protection to 
refugees, not least on account of the international scope and nature of refugee 
movements. Other international instruments were also crucial, notably the 
Charter of the United Nations29 and the Universal Declaration of Human 
24  John Doyle Klier, Russians, Jews, and the Pogroms of 1881–1882 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 269.
25  Peter Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia During World War I (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1999).
26  Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2003); Stefanie Kappler et al. (eds), Mass Media and the Genocide of the Armenians: One 
Hundred Years of Uncertain Representation (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), doi.org/10.1007/ 
978-1-137-56402-3.
27  Gilbert Jaeger, ‘On the History of the International Protection of Refugees’, International Review 
of the Red Cross 83, no. 843 (2001): 727; Haddad, The Refugee in International Society, 31.
28  Pia Oberoi, Exile and Belonging: Refugees and State Policy in South Asia (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 22 n. 26.
29  United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, adopted 26 June 1945 1 UNTS XVI, entered 
into force 24  October 1945 (‘UN Charter’); Annemarie Devereux, Australia and the Birth of the 
International Bill of Human Rights 1946–1966 (Sydney: Federation Press 2005); Eve Lester, 
‘Internationalising Constitutional Law: An Inward-Looking Outlook’, Australian Feminist Law 
Journal 42, no. 2 (2016): 321–49, 335–40, doi.org/10.1080/13200968.2016.1273066.
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Rights,30 which recognised, respectively, the imperative of cooperation 
between states to maintain international peace and security31 and the 
universality of the right to seek and enjoy asylum.32 The underpinning of 
international cooperation, intended to embrace a number of postwar issues 
including finding permanent solutions for refugees, was a critical dimension 
to these commitments.33 The characterisation of asylum as an inherently 
peaceful and humanitarian (and therefore supposedly non-political) 
act was politically important at the time and endures in theory if not in 
practice. Nevertheless, it is now more widely recognised that it is unrealistic 
to imagine that either the ‘refugee problem’ or humanitarian responses to 
it can ever be entirely apolitical.34 So, while international legal discourse 
on refugee protection between 1950 and 1989 (marking the end of the 
Cold War) might have been relatively depoliticised, the Western agenda 
that this depoliticised discourse encouraged and legitimised positioned 
refugee law as neutral and apolitical – indeed innocent.35 However, this 
depoliticised discourse was itself political, because of, rather than in spite of, 
the discernible geopolitical interests and Cold War dynamics at work. These 
interests and dynamics deployed law’s innocence to determine who would 
be protected under the Refugee Convention and, equally as importantly, who 
would be neglected.36
An ‘international’ protection framework emerges
It is well recognised that it was large-scale displacement in Europe that 
prompted the negotiation and adoption of the Refugee Convention and 
the grant by the General Assembly of a (temporary) mandate to the Office 
30  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen 
mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) (‘UDHR’). Devereux, Australia and the Birth of the 
International Bill of Human Rights 1946–1966; and specifically on the right to asylum and the issue 
of free movement, see Lester, ‘Internationalising Constitutional Law’, 340–44.
31  UN Charter, arts  1(3), 55, 56; Volker Türk and Madeline Garlick, ‘From Burdens and 
Responsibilities to Opportunities: The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and a Global 
Compact on Refugees’, International Journal of Refugee Law 28, no. 4 (2016): 656–78, 658, doi.org/ 
10.1093/ijrl/eew043.
32  See UDHR, art 14. For discussions, Devereux, Australia and the Birth of the International Bill 
of Human Rights 1946–1966, and Lester, ‘Internationalising Constitutional Law’, 328–35.
33  Türk and Garlick, ‘From Burdens and Responsibilities to Opportunities’, 658–65.
34  Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Politics of Refugee Protection’, 21; Haddad, The Refugee in International 
Society, 214.
35  For a critical analysis of law’s claim to equality, universality and indeed innocence, see Peter 
Fitzpatrick, ‘Racism and the Innocence of Law’, Journal of Law and Society 14, no. 1 (1987): 119–32.
36  B S Chimni, ‘The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South’, Journal of Refugee 
Studies 11, no. 4 (1998): 350–74.
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of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).37 
At the time of its drafting, the scope of the Refugee Convention was 
temporally limited to ‘events occurring before 1 January 1951’.38 It also 
included a geographical limitation that enabled states to apply its terms 
only to pre-1951 events that took place in Europe.39 In addition to this, 
the Convention’s application was confined to the type of refugee who was 
of political and ideological interest to the West; a person whose fear of 
persecution had to be for reasons of civil or political status.40
The refugee as defined under the Refugee Convention was a person whose 
grant of asylum would, in Cold War terms, serve to weaken the hand of the 
Eastern Bloc as it strengthened that of the West. Narrowly defined, a person 
fleeing generalised violence or conflict- or state-induced poverty did not 
come within its purview unless he41 could sustain an individualised claim 
to persecution for one of the five Convention grounds.42 This constructed 
what Chimni has described as ‘an image of a “normal” refugee’ as ‘white, 
male and anti-communist’.43 The distinction thereby created produced 
what he has since described as a ‘myth of difference’; that is, the idea 
that refugees fleeing Europe did so for radically different reasons – and 
indeed had radically different needs – to those fleeing the Third World.44 
Yet, there was large-scale displacement in the Third World at the time of 
37  Oberoi, Exile and Belonging, 20.
38  Refugee Convention, art 1A(2).
39  Refugee Convention, art 1B. Although textually the most obvious example is the inclusion of 
art 1D concerning the Palestinians, see also, e.g., Oberoi, Exile and Belonging, 17–25, and Laura 
Madokoro, Elusive Refuge: Chinese Migrants in the Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2016), 32.
40  It is a fairly recent development that the possibility of social and economic rights violations 
grounding a claim to refugee status has been recognised: see, most notably, Michelle Foster, 
International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511493980.009.
41  Although from time to time, as here, I intentionally use the male pronoun, I use the female 
pronoun generically in my writing. Although I acknowledge that dispensing with gendered pronouns 
in favour of using ‘they/them’ is a valid and inclusive approach that properly resists the gender binary, 
my purpose in differentially using the male and female pronouns is part of a broader objective of 
engaging critically with law and history and highlighting shifting power dynamics over time. In other 
words, ‘she/her’ is a form of resistance that is conscious and critical, with transformative possibilities. 
In making this choice, I am persuaded by Haddad’s thinking, recognising that the habitual use of 
the male pronoun can allow the identity of the subject to go unnoticed by the reader: Haddad, 
The Refugee in International Society, 39–41; see also Wendy Martyna, ‘What Does “He” Mean? Use 
of the Generic Masculine’, Journal of Communication 28, no. 1 (1978): 131–38, doi.org/10.1111/ 
j.1460-2466.1978.tb01576.x; Lester, Making Migration Law, 15–16 n. 49.
42  Refugee Convention, art 1A(2).
43  Chimni, ‘The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies’, 351; cf. Chinese fleeing the victorious Chinese 
Communist Party during the Chinese Civil War: see Madokoro, Elusive Refuge, 2–3, 37.
44  Chimni, ‘The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies’, 355–63.
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drafting and, despite the superficial universality of the Refugee Convention, 
protection of refugees and displaced persons in strategically marginal 
contexts were not included in its terms.
Sites of non-European displacement on a massive scale included the 1948 
Arab–Israeli conflict,45 the Indian subcontinent in the context of Partition,46 
the Chinese Civil War and the second Sino–Japanese War.47 Despite their 
size and significance, none of these situations was contemplated in the 
Convention’s terms. That said, they were central – not marginal – to the 
thinking of the framers of the Refugee Convention. Displacement figures for 
these situations were in the order of tens of millions. As Oberoi has noted, 
in the context of decolonisation of India and Pakistan alone, upwards 
of 30  million people were displaced,48 representing one of the greatest 
forced movements of people in contemporary history.49 Of these, some 
14.5 million were ‘refugees’ in the Convention’s sense of being outside 
their country of origin, in some cases as a result of newly demarcated 
international borders.50 Likewise, the Sino–Japanese War (1937–1945), 
which displaced as many as 95  million people by one account,51 did 
not feature in the refugee protection calculus. As Madokoro has noted, 
the drafting of the Convention similarly disregarded the movement of 
people out of the Chinese mainland following the victory of the Chinese 
Communist Party in the Chinese Civil War.52
In the text of the Convention, these exclusions would be reflected most 
tellingly through the incorporation of the geographical and temporal 
limitations on its reach as well as art 1D, which explicitly excluded from 
the Convention’s embrace refugees receiving assistance from another 
UN agency. This provision was specifically intended to cover Palestine 
45  For a detailed discussion of the legal complexities of the situation, see Lex Takkenberg, The Status 
of Palestinian Refugees in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
46  Oberoi, Exile and Belonging, 11–43.
47  Madokoro, Elusive Refuge, 103.
48  Oberoi, Exile and Belonging, 1.
49  Ibid.
50  Madokoro, Elusive Refuge, 23.
51  Keith A Crawford and Stuart J Foster, War, Nation, Memory: International Perspectives on World 
War II in School History Textbooks (IAP Publishing, 2008), 90. Schoppa describes numbers as being 
in the tens of millions: R Keith Schoppa, In a Sea of Bitterness: Refugees During the Sino-Japanese War 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 6, doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674062986.
52  Madokoro, Elusive Refuge, 23.
REFUGEE JOURNEyS
32
refugees assisted by the UN Relief and Works Agency (‘UNRWA’).53 
Notwithstanding their exclusion, the aforementioned non-European 
situations were the subject of debate during the drafting process. In each 
instance, arguments were constructed as to why these groups of non-
European refugees should be excluded from protection under the Refugee 
Convention. In this connection, the focus of the drafters was on the 
definition of a refugee set out in art 1A(2) and the issue of legal rights and 
protection rather than framing an agreement for the provision of material 
assistance and relief. So, while India and Pakistan positioned themselves in 
the course of debate as providing international protection and assistance 
to refugees, this impelled them to concede that their refugees had the 
protection of a state.54 In response, therefore, other delegations could 
assert that Partition refugees did not require international legal protection 
because they did not lack the protection of a government, and therefore 
would not need to be covered by the Convention’s terms.55 Similarly, 
the central argument for excluding Chinese refugees from the People’s 
Republic of China (‘PRC’) was that they had, at least in theory, a place 
of refuge in the Republic of China (Taiwan), which still had a seat in the 
United Nations. Robinson, the Israeli delegate, argued that this meant 
that Chinese refugees ‘had a government of their own … able to provide 
refuge  …  to those who sought asylum there’.56 In Robinson’s words, 
therefore, for ‘the purposes of the Convention, there were practically no 
refugees in the world other than those coming from Europe’.57 Of course, 
if that were the case, the geographical and temporal limitations that were 
incorporated into the Convention would have been moot. Robinson knew 
also that there were some 750,000 Palestine refugees, but, as noted above, 
53  Exclusion of Palestinian refugees receiving assistance from UNRWA under art 1D contrasts with 
arts 2–34 of the Refugee Convention, which outline a rights framework for (European) refugees: see, 
generally, Takkenberg, The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law.
54  UN General Assembly, Provisional Summary Record of the Two Hundred and Sixty-Third 
Meeting Held at Lake Success New York on Tuesday, 15 November 1949, at 10.45 am, 15 November 
1949, A/C.3/SR.263, [59], available at: www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68bec18.html.
55  UN General Assembly, Fourth Session, Joint Third and Fifth Committees, 264th Plenary 
Meeting, 2 December 1949, para 73 (Eleanor Roosevelt), cited in Oberoi, Exile and Belonging, 21.
56  Although attempts to argue that refugees of Jewish background should avail themselves of Israel’s 
Law of Return, enacted in 1950, have been described as imbued with ‘an exquisite irony’ given the 
very raison d’être of the Refugee Convention, it is nevertheless striking that this argument should 
have been raised by the Israeli delegate: see NAEN v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs (2003) 130 FCR 46, 60 (per Sackville J).
57  UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Twenty-second 
Meeting, 26 November 1951, A/CONF.2/SR.22 (Mr Robinson, Israel), available at: www.refworld.org/ 
docid/3ae68cde10.html; Madokoro, Elusive Refuge, 30.
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they were expressly excluded. Implicitly, therefore, material assistance and 
relief for non-European refugee populations (even absent legal protection) 
was considered to suffice.
During the drafting process, there was even resistance to representations 
that Palestine refugees should be covered by the Convention’s terms should 
UNRWA cease to exist. One delegate suggested that such an approach 
would not be necessary because a protocol or separate convention that was 
‘perfectly suited’ to the requirements of Palestine refugees could ‘easily’ 
be arranged.58 History of course tells us otherwise, and with Palestine 
refugees registered by UNRWA numbering 5.6 million in 2019,59 we are 
also reminded that refugee populations expand exponentially if their 
situations are allowed to become protracted and the conditions that 
produce them remain unresolved.
In the course of debate, the Indian delegate described the Refugee Convention 
as a ‘partial remedy involving discrimination’, stating that ‘the UN should 
try to help not only special sections of the world’s population, but all 
afflicted people everywhere’. As she said, ‘[s]uffering knew no racial or 
political boundaries; it was the same for all’.60 So, although the geographical 
and temporal limitations in the Convention had been opposed by a 
majority of representatives from the emerging Third World states,61 as well 
as the UK and (for a time) France, this universalist position was ultimately 
unsuccessful.62 Oberoi describes India and Pakistan as being left with a 
sense of exclusion on the grounds of political expediency.63
58  UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Twenty-ninth 
Meeting, 28 November 1951, A/CONF.2/SR.29 (Mr Rochefort, France), available at: www.refworld.
org/ docid/3ae68cdf4.html.
59  ‘Figures at a Glance’, UNHCR.org, as at 18 June 2020, available at: www.unhcr.org/en-au/figures-
at-a-glance.html.
60  UN, Fifth Session, Third Committee, 332nd Meeting, 1 December 1950, paras 26–27, cited in 
Oberoi, Exile and Belonging, 24.
61  Oberoi, Exile and Belonging, 19–20, and, at 24, referring to the position of the Chilean 
delegation as well as the position of India and Pakistan. As she notes, the Chilean delegate argued that 
‘it was the duty of the UN to extend international protection to every person who, for reasons beyond 
his control, could no longer live in the country of his birth’: UN, Fifth Session, Third Committee, 
324th Meeting, 22 November 1950, para 36.
62  Oberoi, Exile and Belonging, 20; Madokoro, Elusive Refuge, 31. This is so, even though the 
majority of states (including Australia) ultimately opted for a broader geographical reach as provided 
in Refugee Convention art 1B(1)(b).
63  Oberoi, Exile and Belonging, 22 n. 26.
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The participation of China in the drafting process – as the Republic of 
China (Taiwan) not the PRC – is notable for two reasons. First, Taiwan 
was invited into negotiations on account of China’s history of providing 
shelter to some 200,000 white Russian and 18,000 Jewish refugees in 
the 1920s and 1930s rather than out of concern for Chinese refugees.64 
Second, because the General Assembly gave its China seat to Taiwan not 
the PRC, the Soviet and Polish delegations withdrew from the meetings. 
This, as Madokoro has noted, gave ‘ample room for Western nations to 
advance their Cold War interests in discussions’.65
The geopolitical dynamics at play in the drafting of the Refugee Convention 
make it hard to resist the conclusion that writing the Palestinian, Partition 
and Chinese refugee crises out of the Refugee Convention as unworthy 
of international protection and permanent rights-based solutions not 
only reflected Cold War politics and ideology, but was also racialised.66 
Certainly, there is evidence to suggest that an international instrument 
underwriting both legal protection and material assistance to many 
millions of non-European refugees was seen by powerful states to be 
a problem too enormous to manage in the first instance and as strategically 
unnecessary in the second.67 It also suggests that the global estimate that 
151  million people were forcibly displaced as a result of persecution, 
conflict, decolonisation and wars of independence between 1940 and 
2015 is, at best, conservative.68
So, notwithstanding that the Refugee Convention presented as an 
international instrument in seemingly benign or neutral terms, it is clear 
that the debate around its geographical and temporal limitations reveals 
an informed neglect and deliberate exclusion of large populations of 
non-European refugees. Although the emergent international framework 
recognised the importance of legal protection and envisaged permanent 
solutions, its situation-specific focus was on European refugees and 
64  Madokoro, Elusive Refuge, 26.
65  Ibid.
66  Fitzpatrick, ‘Racism and the Innocence of Law’; Madokoro, Elusive Refuge, 20, who underscores 
that refugees fleeing the Chinese Communist Party’s victory in the Civil War were a political and 
ideological fit for the Refugee Convention but not a racial one.
67  Oberoi, Exile and Belonging, 22.
68  Lydia DePillis, Kulwant Saluja and Denise Lu, ‘A Visual Guide to 75 years of Major Refugee 
Crises Around the World’, Washington Post, 21 December 2015, available at: www.washingtonpost.
com/graphics/world/historical-migrant-crisis/?noredirect=on. However, note that the graphics 
provide limited information about displacement figures in the context of, for example, the Chinese 
Civil War and the second Sino–Japanese War.
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displaced persons. In contrast, the ‘international community’ did not see 
fit to respond to non-European displacement and to deliver to affected 
refugees the permanent solutions envisaged for European refugees and 
displaced persons.69 Instead, assistance (not rights or solutions) was 
deemed sufficient for the rest. Thus, both the text of the Refugee Convention 
and its travaux préparatoires remind us of the way in which non-European 
refugee situations shaped, and indeed narrowed, its scope. And, as the 
next section demonstrates, this suited Australia well.
White Australia and the Refugee Convention
During World War II, Australia hosted more than 6,000 non-European 
wartime refugees fleeing the Japanese conquest of South-East Asia.70 Like 
many of the ad hoc responses to refugee movements discussed above, 
this too was a situation-specific response. Importantly, it was only ever 
intended to be a temporary one and special exemptions to members of 
this population under Australia’s restrictive and racialised immigration 
legislation were only granted on condition that they return to their 
own countries once hostilities ceased. Most returned after the war, and 
Australia took tough legislative measures to ensure that the remaining 
1,000 or so who resisted return – because they had settled, married, had 
children and/or found jobs – could nevertheless be deported.71
As we have seen, this differentiated approach to refugee protection was 
reflected in Australia’s position on negotiation of the aforementioned 
instruments, and in relation to which it played a pivotal role. 
An  examination of Australia’s role affirms the view that its diplomatic 
engagement was always characterised by an ‘anxious parochialism’ that 
viewed immigration – including by refugees – as a matter entirely within the 
domestic purview of the state.72 There is no doubt that this differentiated 
approach was driven in particular by the perceived political-economic 
imperatives of the White Australia immigration policy. So,  although 
69  Johan Cells, ‘Responses of European States to de facto Refugees’, in Refugees and International 
Relations, ed. Gil Loescher and Laila Monahan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 187, 189.
70  Kevin Blackburn, ‘Disguised Anti-Colonialism: Protest Against the White Australia Policy in 
Malaya and Singapore, 1947–1962’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 1 (2001): 101–
17, 103, doi.org/10.1080/10357710120055102.
71  Ibid., 103. For a discussion of the War-Time Refugees Removal Act 1949 (Cth), see Lester, Making 
Migration Law, 142–51.
72  Lester, ‘Internationalising Constitutional Law’, 328; see, generally, Devereux, Australia and the 
Birth of the International Bill of Human Rights 1946–1966.
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Australia had already received non-European wartime refugees from the 
region, it had no enduring interest in providing them with the permanent 
protection contemplated in the Refugee Convention. As the secretary of the 
immigration department, Tasman Heyes, observed in 1950:
There are thousands of non-European refugees, and acceptance 
by Australia of a convention which provides that such a class 
of persons should not be discriminated against and should not 
be subjected to any penalty for illegal entry, would be a direct 
negation of the immigration policy followed by all Australian 
Governments since Federation.73
As Neumann has said, this was an understatement.74 What we can 
see here is that Australia’s participation in the drafting of the Refugee 
Convention and its subsequent accession, as well as the negotiation of 
other relevant international instruments, were viewed through the lens 
of a discriminatory immigration policy that sought to exercise absolute 
and unqualified control. This is consistent with Australia’s determination 
to ensure that non-European wartime refugees could be excluded while 
young, white, able-bodied refugee labour was welcomed.75 What we can 
see, therefore, is that although the White Australia immigration policy 
would have its day, there is no doubt that it was a policy that not only 
helped shape the differentiated terms of the Refugee Convention but was 
also enabled by them.
So, how did Australia respond? In November 1954, five years after passing 
the Wartime Refugees Removal Act to enable removal from Australia of 
non-European refugees and long before it abolished the White Australia 
immigration policy, Australia became one of the first states to accede to 
the Refugee Convention. As we have seen, there was no pushback in the 
Convention against Australia’s immigration policy and the commitment 
Australia made to receive postwar refugees as migrants. Indeed, it was 
entirely consistent with Australia’s political-economic (and highly 
racialised) desire to ‘populate or perish’ – that ‘catchy alliterative’ 
73  Heyes to Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 22 May 1950, NAA: A445, 194/2/3, cited 
in Neumann, Across the Seas, 137.
74  Neumann, Across the Seas, 137.
75  See, generally, Persian, Beautiful Balts.
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nation-building slogan76 that etched European immigration in the 
popular imagination as a strategic imperative in the face of unexpectedly 
low numbers of postwar British settlement.77 Minister for Immigration 
Arthur Calwell’s ‘Beautiful Balts’ – blond, attractive, middle-class refugees 
– were a saleable European substitute.78 They were, as Persian has noted, 
‘the elite of the refugee problem’.79
Part III: The 1967 Protocol
Of course, displacement since the early postwar years continued to occur 
in many places outside Europe. For example, it arose as a consequence of 
the decolonisation process and associated wars of independence, and in 
the context of ongoing and new proxy wars of the Cold War superpowers. 
Decolonisation and wars of independence not only generated large numbers 
of refugees who needed protection, but they also provided a catalyst for 
the adoption of further instruments, some international, others regional.80 
Of great significance was the 1967 Protocol, which removed the geographic 
and temporal limitations in the Refugee Convention.
Decolonisation and the Cold War
The negotiation and adoption of the 1967 Protocol reflected the realisation 
that the geographical and temporal limitations to the Refugee Convention 
could no longer be sustained. Whether the reasons for this were primarily 
legal, political or operational is a matter of debate. As Einarsen has noted, 
however, it was the non-universality of the refugee definition in the 
1951 Convention that meant there was little incentive for states that were 
affected by the process of decolonisation rather than pre-1951 events in 
76  The term ‘populate or perish’ was first coined by Billy Hughes as a call for motherhood to 
serve defence imperatives: see ‘Hughes, William Morris (Billy) (1862–1952)’, Australian Dictionary 
of Biography, available at: adb.anu.edu.au/biography/hughes-william-morris-billy-6761. It was later 
co-opted by Australia’s first immigration minister as a rallying cry for immigration: James Jupp, From 
White Australia to Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration, 2nd ed. (Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 159, doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511720222; Catriona Elder, Being Australian: 
Narratives of National Identity (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2007), 83–84, 93–114.
77  Judith Brett, ‘Fair Share: Country and City in Australia’, Quarterly Essay 42, (2011), 1–67, 29; 
Persian, Beautiful Balts, 6.
78  Persian, Beautiful Balts, 6–7.
79  Ibid., 45.
80  The earliest regional example of a refugee-specific instrument was in Africa: Organization 
of  African Unity (OAU), Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
(‘OAU Convention’), 10 September 1969, 1001 UNTS 45.
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Europe to ratify the Refugee Convention. In the absence of a duty on the 
part of those states to cooperate with UNHCR81 – which was becoming 
increasingly operational in its delivery of humanitarian assistance and 
protection – it was difficult for UNHCR to engage them in its work 
for refugee protection in Africa.82 This appears to have been a key driver 
behind the adoption of the 1967 Protocol.
The transition to a protection regime that was no longer temporally 
and geographically limited certainly appeared to signal a step towards 
universalisation. However, while there may be some truth to this, it 
also coincided with a perceptible shift from the ‘exilic bias’ of refugee 
protection to the emergence and consolidation of a range of policies of 
containment.83 These policies took different forms. Broadly, however, 
they can be described as state-centric tools and policies intended to keep 
the refugees of the Third World at arm’s length. As we will see, this led 
to institutional declarations that voluntary repatriation of refugees was 
now the ‘preferred’ solution as well as, with time, the proliferation of laws 
and policies of exclusion by the liberal West. Although the process of 
decolonisation presented as a political opportunity for Cold War rivals 
and the emergent newly independent states as sites for proxy wars, 
refugees were still regarded as politically and ideologically interesting and 
continued to serve as pawns in Cold War geopolitical brinksmanship. 
This suggests that any claim that the 1967 Protocol tells a progress story 
needs to be treated with caution. The reality is clearly more complex 
and nuanced.
Australia and the Indochinese refugee crisis
In the postwar period up to 1975, Australia received some 297,000 
refugees, most of whom arrived not as refugees, but as assisted or 
unassisted migrants.84 As we have seen, these figures notwithstanding, any 
81  Refugee Convention, art 35.
82  Terje Einarsen, ‘Drafting History of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol’, The 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary, ed. Andreas 
Zimmermann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 37–73, 69, doi.org/10.1093/actrade/ 9780 
199 542512.003.0002.
83  Chimni, ‘The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies’, 355, 367, 369; see also T Alexander Aleinikoff, 
‘State-centered Refugee Law: From Resettlement to Containment’, Michigan Journal of International 
Law 14, no. 1 (1992): 120–38.
84  Janet Phillips, ‘Australia’s Humanitarian Program: A Quick Guide to the Statistics Since 1947’ 
(Research Paper Series 2016–17, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, updated 17 January 
2017), 2 (Table 1).
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claim to humanitarianism was unquestionably secondary to the enduring 
political-economic desire to ‘populate or perish’. And of course, as we 
have also seen, the figures pale in comparison to the scale of European 
displacement, much less global displacement.
Australia did not accede to the 1967 Protocol until December 1973 and it 
was not until 1977, more than 20 years after its accession to the Refugee 
Convention, that Australia developed its first clear refugee policy.85 Even then, 
in a post-Protocol environment, with the inking of its first refugee policy and 
the institutional demise of the White Australia immigration policy, Cold 
War dynamics continued to govern the order of things. The refugee crisis 
of greatest significance to Australia at this time was the Indochinese refugee 
crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s.
The departure of some 3 million Indochinese followed the fall of Saigon 
and other proxy wars in Indochina. As Madokoro has noted, virulent 
racism accounted at least in part for the international community having 
frozen out the possibility of refugee protection for Chinese refugees 
fleeing communism in mainland China in the 1950s.86 But in the case 
of the Indochinese, Cold War politics and ideology became the enabler 
in negotiating multilateral agreements for protection and resettlement 
of refugees on a large scale.87 For the most part, refugees were resettled to 
Australia, Canada, France and the US. For Australia, it was the first real 
test of Australia’s mettle following both its decision to abolish the White 
Australia policy and its accession to the 1967 Protocol, which together 
signalled a willingness to protect post-1951 non-European refugees.
To quell the exodus from Vietnam in a way that would still deliver 
protection, a memorandum of understanding between the Vietnamese 
government and UNHCR was negotiated and signed in 1979. Under 
this Orderly Departure Program (ODP), the Vietnamese government 
agreed to authorise exit for the purposes of ‘family reunion and other 
humanitarian cases’ where other countries were willing to receive them.88 
This meant that at least some people could leave Vietnam without having 
85  The formulation of a refugee resettlement policy was a major recommendation of a Senate inquiry 
in 1976: Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australia and the Refugee Problem, 
89; Claire Higgins, Asylum by Boat: Origins of Australia’s Refugee Policy (Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 
2017), 17.
86  Madokoro, Elusive Refuge, 27–30.
87  Judith Kumin, ‘Orderly Departure from Vietnam: Cold War Anomaly or Humanitarian 
Innovation?’, Refugee Survey Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2008): 104–17, 105, doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdn009.
88  Ibid., 111–12.
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to take up the dangerous alternative of a boat journey. As Kumin has 
noted, the ODP is the only time UNHCR has provided large-scale 
assistance to people seeking to leave their country of origin, attributing it 
as much to a fortuitous confluence of events, interests and personalities 
as from a rational decision to provide would-be refugees with a viable 
alternative.89 She has also wondered whether such a model could only 
work in a Cold War context.90
Over the next 10  years, in refugee camps across South-East Asia, the 
protection tables would start to turn. States were less ready presumptively 
to accord prima facie recognition to refugees. Over time, and alongside the 
commitment to resettle, the Comprehensive Plan of Action on Indochinese 
Refugees (CPA) was negotiated. Adopted in June 1989, it conditioned 
temporary protection of certain Indochinese refugees by South-East Asian 
nations on an international commitment to screen asylum claims, to 
resettle those screened in to third countries, to return those screened out 
to their countries of origin and to continue processing departures under 
the ODP. The CPA coincided with the unravelling of the Cold War stand-
off that had shaped both international relations and refugee protection in 
the postwar era and represents a critical moment that would shape state 
practice in at least two unexpected ways. First, this period marked the 
diminishing importance of the exit permit by refugee-producing countries 
that had hitherto served as the main point of resistance to refugee-hood. 
Second was the decisive emergence of temporary protection as part of 
a recalibration and reprioritisation of durable solutions. The impact that 
these developments had on international protection dynamics and  the 
changing political landscape of durable solutions are considered in 
the following part.
Part IV: The Cold War et seq.
Even before the Berlin wall came down, flight from communism had 
already begun to lose its ideological cachet. Nevertheless, there were high 
hopes for a new and enlightened era in refugee protection. They would be 
short-lived. Instead, and despite a burgeoning refugee law jurisprudence 
and literature, the Refugee Convention and its Protocol and their limitations 
89  Ibid., 105.
90  Ibid., 117.
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as instruments of international protection would be  brought into 
sharp relief.91 As this part explores, geopolitical interests (re)calibrated and 
(re)prioritised the commitment to protect refugees through measures that 
restricted access to protection procedures and reshaped the way in which 
durable solutions were used and understood.
From barriers to exit to barriers to entry
When the Cold War dynamics of the post–World War  II period took 
hold, the single greatest obstacle to protection from persecution that 
a would-be refugee faced was finding a way out – to exit his92 country of 
persecution and the clutches of communism. Exit permits or exit visas – 
markers of a state-centred politico-legal resistance to the refugee journey 
– were prized and rare, and of course often fraudulently obtained. People 
smugglers were celebrated as heroes of the liberal West because they risked 
their lives to facilitate the escape of others who were refused or could not 
secure exit permits. Importantly, they were assisting the sort of people 
the liberal West wanted to protect. So here we see that the refugee fleeing 
communism was privileged in the sense of being wanted and welcomed, 
and his clandestine departure celebrated instead of criminalised.
These days, since the wall of communism has crumbled both figuratively 
and literally, the visa to exit a state of persecution has been replaced by 
something equally prized and rare, the visa to enter a safe haven. In other 
words, in the post–Cold War era a pattern of politico-legal resistance to 
the refugee journey now manifests as resistance to reception. As a result 
of this shift from barriers to exit to the construction of barriers to entry, 
refugees  are cast adrift into a protection-less space where they lead 
a  ‘provisional’ or ‘bare life’ existence in a state of perpetual exception – 
‘in orbit’ or ‘in limbo’.93 These protection-less spaces are created through 
physical tools of exclusion (such as interdiction on the high seas, biometrics 
and other border control measures in the international zones of airports, 
91  Chimni, ‘The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies’, 360, 362–65; Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Politics of 
Refugee Protection’, 18.
92  On the image of the ‘normal’ refugee as ‘white, male and anti-communist’, see Chimni, 
‘The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies’, 351.
93  Chan Kwok Bun, ‘Getting Through Suffering: Indochinese Refugees in Limbo 15 Years Later’, 
Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 18, no. 1 (1990): 1–18, 6, doi.org/10.1163/080382490x00015; 
Fiona Jenkins, ‘Bare Life: Asylum-Seekers, Australian Politics and Agamben’s Critique of 
Violence’, Australian Journal of Human Rights 10, no.  1 (2004): 79–95, doi.org/10.1080/132323
8x.2004.11910771; Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
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or territorial or extraterritorial detention) or tools that exclude refugees 
from social and economic participation and engagement, leaving them 
to eke out an existence on society’s margins – maybe on the streets, in 
train stations or in underground passageways. The shift has been perfected 
in its brutality.
This pattern highlights a central and enduring problem in the global 
mobility dynamic, namely that the right of a person to leave any country 
including her own, enshrined in post–World War  II international law, 
has no right of entry counterpart for non-citizens.94 The lack of a right 
of entry reflects a Cold War dynamic that problematised barriers to 
exit as barriers to freedom and therefore positioned the right to leave as 
imperative, but at the same time retained entry as a choice (of the state) 
permissibly limited by the immigration laws of the receiving country.95 
The practical effect of this at the end of the Cold War was that once 
exit permits were no longer needed and a person could leave the putative 
refugee-producing country with comparative ease, she now risked being 
stuck in a precarious limbo. In the result, the arbitrariness of exit permit 
schemes was superseded by a new arbitrariness in which the most pervasive 
obstacles to protection were now at points of entry. This development 
has generated a vast and complex state machinery that obstructs access 
to both territory and procedures, and positions refugee protection as ‘by 
invitation only’.96 In parallel, as the next section explores, a recalibration 
of durable solutions has changed the political landscape of protection.
The changing political landscape 
of durable solutions
As we know from the foregoing, Cold War refugee protection, most 
notably in the liberal West, was dominated by an ‘exilic bias’ that 
privileged European refugees from the Eastern Bloc and prioritised 
resettlement and local integration over voluntary repatriation to the 
country of origin. Over time, the relationship between the three durable 
solutions has been recalibrated and reprioritised. This has happened in 
ways that have curtailed access to the ‘asylum space’ and now, alongside 
voluntary repatriation, includes a growing institutional preference for 
94  For more detailed discussion, see Lester, Making Migration Law, 51 n. 4, 59, 65.
95  Lester, ‘Internationalising Constitutional Law’, 342 n. 145.
96  Human Rights Watch, ‘“By Invitation Only”—Australian Asylum Policy’, Human Rights Watch 
14, no. 10 (2002), available at: www.hrw.org/reports/2002/australia/.
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temporary protection. Although, of course, not itself a durable solution, 
temporary protection has come to serve instead as a technique for staving 
off access to local integration and resettlement, and for channelling the 
institutional preference for voluntary repatriation. This has had two key 
effects. First, some states have deployed temporary protection policies as 
a substitute for local integration. Second, there has been an accompanying 
politicisation of resettlement. I turn first to temporary protection.
Although not the first time temporary protection policies were activated,97 
it was in the context of the Indochinese refugee crisis that temporary 
protection secured its place in international protection discourse. Part of 
the problem since has been the absence of clear content, boundaries and 
legal foundation for the concept.98 There has also been an increasing and 
state-centric tendency for host countries to couple temporary protection 
with their preference for voluntary repatriation; that is, to qualify the 
grant of temporary protection with an expectation (or requirement) of 
voluntary return. So, not only has temporary protection served as an 
(effective) emergency response technique in situations of mass influx,99 
but it has also become a tool whose use has undermined international 
protection obligations. For example, legislation granting temporary 
protection to 4,000 Kosovar and 1,800 East Timorese refugees following 
their humanitarian evacuation to Australia in 1999 assumed voluntary 
return would ensue and specifically prohibited both cohorts from 
applying for asylum. The legislation also provided that decisions to extend, 
shorten or cancel temporary safe haven visas were a matter of ministerial 
discretion.100 In the last few months of 1999, when some Kosovars 
signalled their resistance to return, the immigration minister threatened 
them with withdrawal of basic necessities, detention and removal, and 
told them that it was not a matter of ‘if ’ but ‘when’ they would return 
to Kosovo.101 Policies such as these come and go. Current policy is to 
97  UNHCR, ‘Discussion Paper’ (UNHCR Roundtable on Temporary Protection, San Remo, 
19–20 July 2012), 3 n. 12.
98  UNHCR, ‘Summary Conclusions on Temporary Protection’ (UNHCR Roundtable on 
Temporary Protection, San Remo, 19–20 July 2012), 1 (‘Summary Conclusions’).
99  Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on Minimum 
Standards for Giving Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons and on 
Measures Promoting a Balance of Efforts Between Member States in Receiving such Persons and 
Bearing the Consequences Thereof, 7 August 2001, OJ L 212-223, 2001/55/EC, available at: www.
unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ddcee2e4.html.
100  For a discussion, see Michael Head, ‘Australia’s 1999 “Safe Haven” Refugee Act: Is it Humanitarian?’, 
Australian International Law Journal (1999): 224–32.
101  Ibid., 225.
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grant Temporary Protection Visas to refugees arriving in Australia without 
a visa – such as those arriving by boat – and to prohibit them from ever 
applying for a permanent visa. Quite apart from the perpetual cycle of 
temporariness and uncertainty that this creates it also, crushingly, denies 
any possibility of family reunion.102 Such measures, which are blatantly 
punitive,103 form part of a narrative that also politicises resettlement.
In recent years, a contemporary resettlement narrative has emerged 
that maximises the rhetorical power of resettlement at the same time 
as it denigrates those who seek protection through other avenues and 
justifies harsh policies of exclusion. It becomes the basis on which binaries 
are constructed; binaries that ‘split’104 refugees into the ‘good’ ones 
languishing in camps who come ‘by invitation only’,105 and the ‘bad’ ones 
whose arrival in Australia, whether by boat or by plane, is unsolicited 
and therefore unwelcome. It is a narrative that eschews (at worst) and 
cherry-picks (at best) broader perspective and context, whether historical 
or global, as well as the living realities of the refugee. A 1996 change 
in government policy, which linked Australia’s onshore (asylum) and 
offshore (resettlement) program, was an important step in cementing 
the binary that is integral to this emergent resettlement narrative. Under 
the policy, a cap was placed on the number of refugees given protection, 
such that increases in the number of onshore refugees would result in 
a corresponding decrease in access to the resettlement program. Although 
it has been suggested that Cabinet papers reveal that the reasons for the 
policy change were to obscure planned cuts in the offshore program,106 
the decision meant that onshore refugees could be blamed for those 
102  For a summary, see Refugee Advice & Casework Service (RACS), ‘Fact Sheet: Temporary 
Protection Visas (TPV), Safe Haven Enterprise Visas (SHEV)’ (RACS, December 2020), available at: 
www.racs.org.au/fact-sheets.
103  Refugee Convention, art  31; An expert roundtable convened by UNHCR concluded that 
temporary protection should not exceed three years, after which refugees should transition 
(voluntarily) into more permanent solutions: UNHCR, ‘Summary Conclusions’, 4–5 [21].
104  Splitting is a discursive device that fends off the accusation of racism or other prejudice by 
conceding that some members of an out group are good: see Raymond G  Nairn and Timothy 
N  McCreanor, ‘Race Talk and Common Sense: Patterns in Pakeha Discourse on Maori/Pakeha 
Relations in New Zealand’, Journal of Language and Social Psychology 10, no.  4 (1991): 245–62, 
251, doi.org/10.1177/0261927x91104002; Martha Agoustinos and Danielle Every, ‘The Language 
of “Race” and Prejudice: A Discourse of Denial, Reason, and Liberal-Practical Politics’, Journal of 
Language and Social Psychology 26, no. 2 (2007): 123–41, 132, doi.org/10.1177/0261927x07300075.
105  Human Rights Watch, ‘By Invitation Only’.
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cuts – cast as ‘stealing’ places from offshore refugees.107 The coupling of 
the onshore and offshore programs not only fuelled populist migration 
discourses, but also deflected responsibility for the limited number of 
resettlement places away from policymakers, projecting responsibility 
instead onto the onshore refugees it deemed to be unworthy. Because 
of the demographic differences between offshore (resettled) and onshore 
(asylum) refugee populations, the decision had the further deleterious 
effect of pitting different cultural communities against one another.
At the same time as the resettlement narrative denigrates the spontaneously 
arriving refugee as a thief, it frames an image of Australia as one of the 
most generous refugee receiving countries in the world, and by some 
accounts the most generous.108 The power of this ‘generosity narrative’ 
lies in its capacity at once to feed and to exploit public perceptions that 
Australia’s refugee resettlement program is not just an adequate response to 
the global protection crisis, but proof that Australia is pulling its weight 
internationally. However, while compared to other countries Australia 
is a leading resettlement country, global resettlement numbers represent 
less than 1 per cent of the world’s refugee population. So, in staking its 
generosity claim, Australia is overlooking the plight of the remaining 
99 per cent of the world’s refugees.109 In case these are hard figures to 
fathom, here is another way of thinking about the numbers. According to 
figures published by UNHCR, every day in 2019, some 30,137 people 
were newly displaced globally.110 That works out to be almost twice as 
many people as the 18,200 Australia resettled across the whole year.111 
Viewed in this way, Australia’s 2019 resettlement program protected little 
more than a morning’s worth of the world’s newly uprooted people.
107  Robert Manne and David Corlett, ‘Sending Them Home: Refugees and the New Politics 
of Indifference’, Quarterly Essay 13 (2003).
108  Amanda Vanstone, ‘Think We’re Tough on Refugees? That’s Fake News’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
22 April 2018, available at: www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/think-we-re-tough-on-refugees-that-s-
fake-news-20180420-p4zatw.html.
109  Australia’s resettlement program accounts for 0.09 per cent of the global refugee population. 
Resettlement figures have long represented less than 1 per cent of the world’s refugee population. 
However, recent figures suggest a decline to 0.5 per cent, which UNHCR attributes to a decline in 
resettlement quotas rather than need. The present percentage calculations are based on the following 
figures published by UNHCR for 2019: 20.4 million refugees under UNHCR’s mandate; 4.2 million 
asylum seekers; and 107,800 refugees admitted for resettlement. See UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced 
Displacement in 2019 (UNHCR, 2020), 2–3, 48. Note, if this figure were to include the 5.6 million 
Palestinian refugees under UNRWA’s mandate and without a durable solution, the resettlement 
percentage would drop to 0.41 per cent.
110  UNHCR, Global Trends 2019, 2.
111  Ibid., 52.
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For states, it is clear that discourses of humanitarianism, accurate or 
otherwise, are politically important, domestically and internationally. 
As Dauvergne has observed, the humanitarianism of the contemporary 
resettlement narrative seeks to ‘mark the nation as good, prosperous, 
and generous’.112 However, as she notes, this kind of humanitarianism 
is ‘an impoverished stand-in for justice’.113 In part, this is because global 
resettlement figures are so small. Tellingly, the discourse barely conceals 
the utilitarian nature of this kind of humanitarianism – a functional 
approach to protection that has a hard core of self-interest coated with 
a thin veneer of altruism and generosity.
So, how is it possible for states to take this approach? Under international 
law, there is no binding obligation to resettle refugees.114 In contrast, states 
are legally obliged not to refoule a refugee115 and, by extension, to grant 
her protection if she arrives spontaneously and seeks protection. This is 
what sets resettlement apart as an attractive policy option. Thus, not only 
is the protection of a refugee who has not directly engaged the protection 
obligations of the state optional, but also decisions about the size and 
composition of the program are policy-based.
Part V: Charting a way forward in the 
twenty-first century
In the twenty-first century, we find an already fractured protection 
landscape further damaged by state responses to the so-called global 
migration crisis; a crisis of political will that has arisen in the context and 
aftermath of the so-called War on Terror and a resurgence in ‘neo-’ forms 
of liberalist and colonialist ideologies.
Conflict in the Middle East has had an immeasurable impact on 
displacement and state responses to the emergent ‘global migration crisis’, 
most notably in the context of wars in Iraq and Syria. A key feature of 
112  Catherine Dauvergne, Humanitarianism, Identity and Nation: Migration Laws of Australia and 
Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005), 7.
113  Ibid.
114  Naoko Hashimoto, ‘Refugee Resettlement as an Alternative to Asylum’, Refugee Survey Quarterly 
37, no. 2 (2018): 162–86, 163, doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdy004.
115  Refoulement is the forcible return of a person to a place where her life or freedom would be 
threatened. It is prohibited under Refugee Convention art  33 and is also a principle of customary 
international law.
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this time has been the numbers of refugees who have spontaneously 
sought protection – often by sea – in Europe and other countries of the 
global North, as it is now known. In Australia, increased numbers seeking 
asylum reignited debate and reinvigorated controversial policies such as 
its scheme of extraterritorial detention and processing, dubbed Pacific 
Solution Mark II, and triggered a further campaign known as Operation 
Sovereign Borders, an equally controversial policy designed to prevent 
boat arrivals through pushbacks.
Another dimension to early twenty-first century developments has been 
the way in which the so-called War on Terror and radicalisation and 
extremism have enabled security discourse to permeate and complicate 
the refugee protection debate and state responses to it. These factors have 
often clouded the reality that the vast majority of refugees are in flight 
from, rather than causes of, insecurity. As early as 2001, treatment of 
the Tampa refugees rescued off the coast of Australia just days before 
the 9/11 attacks in the US and their relocation were justified – but later 
dismissed – as being security related.116
Resettlement in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis has been important 
for individuals and communities, but the numbers have been small in 
real terms. Australia only agreed to resettle 12,000 Syrian refugees in the 
face of considerable international pressure. In 2015, the suggestion of 
resettling some of the 8,000 Rohingya refugees stranded at sea in South-
East Asia in flight from genocidal policies in Myanmar was dismissed with 
a resounding ‘Nope, nope, nope’ from an Australian prime minister.117 
And in 2018, Australia’s minister for home affairs singled out white 
South African farmers as a community particularly worthy of Australia’s 
concern.118 All this suggests that state responses continue to be both 
selective and situation specific.
116  Irene Khan, ‘Trading in Human Misery: A Human Rights Perspective on the Tampa Incident’, 
Washington International Law Journal 12, no. 1 (2003): 9–22, 11.
117  Lisa Cox, ‘“Nope, Nope, Nope”: Tony Abbott Says Australia Will Not Resettle Refugees in 
Migrant Crisis’, Sydney Morning Herald, 21 May 2015, available at: www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/
nope-nope-nope-tony-abbott-says-australia-will-not-resettle-refugees-in-migrant-crisis-20150521-
gh6eew.html; Penny Green, Thomas MacManus and Alicia de la Cour Venning, Countdown to 
Annihilation: Genocide in Myanmar (London: International State Crime Initiative, 2015), available 
at: statecrime.org/data/2015/10/ISCI-Rohingya-Report-PUBLISHED-VERSION.pdf.
118  Paul Karp, ‘Australia Considers Fast-Track Visas for White South African Farmers’, Guardian, 




Institutional responses to the ‘global 
migration crisis’
In September 2016, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the 
New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (‘New York Declaration’).119 
The New York Declaration came out of a summit that sought to recognise 
all refugees and migrants as rights holders and to condemn acts and 
manifestations of racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance. 
The declaration reaffirmed the importance of the international refugee 
regime and contains a wide range of commitments by member states to 
strengthen and enhance mechanisms to protect people on the move, both 
refugees and migrants. It paved the way for the negotiation of two new 
global compacts in 2018: one on refugees and the other for safe, orderly 
and regular migration.
States have since negotiated the text of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration (GCM), adopted in Marrakech in December 2018. 
In parallel, states also participated in consultations led by UNHCR on the 
text of the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR). Although the names of 
the compacts suggest a focus in the first instance on migrants and in the 
second on refugees, there is not a clear line between the two. In particular, 
the text of the GCM includes a number of issues that are directly relevant 
to refugees’ experience of ‘border management policies’, particularly when 
they are impelled to use irregular migration routes in search of protection. 
Together the compacts represent the latest opportunity to try and achieve 
international momentum for protection of the rights and interests of 
refugees and migrants. If history is any measure, Australia’s withdrawal 
from the GCM on the grounds that it is a ‘threat to sovereignty’ should 
not have come as a surprise.120 Certainly, its decision to do so may 
undermine prospects for the GCM and GCR to strengthen international 
frameworks for protection of refugees and migrants. As two leading civil 
society commentators observed when Australia first signalled its intention 
119  New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, GA Res 71/1, UNGA, 71st sess, UN Doc A/RES/ 
71/1 (3 October 2016).
120  Chris Merritt, ‘UN Migration Pact “a Threat to Sovereignty”’, The Australian, 3  August 2018, 
available at: www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/immigration/un-migration-pact-a-threat-to-sovereignty/ 
news- story/f9c795ec8127863e55aacbd9baebb6eb. Withdrawal from the GCM was confirmed in a joint 
ministerial statement: The Hon Scott Morrison MP, Prime Minister, The Hon Peter Dutton MP, Minister 
for Home Affairs, Senator the Hon Marise Payne, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ‘Global Compact for 
Migration’, joint media release, 21 November 2018, available at: www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/
marise-payne/media-release/global-compact-migration.
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to withdraw from the GCM, there were good reasons why Australia 
should have joined the rest of the world – except most notably Donald 
Trump’s America and Victor Orban’s Hungary – in rethinking the way it 
responds to the global movement of people.121 First and foremost is that 
no state can respond to these issues alone.
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that, in the case of Australia, both who 
the refugee is and how she got to Australia have historically defined how 
well she has been received, and that this ‘who’ and that ‘how’ continue to 
shape the way we think about, validate and accept as justified the ‘why’ of 
her quest for protection and the ‘where’ in which she seeks it. The chapter 
has endeavoured to show that the way we understand Australia’s responses 
to the refugee journey, and the way those responses fit into a bigger 
international picture, is highly dependent on historical-political context 
and perspective. It has sought to show that each part of this framework has 
a political and ideological dimension that changes, depending on time and 
place. To that end, it has presented a broader context for understanding 
and thinking about Australia’s protection of refugees, with the intention 
of enabling the reader to see Australian accounts of and approaches to the 
refugee journey through a wider lens.
What we have seen in this background is that Australia’s approach to refugee 
protection has long been situation specific and highly differentiated. 
The narrow scope of the Refugee Convention in its initial framing certainly 
helps to explain Australia’s willing accession to it and Australia’s responses 
to refugee movements in the Convention’s early years. We have seen 
that Australia’s responses were not just aligned with but also driven by 
its postwar labour shortages and immigration priorities. It suggests too 
that the underpinnings of Australia’s oft-celebrated decision to become 
one of the first states parties to the Refugee Convention reflected an early 
form of the ‘utilitarian humanitarianism’ that has served and suited both 
Australia’s immigration priorities and changing geopolitical interests.
121  Carolina Gottardo, ‘Migration Compact Will Benefit Australia’, Eureka Street, 5 August 2018, 
available at: www.eurekastreet.com.au/article/migration-compact-will-benefit-australia, and Anne 
Gallagher, ‘3 Reasons All Countries should Embrace the Global Compact for Migration’, World 
Economic Forum, 22 August 2018, available at: www.weforum.org/.
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Finally, we have seen how and with what effects and implications 
states, including Australia, have (re)calibrated and (re)prioritised 
durable solutions for refugees over time – those durable solutions being 
resettlement, local integration and voluntary repatriation. We have seen 
that Australia’s attempts to legitimise exclusionist asylum policies by 
talking up the resettlement program and implying that it is conceptually 
and statistically adequate as, in the first instance, a response to the global 
protection crisis and, in the second, a substitute for spontaneous asylum 
requests, are unconvincing. At the same time, it is also clear that these 
attempts are entirely consistent with longstanding approaches to refugee 
protection.
As the chapter demonstrates, the way in which the state of Australia 
approaches its obligations to protect refugees and asylum seekers is 
politically tidal, ebbing and flowing with changing perceptions of the 
national interest. We see that nation-states such as Australia have positioned 
themselves legally and politically in a state of perpetual resistance to the 
refugee journey, unable to accept the need to flee and seek safe haven as 
a reality that is part of the order of things, or even part of the disorder 
of things. In the New York Declaration and the two global compacts, we 
see an acceptance of mobility, including the refugee journey, as part of 
humanity’s reality. Despite Australia’s withdrawal from the GCM, that 
acknowledgement must surely be cause for hope.
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ONCE A REFUGEE, 
ALWAYS A REFUGEE?
The haunting of the refugee 
label in resettlement
Melanie Baak1
So I have a new name – refugee
Strange that a name should take away from me
My past, my personality and hope
Strange refuge this.
So many seem to share this name – refugee
Yet we share so many differences.
I find no comfort in my new name
I long to share my past, restore my pride,
To show, I too, in time, will offer more
Than I have borrowed.
For now the comfort that I seek
Resides in the old yet new name
I would choose – friend.
Ruvimbo Bungwe, aged 9 or 14 depending on source, from Zimbabwe2
1  Acknowledgements: I would like to acknowledge that the thinking and work that informed this 
chapter was undertaken on the lands of the Nukunu and Kaurna people and pay my respects to ancestors 
and Elders past, present and emerging. I would also like to acknowledge the work of my colleagues, 
Emily Miller, Associate Professor Anna Sullivan and Associate Professor Kathleen Heugh, on the research 
project from which a component of data is used in this chapter. Finally, I’d like to thank all those from 
across the world who have shared their stories of refugee experiences with me over many years.




On International Refugee Day 2018, Danijel Malbasa, a Melbourne-
based industrial relations lawyer and a refugee of the Yugoslav wars, wrote 
of his desire growing up to distance himself from his refugee identity. 
He worked hard to ‘scrub out my strong Slavic accent, develop an Aussie 
drawl, take out the letter “j” from my name, even better anglicise it to 
“Dan”, get out of the ESL class’ and in doing this to ‘pass’ as Australian, 
to shun all the ‘stereotypical baggage that comes with declaring oneself 
a refugee’.3 Similarly, my own father was the child of post–World War II 
refugees from Poland and Russia resettled in Australia. My father began 
school as Henrik, not speaking a word of English, shortly thereafter he 
became Henry and fairly quickly forgot most of the Polish and Russian 
he spoke as a child. Like Danijel and my father, many former refugees 
have written of the desire to escape the ‘refugee’ label. Hannah Arendt, 
for example, in her seminal essay ‘We Refugees’ suggests that ‘[i]n the first 
place, we don’t like to be called “refugees”. We ourselves call each other 
“newcomers” or “immigrants”’.4 Ruvimbo Bungwe (cited above) at a very 
young age identified the desire to resist the naming ‘refugee’.
Both Danijel and my father could take these actions to ‘pass’ as Australians 
and shun their refugee backgrounds because they were young, ‘white’ 
people of Eastern European refugee background resettled in Australia, 
and thus had some of the characteristics of ‘whiteness’ required to pass 
in Australia.5 The cultural and ethnic diversity of Australia has shifted 
significantly since my father was a five-year-old in the 1950s. Jupp 
identifies that in 1947, Australians were 99 per cent white and 96 per cent 
Anglo-Celtic.6 During the peak period of Yugoslav resettlement in 
Australia in the early 1990s, approximately 82  per cent of Australians 
spoke English as their first language.7 The 2016 Australian census 
identified that 21  per cent of Australians speak a language other than 
3  Danijel Malbasa, ‘I Used to Distance Myself from my Refugee Identity. Now I Own It’, Guardian, 
20  June 2018, available at: www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/19/i-used-to-distance-
myself-from-my-refugee-identity-now-i-own-it.
4  Hannah Arendt, ‘We Refugees’, in Altogether Elsewhere: Writers on Exile, ed. M Robinson 
(Boston: Faber and Faber, 1994), 110.
5  Val Colic-Peisker, ‘“At Least You’re the Right Colour”: Identity and Social Inclusion of Bosnian 
Refugees in Australia’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no. 4 (2005), doi.org/10.1080/ 
13691830500109720.
6  James Jupp, Immigration, 2nd ed. (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1998), 132.
7  James Jupp, ‘From “White Australia” to “Part of Asia”: Recent Shifts in Australian Immigration 
Policy Towards the Region’, International Migration Review 29, no. 1 (1995): 211, doi.org/10.2307/ 
2547002.
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English at home and 33 per cent were born outside of Australia.8 While 
the ethnic and linguistic diversity of Australia has shifted significantly 
since the ending of the official ‘White Australia’ policy in 1973,9 Australia 
is still perceived as a ‘white nation’. The concept of ‘race’ has always been 
and continues to be central to political debates in Australia on issues 
such as immigration and national identity. These political debates in 
turn influence the everyday experiences of those who are ‘marked’ by 
their race. Having a ‘visibly different’ appearance, whether on the basis 
of skin colour or religious markers (such as wearing Islamic dress), results 
in a very different resettlement experience than those refugees who can 
pass in the ‘invisibility’ of ‘whiteness’ in Australia. While Danijel writes 
that he has recently learnt to ‘own’ his refugee identity after ‘hiding’ it 
for many years, this raises a number of questions. Why do some people 
with refugee experience resettled in countries such as Australia feel the 
need to distance themselves from their refugee background? What are the 
experiences of refugees resettled in countries such as Australia who can’t 
‘pass’ as Australian, whose visible difference can’t be erased – whether by 
virtue of their skin colour or religion or whose audible difference can’t be 
silenced? This chapter explores these questions. First by interrogating the 
framing of refugees in media, political and broader discourse. Second, 
by focusing on the experiences of former refugees who have been resettled 
in Australia.
For those who have lived in uncertain, protracted refugee situations with 
little hope of repatriation to their countries of birth and limited options 
for integration into countries of first asylum, resettlement can be seen as 
a dreamlike aspiration. The numbers of those resettled globally each year 
are a tiny number of the recognised refugees globally. In the 12 months to 
June 2018, approximately 102,800 of the recognised 25.4 million refugees, 
or 0.4 per cent, were resettled.10 While the number of resettled refugees 
are a very small percentage of the overall number of displaced people 
globally, those who are resettled live their lives at the intersection of the 
multiple framings of refugeeness. They bring the refugee experience into 
direct contact with the Western frames of understanding what it means 
8  ‘Cultural Diversity in Australia’, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 28 June 2017, available at: www.
abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/2071.0~2016~Main%20Features~Cultural %20 
Diversity %20Data%20Summary~30.
9  James Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration (Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139195034.




to be a refugee. In a country such as Australia, for example, where over 
220,000 people from refugee backgrounds were resettled in the period from 
2000 to 2019,11 these people, their experiences and the resultant research 
play a significant role in shaping perceptions and understanding of forced 
migration and refugees. In the past 20 years, resettlement has mainly been 
concentrated in a relatively small number of countries, primarily the United 
States, Canada, Australia, the Nordic countries and, increasingly, Europe. 
Given the geographical locations in which refugees have predominantly 
been resettled, interrogating the framing of refugees in these countries is 
crucial to understanding the ways in which former refugees are likely to be 
‘seen’ and understood in their new home countries.
After resettlement, many former refugees continue to be referred to as 
‘refugees’, even when resettlement entails a formal bureaucratic relabelling 
as permanent residents and then later as citizens. Labelling of those who 
have been resettled as ‘refugees’ continues in much academic12 and media 
discourse.13 This labelling continues for long after former refugees become 
permanent residents and citizens. For example, a recent research article 
refers to children born of parents with refugee experience who have lived 
in the UK for all or most of their lives as ‘second generation refugees’.14 
The question becomes: when, if ever, do people who have been refugees 
stop being refugees (with all of the frames of reference this entails)?
11  Janet Phillips, ‘Australia’s Humanitarian Program: A quick guide to the statistics since 1947’, 
2017, available at: www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_
Library/ pubs/ rp/rp1617/Quick_Guides/HumanitarianProg; Department of Home Affairs, 
‘Austraila’s offshore Humanitarian Program: 2018–19’, 2019, available at: www.homeaffairs.gov.au/
research-and-stats /files/australia-offshore-humanitarian-program-2018-19.pdf.
12  See, for example, Mark Brough et al., ‘Young Refugees Talk About Well-Being: A Qualitative 
Analysis of Refugee Mental Health from Three States’, Australian Journal of Social Issues 38, no. 2 
(2003), doi.org/10.1002/j.1839-4655.2003.tb01142.x; Peter Browne, The Longest Journey: Resettling 
Refugees from Africa (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2006); Clemence Due, ‘“Who 
are Strangers?”: “Absorbing” Sudanese Refugees into a White Australia’, ACRAWSA E-Journal 4, no. 1 
(2008), available at: acrawsa.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/CRAWS-Vol-4-No-1-2008-1.pdf.
13  See, for example, Piers Ackerman, ‘Refugee Fury at Africa Ban; Sudanese: Minister 
Insulted Us’, Sunday Mail, 14  October 2007, available at: www.news.com.au/adelaidenow/
story/0,22606,22581759-5006301,00.html (site discontinued); Elissa Hunt, ‘Killers who Bashed 
Sudanese Refugee Liep Gony to Death can be Identified after Herald Sun Campaign’, Herald Sun, 
18  February 2010, available at: www.heraldsun.com.au/news/killers-who-bashed-saudanese-
refugee-liep-giny-to-death-can-be-identified-after-herald-sun-campaign/news-story/ 35af7 b625d 
754b6d4643a 40d072 ae026; Ben Schneiders, ‘Refugees Fear for Future, Say Leaders’, Age (Melbourne), 
23  October 2007, available at: www.theage.com.au/news/national/refugees-fear-for-future-say-leade
rs/2007/10/22/1192940985058.html.
14  Alice Bloch and Shirin Hirsch, ‘“Second Generation” Refugees and Multilingualism: Identity, 
Race and Language Transmission’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 40, no. 14 (2017), doi.org/10.1080/014
19870.2016.1252461.
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To interrogate this question, this chapter will highlight the development 
of frames of understanding the refugee, then dialogue these with everyday 
experiences of people from refugee backgrounds resettled in countries 
such as Australia. The chapter presents a small component of a research 
project conducted with students with refugee experience in secondary 
schools as well as drawing on literature, writing by people from refugee 
backgrounds such as Danijel Malbasa15 and personal experience with 
people from refugee backgrounds over the past 15  years. This chapter 
will provide examples of the ways in which ‘race’ and racialisation of 
the refugee underpin how refugees are seen and understood as well as 
the ways in which the refugee label continues to haunt former refugees 
who are resettled in third countries such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia and Canada.
In this chapter I use the term ‘haunt’ to understand the ways in ‘which 
abusive systems of power make themselves known and their impacts felt 
in everyday life’.16 To be haunted, Gordon argues:
is to be tied to historical and social effects … these ghostly aspects 
of social life are not aberrations, but are central to modernity 
itself … The ghostly phantom objects and subjects of modernity 
have a determining agency on the ones they are haunting.17
Through tracing the framing of the refugee and the everyday experiences 
of this framing, I argue that there are ‘abusive systems of power’ in place 
that haunt refugees and former refugees and have a ‘determining agency’ 
that positions them as always already in deficit and as objects in need 
of assistance. Through tracing the development of the refugee label and 
explicating how the label is enacted and experienced in everyday lives, 
I argue that it is not the refugee label that needs to be escaped/exorcised 
but the frames of reference through which the refugee experience 
is understood.
15  Malbasa, ‘I Used to Distance Myself from my Refugee Identity. Now I Own It’.
16  Avery F  Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Hauntings and the Sociological Imagination (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008), xvi.




The word ‘refugee’ can be traced to its origins in the French word réfugié 
that was used to identify the Huguenots, tens of thousands of Reformed 
Protestant French migrants who escaped the French Catholic monarch 
to live in other non-Catholic European countries at the time.18 While the 
‘legal and moral status’19 of refugees was crystallised with the development 
of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,20 the ways in which 
refugees are understood by the broader population, particularly in countries 
in which they are given refuge, has shifted and changed, and been influenced 
by wider cultural and political rhetoric. Canadian historian Michael 
Ignatieff argues that currently ‘new metaphors have entered the democratic 
body politic, categorizing the refugee not as an individual with rights and 
a moral claim, but as the invasive other’.21 Visual, political and discursive 
fields operate to construct frames that position refugees not only as Other, 
but as a threatening, undesired Other. Butler argues that certain normative 
processes operate to ‘produce certain subjects as “recognizable” persons and 
to make others decidedly more difficult to recognize’.22 Through processes of 
framing particular populations, such as refugees, these normative processes 
make refugees inherently more difficult to recognise as subjects and thereby 
human. In order to understand the ways in which these normative processes 
have operated to produce refugees as infinitely less ‘recognizable’ persons, 
it is important to trace the ways in which refugees have been labelled 
and understood.
A number of important research articles have interrogated the labelling 
of refugees. Roger Zetter’s original paper ‘Refugees and Refugee Studies 
– A  Label and an Agenda’23 articulated a framing of the refugee that 
continues in a similar vein 30 years later:
in the present century it is the word ‘refugee’ which has 
increasingly been deployed to describe the millions of uprooted 
people who have been forced into exile or displaced within their 
18  Leo Hornak, ‘The Word “Refugee” has a Surprising Origin’, Public Radio International, 
20 February 2017, available at: www.pri.org/stories/2017-02-20/word-refugee-has-surprising-origin.
19  Michael Ignatieff, ‘The Refugee as Invasive Other’, Social Research: An International Quarterly 
84, no. 1 (2017): 223.
20  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 
(entered into force 22 April 1954).
21  Ignatieff, ‘The Refugee as Invasive Other’, 223.
22  Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2010), 6.
23  Roger Zetter, ‘Refugees and Refugee Studies – A Label and an Agenda’, Journal of Refugee Studies 
1, no. 1 (1988): 1–6, doi.org/10.1093/jrs/1.1.1.
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own countries because of intolerance, war or other human factors. 
‘Refugee’ constitutes one of the most powerful labels currently in 
the repertoire of humanitarian concern, national and international 
public policy and social differentiation. The label ‘refugee’ both 
stereotypes and institutionalises a status. It is benevolent and 
apolitical, yet it also establishes, through legal and policy making 
practices, highly politicised interpretations (Wood 1985). It may 
designate crisis needs and the associated conditions of poverty 
and deprivation. Conversely it encompasses longer term issues of 
resettlement and assimilation.24
Zetter’s subsequent works, particularly ‘Labelling Refugees: Forming and 
Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity’25 and ‘More Labels, Fewer Refugees: 
Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization’,26 continue to 
explore the ways in which bureaucratic action forms and transforms the 
framing and identification, as well as the identities, of refugees. He argues, 
along with others such as Malkki,27 that humanitarian agencies and 
interventions in refugee situations have resulted in a ‘focus on refugees 
as their object of knowledge, assistance, and management’.28 Chimni 
develops these arguments, suggesting that through the objectification 
of refugees, understandings of refugees have been constructed through 
a ‘western strategy to employ political humanitarianism’.29 Through this 
focus on refugees as an object of knowledge, refugees have become 
‘an object of concern and knowledge for the “international community,” 
and for a particular variety of humanism’.30 The objectification of 
refugees has seen refugees represented as ahistorical, apolitical, victims, 
24  Zetter, ‘Refugees and Refugee Studies – A Label and an Agenda’, 1.
25  Roger Zetter, ‘Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity’, Journal 
of Refugee Studies 4, no. 1 (1991), doi.org/10.1093/jrs/4.1.39.
26  Roger Zetter, ‘More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of 
Globalization’, Journal of Refugee Studies 20, no. 2 (2007), doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fem011.
27  Liisa H Malkki, ‘National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of 
National Identity Among Scholars and Refugees’, in Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in Critical 
Anthropology, ed. Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), doi.
org/ 10.1215/ 9780822382089-002; Liisa H Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National 
Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), doi.
org/ 10.7208/ chicago/ 9780226190969.001.0001; Liisa H Malkki, ‘Refugees and Exile: From “Refugee 
Studies” to the National Order of Things’, Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995), doi.org/10.1146/
annurev.an.24.100195.002431; Liisa H Malkki, ‘Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and 
Dehistoricization’, Cultural Anthropology 11, no. 3 (1996), doi.org/10.1525/can.1996.11.3.02a00050.
28  Malkki, ‘Speechless Emissaries’, 377.
29  B S Chimni, ‘The Birth of a “Discipline”: From Refugee to Forced Migration Studies’, Journal 
of Refugee Studies 22, no. 1 (2009): 13, doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fen051.
30  Malkki, ‘Speechless Emissaries’, 378.
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‘universal humanitarian subjects’,31 in need of ‘fixing by state actors and 
aid providers’,32 as ‘undesirable elements disruptive to the national order 
of things’,33 who are recognised through ‘racializing schemes that serve to 
blacken and stigmatize’.34
Photojournalism, film, the media and the state have all shaped the 
positioning of ‘refugees’ in particular ways.35 The images that circulate 
in the media ‘play a central role in framing how refugees are publicly 
perceived and politically debated’.36 Media images and political discourses 
have framed understandings of the refugee such that, on hearing the 
word refugee, many people imagine images of refugee camps, hunger, 
war, conflict and trauma. Others think of current political discourses 
globally around ‘asylum seekers’, ‘queue jumpers’, ‘terrorists’ and fear. 
International and national discourses around the ‘refugee crisis’ see current 
events framed in ways that sensationalise the ‘problem’ of the refugee.37 
For refugees, certain representational conventions ‘have coagulated into 
a standard discursive mode that one finds routinely in journalistic writing 
and other news media’.38 Through representations of refugees as ‘needy’ 
victims who have experienced trauma,39 they are frequently portrayed as 
31  Ibid.
32  Sara L McKinnon, ‘Unsettling Resettlement: Problematizing “Lost Boys of Sudan” Resettlement 
and Identity’, Western Journal of Communication 72, no. 4 (2008): 397, doi.org/10.1080/ 105703 108 
02 446056.
33  Bishupal Limbu, ‘Illegible Humanity: The Refugee, Human Rights and the Question 
of Representation’, Journal of Refugee Studies 22, no. 3 (2009): 268, doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fep021.
34  Aihwa Ong, Buddha is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2003), 13.
35  Melanie Baak, ‘Murder, Community Talk and Belonging: An Exploration of Sudanese Community 
Responses to Murder in Australia’, African Identities 9, no. 4 (2011), doi.org/10.1080/14725843. 
2011. 614415; Prem Kumar Rajaram, ‘Humanitarianism and Representations of the Refugee’, Journal 
of Refugee Studies 15, no. 3 (2002).
36  Roland Bleiker et al., ‘The Visual Dehumanisation of Refugees’, Australian Journal of Political 
Science 48, no. 4 (2013): 402.
37  Marlou Schrover and Willem Schinkel, ‘Introduction: The Language of Inclusion and Exclusion 
in the Context of Immigration and Integration’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 7 (2013), doi.org/
10.1080/01419870.2013.783711.
38  Limbu, ‘Illegible Humanity’, 268.
39  Laura Bates et al., ‘Sudanese Refugee Youth in Foster Care: The “Lost Boys” in America’, Child 
Welfare Journal 84, no. 5 (2005); Brough et al., ‘Young Refugees Talk About Well-Being’; Kaaren Frater-
Mathieson, ‘Refugee Trauma, Loss and Grief: Implications for Intervention’, in Educational Interventions 
for Refugee Children: Theoretical Perspectives and Implementing Best Practice, ed. Richard Hamilton and 
Dennis Moore (London: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004), doi.org/10.4324/9780203687550; Jay M Marlowe, 
‘Beyond the Discourse of Trauma: Shifting the Focus on Sudanese Refugees’, Journal of Refugee Studies 
23, no.  2 (2010), doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feq013; Robert Schweitzer et al., ‘Trauma, Post-Migration 
Living Difficulties, and Social Support as Predictors of Psychological Adjustment in Resettled Sudanese 
Refugees’, Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 40, no. 2 (2006), doi.org/10.1080/j.1440-
1614.2006.01766.x.
59
2 . ONCE A REFUGEE, ALwAyS A REFUGEE?
undesirable ‘parasites’ of the state40 who are unwilling or unable to find 
employment,41 unlikely or unable to succeed at school without significant 
state-funded support,42 and unwilling or unable to integrate within the 
host community.43 The re-inscription of representations of ‘refugees’, 
then, works to preclude refugees from inclusion into the communities to 
which they are resettled.
These standard discursive modes have resulted in what Adichie refers to as 
the ‘single story’.44 The ‘danger of the single story’ is that it serves to rob 
people of their dignity and make ‘our recognition of our equal humanity 
difficult’.45 The discourses and images, the ‘single story’ of refugees, not 
only haunt the ways in which the broader population understands refugees 
in the countries in which they first seek asylum, but these framings also 
follow refugees to the countries in which they are resettled. Through 
representations of ‘the refugee’, anonymising and dehumanising narratives 
are allowed, and even encouraged, to permeate. These singular, deficit 
views overlook the ‘complex and oftentimes contradictory humanity and 
subjectivity’46 that underscores how refugees negotiate their lives. It limits 
40  Mireille Rosello, Postcolonial Hospitality: The Immigrant as Guest (California: Stanford University 
Press, 2001); Alison Saxton, ‘“I Certainly Don’t Want People Like That Here”: The  Discursive 
Construction of “Asylum Seekers”’, Media International Australia 109, no. 1 (2003), doi.org/10.1177/ 
1329878x0310900111.
41  Val Colic-Peisker, ‘The “Visibly Different” Refugees in the Australian Labour Market: Settlement 
Policies and Employment Realities’, in Refugees, Recent Migrants and Employment: Challenging 
Barriers and Exploring Pathways, ed. S  McKay (New York: Routledge, 2009), doi.org/10.4324/ 
9780203890745.
42  Lutine de Wal Pastoor, ‘Rethinking Refugee Education: Principles, Policies and Practice from 
a European Perspective’, Annual Review of Comparative and International Education 2016, vol. 30 
(2016), doi.org/10.1108/s1479-367920160000030009; Rachel Hek, ‘The Role of Education in the 
Settlement of Young Refugees in the UK: The Experiences of Young Refugees’, Practice 17, no. 3 
(2005), doi.org/10.1080/09503150500285115; Jody  Lynn McBrien, ‘Educational Needs and 
Barriers for Refugee Students in the United States: A Review of the Literature’, Review of Educational 
Research 75, no.  3 (2005), doi.org/10.3102/00346543075003329; Emily Miller, Tahereh Ziaian 
and Adrian Esterman, ‘Australian School Practices and the Education Experiences of Students with 
a  Refugee Background: A Review of the Literature’, International Journal of Inclusive Education 
(2017), doi.org/10.1080/13603116.2017.1365955.
43  Surjeet Dhanji, ‘Welcome of Unwelcome? Integration Issues and the Resettlement of Former 
Refugees from the Horn of Africa and Sudan in Metropolitan Melbourne’, The Australasian Review 
of African Studies 30, no.  2 (2009); Kerstin Lueck, Clemence Due and Martha Augoustinos, 
‘Neoliberalism and Nationalism: Representations of Asylum Seekers in the Australian Mainstream 
News Media’, Discourse & Society 26, no. 5 (2015), doi.org/10.1177/0957926515581159; Alison 
Strang and Alastair Ager, ‘Refugee Integration: Emerging Trends and Remaining Agendas’, Journal of 
Refugee Studies 23, no. 4 (2010), doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feq046.
44  Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, ‘The Danger of a Single Story’ (talk, TEDGlobal 2009), available 
at: www.ted.com/talks/chimamanda_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_story/transcript.
45  Adichie, ‘The Danger of a Single Story’.
46  Gordon, Ghostly Matters, 4.
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them to being understood and seen as always and only refugees, with all 
the ghosts that this entails, and homogenises the multiple lives to a single 
experience. As Turton has argued, for refugees, the discourse of forced 
migration:
helps to make it possible for states, governments and the publics 
of host countries, especially rich Northern ones, to respond to 
forced migrants not as individual human beings, people like us, 
embedded in contingent social and historical circumstances, 
but as anonymous and dehumanised masses. As people who are 
members neither of our civil nor our moral community.47
With this dehumanisation of the refugee experience, it becomes clear 
that the lives of refugees have become dissociated from the human in 
a way that makes their lives less recognisable. To interrogate the ways 
in which we might shift these frames, Butler argues that it is essential 
to call these frames into question – ‘to show that the frame never quite 
contained the scene it was meant to limn, that something was already 
outside, which made the very sense of the inside possible, recognizable’.48 
To do this requires not only the production of new frames, but also a 
reworking of the existing frames through which it ‘becomes possible 
to apprehend something about what or who is living but has not been 
generally “recognized” as a life’.49 While there is effort in the alternative 
media (i.e. media sources that do not seek to represent government 
and corporate interests as the mainstream media does)50 and in various 
research to produce new frames of understanding the refugee experience,51 
there is still significant work required to rework the existing frames. In 
the sections that follow, I provide examples from a research project that 
identify how frames of understanding the refugee are enacted in everyday 
life. However, the research examples also emphasise the ways people with 
refugee experience struggle to resist these framings.
47  David Turton, ‘Conceptualising Forced Migration’ (RSC Working Paper No. 12, 2003): 10, 
available at: www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/wp12-conceptualising-forced-migration-2003.pdf.
48  Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?, 9.
49  Ibid., 12.
50  Edward S Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the 
Mass Media (Random House, 2010), doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1977265.
51  See, for example, Melanie Baak, Negotiating Belongings: Stories of Forced Migration of Dinka 
Women from South Sudan (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2016), doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6300-588-3; 
Behrouz Boochani, No Friend but the Mountains: Writing from Manus Prison, trans. Omid Tofighian 
(Sydney: Picador, 2018); Laurent Van Lancker, Kalès (Polymorfilms, 2017); Olivia Woldemikael, 
‘A Crisis of Definition Rehumanising the Refugee’, Real Media, 2017, available at: realmedia.press/a-
crisis-of-definition-rehumanising-the-refugee/ (site discontinued).
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Research context
This chapter is informed by over 15 years of personal and professional 
experience living and working with people of various refugee backgrounds 
in a number of different countries and contexts. As a white Anglo 
Australian woman who is married to a South Sudanese Australian of 
refugee background, my understandings are informed by his experiences 
as well as those of his family, friends and community. I have also spent 
time living with South Sudanese refugees in Kenya and Uganda. Over the 
past 11 years I have undertaken a number of different research projects 
exploring different aspects of the resettlement experience for refugees in 
Australia and in Scotland, particularly focused on schooling, but also 
on broader contexts including employment, health and social inclusion. 
While these experiences inform this chapter, the data presented in what 
follows largely draw on a project I recently undertook with colleagues 
entitled ‘Improving Educational Outcomes for Students from Refugee 
Backgrounds in the South Australian Certificate of Education: A Case 
Study of Two Catholic Secondary Schools’.52 The aim of the project 
was to explore how schools support students with refugee experience 
undertaking the senior secondary certificate of education, and was 
focused on evaluating an intervention that was introduced in the two 
participating schools to support students with refugee experience. Case 
studies were undertaken in two secondary schools. The data included 
online surveys with school staff (n=34) and students (n=29), one focus 
group with teachers in each school (n=17), one focus group with students 
in each school (n=16), and individual interviews with five teachers and five 
students in each school (n=20). This chapter specifically focuses on themes 
that arose during the research at one of the schools, which was a girls-
only school where approximately 60 per cent of students spoke English 
as an Additional Language and almost 40 per cent of students came from 
a refugee background. School staff were requested to identify students 
from refugee backgrounds for participation; this was usually done by the 
English as an Additional Language specialist teacher or by an educational 
support officer who worked closely with the culturally and linguistically 
diverse students at the school. The school staff reported that students were 
identified for participation based both on ‘visa type’ identified in school 
52  Melanie Baak et al., ‘Improving Educational Outcomes for Students from Refugee Backgrounds 
in the South Australian Certificate of Education Project: A Case Study of Two Catholic Schools’ 
(University of South Australia, 2018), available at: apo.org.au/node/136916.
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enrolment records as well as on knowing the students. The study was 
not specifically about exploring the refugee label or experience. However, 
what became obvious very early in the project, particularly at the girls-
only secondary school, was a reluctance from the students to be identified 
as refugee background students. Some of the reasons for this possible 
reluctance to be identified as ‘refugee students’ will be explored in the 
sections below.
The haunting of the refugee label: Who is 
a refugee and for how long?
The word refugee stalks you through life prefixed to any other 
subsequent identity you develop in post-refugee life.
A ‘refugee’ felt like a prior identity, a political status once ascribed 
to me that suggested vulnerability, inferiority, alienness, pity – 
everything I wanted to remove from my idea of myself.53
The refugee label, with all the frames of reference it entails, continues to 
haunt those with refugee experience through resettlement. This label has 
a ‘determining agency’ on those whom it haunts.54 As Malbasa argues, ‘the 
word refugee stalks’ suggesting ‘vulnerability, inferiority, alienness, pity’.55 
This perhaps goes a long way in explaining why the students in our project 
were reluctant to be identified as refugee background students. Feedback 
from the teachers facilitating the recruitment of student participants 
suggested that the girls did not want to be identified as refugee students. 
Jacinta, one of the specialist support teachers who worked very closely 
with students from diverse backgrounds, identified that:
some of the other girls are like ‘I’m not a refugee student what are 
you talking about’ you know ‘My parents came here … because 
they had the skills’. So no acknowledgement whatsoever, a couple 
of girls in particular … that’s why – I guess I can assume that for 
those girls they didn’t want to be part of it because they didn’t want 
to be labelled … And also the fact that they perhaps care about 
what other people think, their friends – they do care about what 
people are going to think about them. (Jacinta, school educational 
support officer)
53  Malbasa, ‘I Used to Distance Myself from my Refugee Identity. Now I Own It’.
54  Gordon, Ghostly Matters, 190.
55  Malbasa, ‘I Used to Distance Myself from my Refugee Identity. Now I Own It’.
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The students from refugee backgrounds who undertook the survey, focus 
group or interviews self-identified as being from a range of national, 
linguistic, cultural and religious backgrounds including Afghanistan, 
Burma, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and ‘Muslim’. 
With the diversity of the school, some students from refugee backgrounds 
endeavoured to de-identify themselves from the label refugee. Jacinta 
argued that the young women ‘care about what people are going to think 
about them’ and therefore ‘didn’t want to be labelled’. Instead the girls 
preferred to identify that their parents came here ‘because they had the 
skills’ thereby identifying as skilled migrants, a category of migrant that 
does not have the negative framing associated with being a refugee. The 
quote from Jacinta suggests that some of the girls from refugee backgrounds 
sought to ‘hide’ their refugee backgrounds in the diversity of the school 
without having to identify with the ‘refugee’ label. In a similar way, Ryu 
and Tuvilla describe Chin youth from Burma, resettled in the United 
States, as recalibrating ‘their refugee identity as a voluntary immigrant’ 
and challenging the ‘dominant narrative of refugees’.56 Danijel Malbasa 
also identifies with this experience, describing:
Better to call myself an immigrant, I decided … To regard myself 
as belonging to a category of migratory humanity that is for 
the most part uncontroversial, less needy, less ‘frightening’ than 
a refugee.57
A majority of the students who participated in the focus groups and 
interviews conducted as part of this project were comfortable with 
identifying as being from a refugee background. It is assumed that 
most of those who were uncomfortable with this labelling chose not to 
participate. However, one female participant, Gloria, a young woman 
from an African country who was in Year 11 at the time of the research, 
rejected identification as a refugee, highlighting her father’s employment. 
Gloria was identified by the school for participation in the project based 
on her refugee background. However, when asked about this, Gloria did 
not identify as being from a refugee background.
Interviewer: And so you came when you were two, did your family 
come as refugees?
56  Minjung Ryu and Mavreen Rose S Tuvilla, ‘Resettled Refugee Youths’ Stories of Migration, 
Schooling, and Future: Challenging Dominant Narratives about Refugees’, The Urban Review (2018), 
doi.org/10.1007/s11256-018-0455-z.
57  Malbasa, ‘I Used to Distance Myself from my Refugee Identity. Now I Own It’.
REFUGEE JOURNEyS
64
Gloria: Not really. Dad he kind of grew up in the city so he’s like 
– and so he got offered a job here in Sydney, so he came first and 
then we came – he brought us after.
As well as demonstrating Gloria’s self-identification as an immigrant, this 
excerpt presents two additional questions for labelling refugees. First, if 
Gloria did not identify as being from a refugee background, on what 
basis was she recruited by the school staff to participate in the research? 
Second, even if Gloria was from a refugee background, if she came to 
Australia when she was two and she was in Year 11 at the time of the 
interview (making her about 17 years old), should this refugee label still 
be following her 15 years after arrival in Australia? I hypothesise that the 
racialisation of refugees in Australia plays a significant part in the haunting 
of the refugee label particularly for those, like Gloria, who are of ‘black’ 
African appearance. In the sections that follow, I first argue for the role of 
racialisation in the identification of people as refugees and finally I explore 
the question of how long a refugee remains a refugee.
‘This black refugee …’: Racialisation 
of the refugee in countries of hegemonic 
whiteness
Gloria, like other arrivals to Australia of African descent, has become 
part of a complex, racialised country. Since colonisation, Australia has 
been a nation of settlers.58 But since this time, the hegemonically ‘white’ 
Australian national identity continues to be unsettled by the presence of 
non-‘white’ Indigenous Australians and the arrival of non-‘white’ migrants 
and refugees. The White Australia policy, which was only officially 
disbanded in the early 1970s, aimed to promote and strengthen the ‘white’ 
European national identity. The numbers of ‘black’ Africans in Australia 
has historically been quite low. In 1971, census data estimated that 61,935 
African-born people lived in Australia and over 20 per cent of these were 
born in South Africa, with a significant number being ‘children of colonial 
functionaries and Anglo Saxons from Southern Africa’.59 By  2006, the 
African-born population in Australia had increased significantly, with 
58  Pal Ahluwalia, ‘When Does a Settler Become a Native? Citizenship and Identity in a Settler 
Society’, Pretexts: Literary and Cultural Studies 10, no. 1 (2001), doi.org/10.1080/713692599.
59  Graeme Hugo, ‘Migration Between Africa and Australia: A Demographic Perspective’ (Sydney: 
Australian Human Rights Commission, 2009): 15.
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approximately 248,699, of whom approximately 42 per cent were South 
African.60 From the late 1990s, Australia has accepted significant numbers 
of African-born refugees through the humanitarian entrant program. 
In the period from 2004 to 2016, the largest sources of resettled refugees 
to Australia included Burma, Iraq, Bhutan, Somalia, Syria and South 
Sudan. For a country still rooted in denial of the original owners of the 
land, a nation founded on ideals of white superiority and with a history of 
white migration,61 the significant recent arrivals of refugees, particularly 
from Horn of Africa countries and Middle Eastern countries, have 
continued to unsettle these ‘white’ ideals. Phenotypical characteristics as 
well as other markers of visible difference, such as Islamic female dress 
or veils, mark refugees as culturally and/or religiously different from the 
hegemonically white identity that is still presumed to be ‘Australian’.
Gloria was identified by her school as being from a refugee background 
despite not self-identifying as a refugee and having lived in Australia for 
15 of her 17 years. She was of ‘black’ African appearance. This demonstrates 
the tendency to conflate blackness with refugeeness in Australia. While 
Phillips, in her analysis of the labelling of South Sudanese Australians as 
a refugee group, argues that Sudanese Australians are ‘generally understood 
to be refugees’,62 I would take this further to propose that ‘black’ Africans 
in Australia are frequently assumed to be refugees. The conflation of 
blackness with refugeeness was also described by participants in my PhD 
research. My PhD project explored the experiences of belonging for five 
Dinka women from South Sudan who were resettled in Australia, through 
in-depth qualitative ethnographic and life history approaches.63 Achol, for 
example, described an experience at her daughter’s school:
But when I was moving here this house, I take children to 
Greenhills Primary School. Other girls to fighting with the Ayak 
[my daughter] in the school. Other woman coming, she tell me 
‘This one refugees, refugees  …  [switches to Dinka] this black 
refugee. How could she beat my child?’ … Then I was called to the 
meeting, there was a translator, and I had already been informed 
by Ayak that there was a woman who was angry with me in the 
school. Then the headmaster asked me through the interpreter, 
60  Hugo, ‘Migration Between Africa and Australia’, 16.
61  Jupp, ‘From “White Australia” to “Part of Asia”’.
62  Melissa Phillips, ‘Convenient Labels, Inaccurate Representations: Turning Southern Sudanese 
Refugees into “African-Australians”’, Australasian Review of African Studies 32, no. 2 (2011): 57–79 
(emphasis added).
63  Reported extensively in Baak, Negotiating Belongings.
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and I replied that ‘If you people say you don’t want my child in 
the school because she is a black refugee, then I will take her to 
another school.’64
Achol described another mother at her daughter’s school identifying her 
as a ‘black refugee’ thereby conflating blackness and refugeeness. Ramsay 
argues that ‘experiences of racialisation toward women who are resettled 
in Australia from Central African countries … reflect a colonial imaginary 
and a legacy of postcolonising dominance in Australia’ with ‘assumptions 
of difference, dirtiness, and savagery’ attached to the women.65 Similarly, 
Kumsa, in a study of young Oromo refugees in Toronto argues that the 
‘refugee’ label is used as a label of exclusion to further distance people from 
belonging to the nation.66 With the negative framing of the refugee that 
positions those with refugee background as always in deficit as described 
above, it is hardly any wonder that those with refugee backgrounds 
endeavour to find other labels and identities without these framings with 
which they can be identified.
For African-born Australians, blackness and refugeeness are conflated 
as a double negative relegating them to a form of perpetual foreignness. 
In a similar way, the association of Muslim immigrants and refugees with 
threats of terrorism results in them being ‘considered suspicious and 
consequently less desirable’.67 This results in visible markers of Islamic faith 
also being frequently associated with refugeeness. Colic-Peisker further 
argues that European refugees and immigrants ‘do not face their own racial 
“visibility” as a barrier to inclusion’ in Australia.68 The visible difference 
of most refugee groups results in the humanitarian resettlement program 
being ‘the most contentious immigration category’.69 These experiences of 
visibly different refugees, whose blackness or religious Otherness position 
them as perpetual refugees, sit in stark contrast to the ‘white’ Bosnian 
refugees Colic-Peisker interviewed in her research. The Bosnian refugees, 
like Malbasa described above, were able to distance themselves from 
64  Baak, Negotiating Belongings, 58–59.
65  Georgina Ramsay, ‘Central African Refugee Women Resettled in Australia: Colonial Legacies 
and the Civilising Process’, Journal of Intercultural Studies 38, no. 2 (2017): 170, doi.org/10.1080/07
256868.2017.1289904.
66  Martha Kuwee Kumsa, ‘“No! I’m not a Refugee!” The Poetics of Be-Longing Among Young 
Oromos in Toronto’, Journal of Refugee Studies 19, no. 2 (2006), doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fel001.
67  Colic-Peisker, ‘“At Least You’re the Right Colour”’, 619.
68  Ibid., 619.
69  Ibid., 619.
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their refugee identity, seeing themselves as ‘whites in a white country’70 
and recounted being told by other Australians that ‘at  least you’re the 
right colour’.71 The racialisation of the refugee in countries of hegemonic 
whiteness, such as Australia, results in them perpetually being seen as 
refugees regardless of how long they have lived in Australia.
‘I’m still a refugee …’
Gloria, in the excerpt quoted above, came to Australia when she was two. 
Yet, 15  years later, her school continued to identify her as being from 
a refugee background. Even if she did arrive on a refugee-related visa, 
15 years of a 17-year old’s life is a very long time to continue being haunted 
by the refugee label. It is likely that even if Gloria did arrive in Australia 
on a refugee-related visa, the most likely visa program she would have 
come through would have been a family reunification visa through the 
sponsored Special Humanitarian Visa program, sponsored by her father 
who was already living in Australia. Resettlement through this pathway 
facilitates people legally becoming permanent residents in Australia as 
soon as they arrive. Thus, in the legal sense of the label refugee, Gloria has 
not been a refugee since her arrival in Australia. However, the informal 
label of refugee and its concomitant frames of reference have continued to 
haunt Gloria for 15 years, despite her legal status as permanent resident 
(and likely citizen). On this basis Ludwig argues that the ‘legal refugee 
status and the informal label refugee are not, and should not be used as, 
synonymous terms’.72
The problem with the continuing haunting of the refugee label for people 
with refugee experience resettled in Australia was also described to me 
in my PhD research, outlined above. Abuk, a woman aged in her 50s, 
described in Dinka:
But we’ve been here for years and we are not refugees anymore. 
Now I’ve been here for about five years and I’m not a citizen, 
I’m still a refugee.73
70  Ibid., 621.
71  Ibid., 620.
72  Bernadette Ludwig, ‘“Wiping the Refugee Dust From my Feet”: Advantages and Burdens of 
Refugee Status and the Refugee Label’, International Migration 54, no. 1 (2016): 6, doi.org/10.1111/
imig.12111.
73  Baak, Negotiating Belongings, 47.
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Despite arriving in Australia through Australia’s humanitarian entrant 
program, and thereby being a permanent resident on arrival in Australia, 
Abuk’s experience was that, even after five years living in Australia, she 
was still recognised and identified as a refugee. This experience resonates 
with other people from various refugee backgrounds in contexts of 
resettlement. Jumsa writes of the experiences of Oromo resettled in 
Canada, who, despite being citizens for over 10 years, are still seen by 
others, and therefore themselves, as refugees.74 Neumann and Gifford 
argue that ‘Australian scholarship largely remains steeped in labelling 
resettled refugees as refugees well beyond their initial arrival in Australia’.75 
This is an issue not only in scholarship and research, but also in the media 
as well as political and everyday discourse. While legally the ending of the 
refugee label is clearly demarcated, there is no finite point at which people 
stop being seen by others, or in some instances by themselves, as refugees.
Conclusion: Rehumanising the refugee
While labelling resettled former refugees is inherently problematic, 
as  highlighted above, without using labels such as ‘refugee’ or ‘former 
refugee’ or ‘refugee background’ it is impossible to acknowledge and 
recognise the previous experiences that people have had prior to resettlement 
in Australia. The word refugee in and of itself is not the problem: rather, 
it is the framing and what it represents, the social constructions of what 
that label means, that results in a negative framing of the former refugee. 
Reframing the socially constructed understanding of the term ‘refugee’, 
while notably difficult, would enable the use of the label ‘refugee’ without 
using it to Other through marginalisation and deficit understandings. 
As Ryu and Tuvilla suggest, in their article exploring the educational 
experiences of Chin former refugees resettled in the United States, there 
is a ‘dilemma as to how to identify and accommodate their needs while 
not subscribing to sweeping narratives about the helpless refugees in need 
of support’.76
74  Kumsa, ‘“No! I’m not a Refugee!’”.
75  Klaus Neumann and Sandra M Gifford, ‘Producing Knowledge about Refugee Settlement in 
Australia’, in Critical Reflections on Migration, ‘Race’ and Multiculturalism, ed. Martina Boese and 
Vince Marotta (Routledge, 2017), 116, doi.org/10.4324/9781315645124-7.
76  Ryu and Tuvilla, ‘Resettled Refugee Youths’ Stories of Migration, Schooling, and Future’, 5.
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The politics of representation have seen refugees constructed as Others: 
as victims, lacking agency, in need of humanitarian intervention. 
This Othering serves to remove the human subjectivity of refugees,77 
dehumanising them through a process that objectifies. As Bakewell has 
argued, ‘[b]y staring too hard at “refugees” or “forced migrants”, we fail 
to see their “normality”’.78 The question then becomes, ‘how to reverse 
this dehumanization and to return the humanity to those from whom 
categorization has removed all individual attributes’.79
To rehumanise requires really listening to and hearing the voices of those 
who are often not heard. It is important to recognise that really ‘hearing’ 
their stories is:
embodied in the process of mutually recognizing our claims on 
each other as reflexive human agents, each with an account to give, 
and account of our lives that needs to be registered and heard.80
It is necessary to hear narratives of former refugees and those who are 
resettled as more complex than those of trauma, disempowerment and 
victimisation inherent in research, media and public discourse. Rather we 
need to hear the stories of agency, subjectivity, individuality, resiliency, 
resentment, fear, hate, love, passion, vulnerability, strength, courage and 
challenge. This also requires hearing the multiple stories that these voices 
have to tell. As Adichie has argued:
Stories matter. Many stories matter. Stories have been used to 
dispossess and to malign, but stories can also be used to empower 
and to humanize. Stories can break the dignity of a people, but 
stories can also repair that broken dignity.81
The stories and lives of those from refugee backgrounds can illustrate 
a complexity that is so quickly lost in research that struggles to be objective 
and representative. An acknowledgement of this complexity is vital if 
former refugees are to be understood in their full humanness. As Halpern 
and Weinstein have observed, ‘[a] critical step in rehumanization is to view 
77  Zygmunt Bauman, Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts (John Wiley & Sons, 2013).
78  Oliver Bakewell, ‘Research Beyond the Categories: The Importance of Policy Irrelevant Research 
into Forced Migration’, Journal of Refugee Studies 21, no. 4 (2008): 449, doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fen042.
79  Jodi Halpern and Harvey M Weinstein, ‘Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation’, 
Human Rights Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2004): 567, doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2004.0036.
80  Halpern and Weinstein, ‘Rehumanizing the Other’, 580.
81  Adichie, ‘The Danger of a Single Story’.
REFUGEE JOURNEyS
70
another person as a complex, nonidealized individual’.82 Rehumanising 
those with refugee experience, beyond the negative, singular stories that 
are so often represented, requires an acknowledgement that:
there is no intrinsic paradigmatic refugee figure to be at once 
recognised and registered regardless of historical contingencies. 
Instead … there are a thousand multifarious refugee experiences 
and a thousand refugee figures whose meanings and identities are 
negotiated in the process of displacement in time and place.83
Listening to the voices and representing them in all their complexity can 
and will help to rehumanise those with refugee experience. Rehumanising 
understandings of the refugee would enable a shift such that being 
a  refugee is not seen as a negative experience. It is simply one part of 
the experience that makes up the lives of complex humans. While it is 
essential that there is increased recognition that those who are resettled 
in Australia are no longer officially refugees, people with experience as 
refugees should feel able to identify with this experience in the knowledge 
that it will not be seen others as a deficit.
82  Halpern and Weinstein, ‘Rehumanizing the Other’, 574.
83  Nevzat Soguk, States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 4.
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‘HIS HAPPY GO LUCKY 
ATTITUDE IS INFECTIOUS’
Australian imaginings of unaccompanied 
child refugees, 1970s–80s
Jordana Silverstein1
In 1976 one welfare officer working at the Enterprise Hostel – a migrant 
holding centre in Springvale, Victoria – produced a set of descriptions of 
the refugee children living there.2 Of one it was noted that: ‘This girl is 
attractive and very shy, at school she is withdrawn and rarely speaks up’.3 
Of another was written an extensive note documenting her family’s life 
in Timor and noting that: ‘All of their property was occupied by various 
Army forces during the war, and resulted in considerable loss of property’. 
1  This chapter was researched and written with funding provided by the ARC Laureate Research 
Fellowship Project FL140100049, ‘Child Refugees and Australian Internationalism from 1920 to the 
Present’.
2  For recent histories of migrant hostels and holding centres, see, for example, Alexandra Dellios, 
Histories of Controversy: The Bonegilla Migrant Centre (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2017); 
Catherine Kevin and Karen Agutter, ‘The “Unwanteds” and “Non-Compliants”: “Unsupported 
Mothers” as “Failures” and Agents in Australia’s Migrant Holding Centres’, The History of the Family 
22, no. 4 (2017): 554–74, doi.org/10.1080/1081602X.2017.1302891; Sara Wills, ‘Between the Hostel 
and the Detention Centre: Possible Trajectories of Migrant Pain and Shame in Australia’, in Places of 
Pain and Shame: Dealing with ‘Difficult Heritage’, ed. William Logan and Keir Reeves (Florence: Taylor 
and Francis, 2008), 263–80, doi.org/10.4324/9780203885031; Hostel Stories: Life in S.A. Migrant 
Accommodation, University of Adelaide, available at: arts.adelaide.edu.au/history/hostel-stories/.
3  No author, Report on child, National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA): B925, V1978/60922 
PART 1. To try to ensure anonymity, I have removed the names of the children.
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Since her arrival in Melbourne, she had been found to be ‘shy to the 
extent that she was unable to say her name’. This report concluded by 
noting that:
At the hostel M socialises well. The only time M and her family 
were upset, was during the time when her uncle Mr SW was under 
a deportation order – This however has now been withdrawn and 
the family hopes that permanent residence will be given.
M has applied for permanency and nominated her parents to 
come to Australia.
Comment: This family could serve as a model in many ways.4
Maintaining refugee settlement services in Australia has, over the years, 
resulted in a vast bureaucracy and paper trail, with many of these types of 
reports that describe those who were ‘settled’ being produced. Oftentimes 
it has been social workers who played an integral role in facilitating and 
documenting the lives of refugees living in holding centres – the sites 
where refugees would first live after arrival in Australia – as they began 
the process of settling into their new lives. The records from the 1970s 
and 1980s that these workers left behind in their files, now held in the 
National Archives of Australia – our national repository of government 
documents – provide a vital window through which we can catch a 
glimpse of the ways that governments, and those who help create and 
implement government policy, thought about the people whose lives they 
were describing, and controlling.5
Looking at some of these writings presents an opportunity to think about 
the ways in which a category of person – that of the ‘refugee child’ – has 
been constructed by and through Australian public policy. This category 
of person has a long, transnational history, and is importantly understood 
as historical: like any other legal, social, cultural or political category 
of person, it is not one that naturally occurs. By confining children in 
particular places and writing about them in certain ways and with specific 
vocabularies, government bureaucracies can create a body of knowledge 
around a population, or a category of person. In this chapter I am 
interested in thinking about what makes this group of people a visible 
category, or a defined group, at a particular moment in time, that of the 
4  F Wositzky, Report on child, NAA: B925, V1978/60922 PART 1.
5  See Kevin and Agutter, ‘The “Unwanteds” and “Non-Compliants”’.
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late 1970s and early 1980s, and in a particular place, Australia. This is 
a group that is largely defined around their location in the world – that they 
are travelling, or have recently travelled fleeing violence and persecution, 
and seeking a different home – and by their relative age. By exploring 
the role that bureaucracies, lists and descriptions of people composed 
by welfare officers, social workers and government department workers 
play in creating this differentiated group, we can understand the ideas of 
refugee children that are created. In this chapter, files that predominantly 
describe and organise Vietnamese and Timorese children will be explored. 
Through an examination of a set of documents that were created by the 
bureaucracies surrounding their settlement process, I will explore the 
ways that these refugee children are understood as a group to be managed. 
As described by anthropologist, historian and critical theorist Ann Laura 
Stoler, this is a crucial part of a government’s descriptive project: a group is 
described as a necessary part of the project of managing them.6 Similarly, 
historian and political theorist Mahmood Mamdani has asserted that ‘the 
management of difference is the holy cow of the modern study of society, 
just as it is central to modern statecraft’.7
The project of managing people who cross the nation-state’s borders is 
a fundamental part of the Australian national project, and has been integral 
to Australia’s sense of itself since before Federation.8 By understanding the 
ways that the bureaucracy describes, controls and produces in order to 
manage, we get a glimpse of the ways that borders are maintained and 
populations are controlled. The practices of government that control 
those who move exist as part of a project of, to use Jennifer Hyndman’s 
phrasing, ‘disciplining displacement’.9 They are a way of governmentally 
organising people who are on the move. This is part of a broader ideology 
that determines that the movement of people across borders is something 
that requires governmental control. Indeed, the notion that the movement 
of people should be controlled and administered by governments is a 
6  See Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Commonsense 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
7  Mahmood Mamdani, Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2012), 2.
8  Tracey Banivanua-Mar, Decolonisation and the Pacific: Indigenous Globalisation and the Ends 
of Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139794688; 
Claire Higgins, Asylum by Boat: Origins of Australia’s Refugee Policy (Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 
2017). More generally see Hagar Kotef, Movement and the Ordering of Freedom: On Liberal Governances 
of Mobility (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015).
9  Jennifer Hyndman, Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), xx.
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historical one, rather than one that is necessary or natural, even though 
it may have attained such normalcy in our society as to seem natural and 
inevitable. On the flip side, could we imagine, for instance, a world in 
which people move across borders without control: what new languages 
and forms of government would that produce? What would Australia 
look like, for instance, without the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act as a 
founding document? What would relationships between people look like 
if they were not being produced through the violence of these modes of 
description?
In the descriptions that I will explore in this chapter there is some overlap 
between what we will see and the ways that adult refugees and/or citizen 
children have been described by social workers. The social workers whose 
words we are looking at here are part of a long history of social workers 
in Australia conducting similar work, as Shurlee Swain has documented.10 
Moreover, as I will go into more detail about below, there is overlap in the 
ways that other racialised populations – in particular Aboriginal children 
or non-child refugees – have been described by Australian welfare workers. 
These overlaps arise as a result of a broader history of migration, settler 
colonialism and racialisation within which the particular documents I am 
considering here sit. But, as we will come to see, there are important 
particularities to the words used and the stories told about these refugee 
children. Understanding that these words and stories serve as a means 
to control a group living in a particular space and having a certain age is 
vital to understanding the work that these accounts do. So while language 
might be borrowed from or shared with other fields of governmental 
knowledge, and circulate amongst social workers in recurring ways, the 
words used here do particular work to produce certain meanings and 
certain outcomes. When coupled with an understanding of the work that 
the bureaucracy does when it comes to sit in the archive – as I will explore 
below – we can gain an understanding of how this language works as part 
of the governmental project of constructing and producing the category 
of the refugee child. I am looking here at this category as a governmental 
and bureaucratic one, working to understand how it takes shape as such. 
10  See, for example, Shurlee Swain, ‘Beyond Child Migration: Inquiries, Apologies and the 
Implications for the Writing of a Transnational Child Welfare History’, History Australia 13, no.  1 
(2016): 139–52, doi.org/10.1080/14490854.2016.1156212. See also Fiona Davis, ‘Put Down Your 
Knitting: Unpicking Social Welfare Professionalisation in 1970s Australia’, Journal of Australian Studies 
41, no.  2 (April 2017): 222–36, doi.org/10.1080/14443058.2017.1308420, and R J  Lawrence, 
Professional Social Work in Australia (Canberra: ANU Press, 2016), doi.org/10.22459/PSWA.02.2016.
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The stories of themselves that these child refugees would narrate, or that 
their friends or parents or doctors or, indeed, social workers, would tell, 
would most likely be vastly different. In this chapter, one story – a small 
part of a much larger historical story – will be told.
Refugee children, guardianship 
and documentation
The descriptions of refugee children from the migrant holding centres in 
Victoria in the 1970s–80s, which sit within the archive of the government 
bureaucracy, were produced for a number of reasons: as part of reports by 
government workers arguing for more funding or explaining the workings 
of the holding centres; as part of the process of keeping track of the 
children’s lives, behaviours, schooling and finances; and as general case file 
notes. Much of this bureaucracy resulted from the process of documenting 
the people whose lives were being cared for by the government under the 
structures of the Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act.11
This Act first came into action in 1946 to provide the measures necessary 
for the minister for immigration to act as guardian for the British boys 
who had been brought to Australia during World War II.12 While it has 
always applied to immigrant children in general, the Act has also applied 
to child refugees, most particularly since the beginnings of the mass arrival 
11  For an overview, see Tamara Blacher, ‘Resettlement of Unattached Refugee Children in Victoria, 
1975–1979: Placement Alternatives’ (Multicultural Australia Paper No. 7, Melbourne: Clearing House 
on Migration Issues, 1980); Robert Bennoun and Paula Kelly, Indo-Chinese Youth: An Assessment of the 
Situation of Unaccompanied and Isolated Indo-Chinese Refugee Minors (Melbourne: Indo-China Refugee 
Association of Victoria, 1981).
12  The full name of the Act was ‘An Act to make provision for and in connexion with the Guardianship 
of certain alien children’. It was changed to ‘alien’ from ‘Children outside Australia’ in the amendments 
of 1983, available at: www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2004A02801. Its origins in the management 
of child migrants can also be seen in the report produced by the Senate Standing Committee on 
Community Affairs, Lost Innocents: Righting the Record – Report on Child Migration, 30 August 2001, 
esp. 11–45, available at: www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Community_
Affairs/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/child_migrat/report/index. For longer histories of this Act 
see Jordana Silverstein, ‘“The Beneficent and Legal Godfather”: A History of the Guardianship of 
Unaccompanied Immigrant and Refugee Children in Australia, 1946–1975’, The History of the Family 
22, no.  4 (2017): 446–65, doi.org/10.1080/1081602X.2016.1265572; Jordana Silverstein, ‘“I Am 
Responsible”: Histories of the Intersection of the Guardianship of Unaccompanied Child Refugees and 




of unaccompanied refugee and asylum seeker children in the 1970s.13 
While in recent years this Act has proved highly contentious – with some 
labelling it as providing for the minister to be ‘both the jailer and the legal 
guardian’ of children – in the late 1970s it was seen as predominantly a 
bureaucratic instrument by politicians.14 Indeed, for some people working 
in the Immigration ministry and Department of Immigration, it was not 
of any great significance.15 The public debate that has occurred about it 
since the early 2000s, and which occurred in the late 1940s, stands in stark 
contrast to this era of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In this era, it seems, 
it was at the level of the social workers, undertaking the face-to-face work 
with the children in the hostels and group homes, that the workings of 
the Act were most visible. Ian Macphee, the minister for immigration and 
ethnic affairs from 1979 to 1982, noted in an interview I conducted with 
him in 2017, that while he could not remember doing the work of being 
a guardian under the Act, he was:
sure that whatever happened if anyone had recommended to me 
that action be taken in accordance with that I would have, of course, 
gone along with that. In fact, I would have gone out of my way.
He and other senior officials, he said, took time ‘to investigate and weigh up 
what was in the best interest of the person’ because ‘they cared. The senior 
officials cared and I cared’. It was, Macphee remembered, ‘just a process 
based on our humanity’.16 One of the senior officials of whom Macphee 
spoke, John Menadue, the secretary of the Department of Immigration 
from 1980 to 1983, commented in an interview with me in 2017 on the 
single boys who were ‘selected’ by Australian immigration officials and 
brought from displaced persons camps in Vietnam, noting that ‘frankly’ he 
did not ‘know how well they settled. I don’t know’, he said.17
13  Note though that the 1994 amendments changed the legislation so that the minister was no 
longer responsible for children entering Australia for the purposes of adoption. Senate, Parliament of 
the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Amendment Bill 1993: 
Explanatory Memorandum’, available at: www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/iocab1993427/
memo _0.html.
14  Sarah Hanson-Young, ‘Motion—Convention on the Rights of the Child’, Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates (CPD), Senate, 14 March 2012. See also, for example, Chris Evans, Testimony 
at Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs—Immigration and Citizenship Portfolio—
Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Senate Estimates Committee, CPD, 21 October 2008; 
and Julia Gillard, ‘Ministerial Statements—Managing Migration’, CPD, House of Representatives, 
3 December 2002.
15  Interview conducted by author with Ian Macphee, 3  August 2017, Melbourne. Interview 
conducted by author with John Menadue, 11 September 2017, Sydney.
16  Interview with Macphee.
17  Interview with Menadue.
77
3 . ‘HiS HAPPy GO LUCKy ATTiTUDE iS iNFECTiOUS’
The Act has been amended numerous times, but the key provision that 
the immigration minister is the guardian of all children who are governed 
by the Act has remained. These children have included those who were 
under 21 (or, since 1983, 18), were not Australian citizens, and were not 
accompanied by a parent or a relative over the age of 21 who was to act in 
the role of a parent or guardian.18 The minister’s guardianship obligations 
were considered to have ended when the child reached adulthood, when 
they became a citizen or when they left Australia permanently. The 
minister has also always been able to delegate some of the responsibilities 
of guardianship and has regularly done so, particularly to the departments 
of Social Service or Community Service, or similar bodies.19 These 
departments have also been responsible for providing support for refugee 
and asylum-seeking children who have come to Australia as part of 
families, and as part of the general settlement services with which they 
were provided.20 And it is the workings of the people who conducted 
these services that will be explored in this chapter.
The guardianship produced by the Act has also provided for the 
categorisation of refugee children into a number of different groups. 
From the 1970s, all children governed by this legislation were known 
as ‘isolated’. Under the umbrella term ‘isolated’ they fell into one of two 
groups: ‘unattached’, which meant that they had no relative in Australia 
to look after them, or ‘detached’, which meant that they had a relative 
who was over 21, but who was not a parent. These different categories 
translated into different funding schemes, housing arrangements, and 
modes of care from the government and social services, and this was 
always debated as a problem by those responsible for the day-to-day care 
of these children.21 Regardless of the precise term being used, all of these 
18  The children governed by the Act were initially referred to as ‘immigrant’ children, and in an 
amendment in 1983 this was changed to ‘non-citizen’. For all versions of this Bill see Australian 
Government, ComLaw, ‘Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946’, available at: www.com 
law. gov.au/Series/C1946A00045.
19  This delegation has, at times, required clarification. In response to a minute asking for confirmation 
of whether the immigration minister’s authorisation was required before a child who was governed by 
the Act was allowed to marry, a memo issued by D J Rose, Senior Assistant Secretary, Constitutional and 
Financial Branch, Advisings Division, Attorney-General’s Department, on 2 June 1977 makes clear that 
‘this power of delegation only extends to the Minister’s powers and functions under that Act’, and that 
the minister (or acting minister) must provide consent ‘in person’, NAA: A432, A1977/3319.
20  For a discussion of this by someone working in the field, see Confidential Report by the A/Director 
Regional Services, Ivan Beringer, addressed to the Deputy Director-General, 30 July 1976, NAA: B925, 
V1978/60922 PART 1.
21  A Working Party on the Problems of Unattached Refugee Children was formed in 1978 to 
try to deal with some of these problems. It contained representatives from all states, as well as the 
Commonwealth. See NAA: B925, V1978/60922 PART 1 and PART 2.
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descriptors position the child in relation to family and lack of family, 
and ensure that the guardian is seen as providing a form of family. These 
refugee children are produced and comprehended as a group through 
the description of their relation to a caregiver and their relative perceived 
vulnerability. The  descriptions of them contained in the reports I am 
exploring in this chapter are a further testament to this positioning. Minute 
detail regarding their behaviour is recorded, indicating that it was thought 
that they required both care and surveillance, housing and monitoring, 
schooling and documenting. Guardianship, in this formulation and in 
these documents, enacts a certain control, at the level of the everyday.
This control came as a result of the vast majority of the refugee children 
coming to Australia in the late 1970s – children predominantly from Vietnam 
and Timor, coming normally after having been ‘selected’ in a refugee camp 
somewhere in Asia – being housed in migrant hostels on arrival. These 
were spaces that would provide access to housing, food, English classes and 
medical care, and would act, as Sara Wills has framed it, as ‘frontiers of 
assimilation’, ‘hold[ing] together’ ideas of Australianness and creating, as 
Glenda Sluga has made clear, sites of ‘material and cultural discomfort’ for 
many.22 While in these hostels, the unaccompanied children would have 
their lives documented.23 There were a series of instrumental reasons for 
this. Firstly, governments were unaware of how many unaccompanied 
children were in Australia and in each city. Reports on children at each 
hostel thus functioned as a type of census exercise. Secondly, while the 
immigration minister was the guardian of these children, responsibilities of 
guardianship were delegated to the local Department of Social Services, and 
the departments believed that they required certain information about each 
child to be known in order for services to be provided. Thirdly, there was 
the question of funding: as each child was recorded, their funding needs and 
pensions provided were noted.24
22  Wills, ‘Between the Hostel and the Detention Centre’, 268. Quote from Glenda Sluga, and 
emphasis, in Wills.
23  Indeed, for a number of reasons, the hostels were a key site for the gathering of information. 
For one child it was noted that the family with which he was living ‘left Midway Hostel before case 
studies were completed and the information on hand is minimal. The Welfare Officer will attempt 
to home-visit the family as soon as possible, and information gained will be forwarded’. Mary Ralph, 
Welfare Officer, Migrant Services, 23 August 1976, NAA: B925, V1978/60922 PART 1.
24  A note from M L  McCready, Executive Officer, Settlement, to all Settlement Officers, dated 
29  August 1979, titled ‘Isolated Refugee Children’, explains that ‘It is extremely important that 
[reports about the children are] done as Community Welfare Services is relying on these details to 
have an up-to-date picture of refugee children, isolated or at risk. It also assists Community Welfare 
Services in submissions for staff to cope with long-term casework demands of this group’, NAA: B925, 
V1978/60922 PART 2.
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The government policy framework being used, however, was unclear 
for many of the workers. In July 1976, the associate director of regional 
services wrote to the deputy director-general of the Department of 
Immigration and argued that ‘There would appear to be a fairly urgent 
need to clarify a range of policy issues related to defining responsibility 
and effective case planning for refugee children’.25 It was not until 1985 
that a cost-sharing agreement between state and federal governments was 
established – an agreement that remains in place, unaltered, to today.26 
Before this period, arrangements were generally ad hoc.
While some workers at the hostels would provide simple lists, at other 
times stories about the children were told by welfare and settlement 
officers. Some of these were full-page reports, containing information 
such as name, sex, place and date of birth, address, nationality, ethnic 
origin, ‘natural’ father and mother, financial support, relatives in 
Australia, relatives in country of origin, relatives elsewhere, current 
situation and sections for an expanded background and comment. Others 
were short paragraphs, headed by a name and birthdate. Of recurring 
focus throughout the reports were questions of finance, housing and the 
temperament of the children. Throughout these reports, the voices of the 
workers dominate, with the chance rarely, if ever, provided for the children 
to report about themselves. What we learn from these reports, therefore, 
is not how the children were living their lives, or undertaking their own 
settlement process, or understanding themselves; instead, we get a glimpse 
of the discourses and structures of governmental bureaucracy at work. We 
gain a sense of the ways the social workers and administrators imagined 
and catalogued the task of managing the migration and settlement of 
refugee children in Victoria. Through these bureaucratic writings we 
find just one of the ways in which the category of the ‘child refugee’ was 
created. Indeed, this bureaucratic production sits within a long set of 
histories and practices of governments creating and defining populations, 
and of international law and instruments such as the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child – which would come later – providing guidelines that 
25  Confidential report by the A/Director Regional Services, Ivan Beringer, addressed to the Deputy 
Director-General, 30 July 1976, NAA: B925, V1978/60922 PART 1.
26  The cost-sharing agreement is available in NAA: A14039, 2520: Cabinet Memorandum 2520 – 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs – 1985–1986 Budget – new policy proposal – cost-sharing program 
for care of refugee minors – Decisions 5059/ER (Amended) and 5667.
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national governments variously follow or ignore.27 In Australia, this forms 
part of a broad settler-colonial project of control and assimilation, which 
works to differentiate, often in racial terms, this population.28
Descriptions of the children
Within the surveys of the children, there were continued reports on their 
present and future housing situations. This began before the children 
arrived in Australia, with cables being sent from officials in Canberra 
to the Department of Immigration branch in Melbourne noting the 
settlement officers’ decision as to where the children should be placed 
upon arrival.29 While children could express a view on where they would 
live, the ultimate decision rested with settlement officials. As one cable 
noted, ‘confirming’ a previous cable regarding three siblings who were 
‘unattached refugee minors’ and were living in ‘Singapore having been 
rescued at sea’: there was a ‘distant cousin’ living in Springvale, who could 
not ‘accommodate’ them. The corresponding official wrote that:
we would wish to send them to Victoria to at least give them some 
family tie but we would also wish them to be retained as a group 
in hostel accommodation after initial period in migrant centre.
The ‘urgent views’ of officials in Melbourne was ‘appreciated’.30
Once in Australia, the housing arrangements were under constant scrutiny 
and discussion. Of one child it was reported that:
He would be happy to live in a large communal house if his friends 
were also living there, if this cannot be arranged he has a twenty 
year old friend … [in Oakleigh] with whom he could live.31
27  For histories of children’s rights and international law, as well as Australia’s relationship to this 
law, see, for example, Mary Crock and Lenni B Benson, eds, Protecting Migrant Children: In Search 
of Best Practice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018).
28  See, for example, Patrick Wolfe, Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race (London: Verso, 
2016).
29  There are many examples of these cables in NAA: B925, V1978/60922 PART 4.
30  Cable sent from Tarbath to Melbourne, 20 March 1981, NAA: B925, V1978/60922 PART 4.
31  ‘Timorese Children’, no date, NAA: B925, V1978/60922 PART 1.
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Another boy was reported as ‘prefer[ring] living with his sisters to any 
other accommodation arrangement’.32 Of a set of siblings it was written 
that a settlement officer from Midway Hostel together with a worker from 
the department ‘agreed that the best solution is to try to obtain a flat 
for them, but we believe that economically they cannot afford to pay for 
one’.33 In this way, housing and financial concerns from the department 
often intersected. Similarly, in an April 1976 report on Timorese 
unaccompanied children at the Midway Hostel it was noted that the 
situation with a group of boys was:
fairly stable. They have caused no problems. They are the boys 
who are receiving $4.80 per week after the hostel tariff is paid. 
Financially their situation is inadequate because from $4.80 they 
need to pay school requisites, clothing, other personal items and 
medical expenses.34
This focus on the financial position of the children recurred throughout 
the reports, as social workers documented how much money the children 
had, needed and earned, and what this would mean for their living 
situation. Some children, it was written, ‘reject any form of communal 
living’ and sought employment to support their desire to live together, 
while others were described as ‘not presently receiving any financial 
support’.35 In the lists of the children, careful notes were made to explain 
precisely which government ‘benefits’ were received.36
As social workers tended to do, these workers were also keen to describe 
the behaviours of the unaccompanied children. In the description of one 
child it was noted that:
the Welfare Officer feels that [she] has suddenly been allowed 
too much freedom and needs welfare follow-up. It would also be 
beneficial if she found lasting friendships outside of the hostel in 
the community.37
32  Ibid.
33  Victoria Undurraga, Settlement Officer, Midway Centre, to Ms Margaret McCready, Executive 
Officer, Settlement Unit, 21 December 1979, NAA: B925, V1978/60922 PART 3.
34  Assistant Director, Settlement Services Section, ‘Report on Timorese Refugees. “Isolated 
Children”’, 14 April 1976, NAA: B925, V1978/60922 PART 1.
35  J Zaia, Welfare Officer, Migrant Services, ‘Reports on Timorese Without Parents (Midway)’, 7 July 
1976, NAA: B925, V1978/60922 PART 1. The report begins by noting that ‘These reports are only 
factual – they will be followed-up with recommendations and suggestions for the children’s future’.
36  NAA: B925, V1978/60922 PART 2.
37  ‘Progress Report on Welfare of Isolated Timorese Children at Enterprise Hostel’, 9 April 1976, 
NAA: B925, V1978/60922 PART 1.
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Another child was described as being bound to:
have many problems settling in Australia. She is functionally 
illiterate. She has little or no concept of time, and combined 
with a very short concentration span, she has great difficulty in 
keeping appointments and performing any kind of organised 
work. [expunged section  …  ] Many efforts have been made to 
help and support her. Catholic Family Welfare had arranged for 
her to live in a hostel with five girls, but she rejected this, she also 
has rejected any other form of alternative accommodation. [She] 
has always lived a ‘free life’, not bound by any restriction. I do not 
believe institutional care is the answer, but I am unable to offer 
any other alternative.38
This girl’s description ends there, with the last sentences ‘expunged’, 
presumably by the archivist at the National Archives of Australia, where 
these documents are now housed.39
These expungements give pause, compelling the historian reading these 
archival papers to note the potential ongoing force of the documentation 
of these children’s lives. Through these lists, as I have indicated, 
information is acquired, and certain forms of knowledge produced, about 
these children and where they do and can live within society. Where once 
these names and descriptions sat within confidential government files, 
today they sit in the archives, publicly accessible. This notation, described 
above, was created on 7 July 1976, relatively recently, and we can thus 
presume that this girl, or people who know her, remain within Australia, 
able to access this description. This description is saturated with racialised 
ideas of ‘appropriate’ migrant living and settlement, and also contains 
expunged sentences. Some descriptors are, it would seem, judged too 
sensitive to be available to the public. Others are deemed suitable to be 
made available.
38  J Zaia, Welfare Officer, Migrant Services, ‘Reports on Timorese Without Parents (Midway)’, 
7 July 1976, NAA: B925, V1978/60922 PART 1.
39  From looking at the pages in the archives, it appears that certain sentences are covered over 
with tape reading ‘expunged’, and the page has then been photocopied before being re-placed in the 
archival file. In the NAA’s Recordsearch facility, the file is noted as being ‘Open with exception’ for 
reasons under the Archives Act 1983 (Cth) para 33(1)(g): would ‘unreasonably disclose information 
about the personal affairs of a person’. See ‘Why we refuse access’, NAA, available at: www.naa.gov.
au/help-your-research/using-collection/access-records-under-archives-act/why-we-refuse-access.
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Indeed, this expunging is part of the process of racialisation of these 
children,  wherein certain descriptors remain public while others are 
withheld from view. It is important to note that the archival records of 
citizen children are withheld from public access for 100 years.40 The files 
and papers that I am exploring in this chapter are possible to view, I would 
guess, because they sit within the record-keeping of immigration, rather 
than of social services. And while archivists might repeatedly inform 
me that anything to do with personal, medical or sexual information is 
withheld from public viewing under the Archives Act of 1983’s exemption 
reason 33(1)(g), the presence and public availability of  these types of 
information suggests that this is not always true.41
While we cannot know the mindset of the archivist who ruled this open 
– and indeed documents like this, which tell the histories of refugee 
children in Australia, remain viewable throughout the archives – the 
fact that the file remains publicly accessible requires us to ponder the 
layers of ethics in using them to write these histories. As I utilise them, 
then, I am forced to sit with an ambivalence over their usage. Perhaps 
this ambivalence is essential to the work of the historian – for in colonial 
archives we can often find materials that describe people without their 
consent, and that have been made public without their ongoing consent 
– but in this present political moment, when refugees remain a political 
battleground within Australian politics, it takes on a particularly potent 
feeling. These are affective archives, we could say. As I put them to work 
to craft a narrative, they do emotional work within me, and within the 
Australian nation.42 There is a discomfort attached to them. But the 
historians’ discomfort is, of course, beside the point. An ethical usage of 
these documents and descriptions then, one can only suppose, arises from 
their use in the service of the seeking of migrant and refugee justice. It lies 
further in the constant remembering that these are people, with lives, 
histories, memories and futures, who are being described. Their humanity 
sits not in these documents but in the lives they have lived.
40  I am grateful to Professor Shurlee Swain for alerting me to this point.
41  Medical information is often freely available in these archives, and has appeared in almost every 
NAA file that I have seen which holds documents dealing with the implementation of this Act.
42  See, for example, Trish Luker, ‘Decolonising Archives: Indigenous Challenges to Record Keeping 




Additionally, I am compelled to wonder, does the public availability 
of these documents tell us something vital about how the various arms 
of government imagine, and manage, refugees and their place within 
Australian society? These documents, it would seem, testify to an idea of 
these child refugees as being outside the realm of citizenship. If citizen 
children’s archives are kept from public view for longer than non-citizen 
children’s, and difference is not neutral, then these differences can be 
understood to demonstrate a conception of the personhood of child 
refugees as being substantively different to that of child citizens. While 
this might be obvious when considered as a question of legal categories 
– of course a citizen is different to a non-citizen, some may say – I am 
interested in what it means when thought through the lens of a history 
of bureaucratic writing, or governmental practices, or interpersonal 
relations.43 What can this tell us about how these children are imagined, 
and their lives noted down, described and understood? It produces 
simultaneously both an outsiderness to citizenship and a life lived under 
government control and surveillance. This is the predicament that many 
racialised populations face, as they are refused access to the benefits of 
citizenship, but are saddled with the controlling aspects of government 
bureaucracy. In this way, these refugee children are experiencing similar 
types and effects of descriptions and controls that have been used to 
determine the lives of Aboriginal children and other racialised groups over 
Australia’s history. What distinguishes them is their different position in 
society: it is the movement across borders, and their position within the 
Australian community after arrival, that is being placed under surveillance 
and managed. Those who migrate, and those who are Indigenous, are 
treated by governments in ways that coincide, but are not the same.
Refugee children are being produced as a group through both the collection 
of this information by social workers and the like, and then by its retention 
and public availability through archival practices. Bureaucratic processes 
of description, collection and retention help to produce a population 
that can be known, for these instances of refugee children’s lives being 
intimately – and now publicly – documented repeat and repeat. Another 
child at the Enterprise Hostel was described in the following language: 
‘His relationship with his aunt … is not good. Amongst the complaints 
that he lists are that no friends are allowed to visit him in his room, 
43  See, for example, David Tait, Terry Carney and Kirsten Deane, A Ticket to Services, or, a Transfer 
of Rights? Young People and Guardianship (Hobart: National Clearinghouse for Youth Studies, 1995).
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he receives no pocket money’, and the next few sentences are expunged.44 
While certain intimate details are determined to be of interest to note, and 
allowed to be read by the public, a line is drawn somewhere. The precise 
place is – for those of us who access these documents – inscrutable. But 
we know that we can read other children described as ‘likeable’,45 as ‘more 
mature than her age would indicate, readily displaying responsibility and 
sensibility’,46 as having a ‘well mannered, pleasant personality’,47 and as 
‘attractive and very shy’.48 One school was asked to provide a report on 
two siblings, and of the brother they report that he ‘wears very corrective 
glasses’ while the sister ‘has no physical problems, in fact she has a most 
affectionate smile’.49 Another child’s report states that:
At the beginning he wanted to go back but with the time, he 
gained friends and his happy go lucky attitude is infectious. 
He has changed his mind and is definitely FOR AUSTRALIA.50
In this notation, as in the one with which I began this chapter, the 
position of the child refugee in relation to the nation is invoked: there is 
a move towards incorporating these model child refugees into the nation. 
Surveillance and description remain part of the process of producing 
a desired national population.
All of these stories were collected as the result of the existence of the idea 
of the category of the child refugee, and in the service of the production 
of that category of person. As noted in the description of the child and her 
family with which I began this chapter, certain refugees were imagined as 
‘models’ for others by the social workers and settlement service workers 
who created the reports; certain ideas of what it meant to be a refugee 
were created through these reports in order to be held up and followed 
by others. These descriptions of the children existed as both a product of 
surveillance and a way of creating a category of personage, as well as in 
order for bureaucrats and public servants to lobby different branches of 
government to provide funding and support. Thus, a July 1976 report 





49  K  Richardson, Migrant Coordinator, and K  Gough, Principal, Springvale Primary School, 
15 July 1976, NAA: B925, V1978/60922 PART 1.
50  Deputy Director General, Victorian Resettlement Co-ordinating Committee, Confidential Note: 
‘Unattached refugee children still in Victoria’, 30 July 1976, NAA: B925, V1978/60922 PART 1.
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from the Victorian state government utilised case file reports written about 
unattached children in order to support their claims for greater assistance 
and regulation in policy and practice. The cases outlined included 
descriptions of children’s housing and financial arrangements, as well as of 
their state of mind, and served to be ‘illustrative of the difficulties being 
encountered in effectively planning for these refugee children’.51
These documents thus provide us with a glimpse into the genealogy of 
these categories of person and the ways in which their histories can be 
written. While these case file notes in some ways propose to outline the 
stories of the children, to provide seemingly vital information about 
them, they instead provide a set of discourses about how these refugee 
children were thought of and written about, how they were surveyed, 
described and categorised. Certain aspects of their lives were deemed 
important to document, other aspects discarded. These traces sit within 
the government archive, providing us with the means to understand the 
work that government discourse does when relating to, describing and 
producing certain categories of person.
Conclusion: The work of categorisation
In their use of surveys to gain information about the children, and their 
management of their housing and thus relationships with others, the 
Australian welfare departments and their social worker employees sought 
to tell a set of stories about who these refugee children were, how they 
would live and what their relational lives in Australia would look like. 
These stories were collected as the result of the imagining of the category 
of the child refugee, and in the service of the production of that category 
of person. This was to be a category of person defined as ‘child-like’: as 
requiring care and protection provided by the workers of the state. These 
descriptions buttressed the existence of this category of person within 
the population. The dividing up of the population served as a means of 
exerting control, both of this divided group and of the population at large. 
In this way, refugee children as a group were circumscribed and defined 
through their relationship to place, to surveillance and to other peoples. 
They were kept within a particular political order.
51  Confidential Report by the A/Director Regional Services, Ivan Beringer, addressed to the 
Deputy Director-General, 30 July 1976, NAA: B925, V1978/60922 PART 1.
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But alongside this we can read the work of Bashir Bashir and Amos 
Goldberg, who have written, following Hannah Arendt and Giorgio 
Agamben, that ‘the refugee is precisely the one who stands outside 
the political order, and is thus by definition a figure that disrupts the 
established order of things’.52 This is because, they say, the refugee crosses 
boundaries, moving around the world and thus inhabiting the world in 
a manner that disrupts the bounded world of the citizen. If we follow this 
thinking, which I think can be helpful, we can understand the ways that 
the bureaucracy tries to contain and annul this disruption: to manage any 
possible alteration to the political order.
Peter Mares, writing in relation to a recent case of a temporary resident 
parent being denied permanent residency even though their children and 
former partner were Australian citizens, explains that there is caution 
among policymakers that women may fall pregnant in order to remain in 
Australia: one ‘senior government adviser’ told him that ‘You have to be 
very careful what visa products you put on the market … People will try to 
exploit those loopholes’.53 Could a new way of thinking – one that avoids 
these racialised capitalist logics – about the place and role of regulation 
of borders and human movement open up a new way of describing how, 
and why, people move around the world, and how they should be related 
to when they do? What other possible languages, or ‘grammars’ could be 
used?54
We can come to understand that in these documents those who 
worked within settlement services, or at schools, or in the multitude of 
other spaces (both bureaucratic and physical) with which the children 
interacted, produced a set of languages, discourses and grammars about 
the children. The knowledge that was produced about these children 
was refracted through the government and social workers’ words. As  in 
governmental documents more generally, there was an attempt at 
silencing. Governments tend to make policy for, rather than with, those 
who are subjected to that policy. In this case, these refugee and asylum 
seeker children were doubly infantilised, imagined as unable to speak, 
52  Bashir Bashir and Amos Goldberg, ‘Deliberating the Holocaust and the Nakba: Disruptive 
Empathy and Binationalism in Israel/Palestine’, Journal of Genocide Research 16, no. 1 (2014): 90, 
doi.org/ 10.1080/14623528.2014.878114.
53  Peter Mares, Not Quite Australian: How Temporary Migration is Changing the Nation (Melbourne: 
Text Publishing, 2016), 93.
54  Liisa H Malkki, ‘Refugees and Exile: From “Refugee Studies” to the National Order of Things’, 
Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995): 516, doi.org/10.1146/annurev.an.24.100195.002431.
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both as refugees and as children. This then, perhaps, is part of the work 
being done in these documents: the production of a group of people who 
are imagined to rely on being controlled, and having their lives shaped, 
by the settlement services offered by various layers of government. Even 
if at times officials might have consulted with children as to where they 
wanted to live, decision-making power rested with officials, not with 
the children. These archives that I have examined – and that now share 
too much with the public – are sources of discipline, both discursive and 
material, and they sit within those practices of the art and vocabulary of 
government that work to create ideas of what it meant to be a Vietnamese 
or Timorese unaccompanied child refugee in Australia in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s.55
55  Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978, ed. 
Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), esp. 87–134.
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‘FOREIGN INFILTRATION’ VS 
‘IMMIGRATION COUNTRY’
The asylum debate in Germany
Ann-Kathrin Bartels
The capacity of how many people our country can take in is 
limited … The burden refugees put on the FRG [Federal Republic 
of Germany] is too heavy. How should this cramped, overpopulated 
country be able to take in tens of thousands of people? How should 
the already strained nature cope with the inevitable consequences 
of settling more and more asylum seekers? … There is indeed still 
physical space in this country (maybe it is possible to accumulate 
the entire world population on the territory of the FRG), but this 
cannot be the standard. Nature’s reserves will not withstand further 
mass immigration, especially not if from different cultural hearths. 
And the psychological willingness to accept more refugees of the 
people, who do not want to lose their homes, is waning too.1
1  Original: Aber die Aufnahmefähigkeit unseres Landes ist begrenzt  …  Die Flüchtlingslast wird 
zu schwer für die Bundesrepublik. Wie soll dieses enge, übervölkerte Land immer neue Zehntausende 
aufnehmen können? Wie soll die jetzt schon überstrapazierte Natur fertig werden mit den unvermeidlichen 
Folgen der Ansiedlung von immer mehr Asylbewerbern? … Platz im rein physischen Sinne ist in der Tat 
noch (vielleicht kann man die ganze Menschheit auf dem Territorium der Bundesrepublik versammeln); 
aber das kann doch wohl nicht der Maßstab sein. Für weitere Massenzuwanderung, vor allem aus anderen 
Kulturkreisen, reichen die Reserven der Natur und der Ökonomie nicht, reicht auch nicht die psychische 
Hinnahmebereitschaft der Bevölkerung, die ihre Heimat nicht verlieren will. Johann G  Reißmüller, 
‘Diese Last wird zu schwer’, FAZ, 5 September 1985, 1.
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The above quotation was published in the German newspaper Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) in September 1985. Other articles of that 
time spoke of ‘foreign infiltration’, ‘bogus asylum seekers’ or ‘legions 
of displaced persons’, and were titled (e.g.) ‘Opfer von Schmarotzern’ 
(Die Zeit), ‘Die Last wird zu schwer’ (FAZ), ‘Ohne Grundgesetzänderung 
geht es nicht. Was tun angesichts der Asylantenflut?’ (FAZ).2 Moderate 
journalists like Klaus Liedtke, former editor of the weekly magazine 
Stern, held politicians responsible for instilling fear in the population by 
using terms such as ‘Grenzen der Ausländerverträglichkeit’ (limitations 
to the tolerance of foreigners) and ‘Überfremdung des Volkes’ (foreign 
infiltration). He deemed it careless of them to suggest that Germans had 
to protect their ‘national identity against ever new waves of Asian invaders 
– disguised as asylum seekers’.3
Conditioned by the country’s National Socialist past, art 16, §2II GG of 
the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) guaranteed 
that ‘[p]ersons persecuted on political grounds shall have the right of 
asylum’.4 Growing numbers of asylum seekers coming to the FRG in the 
1980s led conservatives to proclaim that they would abuse the laws of 
asylum and the constitution. At the time, Theo Sommer, former chief 
editor of Die Zeit, argued that the fierce debate around the right of asylum 
in Western Germany really would revolve more around the question of the 
German self-conception as a nation than around the number of asylum 
seekers coming to Germany.5 Indeed, the 1980s were a period when the 
very existence of a German national identity was thoroughly questioned. 
One existential part of this debate was the ‘Historikerstreit’ (Historians’ 
Quarrel) that emerged in 1986 after the FAZ-publication of Ernst Nolte’s 
essay Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will. In his essay, he questioned 
the singularity of the Holocaust and attempted to newly evaluate its 
importance for German historiography. The German sociologist and 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas accused him of writing revisionist history 
and trying to create an unbroken German national identity based on 
conservative values. A major controversial discussion of the existence, 
composition and definition of a German national identity ignited almost 
2  In English: ‘Victims of Social Parasites’, Die Zeit, 26 April 1985; ‘This Burden is too Heavy’, 
FAZ 5 September 1985; ‘It Cannot be Done Without a Constitutional Change. What is there to be 
Done Given this Flood of Asylum Seekers?’, FAZ, 30 October 1986.
3  Klaus Liedtke, ‘Die Angst vor den “Kanakern”’, Stern, 4 September 1986, 3.
4  Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany], 
available at: www.documentarchiv.de/brd/1949/grundgesetz.html.
5  See Theo Sommer, ‘Wegen Überfüllung geschlossen?’, Die Zeit, 29 August1986, 1.
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at the same time that the asylum debate was gaining momentum, which 
leads to the question of whether the debates emerged isolated or related 
to one another.
I argue that it is possible to gain insight into the concept of a German 
national identity by analysing statements about asylum seekers in 
newspaper articles, as they can be read as a dialogue about the ‘other’ amid 
the German people. The focus of this chapter is on the representation 
and linking of these debates in newspapers and magazines from February 
1985 to January 1987. During these years, the numbers of people seeking 
asylum in the FRG rose to over 100,000 per annum – to 103,076 in 1988.6 
Against the backdrop of an emerging economic crisis and high rates of 
unemployment, a heated debate around the intake of asylum seekers and 
its implications for the German public emerged and peaked shortly before 
the general election in January 1987. Articles for the analysis stem from 
the following nationwide West German broadsheet newspapers:
• Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), centre-right, liberal conservative
• Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), centre-left, progressive liberalism
• Bildzeitung, centre-right, conservative populist tabloid
• Frankfurter Rundschau (FR), left-liberal
• Die Tageszeitung (taz), centre-left/left
• Die Zeit, centre-left, liberal.
And additionally, from the weekly news magazines:
• Der Spiegel, centre-left
• Stern, centre-left.
Initially, around 500 articles on microfilm were sourced for analysis by 
scanning them for keywords such as ‘asylum’, ‘asylum seekers’, ‘bogus 
asylum seekers’, ‘refugees’, ‘refugee shelter’, ‘wave of asylum seekers’, 
‘economic migrants’, ‘law of asylum’, ‘national identity’, etc. Thematic 
topics of the newspaper and magazine articles were (e.g.) the FRG’s 
constitution, xenophobia, ethnicity or the right to asylum. These 500 
articles were then sifted through by looking more closely at the types of 
article (descriptive, factual, opinion) and at the headline and content of the 
6  See ‘Table 24: Zahl der Asylbewerber in der Bundesrepublik, 1975 bis 1995’, in Ulrich Herbert, 
Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland (Bonn: C.H. Beck, 2003), 263.
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articles, the language and tone used in them, and distinguishing between 
descriptive and opinion pieces. From this, a good understanding of the 
individual journalist’s or writer’s political standings could be gathered. 
It  also disclosed how these reflected the specific newspaper’s political 
stance. Around 220 articles were selected for closer analysis.
For the purpose of this paper, the debates around ‘asylum’ and ‘national 
identity’ are regarded as discourse threads. This is based upon the concept 
of entanglement of discourses according to Siegfried Jäger. He defines 
discourses as rivers of knowledge through time and acknowledges that 
they affect individual and collective actions and therewith wield power.7 
Discourses are not an absolute reflection of social realities, but they 
shape them. Their analysis aims at problematisation, that is, at exposing 
omissions or contradictions. Furthermore, Jäger assumes that discourses 
are made up out of different components and layers. Their various threads 
are formed out of discourse fragments that, in the broadest sense, discuss 
the same topic. These fragments often refer to several subjects, which 
results in an entanglement of discourses. Consequently, discourses are not 
isolated from each other and their intertwining creates a highly branched 
net of discourse threads.8
At the end of this paper, the German debate of the 1980s will be 
compared to the Australian debate about the arrival of Vietnamese boat 
people in the 1970s and early 1990s. Conclusions will be drawn about 
the similarities and dissimilarities of the two debates and the motifs 
emerging in them. This is of interest, for multiple reasons. First, Germany 
and Australia have a very different history when it comes to taking in 
foreigners. Germany has, apart from the guest worker system of the 
1950s, ’60s and early ’70s, never had a proactive immigration system. It 
does not have a control system or a quota for taking in migrants or asylum 
seekers. Additionally, Germany has always struggled with the question of 
what it means to be German. Friedrich Nietzsche proclaimed in 1886 that 
the question ‘What is German?’ would never die off.9 Australia, on the 
other hand, has been an immigration country from the arrival of the First 
7  Siegfried Jäger, Kritische Diskursanalyse: Eine Einführung (Münster: Unrast, 2004), 132.
8  Jäger, Kritische Diskursanalyse, 132; Siegfried Jäger, ‘Diskursive Vergegenkunft: Rassismus und 
Antisemitismus als Effekte von aktuellen und historischen Diskursverschränkungen’, in Historische 
Diskursanalyse, ed. Franz X Eder (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 239–52, doi.org/ 
10.1007/978-3-531-90113-8_13.
9  Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse: Zur Genealogie der Moral. Eine Streitschrift (Berlin: 
Holzinger Verlag, 2013), §244.
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Fleet in 1788. It has a well-established immigration system, including 
a humanitarian system of refugee resettlement that is split into offshore, 
onshore and special humanitarian programs. The countries had a different 
comprehension of  their ‘national identities’ – Germany believing in jus 
sanguinis, citizenship through German descent, compared to jus soli, 
birthright citizenship, in Australia (this was abolished in 1986).
Defining ‘national identity’
Looking at the political, cultural and technological conditions that 
gave rise to nationalism in eighteenth-century Europe, the author of 
Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson, points to the importance the 
development of newspapers and novels played in forming homogenous 
groups. Their emergence, combined with the rise of capitalism, he argues, 
is the point of origin of national consciousness. He refers to nations as 
‘[imagined communities] because, regardless of the actual inequality 
and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived 
as a deep, horizontal comradeship’.10 Even though the single members 
within a community do not know each other, they share a conception 
of a superior community to which they belong. ‘National identity’ 
is a  feeling of belonging that is shared by a group of humans and that 
produces an idea of a collective as a ‘nation’ according to Eunike Piwonie, 
who analysed changes to the concept of ‘national identity’ in Germany. 
‘National identity’ has an inclusive and an exclusive effect, as it can create 
or show up differences of the outsiders to a specific community.11 Part of 
this ‘feeling of togetherness’ of a group of people, the creation of a ‘we-
feeling’, is a result of features such as historical territory, language, shared 
memories, traditions or rights and obligations. The national narrative, 
built through history and literature, plays a particularly important role as 
it is internalised and understood as the public’s shared history. Considering 
Germany’s National Socialist past, it becomes clear why especially the 
question about the creation of an identity on the grounds of the nation’s 
past was discussed controversially. According to Claudia Tazreiter, ‘ethnic 
nationalism was a fertile environment for the growth of exclusionary 
politics in preserving unity against external threats and internal regional, 
10  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 2006), 7.
11  Eunike Piwoni, Nationale Identität im Wandel: Deutscher Intellektuellendiskurs zwischen Tradition 
und Weltkultur (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2012), 46, doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-18740-2.
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religious and social forces’.12 A clear differentiation from ‘Others’ plays an 
important part for the concept of ‘national identity’, seeing that Germany 
is generally considered to be an ‘ethnic nation’. It builds its concept of 
identity on the grounds of its cultural and ethnic heritage and the concept 
of jus sanguinis that makes German citizenship an exclusive one.
Heterostereotypes and autostereotypes
One way of creating an ‘Other’ is by stereotyping. Stereotypes, which help 
make sense of the world, are passed on through ‘socialisation, education, 
our families, media, propaganda etc.’13 (social genesis), and are accepted 
in society as fixed structures. Stereotypes come into existence and change 
at certain points in time (historical genesis). They play an important role 
in our everyday lives, as they are resilient and integrative and form our 
preconceptions, influence the integration of others into society and are 
the motivation behind social acts, ideologies, politics etc. The historian 
Hans Henning Hahn defines a stereotype as:
a (negative or positive) value judgement, which is generally backed 
by a strong conviction (or the speaker only pretends to be of this 
conviction if he uses the stereotype specifically with a manipulative 
intention, thus not himself convinced that the stereotype is true). 
It is mostly used on humans, specifically on groups of humans 
which can be defined in different ways: racial, ethnical, national, 
social, political, religious or confessional, vocational etc.14
A stereotype’s research value can be separated into three levels: (a) an 
asserted claim to truth about a person’s nature, (b) alleged objectivity 
about the stereotype’s target (the person that is being discussed) and 
(c) information about the user of the stereotype. Only the last offers actual 
insight as it reveals the user’s perception of the world and much about 
the society in which the stereotype exists.15 Stereotypes have two ‘sides’: 
12  Claudia Tazreiter, Asylum Seekers and the State (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2004), 88.
13  Hans Henning Hahn, ‘12 Thesen zur historischen Stereotypenforschung’, in Nationale 
Wahrnehmungen und ihre Stereotypisierung: Beiträge zur Historischen Stereotypenforschung, ed. Hans 
Henning Hahn and Elena Mannová (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2007), 18.
14  Hans Henning Hahn and Eva Hahn, ‘Nationale Stereotypen: Plädoyer für eine historische 
Stereotypen-forschung’ in Stereotyp, Identität und Geschichte: Die Funktion von Stereotypen in 
gesellschaftlichen Diskursen, ed. Hans Henning Hahn (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2002), 20.
15  Hahn, ‘12 Thesen’, 20f.
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they show the way others are perceived (‘heterostereotype’) and reveal 
self-perception (‘autostereotype’). Conclusions about the worldview of the 
heterostereotype user can be drawn by analysing both sides.
Heterostereotypical depictions 
of asylum seekers
It is possible to identify five main heterostereotypes in the newspaper and 
magazine articles under consideration here:
1. The ‘Wirtschaftsflüchtling’ or ‘Scheinasylant’ (‘economic refugee’ or 
‘bogus asylum seeker’) was widely used and assumes that people mainly 
come to Germany for economic reasons. Attorney Manfred Ritter 
wrote that, for example, Sri Lankan Tamils would abuse art 16 of the 
constitution by coming to Germany ‘because of the significantly better 
economic conditions  …  instead of seeking refuge in neighbouring 
countries which are linguistically, religious, culturally, climatic and 
historically more like their own countries’.16
2. Criminal offences such as drug trafficking, robbery or prostitution were 
attributed to asylum seekers. The ‘criminal asylum seeker’ could not 
be trusted and certain crimes were attributed to specific nationalities. 
In an interview with Der Spiegel in March 1986, Berlin’s Interior 
Senator Heinrich Lummer said ‘but it is the truth’17 when asked if he 
really thought Ghanaian women were prostitutes, Sri Lankan Tamils 
drug traffickers and Lebanese people petty criminals. However, 
official documents, such as the German Federal Office of Criminal 
Investigation’s paper on crime reduction from 1987,18 make no reference 
of a noticeable rise of crimes committed by asylum seekers.
3. People from non-European backgrounds were portrayed as being 
distinctively ‘culturally different’19 and hence incompatible with 
German culture. It was implied that asylum seekers from African or 
16  Manfred Ritter, ‘Ohne Grundgesetzänderung geht es nicht: Was tun angesichts der Asylantenflut?’, 
FAZ, 30 October 1986, 9.
17  Axel Jeschke and Christian Habbe, ‘“Gucken Sie sich doch die Leute aus Ghana an”: Der Berliner 
Innensenator Heinrich Lummer (CDU) über seine Pläne zur Verschärfung des Asylrechts’, Der Spiegel, 
17 March 1986, 61–64.
18  Bundeskriminalamt Wiesbaden, Kriminalitätsbekämpfung als gesamtgesellschaftliche Aufgabe: BKA-
Vortragsreihe Band 33 (Wiesbaden: BKA, 1988), 36–38.
19  Ritter, ‘Ohne Grundgesetzänderung’, 9; or Liedtke, ‘Die Angst vor den “Kanakern”’, 3.
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Asian countries did not want to integrate themselves. Asylum seekers 
of Muslim belief were defined mainly by their religion and Islam was 
seen as incomprehensible and threatening. In an FR reader’s letter, 
Alfons Winter demanded that ‘the entry of Islamists, which come 
from a  completely different culture’, should be banned because the 
FRG would be in danger of ‘slowly, but surely turning into an Islamic 
republic’.20 Sommer pointed out that Germany had been a country 
shaped by immigration for centuries and that waves of migrants had 
shaped its culture over time and eventually always became part of the 
nation.21
4. Asylum seekers were also portrayed as a ‘source for social unrest’. 
According to Reißmüller, the accumulation of more ‘economic 
refugees’ could lead to social conflict and result in destabilisation of 
democracy.22 Other articles pointed out that the German problems 
with asylum seekers were home-grown: ‘Strict prohibition to work 
and detention in camps forced foreigners into the role of vexatious 
outsiders’.23 Poor hygiene standards and overcrowding in camps 
resulted in fights and led to growing public resentment.24
5. Several articles described the construction of camps and the intake of 
asylum seekers generally to be the source of ‘xenophobia’ in Germany. 
The Stern reported that residents of Eggenfelden put up banners that 
read ‘Keine Asylanten nach Eggenfelden! Eltern schützt eure Kinder! ’ 
(No Asylum Seekers in Eggenfelden! Parents, protect your children!)25 
Another article stated how an anonymous caller threatened to send 
petrol so that the asylum seekers could set themselves on fire26 and 
yet another argued that Germans must be stupid allowing asylum 
seekers in despite high unemployment rates, as this would lead to 
social conflict.27
20  Alfons Winter, ‘Asylsuchende nach Amerika? Leserbrief ’, FR, 11 August 1986, 2.
21  Sommer, ‘Wegen Überfüllung geschlossen?’, 1.
22  Johann G Reißmüller, ‘So geht es nicht weiter’, FAZ, 15 July 1986, 1.
23  ‘“Im Lager ist besser als daheim”: Asylgrundrecht – Gütezeichen der Verfassung oder 
Fehlkonstruktion?’, Der Spiegel, Nr. 31/1986, 28 July 1986, 32.
24  Josef-Otto Freudenreich, ‘Kein Platz für Toleranz’, Die Zeit, 11 October 1985, 14.
25  Christine Claussen, ‘“Menschen die keiner will  …” Im Bezirk Niederbayern wehren sich 
Einwohner gegen die Aufnahme von Asylsuchenden’, Stern, 8 August 1985, 60.
26  See Gerhard Tomkowitz, ‘Den Druck im Kessel erhöhen’, Stern, 4 September 1986, 210.
27  Helmut Böpple, ‘Die Deutschen sind … Leserbrief ’, Stern, 28 August 1985, 9–10.
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In the following section, the heterostereotypes and autostereotypes of 
the ‘bogus asylum seeker’/‘economic refugee’ and the ‘culturally different 
asylum seeker’ will be examined. The development of the term ‘Asylant’28 
and the declassification of asylum seekers as ‘Scheinasylanten’ is the 
subject of an article in the taz from July 1986. According to author Jürgen 
Link, the term ‘Asylant’ was not part of the public discourse until the 
late 1970s as there were only small numbers of people seeking asylum, 
mainly coming from communist countries and therefore deemed eligible 
applicants. In the following years, the term developed into a negatively 
denoted term to describe asylum seekers. It followed the tradition of 
other negatively connoted words ending with the affix ‘-ant’, which is also 
used in words such as ‘Ignorant’ (ignoramus) or ‘Simulant’ (malingerer). 
According to Link, ‘Asylanten’ lost their human face as media and 
politicians no longer saw them as individual human beings, but rather 
as a threatening flood or avalanche.29 Ritter accused asylum seekers of 
falsifying political persecution in their home countries by ‘provoking 
their government or through joining a radical … organisation’.30 Equally, 
Reißmüller thought it indisputable that most of the people coming 
to Germany were doing so for economic benefits and thus, he noted, 
natural and economic resources, as well as society’s willingness to accept 
more migrants, were dwindling.31 Migrants of a different cultural, non-
European background were perceived as particularly problematic. While 
asylum seekers from Eastern Europe were likely to be of Christian belief, 
followed similar traditions and learned the German language quickly, 
asylum seekers from African or Asian countries were depicted as unable 
to adapt and impossible to integrate. Muslim asylum seekers were defined 
solely through their religion, with Islam perceived as incomprehensible 
and even threatening. In an article in Die Zeit, the journalist Roland 
Kirbach described the prejudices a Lebanese refugee family faced when 
they moved into an apartment: Since Muslims would only eat after dark 
during Ramadan, it was feared that ‘the four Omayrat-children would, 
under the stimulus of hunger, roam the streets and steal lollipops from 
the German children’.32
28  ‘Asylant’ is commonly used as a negative term to describe asylum seekers, whereas ‘Asylbewerber’ 
is the official term.
29  Jürgen Link, ‘Asylantenflut oder “Flüchtlinge raus”’, taz, 24 July 1986, 5.
30  Ritter, ‘Ohne Grundgesetzänderung’, 9.
31  Reißmüller, ‘Diese Last wird zu schwer’, 1.




Generally, those who are negatively defined are deemed ineligible to be 
granted asylum, yet the accusation that people would come to Germany 
only for economic reasons was hard to verify. None of the articles that 
support restrictions to the laws of asylum questioned the negative 
terminology. There are, however, articles that criticised the use of such 
terminology: ‘Deichgrafen-Metaphorik’33 (dike-reeve imagery or water 
metaphors) is what Sommer called the extensive use of sea-related terms 
such as ‘Flüchtlings-Springflut, Asylanten-Schwemme, Ausländer-Strom, 
Einwanderer-Welle’ (refugee spring tide, glut of bogus asylum seekers, 
stream of foreigners, wave of immigrants) and Rolf Michaelis was surprised 
that Germans were not ashamed to insult those seeking protection.34
It is important to note that the fear of new arrivals from ‘different cultures’ 
was strengthened in these articles by adding the attribute ‘foreign’. 
The historical and social origins of this stereotype therefore went hand in 
hand, as the process of promoting the idea of immigrants as irredeemably 
foreign was reinforced on different levels of social life. The image of 
something being ‘foreign’ became part of the collective symbolism and 
served as a reference point of orientation within society and helped justify 
political and social actions. It appears that the stereotypes built on one 
another and became interdependent, almost forming an argumentative 
circle. Their social and historical origin can be traced back to the increased 
use of the terms by the media and in politics in the 1980s. The more often 
asylum seekers were portrayed negatively, the more these ideas gained 
legitimacy and were adopted in other public spheres of society.
Autostereotypes
Each stereotype allows for conclusions to be drawn about those voicing 
it, about their emotions and perceptions of the world, and thus provides 
insight into the society in which they take effect.35 Assuming that 
stereotypes are particularly useful tools for creating ‘we’-groups, it can 
be argued that the depictions of asylum seekers in mid-1980s newspaper 
articles were primarily used to distance asylum seekers from Germans, 
intending to ensure that readers did not identify with asylum seekers, 
but instead rallied against them.
33  Sommer, ‘Wegen Überfüllung geschlossen?’, 1.
34  See Rolf Michaelis, ‘Gesang vor der Tür’, Die Zeit, 1 August 1986, 29.
35  Hahn, ‘12 Thesen’, 21.
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The first assertion about the autostereotype is the ‘tolerance limit’. This 
suggests that the FRG had saddled itself with too great a burden by 
taking in asylum seekers. It includes the allegation of abuse of the right 
to asylum by ‘Scheinasylanten’ by describing applicants negatively. High 
unemployment rates, criminality, xenophobia and social conflict served 
as reasons for claiming that the right to asylum should not be granted 
to ‘bogus asylum seekers’. Stressing that large numbers of asylum seekers 
arrive in the FRG suggests that parts of the German population were 
concerned about their own living standards. Having experienced the 
economic miracle of the 1950s and 60s, the German state had moved into 
an adverse economic situation after 1973 as the oil crisis affected every 
sector of the German economy. However, despite unemployment rising 
faster than ever since World War  II,36 the idea of thousands of asylum 
seekers burdening the economy was unproven. Emotionally loaded 
terms like ‘psychische Hinnahmebereitschaft’37 (psychological readiness of 
acceptance) or ‘Interessen der Deutschen’38 (German interests) imply that 
the ‘tolerance limit’ is not a measurable but rather a subjective limit, 
suggesting that the exact moment of its excess cannot be determined.
The ‘tolerance limit’ is supplemented by the idea of ‘foreignness’ and both 
blend together to such an extent that their clear distinction is impossible. 
The fear of foreign infiltration led to a call for a limitation of migration. 
Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauss warned: ‘If the situation in 
New Caledonia gets any worse, we will soon have wogs in our country’.39 
He criticised the unwillingness of asylum seekers and foreigners to 
assimilate into German culture. Assimilation seemed to be the only 
acceptable version of integration.
The depiction of asylum seekers as cultural strangers in many articles leads 
to the question of from where this German fear originates. One cause 
appears to be the lack of awareness of differences between Germans and 
non-Germans. The above cited Die Zeit article details how the landlord 
of a Lebanese refugee family was lectured by anonymous callers about 
the differences between Germans and Lebanese: as they would normally 
‘live in caves’ it would not be necessary to offer them ‘a comfortable 
36  See Table, ‘Entwicklung der Arbeitslosigkeit in der Bundesrepublik in den Jahren 1950 bis 1990’, 
bpb.de, available at: www.bpb.de/geschichte/deutsche-einheit/lange-wege-der-deutschen-einheit/ 47242/ 
arbe itslosigkeit?p=all.
37  Reißmüller, ‘Diese Last wird zu schwer’, 1.
38  Gerhard Kropf, ‘Hochtrabend und wirklichkeitsfremd: Leserbrief ’, FAZ, 22 September 1986, 11.
39  Hans Schueler, ‘Kein deutsches Ruhmesblatt’, Die Zeit, 5 April 1985, 7.
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apartment with floor heating, tiles, carpets, precious wooden doors and 
an open fireplace’.40 Arrivals from Poland, however, were greeted with less 
suspicion as ‘they have the right skin tone, come from a familiar cultural 
background and learn German quickly’.41 Different concepts of hygiene, 
intimacy or time, and also of the roles of family, gender or religion, can 
lead to misunderstandings between cultures, but it does not preclude 
their compatibility. If they are nonetheless seen as hindrances, it can be 
concluded that either a feeling of superiority of one’s own culture or a fear 
of explicit displays of foreign customs are the reason for this.
No concrete evidence is given as to those components of the German 
culture supposedly in danger, but it is interesting to look at the Prussian 
virtues that are nominally said to form the basis of the German value 
system: honesty, modesty, discipline, sincerity, diligence, a sense of 
justice, a sense of duty and reliability.42 Asylum seekers in the articles were 
described as not possessing such virtues. Instead they were depicted as 
being the exact opposite, as criminal and immoral.
The discourse thread focusing on a tightening of art 16, §2II GG is of 
significance here. As it guaranteed the right to asylum, the continuous 
increase in numbers of asylum seekers since the 1970s lead especially 
conservatives to the perception that the constitution was being abused 
by asylum seekers. Numerous restrictive measures were taken throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s to constrain the number of foreigners coming to the 
FRG: for example, the First and Second Acceleration Laws in 1978 and 
1980, which aimed at shortening the procedures for granting the right to 
asylum or imposing a five-year working ban for asylum seekers in 1982. 
Interior Senator of Berlin Heinrich Lummer claimed that ‘according to 
the current law of asylum, the entire Red Army and the KGB could march 
[into Germany] as long as they would only proclaim themselves to be 
asylum seekers’.43 Reißmüller and others promoted tightening art  16, 
§2II GG, a move they deemed long overdue seeing that ‘millions, yes 
dozens of millions’ could ask for asylum in the FRG under the current 
laws, which would lead to a destabilisation of the German democracy.44 
40  Kirbach, ‘Sie beten zuviel’, 14.
41  ‘“Die Spreu vom Weizen trennen”: SPIEGEL-Serie über Asylanten und Scheinasylanten in der 
Bundesrepublik (IV): Polen’, Der Spiegel, 15 September 1986, 109.
42  See Herbert Kremp, ‘Preußische Tugenden’, Welt, 2001, available at: www.welt.de/print-welt/
article 431886/Preussische-Tugenden.html.
43  Schueler, ‘Kein deutsches Ruhmesblatt’, 7.
44  Ritter, ‘Ohne Grundgesetzänderung’, 9.
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Asylum seekers were portrayed as threatening to Germany’s political 
system and its values. This becomes particularly apparent when insisting 
that ‘Scheinasylanten’ would abuse the right to asylum: the stereotypical 
user accuses asylum seekers categorically of exploiting the law and implies 
that they would flout basic values. This contradicts imagined German – or 
Prussian – virtues like honesty and sincerity.
Opponents to an amendment of the constitution pointed to the 
experiences of flight and refuge of the founders of the FRG and to 
the National Socialist post of the country, and proclaimed that a change 
to the constitution might sound like a popular idea in an election year, 
but that it would not be a viable solution. Instead, the reasons for flight 
should be investigated and stopped around the world.45 After the general 
election in 1987, an amendment of the constitution was less contested, 
but the discussion came to life again in the early 1990s and finally resulted 
in a constitutional change of art  16, §2II and the so-called safe-third-
country regulation in 1992–93.
Focusing on the ‘tolerance limit’ and ‘foreignness’, it can be concluded 
that there is a presumed limit to what German values can withstand 
and exceeding it could result in their loss. It is interesting to note that 
a  national character is created for asylum seekers even though these 
migrants have diverse national and cultural origins. Their cultural diversity 
is reduced to a few negative attributes to give this group a uniform face. 
Their assimilation is named as the only way to prevent the loss of German 
values, or even the abandonment of the German nation in the Western 
part of Germany.46 This implies insecurity about the building blocks of 
one’s own nation. Talking about ‘floods’ of asylum seekers suggests that the 
control and defence of the arrival of asylum seekers is far more important 
than determining why people flee their home countries. The use of water 
metaphors reinforces this feeling of overstraining. An objective discussion 
or respectful interactions with refugees are treated as equally irrelevant.
It can be concluded that a heterogenic group of asylum seekers is 
moulded into a faceless group with its own national character by means of 
stereotyping. This group is characterised as being different and parasitic; 
verifying the claims of these statements seems to be unimportant. The ideas 
of having a ‘tolerance limit’ and of not being able to accept the ‘foreignness’ 
45  Christian Schütze, ‘Politisch Verfolgte genießen Asylrecht’, SZ, 169/30, 26/27 July 1986, 4.
46  Reißmüller, ‘So geht es nicht weiter’, 1.
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of asylum seekers build upon one another and are interconnected. They 
merge into the assumption that a subset of the German population lives 
in fear of the ‘other’.
Furthermore, the creation of a negative concept of the asylum seeker as 
alien appears to be combined with a stylisation of the self-image of the 
native German. The acceptance of negative stereotypes into the symbol 
system of the German language implies that the existent image of the 
‘foreigner’ is no longer enough. Negative connotations of foreigners 
indeed existed in the FRG before the 1980s, most notably through guest 
worker programs. From 1954 to 1955, a steadily growing number of 
guest workers and their families came to Germany from countries such 
as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece as well as Turkey, Yugoslavia and 
Tunisia. After their work contracts expired, many guest workers and their 
families chose to settle in Germany rather than return to their countries 
of origin. With the economic recession of the mid-60s and early 70s and 
rising unemployment, guest worker programs were no longer required 
and ceased operation in 1973. The permanently settled guest workers 
started being blamed for problems such as shortages in apartments and 
jobs, social conflicts and the emergence of a subculture of semi-isolated 
‘second generation’ migrants. The 1980s, however, saw another shift in 
the discourse and a redefinition of the ‘foreigner problem’: from guest 
worker to asylum seeker.
Discourses and stereotyping
Looking at the asylum debate and the national identity debate as 
discourses, it can be concluded that the two are indeed not occurring 
separately from one another, but that they are entangled. There is, 
foremostly, the  question of how to handle Germany’s nationalist-
socialist past and  the responsibilities that arise out of it. In his speech 
commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II on 
8 May 1985, Federal President von Weizsäcker spoke of learning to accept 
the nation’s past – not in order to overcome it, but to preserve its memory 
and to learn from it. He ended with the plea:
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Do not let yourselves be forced into enmity and hatred of other 
people, of Russians or Americans, Jews or Turks, of alternatives 
or conservatives, blacks or whites. Learn to live together, not in 
opposition to each other.47
These aspects are also mentioned in articles regarding the topic of asylum: 
for example, when defending and challenging art 16, §2II. While some see 
Germany’s history as a reason to take in asylum seekers, others condemn 
this as ‘mistaken altruism’.
Based on the idea that nations, as a construct, work not only in an inclusive 
but also an exclusive way, and that ‘national identity’ is constructed by 
differentiating it from the ‘other’, some aspects of the debate on asylum 
stand out: insisting on the idea that asylum seekers are culturally foreign 
to Germans indicates the creation of a ‘we’-group through the exclusion 
of ‘others’. The resulting feeling of togetherness is based upon ethnic 
homogeneity and relies on the principle of assimilation of everything 
deemed to be foreign. The one common denominator for the ‘we’-
group is fear – fear of foreigners, and fear of related, social problems. 
Here, stereotyping’s impact on public discourses becomes apparent. 
A negative reputation is the result of linking Asian or African asylum 
seekers to criminality, cultural differences, social unrests and xenophobia. 
‘National identity’ and the ‘feeling of togetherness’ influence the thoughts 
and actions of those belonging to the nation and act as strong binding 
material. This is enhanced specifically by thinking in stereotypes, which 
has an important and resilient defensive function. Articles promoting 
immigration do not manage to destroy this negative perception. Instead 
they label fear of asylum seekers as xenophobia and do not offer an 
informed elucidation of the pros and cons of immigration. This, however, 
leads to a growing disparity between supporters and deniers of the right to 
asylum. Eventually, only two options prevail for a nation: redefining the 
image of the society by adjusting it to encompass foreigners or attempting 
to make society fit their idea of it. The actual diversity of the German 
nation, visible in the presence of former guest workers and their families 
as well as resettlers, refugees and asylum seekers, clashes with the idea 
of a national identity based upon ethnic homogeneity. And, ultimately, 
47  Richard von Weizsäcker, ‘Speech by President Richard von Weizsäcker during the Ceremony 
Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the End of War in Europe and of National-Socialist Tyranny 





the German government took the path of attempting to eliminate 
the facticity of a multicultural society by imposing more restrictive 
measures, which culminated in the ‘Asylkompromiss’ of 1992–93. This 
new regulation means that those travelling to Germany via a safe third 
country, or a country of the European Union, cannot ask for asylum in 
Germany, because they have already passed through a safe country in 
which they could have asked for asylum. It also introduced the principle 
of safe countries of origin, which deems certain countries to be safe if they 
do not, or not generally, produce refugees.
(Dis)similarities in German and 
Australian debates
Australia’s immigration policies had for decades been governed by the 
Immigration Restriction Act 1901, which became known as the ‘White 
Australia policy’. It aimed at encouraging Anglo-Celtic migration and 
keeping out the Asian races.48 The post–World War II era saw a shift in 
Australia’s attitude towards non-white, non-European migrants and the 
White Australia policy was abolished in 1973. Shortly after, from 1975 
onwards, Australia witnessed for the first time unauthorised arrivals to 
the country via boat. While Australia had always taken in refugees from 
around the world via its humanitarian program and under its obligations 
to the 1951 Refugee Convention, this was an unexpected challenge.
After the fall of Saigon to the North Vietnamese Army in 1975, large 
numbers of Vietnamese fled their country, seeking refuge abroad. 
The majority of the 80,000 Indochinese migrants arrived in Australia by 
plane and had previously been formally processed by Australian officials 
at Malaysian and Thai refugee camps. In April 1976, however, a boat 
with five Vietnamese men landed in Darwin. They were the first of a total 
of just 2,059 arrivals by boat that came to Australia between 1976 and 
1981.49 Despite the number of boat arrivals being comparatively low, the 
reaction from politics and society were largely negative. With a federal 
election due on 10 December 1977, the arrival of six boats carrying 218 
asylum seekers on 21 November 1977 was major news. Both parties ‘used 
48  Andrew Bennetts, The Mess We’re In. Managing the Refugee Crisis (Camberwell: Trabagem 
Publishing, 2017), 185.
49  Nancy Viviani, The Long Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in Australia (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1984), 85.
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the arrival of Vietnamese asylum seekers to demonstrate their resolve 
to enforce Australia’s immigration laws’.50 Opposition leader Gough 
Whitlam claimed that Australia’s borders needed to be protected against 
unauthorised immigration, criminal offences and the spread of diseases, 
thereby negatively associating asylum seekers with these.51 He also 
doubted the legitimacy of the arrivals’ asylum claims, proclaiming it ‘not 
credible, 2.5 years after the end of the Vietnam war, that these refugees 
should suddenly be coming to Australia’.52 On 25 November 1977, Prime 
Minister Fraser spoke to a woman on talkback radio, who was concerned 
that Australia would turn into ‘another Rhodesia with a white minority’53 
due to the large number of Vietnamese refugees. This shows just how much 
the arrival of unauthorised asylum seekers stoked fears of an Asian invasion 
of Australia. Newspaper articles at the time ranged from being critical 
of the Fraser Government’s and the Opposition’s stance, to proclaiming 
that instead of being eligible asylum seekers, ‘Vietnamese Communist 
agents and rich Thai businessmen are reported to be entering Australia 
posing as Indo-Chinese refugees’.54 Other articles equally describe boat 
arrivals as non-genuine asylum seekers. The arriving Vietnamese would 
lack the ‘lean and hungry look’ and showed ‘evidence of wealth’.55 1977 
also witnessed the hour of birth of one of the most resistant images in 
the Australian asylum debate: the queue. Gough Whitlam motioned 
that ‘genuine refugees’ should be accepted, but spoke out against putting 
refugees ‘ahead of the queue’.56
The debate around the Vietnamese boat arrivals had no significant effect 
on the election outcome;57 it did, however, have influence on the second 
wave of boat arrivals from 1989 to 1998. Arrivals were mostly from 
Cambodia and Southern China. While the Vietnamese boat people of 
the first wave had been granted refugee status and permanent residence, 
arrivals of the second wave were held in detention for the duration of 
their claim assessment – some for over two years. This change was partly 
brought on by a general surge in applications for permanent residency 
50  Rachel Stevens, ‘Political Debates on Asylum Seekers during the Fraser Government, 1977–1982’, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 58, no. 4 (2012): 529, doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497. 2012. 
01651.x.
51  John Mayman, ‘Lib Policies Blamed for Viet Influx’, Australian, 26–27 November 1977.
52  Ibid.
53  ‘Fraser Warns Refugees’, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 November 1977, 1–2.
54  Age, 25 November 1977, 9. As quoted in Stevens, ‘Political Debates’, 530–31.
55  Australian, 25 November 1977, 6. As quoted in Stevens, ‘Political Debates’, 531.
56  ‘Hawke: Return Bogus Refugees’, Australian, 29 November 1977, 1.
57  Stevens, ‘Political Debates’, 529.
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from applicants who had arrived in Australia legally. Australian historian 
Geoffrey Blainey referred to this as having ‘turned the White Australia 
Policy inside out’.58 According to polls quoted by sociologist Katharine 
Betts, the Australian public’s attitude towards boat arrivals toughened 
from 1977 to 1979 and again in 1993, with larger numbers of people 
wanting to send boat arrivals back.59
At first glance, similarities between the German debate of the 1980s 
and the Australian debates of the 1970s and 1990s become apparent. 
The sudden influx in the numbers of asylum seekers led to an intensifying 
public debate in both countries and eventually to toughened regulations. 
The ‘Asylkompromiss’ in Germany in 1992–93 and the introduction of 
mandatory detention in Australia in 1992 are good examples of this.
It is interesting to note that the arguments brought forward in the public 
debates are very similar. In both debates the genuineness of asylum seekers 
is questioned, with the idea of them seeking a better life, rather than 
fleeing from prosecution, dominating. This can be seen, for example, in 
the address to the House of Representatives of the Rt Hon. Ian Macphee, 
member of the Liberal Party, in March 1982,60 as well as in the remarks 
from Manfred Ritter in the FAZ in 1986.61 Rachel Stevens distinguishes 
between three functions of the ‘seeking a better way of life’ argument:
1. trivialising the conditions from which asylum seekers were fleeing
2. exaggerating the threat posed to the Australian nation by, potentially 
large numbers of, asylum seekers
3. creating a separation between those fleeing impoverishment and those 
fleeing political persecution.62
Comparing these three lines of arguments with the German debate, it can 
be stated that especially Stevens’ second point ties in with the idea of the 
‘tolerance limit’ – the extent to which a nation can accept asylum seekers 
58  Geoffrey Blainey in Warrnambool in March 1984, quoted in Michael Kirby, ‘Australian 
Population, Multiculturalism and the Road from Warrnambool: The Hon Justice Michael Kirby 
CMG: The Opening Address delivered at the Second General Conference of the Australian 
Population Association, Sydney, 8 December 1984’, Journal of the Australian Population Association 1, 
no. 2 (1985), 61.
59  Katharine Betts, ‘Boat People and Public Opinion in Australia’, People and Place 9, no. 4 (2001): 
40–41.
60  Stevens, ‘Political Debates’, 538.
61  Ritter, ‘Ohne Grundgesetzänderung’, 9.
62  Stevens, ‘Political Debates’, 538.
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before it may collapse economically or culturally. This is comparable to 
the exaggerations used by Reißmüller, who speaks of potentially ‘millions, 
yes dozens of millions’ of people that could try to seek asylum in the 
FRG63 or Berlin’s Senator of the Interior Heinrich Lummer, who claimed 
that ‘according to the current asylum law, the entire Red Army and the 
KGB could march [into Germany] as long as they would only proclaim 
themselves to be asylum seekers’.64
Insisting that arrivals by boat would ‘jump the queue’ reveals a level of 
‘foreignness’ of asylum seekers. The creation of an imaginary queue in 
which those seeking asylum are lining up leads to the suggestion that 
boat arrivals are disrupting this orderly line by jumping straight to the 
top. They would therewith cheat those asylum seekers who arrived in 
Australia by plane, for example, out of their spot in the queue. This is not 
only used to contrast boat people negatively from other asylum seekers, 
to show them as undeserving of being granted refugee status, but also as 
an emotive descriptor in that it is used to make boat arrivals look like 
criminals. This creates a divide between the ‘them’ and the ‘us’ – asylum 
seekers and Australians.
What is interesting to note in the Australian debate, however, is that 
insisting on a differentiation between ‘genuine asylum seekers’ and boat 
people who ‘jump the queue’ creates a justification for adopting tougher 
regulations and the move to mandatory detention for boat arrivals. 
It serves to legitimise these tougher stances, as it claims that those asylum 
seekers following the proper channels are more deserving of being granted 
a place in Australia than others. The idea of a jumpable queue is not 
something that features in the German debate.
1980s Germany was a country that many felt had an obligation to 
assist asylum seekers due to the experiences during World War  II; it 
was also struggling to come to terms with its ‘national identity’ and the 
significance of an increasingly foreign population. Australia, on the other 
hand, was and is a country whose ‘national identity’ is deeply connected 
with the concept of migration. The arrival of Vietnamese asylum seekers 
to Australia in the 1970s was only the first test for a country that had 
only recently abolished its White Australia policy and was presumably still 
coming to terms with a more multicultural, non-White identity.
63  Ritter, ‘Ohne Grundgesetzänderung’, 9.









THE OTHER ASIAN 
REFUGEES IN THE 1970s
Australian responses to the 
Bangladeshi1 refugee crisis in 1971
Rachel Stevens2
If I was to ask you to imagine Asian refugees in the 1970s, what images 
would spring to mind? I suspect you would think of Vietnamese 
refugees, either on a boat drifting in the South China Sea or perhaps 
in an overcrowded camp in Malaysia. These are iconic images of Asian 
refugees in the 1970s and with little wonder. The Vietnamese exodus was 
dramatic, sudden and was the result of Western, primarily American, 
military intervention in the region. Furthermore, with the resettlement 
of over 1.4 million Indochinese (Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian) 
refugees throughout Western countries from April 1975 to 1991, these 
South-East Asian migrants have had a visible impact on cities across 
North America, Western Europe and Australia.3 If not the Vietnamese 
1  At the time of the conflict, Bangladesh was known as East Pakistan. I will use the contemporary 
term ‘Bangladesh’, unless quoting directly from archival material or discussing the history of the region.
2  This research was generously supported by a National Library of Australia Fellowship, funded by 
the Past and Present members of the National Library Council in 2018.
3  Rachel Stevens, Immigration Policy from 1970 to the Present (New York: Routledge, 2016): 
108; Seamus O’Hanlon and Rachel Stevens, ‘A Nation of Immigrants or a Nation of Immigrant 
Cities? The Urban Context of Australian Multiculturalism’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 
(hereafter AJPH) 63, no. 4 (2017): 556–71, doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12403.
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refugees, then perhaps you thought of Ugandan Asians, the 27,200 ethnic 
Gujaratis who were forcibly expelled by Ugandan President Idi Amin as 
part of his government’s ‘Africanisation’ strategy in 1972–73.4
The resettlement of Indochinese refugees, mostly in North America, 
Australia and France, and the arrival of Ugandan Asians in Britain 
and other countries were significant events in recent refugee history. 
Not surprisingly, these two refugee movements have attracted considerable 
scholarly attention.5 But in terms of numbers, these refugee populations 
were dwarfed by the 10 million Bangladeshi refugees who fled to India 
to escape violence in their home country. Largely forgotten in public 
memory outside of South Asian communities, the Bangladesh refugee 
crisis of 1971 received saturation worldwide media coverage at the 
time and attracted extensive humanitarian relief from governments, aid 
agencies, the United Nations and religious organisations.
This chapter aims to extend the conventional narrative of Asian refugees 
during the 1970s to include Bangladeshi refugees. Specifically, it explores 
the ways that Australians of diverse backgrounds engaged with the 
unfolding refugee crisis in 1971 and examines how they sought to provide 
humanitarian relief to the millions of Bengali refugees languishing in 
camps in India. It asks: Who were the Australians that empathised with 
the plight of Bangladeshi refugees? And why did they care for distant 
Asian refugees, many of whom were non-Christians and with socialist 
leanings? The efforts of Australians to aid Bangladeshi refugees is 
perplexing: during the second half of the twentieth century, the Australian 
Government traditionally gave preference to the resettlement of European 
anti-communist refugees and, later, South-East Asian refugees over 
4  Samia Nasar, ‘We Refugees? Re-defining Britain’s East African Asians’, in Migrant Britain. Histories 
and Historiographies: Essays in Honour of Colin Holmes, eds Jennifer Craig-Norton, Christhard Hoffmann 
and Tony Kushner (London: Routledge, 2018): 138–48, doi.org/10.4324/9781315159959-16, and 
Panikos Panayi, ed., The Impact of Immigration: A Documentary History of the Effects and Experiences 
of Immigrants in Britain Since 1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).
5  For recent scholarship of Vietnamese refugees, see the voluminous work of Nathalie Huynh 
Chau Nguyen; for recent publications on the resettlement of Ugandan Asians in Britain, see 
Becky Taylor, ‘Good Citizens? Ugandan Asians, Volunteers and “Race” Relation in 1970s Britain’, 
History Workshop Journal 85, no. 1 (2018): 120–41, doi.org/10.1093/hwj/dbx055; Yumiko Hamai, 
‘“Imperial Burden” or “Jews of Africa?” An Analysis of Political and Media Discourse in the Ugandan 
Asian Crisis (1972)’, Twentieth Century British History 22, no. 3 (2011): 415–36, doi.org/10.1093/
tcbh/ hwq059.
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other persecuted groups.6 These were the exiles with whom Australians 
sympathised. We shared their struggle against communism and the 
tyranny of authoritarian dictatorships. But the Bangladeshi refugees did 
not fit this typical mould and the cross-sectional support they received 
from the Australian public is, prima facie, counterintuitive.
Two Pakistans, many problems: A brief 
history to the 1971 conflict
The Islamic State of Pakistan emerged from the Partition of British India 
in 1947. Its two wings, West Pakistan (current-day Pakistan) and East 
Pakistan (Bangladesh), were over 1,200 miles apart. These territories were 
hastily devised by Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a London judge, in under six weeks. 
This Partition line, which is now known as the Radcliffe line, cut through 
450,000 km² and affected the lives of 88 million people. The idea behind 
the Partition was to separate Muslim-majority areas from Hindu-majority 
areas, but given the religious diversity in the northern parts of India, this 
task was not as simple as it sounded. West Pakistan had sizeable Sikh 
and Hindu populations around the Punjab while in East Pakistan, around 
16 per cent of the population was Hindu.
Although the created state of Pakistan was conceived on the assumption 
of Muslim solidarity, ethnic and linguistic differences between the two 
wings created frequent instability within the fledgling nation. In Pakistan, 
the government bestowed official status on English and Urdu, the latter 
considered the language of Islam in South Asia. Neither official language, 
however, was widely spoken. According to the 1961 Pakistani census 
(the most relevant census for the 1971 war), 99 per cent of East Pakistanis 
spoke Bengali. Meanwhile, two-thirds of West Pakistanis spoke Punjabi, 
the remainder speaking Urdu, Sindhi or Pashto. Given the dominance of 
Bengali in East Pakistan, East Pakistanis had long agitated unsuccessfully 
for official language recognition. The failure of the Pakistani Government 
to recognise Bengali as an official language was an affront to the rich 
literary tradition among Bengalis.
6  For histories of Australian resettlement of central and eastern European refugees, see Jayne 
Persian’s Beautiful Balts: From Displaced Persons to New Australians (Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 
2017) and Vasilios Vasilas, When Freedom Beckons: The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Jewish 
Hungarian Journey to Australia (Sydney: Vasilios Vasilas, 2017).
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Even the idea of Muslim solidarity overcoming all other differences proved 
to be a myth in Pakistan. West Pakistani elites believed that, even though 
East Pakistanis had Muslim names and identified as Muslim, they were in 
fact ‘Hindu at heart’. West Pakistani elites also saw Bengalis as uncivilised 
and effeminate. As one West Pakistani commander commented, East 
Bengal was ‘a low-lying land of low-lying people’.7 The idea that Bengalis 
were weaker than West Pakistanis had long colonial roots, fostered by the 
British when they recruited most of the military from the Punjab, the 
north-western province of British India. Punjabis believed that, as the 
selected military caste, they were racially superior to other ethnic groups 
in British India. This belief held through the postcolonial years, with most 
of the armed forces recruited from West Pakistan. These racial stereotypes, 
a fear of foreign Hindu influence and linguistic differences rendered East 
Pakistanis outsiders and ‘strangers in their own land’, which in turn 
provided fertile ground for the mass killings that would follow in 1971.8
West Pakistani chauvinism arguably enabled the central government to 
treat its eastern province as a colony and a market, ripe for exploitation.9 
Despite being the more populous province with 76 million people, and 
the main supplier of income to the national economy through exports 
of jute and rice, East Pakistanis were deprived of enjoying the fruits of 
their labour. Government revenue, development projects and foreign aid 
expenditure were all directed to West Pakistan. West Pakistanis also had 
access to well-paid government jobs: Islamabad became the national capital 
in 1967 and home to the civil service; the Pakistan Armed Forces were 
headquartered in neighbouring Rawalpindi. With this relative prosperity, 
75  per cent of all imports to Pakistan were shipped to the western 
province while East Pakistanis endured endemic poverty punctuated with 
regular natural disasters. Two such disasters hit East Pakistan in 1970 and 
exacerbated ill will between the two provinces. The monsoonal floods in 
July were followed by a cyclone and tidal bore in December. Collectively, 
hundreds of thousands perished. While international aid poured in, 
the central government in Islamabad was slow to act and indifferent to 
the suffering of East Pakistanis.
7  Donald Beachler, ‘The Politics of Genocide Scholarship: The Case of Bangladesh’, Patterns of 
Prejudice 41, no. 5 (2007): 467–92, 477–78, doi.org/10.1080/00313220701657286.
8  Yasmin Saikia, ‘Insāniyat for Peace: Survivors’ narrative of the 1971 war of Bangladesh’, Journal 
of Genocide Research 13, no. 4 (2011): 475–501, 486, doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2011.625739.
9  Srinath Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press 2013).
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Pakistan held its first democratic elections in 1970. As a watershed 
moment  for a country plagued by corruption and dictatorships in its 
short history, a sense of optimism filled the air. However, the elections 
did not go to plan, at least from the perspective of the ruling elite in 
West Pakistan. Pro-autonomy East Pakistani party, the Awami League, 
won an absolute majority of the seats out of the newly formed 313-seat 
national assembly, including 167 out of 169 seats allocated to East 
Pakistan. With its absolute majority, the Awami League could enact its 
autonomy program  and install its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, as 
the prime minister of Pakistan. Of course, the prospect of relinquishing 
power to a Bengali was unacceptable to the ruling class in West Pakistan. 
Unwilling to forego power, Pakistan’s military dictator Yahya Khan 
delayed convening  the new assembly, which in turn, triggered mass 
outrage in East Pakistan as Bengalis believed they had been robbed of 
their electoral victory. Mass protests and strikes soon followed, paralysing 
the East Pakistani economy.
At midnight on 25 March 1971, the West Pakistani armed forces invaded 
East Pakistan under the cover of darkness. Their aim was to quash the 
uprising through brute force and, while they were there, to ‘[teach] them 
[Bengalis] a lesson’.10 In practice, this meant burning villages, destroying 
crops, capturing and raping of hundreds of thousands of women, and 
killing agitators, namely, students, intellectuals, Awami League activists 
and, most of all, Hindus. Approximately 80,000 West Pakistani troops 
entered East Pakistan, followed by an additional 100,000 paramilitary 
and civilian armed forces. The West Pakistani forces, however, were met 
by 175,000 East Pakistani guerrillas who were supported, materially and 
morally, by India. When India intervened directly in the war in December 
1971 – for strategic, political and humanitarian reasons – they deployed 
250,000 troops on two fronts. Simply out-powered and overrun, West 
Pakistan surrendered and East Pakistanis declared their independence, 
adopting the name Bangla Desh (Land of Bengal).
This brief, peripheral conflict left destruction on an unimaginable 
scale: the deaths of 1.5 million by conservative estimates; 3 million by 
Bangladeshi estimates. To escape widespread and indiscriminate violence, 
10  Quotation is from British High Commissioner to Pakistan, Cyril Pickard, in 1971. See Angela 
Debnath, ‘British Perceptions of the East Pakistan Crisis 1971: “Hideous Atrocities on Both Sides”’, 
Journal of Genocide Research 13, no. 4 (2011): 421–50, 428, doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2011.62574
4, and Simon C Smith, ‘Coming Down on the Winning Side: Britain on the South Asia Crisis, 1971’, 
Contemporary British History 24, no. 4 (2010): 451–70, 456, doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2010.518410.
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millions of East Pakistanis fled for their lives. By the end of the conflict, 
10  million refugees were living in camps in India, specifically in West 
Bengal. There were a further 20  million Bengalis internally displaced 
within East Pakistan. These statistics are all the more staggering when 
one considers that the East Pakistani population was 76 million at the 
time. With 30 million internally displaced or refugees in India, nearly 
two in five East Pakistanis were uprooted during their war of liberation 
from Pakistan. The mass killings during the 1971 war have been deemed 
by some researchers as constituting genocide, and the Bangladeshi 
Government explicitly promotes this view. However, other scholars 
argue that the violence was multidirectional and opportunistic, and that 
there was no systematic attempt to exterminate a race of people. Putting 
this debate to one side, there is a consensus that the armed forces and 
militia inflicted widespread suffering on civilians: in the words of one 
Bihari woman, 1971 was ‘the year of anarchy and end of humanity 
in Bangladesh’.11
International involvement and 
scholarly silence
Given the scale and regional significance of the Bangladesh War of 
Liberation and ensuing refugee exodus, one may assume that historians, 
anthropologists, political scientists and/or sociologists have extensively 
documented and analysed this event. However, this is not the case. To be 
sure, archival materials are difficult to access: government documents in 
Bangladesh were destroyed by the Pakistani armed forces in the final days 
of the conflict; Pakistani government archives on this topic remain closed.12 
Feminist South Asian scholars based in the West have highlighted the 
11  Quotation comes from Christian Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the 
Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010), chapter  4, doi.org/10.1017/
cbo9780511781254. For scholarly debate on the extent and nature of violence during the 1971 
war, see Beachler, ‘The Politics of Genocide Scholarship’; A  Dirk Moses, ‘The United Nations, 
Humanitarianism and Human Rights: War Crimes/Genocide Trials for Pakistani Soldiers in 1971’, 
in Human Rights in the Twentieth Century, ed. Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman (New York: Cambridge 
University Press 2011): 258–80, doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511921667.017; Wardatul Akmam, 
‘Atrocities against Humanity During the Liberation War in Bangladesh: A Case of Genocide’, Journal 
of Genocide Research 4, no.  4 (2002): 543–59, doi.org/10.1080/146235022000000463; Sarmila 
Bose, ‘The Question of Genocide and the Quest for Justice in the 1971 War’, Journal of Genocide 
Research 13, no. 4 (2011): 393–419, doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2011.625750, and her generalist 
book, Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War (London: Hurst Publishers 2011).
12  Raghavan, 1971, 11.
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gendered nature of violence during the conflict. Through interviews with 
survivors and perpetrators of sexual violence in Bangladesh, researchers 
including Bina D’Costa and Yasmin Saikia have provided a voice to 
civilians normally rendered silent.13
There is scant research on the actions of international actors during this 
conflict. What limited scholarship there is, is typically top-down and 
government-oriented, examining foreign policy cables, speeches and 
government action or inaction, or media portrayals. Drawing on recently 
declassified government archives, scholars have considered the responses 
of the governments of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom 
and India to the crisis.14 However, this focus on state actors does not match 
my own reading of events in which Australians of a variety of backgrounds 
mobilised, lobbied and fundraised to provide aid for Bangladeshi refugees 
despite government indifference to the calamity.
In this chapter, I make three main arguments. First, grassroots activism was 
a significant force in shaping government policy. Throughout 1971, there 
was a schism between community attitudes in favour of humanitarian 
intervention and Australian Government policy to remain neutral, avoid 
interfering in an internal Pakistani matter and donate as little money as 
possible to generate positive publicity for the government. During the 
refugee crisis, the Australian Government provided cash and in-kind aid 
to Bangladeshi refugees gradually, only increasing the donated amount 
in response to public pressure. In terms of refugee relief, resettlement in 
Australia was never an option; the Indian Government that temporarily 
settled the 10 million refugees needed cash to buy materials for shelter, 
food and medical care. In the end, the Australian Government became 
a leading donor nation, a fact even more remarkable given the small 
population base of 12 million people in 1971. By the end of February 
1972, the Australian Government had provided US$5,055,072, 
13  Bina D’Costa, Nationbuilding, Gender and War Crimes in South Asia (London: Routledge, 2010); 
Yasmin Saikia, ‘Beyond the Archive of Silence: Narratives of Violence of the 1971 Liberation War of 
Bangladesh’, History Workshop Journal 58, no. 1 (2004): 275–87, doi.org/10.1093/hwj/58.1.275.
14  Gary J Bass, The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger and a Forgotten Genocide (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2013); Raghavan, 1971; Richard Pilkington, ‘In the National Interest? Canada and the East 
Pakistan Crisis of 1971’, Journal of Genocide Research 13, no. 4 (2011): 451–74, doi.org/10.1080/
14623528.2011.625741; Debnath, ‘British Perceptions of the East Pakistan Crisis’; Janice Musson, 
‘Britain and the Recognition of Bangladesh in 1972’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 19, no.  1 (2008): 
125–44, doi.org/10.1080/09592290801913767; Sonia Cordera, ‘India’s Response to the 1971 East 




a figure only exceeded by Scandinavian/northern European nations, the 
Netherlands (US$5,754,247), Sweden (US$6,000,584), West Germany 
(US$19,771,298), and major powers, the USSR (US$20,000,000), the 
UK (US$38,182,132) and the US (US$89,157,000).15 But substantial 
Australian Government aid may well have never happened had it not been 
for public activism.
Second, the Bangladeshi refugee crisis in 1971 created a coalition of 
disparate groups from a cross-section of Australian society who otherwise 
had little in common. Unlike many other social causes, aid to Bangladeshi 
refugees had broad appeal to the right and the left. It appealed to left-
wingers who abhorred West Pakistan’s seemingly colonial policies 
towards its eastern wing, pacifists shocked by the wanton violence and 
mass killings,  Christians who sought to remedy Third World poverty 
and inequality, and internationalists who wanted Australia to play 
a  leading role in world affairs, especially in Asia. Importantly, due to 
saturation media coverage in 1971, this conflict and refugee exodus 
galvanised ostensibly apolitical citizens into action. This conflict was easy 
to understand, its villains and victims easy to identify. The imagery of 
starving refugees on TV and in the newspaper was evocative; the statistics 
of up to 3 million deaths, 10 million refugees and a further 20 million 
internally displaced, for a  region of 76  million people, were difficult 
to comprehend but impossible to ignore. This refugee crisis appealed to 
Australians’ morality  and humanity, regardless of political affiliation, 
religion, profession, age or class.
Third, Australian involvement in the Bangladesh Liberation War was 
significant because it demonstrated a deep and multifocal engagement 
with Bengal, a region not usually associated with Australian foreign 
policies, whether in relation to defence or development. When we think 
of Australia’s engagement with Asia, particularly since 1945, we  may 
reasonably think of military action in Japan, Korea or Indochina, 
humanitarian efforts in South-East Asia, the complicated relationships 
15  Offers of Assistance Made By/Received from Foreign Governments up to 24-2-1972, Contributions 
from governments to the Focal Point – General File, Series 1, Classified Subject Files, Fonds 11, Records 
of the Central Registry, Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva.
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with Indonesia and mainland China or colonial endeavours in the 
Pacific.16 In short, Australians look north. Maybe it is time Australians 
look north-west.
There are a number of distinct groups of Australians who were active in 
providing aid and relief to Bangladeshi refugees, such as political activists 
(including students), humanitarian organisations, Christian groups and 
Australian diplomats stationed in the region. In this chapter, I will focus on 
the actions of two groups: diplomats (or public servants) and Christians. 
Due to word restrictions, it would be too ambitious to include a discussion 
on humanitarian groups and political activists, and therefore these two 
populations will be the subject of future publications. I have classified 
individuals and organisations according to their overarching affiliation 
and the values that inform their activities. However, the distinctions 
between the four groups are not perfect and there are occasions of overlap, 
for example, in the case of Christian student activists. Furthermore, the 
demarcation between each of these groups does not intend to obscure 
the links between them. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that 
individual actors during this event did not operate in a vacuum; rather, 
they were part of, and impacted by, larger networks.
The diplomats
The National Library of Australia holds a number of transcribed oral 
histories of career diplomats, the public servants who spent most of 
their professional lives stationed at various embassies abroad who offer 
fascinating firsthand accounts as they witnessed major events in world 
history. These oral histories are supplemented with the memoirs and 
16  For recent Australian scholarship on histories of humanitarianism in Asia, Agnieszka Sobocinska, 
‘A New Kind of Mission: The Volunteer Graduate Scheme and the History of International 
Development’, AJPH 62, no.  3 (2016): 369–87, doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12268; Joy Damousi, 
‘The Campaign for Japanese-Australian Children to Enter Australia, 1957–1968: A History of Post-War 
Humanitarianism’, AJPH 64, no. 2 (2018): 211–26, doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12461; on relations with 
Indonesia and China, see Peter van der Eng, ‘Konfrontasi and Australia’s Aid to Indonesia during the 
1960s’, AJPH 55, no. 1 (2009): 46-63; Billy Griffiths, The China Breakthrough: Whitlam in the Middle 
Kingdom, 1971 (Melbourne: Monash University Publishing 2012); on histories of development, see 
Nicholas Ferns, ‘“A New Hope for Asia?” Australia, the United States and the Promotion of Economic 
Development in Southeast Asia’, AJPH 64, no. 1 (2018): 33–47, doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12422; on 
histories of colonial involvement in the Pacific, see Stephen Henningham, ‘Australia’s Economic 
Ambitions in French New Caledonia, 1945–1955’, Journal of Pacific History 49, no. 4 (2014): 421–
39, doi.org/10.1080/00223344.2014.976915; Bruce Hunt, Australia’s Northern Shield: Papua New 
Guinea and the Defence of Australia since 1880 (Melbourne: Monash University Publishing, 2017).
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research papers of the diplomats, some of which were self-published and 
are unlikely to be held at other libraries. In this section, I will focus on 
three key diplomats: Francis Stuart, the Australian high commissioner 
to Pakistan, based in Islamabad, West Pakistan; Jim Allen, deputy high 
commissioner to Pakistan, based in Dhaka, Bangladesh; and Sir Keith 
Waller, who was secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs from 
1970 to 1974.17 All three public servants played a significant part in 
liaising between the William McMahon Government, UN agencies and 
the Indian and Pakistani governments. But that is where the similarities 
end between the three individuals.
Jim Allen
James Lawrence Allen, known as Jim Allen, was definitely not a typical 
Australian diplomat.18 Born in north-east India to Australian, missionary 
Methodist parents, the first language he spoke was Urdu. As a child, 
Jim’s parents would ask him questions in English and he would reply in 
Urdu. During his adolescence, Jim attended boarding school in Adelaide, 
then studied at the University of Adelaide, graduating with honours 
in classics. As a new graduate, Jim dreamed of joining the Indian Civil 
Service. He travelled to London to sit the civil service exam but just fell 
short of acceptance into the highly esteemed Indian Civil Service. Bitterly 
disappointed that he could not realise his lifelong dream, Jim returned 
to West Bengal and worked as an English lecturer before enlisting in the 
British Imperial Forces to fight in World War II.
After the war, Jim worked briefly with Lord Richard Casey, the Australian 
who served the British Empire as governor of Bengal from 1944 to 
1946. Jim joined the Australian High Commission in New Delhi as 
third secretary, becoming a permanent member of the Australian Foreign 
Service in 1946. During this time, he witnessed firsthand the tumultuous 
Partition of India and the creation of Pakistan, an event that unleashed 
communal and sectarian violence on an unprecedented scale.
17  Unless it is a direct quotation, I will use the indigenous spelling of ‘Dhaka’ rather than the 
Anglicised spelling ‘Dacca’ throughout this chapter.
18  The following discussion is based on: ‘James Allen interviewed by Mel Pratt for the Mel 
Pratt Collection [sound recording]’, 1976, typed transcript, National Library of Australia (NLA), 
ORAL TRC 121/76, available at: nla.gov.au/nla.obj-214917676.
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Allen was posted to Dhaka as deputy high commissioner in 1969, a post 
he held for five years. Importantly, Allen had a native’s proficiency in 
Bengali. While other diplomats in Dhaka took crash courses in Bengali, 
they could not shake their foreign accent. Because Allen’s mother tongue 
was Urdu, this helped him gain fluency in another Indo-Aryan language, 
Bengali. While stationed in Bangladesh, Allen mingled with peasants and 
workers throughout the countryside with ease. He could also make jokes 
in Bengali – a true indicator of fluency – which made him very popular 
with the locals. Because of this, Allen was widely admired and respected 
throughout Bangladesh, a fact that gave the Australian Government 
enormous kudos as Bangladesh emerged as an independent state.
In his oral history interview, Allen recalled the beginning of hostilities 
in Bangladesh:
On the night of Thursday the 25th March Pakistani forces surged 
out of their Cantonments in all the major industrial/urban centres 
and started machine gunning anybody in sight – students in 
particular, polices, people on duty, shopkeepers … that went on 
for a few days in the urban centres, and of course all Bengalis 
fled into the countryside. Then the army fanned out into the 
countryside and continued this massacre in the villages … 1971 
was a very sad and unhappy year.
There was a tremendous amount of cruelty and inhumanity going 
on all over the country … Quite frankly I had difficulty in getting 
the message across to Canberra. At the working level, I had the 
feeling there was a strong continuing pro-Pakistan bias, matched 
by an equally strong continuing anti-Indian bias. I had the feeling 
that some of my criticisms of what the Pakistan Army and the 
Pakistan Government was doing in East Pakistan were not all that 
welcome back in Canberra, at any rate on the working level.
What we have here are contesting interpretations over the conflict, its 
causes and how to respond. Jim Allen persevered with relaying his message 
to his superiors in Canberra, and with the backing of UN observers and 
other third parties, his perspective eventually gained traction. As Allen 
recalled ‘my story, told from the point of view of the Bengali people, 
finally prevailed’.19
19  Ibid., 10–11.
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Despite wanton violence, Allen and his wife Marion ‘bravely stuck 
it out’ in Bangladesh, choosing not to relocate to safer surrounds.20 
The Allens were very active in relief efforts for refugees and internally 
displaced persons, providing food, shelter and clothing for refugees in the 
countryside, and later providing rehabilitation work for widows destitute 
after the war. Interestingly, these relief efforts were funded privately from 
friends and acquaintances back in Australia, independent of his work for 
the Australian Government. Jim Allen also liaised closely with aid agencies 
in Australia as well as Australian Baptist missionaries in Bengal, which will 
be discussed later in the chapter.21
Francis Stuart
Francis Stuart was the Australian high commissioner to Pakistan, as well 
as Afghanistan, from 1970 to 1973. He was based in Islamabad, West 
Pakistan, some distance from his deputy, Jim Allen, in Dhaka. The two 
diplomats provide a clear contrast: while Allen had spent much of his life 
in South Asia immersed in the local cultures, Stuart had been a  career 
diplomat and globetrotter, and had been posted in diverse countries such 
as Cambodia, the Philippines, the United Arab Republic (the brief union 
of Syria and Egypt) and Poland. Allen and Stuart also understood the 
conflict in Bangladesh differently. Allen was sympathetic to the view of 
Bengalis and admired Indian humanitarian efforts during the refugee 
crisis. Stuart, on the other hand, was unabashedly pro–West Pakistan and 
anti-Indian. During the conflict, Stuart communicated to the Australian 
Government that the ongoing conflict was a ‘civil war and not a war of 
independence against alien rule’.22 The conflict-as-civil-war perspective 
of Stuart influenced Australian Government policy at first. However, the 
Australian Government would revise its policy and rhetoric by October 
1971 in response to the public outcry at West Pakistani atrocities, and 
arguably, the persuasiveness of Jim Allen.
While Jim and Marion Allen were working tirelessly to help the internally 
displaced in the countryside of Bangladesh, Stuart was frustrated by 
communication difficulties. He wrote in his memoir that:
20  Francis Stuart, Towards Coming of Ages. A Foreign Service Odyssey, Australians in Asia Series, 
March 1989 (Brisbane: Griffith University, 1989), 230.
21  J L Allen to Moira Lenore Dynon, Letter 1972 [manuscript], 1972. NLA MS 3118.
22  Stuart, Towards Coming of Ages, 230.
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Most of the time the telex network was overloaded or closed down, 
or the Pakistani authorities refused to transmit messages in code. 
At times, we were isolated except for messages carried through the 
Khyber Pass to or from Kabul.23
Isolated from communication and distant from the theatre of war, 
Stuart became focused on how the Indian Government, he believed, 
was using the crisis to shift the balance of power in the region in the 
pursuit of Indian hegemony. This focus arguably became an obsession at 
the expense of other issues, particularly humanitarian. What is striking 
about Stuart’s writings is that he seemed removed from what was going 
on in Bengal and also Australia, completely misreading public sentiment. 
In a condescending tone, Stuart wrote that the Australian public:
Could not be expected to interest itself in the 1971 affair. To the 
extent it followed things at all it [the Australian public] saw the 
Bangladesh conflict in black and white terms, as the suppression 
of a nationalist struggle for freedom against an imperialist 
military dictatorship.24
Stuart also commented that ‘the Australian view of the situation as 
a  liberation struggle against colonialism was simplistic, even puerile’. 
Out  of touch with public activism and humanitarian endeavours in 
Australia, Stuart appears oblivious to the multitude of Australian responses 
to the Bangladeshi refugee crisis. Stuart also extended his dismissiveness 
to Prime Minister William McMahon, who he deemed a  political 
opportunist who deliberately harnessed a foreign crisis to further his 
domestic political goals. This cynical depiction of McMahon may well 
have been true but the prime minister was certainly not the first nor the 
last politician to leverage external events for political gain.
In short, the high commissioner for Pakistan, Francis Stuart, and his 
deputy, Jim Allen, held diametrically opposing views, an issue perhaps 
exacerbated by their distance of over 2,000 km. It was up to the secretary 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Sir Keith Waller, to make sense of 
the conflicting information and pass on recommendations to Australia’s 
then novice foreign minister, Nigel Bowen.
23  Ibid., 234.




Secretary from 1970 to 1974, Waller shared Stuart’s pro-Pakistan bias, 
commenting in his memoirs that the Australian Government had 
been traditionally wary of the Indian Government since the time of 
Menzies. Despite general apprehension about Hindus, Waller noted 
that, traditionally, the Australian Government had good relations with 
Bengal, both the eastern part in Pakistan and the western part in India, 
dating back to when Australian Lord Casey was governor of Bengal as 
well as the longstanding involvement of Australian Baptist missionaries 
in the region.25
Sir Keith was very close to Lord Casey, who remained active in foreign 
policy circles until his death in 1976. They would often converse over the 
phone during this period. Given Casey’s experience in Bengal, Waller leant 
on him for advice on the ensuing crisis in South Asia. Importantly, Lord 
Casey respected Jim Allen, describing Allen as ‘remarkably well fitted for 
his difficult task’ of deputy high commissioner in Dhaka.26 It is hard to say 
with any certainty, but the close relationships between Allen and Casey, 
and between Casey and Waller, meant that Jim Allen’s position trumped 
the arguments of his superior, Francis Stuart, who remained isolated and 
irate in Islamabad.
In addition to providing aid for the refugees, the Australian Government 
was the first Western nation to recognise the newly declared state 
of Bangladesh in early 1972. And more than that, the Australian 
Government forged a coalition of Western and non-aligned countries to 
recognise Bangladeshi independence, forcing the Pakistani Government 
into a  corner and stopping them from retaliating. Waller was at the 
centre of the quite complex diplomatic task, organising with Australian 
ambassadors and high commissioners across the globe and in real time, 
persuading allied countries to get on board and support Bangladeshi 
recognition. In Waller’s words, the Australian Foreign Service ‘mounted 
a vigorous diplomatic effort to get a number of countries’ to recognise 
Bangladesh.27 At this time, major Western powers were reluctant to 
25  Sir Keith Waller, A Diplomatic Life: Some Memories, Australians in Asia Series, July 1990 
(Brisbane: Griffith University, 1990), 45–46.
26  Diary entry, 12  April 1969 in ‘Lord Casey’s diaries, 1965 – June 1976’, vol.  29, Box  31a, 
subseries  4.4 Lord Casey’s diaries (photocopies), series 4 Diaries and Letterbooks, Casey family. 
Papers of the Casey family, 1820–1978 [manuscript], NLA MS 6150.
27  Waller, A Diplomatic Life, 46.
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recognise the independence of a secessionist province: the US Government 
refused to recognise Bangladesh as it was closely allied with Pakistan; the 
Canadian Government feared recognition would fan the flames of its own 
rogue province, Quebec; the UK Government were hedging their bets; 
and the Japanese Government had adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach. 
Thus, the Australian Government’s formal recognition of the People’s 
Republic of Bangladesh was a case of it showing regional leadership and 
sticking its neck out to support the independence of a vaguely socialist, 
predominantly Muslim nation.
Christians
Christians were major aid donors who helped provide relief for 
Bangladeshi refugees and were pivotal in making the Bangladeshi refugee 
crisis a non-partisan issue. Both Protestants (mostly Anglicans, Methodists 
and Baptists) and Catholics were equally active in mobilising, lobbying 
and fundraising for Bangladeshi refugees and overcame sectarian divisions 
to work collaboratively on the issue. Leaders within the various Christian 
churches were also very effective lobbyists, with ready access to the Prime 
Minister’s Office, and their seniority within the church bestowed a certain 
gravitas on their views. Unlike ordinary constituents who wrote to the 
prime minister and received a reply from the prime minister’s private 
secretary, church leaders received replies direct from the prime minister 
himself, suggesting that their letters were read by McMahon while other 
constituent letters did not pass the secretary’s desk.28
Len Reid
Len Reid was an outspoken advocate for cash donations to the Indian 
Government to run the refugee camps. He was a Christian first and 
a politician second. After a couple of terms in the Victorian Parliament, 
he was elected the federal member for Holt, an electorate in the outer 
south-eastern suburbs and urban fringe of Melbourne. He was a Liberal 
politician, though he acted like more of an opposition MP and was 
a constant thorn in the McMahon Government’s side. Reid established 
28  Example letters from constituents and the clergy can be found in ‘Constituent correspondence, 
June 1971’: Files 47 and 49, Box 442, Series 17 Prime Minister 1967–72, William McMahon and 
Liberal Party of Australia, Papers of William McMahon, 1949–1987 [manuscript], NLA MS 3926.
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the Christian charity, For those who have less in 1962, an organisation 
dedicated to addressing poverty and famine in India, Pakistan and Nepal. 
Driven by Christian values of service to God and helping the poor with 
humility and service, he believed it was ‘God’s will and our privilege to 
help’.29 He strongly advocated what he termed ‘sacrificial giving’. What 
constituted sacrificial would vary from person to person, but the point was 
that the degree of giving should be so significant that one should suffer 
as a result. Giving is not about feeling good about yourself, he reasoned: 
it’s about sufferance. Quoting Mohandas Gandhi, Reid explained that 
whenever one person suffers voluntarily, it relieves someone else of 
suffering: ‘everyone who fasts gives bread to another who needs it more 
– everyone who makes some sacrifice helps someone else somewhere’.30
Reid’s Christian beliefs were at the forefront of his appeal to Australians, 
invoking references to the Crusades. He argued that, as a Christian 
community, ‘we must take more responsibility for the great human 
problems that confront so many people around the world’ and it is up 
to the non-government sector ‘to campaign more vigorously. If necessary, 
they should crusade’.31 Reid’s rhetoric was at times confrontational, 
challenging Australians to put into action their Christian values. In his 
words, ‘If Australia is to continue to call herself a Christian community, 
we can no longer procrastinate while millions face famine conditions’.32
As a member of parliament, Reid travelled to West Bengal on behalf of the 
government, visiting some 30 refugee camps. With each camp home to 
approximately 5,000 refugees, Reid estimated that he had seen the lived 
conditions affecting 150,000 refugees. During this visit, he consulted with 
government, inter-government and non-government organisations on the 
ground. With this knowledge, he lobbied the McMahon Government 
to do more during the refugee crisis in 1971 and for reconstruction 
and  rehabilitation during 1972. In one letter to the prime minister, 
Reid wrote:
29  Len Reid, The Tragedy of Those Who Have Less (Melbourne: Fraser & Morphet, 1973), 23.
30  Ibid., 7, 13, 63.
31  Ibid., 25.
32  Ibid., 62.
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I know the Australian people to be generous and fair minded and 
where there are injustices they react strongly, for these reasons it 
will be necessary for us to raise our Aid priorities … The people in 
Australia will soon demand that we accept a greater responsibility 
in these countries and I feel we could well seize the initiative.33
Reid dedicated much of his only term in the Federal Parliament to 
lobbying the Australian Government to increase its aid commitment to 
Asia. It appears that he did so purely for compassionate reasons and was 
not interested in grandstanding or accounting tricks to impress the public. 
Specifically, Reid advocated for cash over material (or in-kind) donations.
He was a straight shooter and didn’t hold back in his correspondence with 
the prime minister. Reflecting on events the previous year, in March 1972 
Reid wrote:
During this [refugee] crisis I repeatedly stated that India and the 
United Nations needed cash – not goods – to provide immediate 
relief for the refugee. However, my pleas might just as well have 
come from a junior office boy in the Foreign Office for all the 
notice that was taken.
I might add I had good reasons for suggesting a cash donation of 
$10M for the refugees, as I had spent some time visiting a number 
of refugee camps during the Monsoon, and also had on the spot 
discussions with Mrs Gandhi and the Government of Pakistan, 
and they stressed their most urgent need was cash to purchase 
goods locally  …  Whoever made the decision not to send cash 
made the wrong decision, and it appears to me the less said on this 
issue the better.34
To clarify, cash donations are generally preferred by aid groups over 
in-kind donations. Cash can be sent quickly and used to purchase goods 
on the ground almost immediately. In-kind donations incur significant 
freighting charges and take time to transport to the refugee camps. There 
is also the view that in-kind donations are self-serving, for example, giving 
business to Australian companies when cheaper alternatives were available 
33  ‘Letter. L. S. Reid, Member for Holt to the Rt Hon. William McMahon’, 2 November 1972, 
File  114m Members’ Correspondence. R., Box 449, Series  17 Prime Minister 1967–72, William 
McMahon and Liberal Party of Australia, Papers of William McMahon, 1949-1987 [manuscript], 
NLA MS 3926.




closer to India. In-kind donations are thus a self-beneficial method to 
inflate artificially the aid budget and thus maximise positive publicity 
in the media and with the voting public, as well as earning political 
capital with other nations. Reid was perhaps ill-suited to the realpolitik 
in Canberra, not lasting more than one term in the Federal Parliament. 
His insistent calls for Australians to abandon their addiction to material 
possessions in pursuit of higher ideals no doubt closely aligned with other 
active Christians, namely, Baptist missionaries.
Baptist missionaries
Australian Baptist missionaries first worked in Bengal in 1882 and continue 
to work in Bangladesh to this day. Since 1882, over 250 individuals or 
couples have worked in the region, including 28 individuals who served 
during the early 1970s. Although these Christians provided aid to local 
communities in crisis, it should be clear that humanitarianism was not 
their raison d’être. Even amid the mass destruction and loss of life during 
the Bangladesh Liberation War, Baptist missionaries remained optimistic 
about prospects for Christian conversion of Bengali Muslims. In their end 
of year report in 1971, the South Australian Baptist Union commented:
The outcome of the events [in Bangladesh] are what now concern 
us, and these are not only thrilling, but challenging. Opportunities 
for effective evangelism among Moslems in Bangla Desh are more 
promising today than for many years. The Mission is, therefore, 
looking to God to raise up the men and money to embark on 
concentrated evangelism in the new nation. How will we respond 
to the challenge of a nation that is looking for a satisfying faith? 
[Italics added]35
Along with their evangelism, the South Australian branch of the Baptist 
Church provided material aid from afar, including food parcel delivery, 
medical care and other relief supplies for refugees.36
The Australian Baptist Church also sent missionaries to Bangladesh to 
promote Christianity in the region. When hostilities broke out in March 
1971, there were 17 individuals working in the region, including three 
35  South Australian Baptist Union Incorporated, Handbook for 1971–1972: Programme and Reports 
for Autumn Assembly 1972 (Adelaide: Publisher Unspecified, 1972), 58.
36  Ibid., xvii.
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married couples.37 Most of the Australian missionaries chose to return 
home or continued their work in India. However, three individuals – 
Rev. Ian Hawley, Miss Betty Salisbury and Miss Grace Dodge – stayed 
in Bangladesh throughout the war. They were based in the north at 
Mymensingh in a compound with 80 refugees, a town that Hawley 
later described as ‘an awful place of death’. In a 2005 piece, Ian Hawley 
remembered that:
Every night in Mymensingh during the months of November and 
December [1971] people were arrested on any pretence, with the 
Army’s consent. Fanatical Muslims, it would seem, were given 
a free hand to kill whoever they wanted to kill. They unashamedly 
left victims’ bodies on the edge of a river … Vultures and dogs 
feasted on them. The bodies of others were cut into pieces and 
thrown down wells. I have seen these wells full of dismembered 
bodies and also corpses being eaten by dogs on the river bank. 
How a person can act with such unrelenting savagery and utter 
contempt for the sacredness and value of human life is beyond 
all comprehension.38
Australian missionaries were unharmed during the conflict, though 
their properties were damaged and ransacked. Grace Dodge, one of the 
Australian missionaries, believed that the retreating West Pakistani Army 
torched the countryside in a final attempt at destruction, leaving the natural 
environment appearing more like the Australian bush after a fire than the 
verdant plains associated with Bengal. The local Christian community in 
Bangladesh had a low death rate as the Pakistani armed forces and militias 
targeted Hindus, as well as dissenters and professionals.39 Australian 
Baptists sought divine wisdom to understand the unfolding conflict and 
to remain brave among escalating dangers. The missionaries maintained 
their faith and, in fact, saw the conflict as an opportunity to improve their 
standing with the locals and acceptance in the community. Beyond their 
missionary goals, Australian Baptists provided practical compassion for 
refugees, sheltering vulnerable populations – such as women and children 
– from the army.40
37  Tony Cupit, Ros Gooden and Ken Manley, From Five Barley Loaves: Australian Baptists in Global 
Mission 1864–2010 (Melbourne: Mosaic Press, 2013), 124.
38  Ian Hawley, ‘Reflections on the 1971 Civil War in Bangladesh’, Our Yesterdays: A Publication of the 
Victorian Baptist Historical Society 13 (2005): 7–23, 19.
39  Grace Dodge, ‘Birisiri Mission or Bunker Mission?’ Vision (Australian Baptist Missionary Society 
Magazine) March 1972, 3, 5.
40  Dodge, ‘Birisiri Mission or Bunker Mission?’.
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Australian Council of Churches
The Australian Council of Churches (ACC) is the peak body representing 
Anglican, Protestant and Orthodox churches, with its global headquarters 
in Geneva. Missionary zeal was also evident in this organisation, though 
there was an awareness that such proselytising could backfire. In a report 
sent to the World Council of Churches, ACC staff writer Bruce Best 
observed that Christians would be able to play a more prominent role in 
postwar Pakistan and Bangladesh but warned that students in particular 
were becoming dissatisfied with ‘what they see as the pietism of the churches 
and the “missionary” mentality’. Best believed that young students were 
more likely to support Christianity in its practical dimension, especially 
projects that promoted social and economic equality rather than adhering 
to Christian theology alone. While postwar Bangladesh presented fertile 
ground for conversion, Best worried that it may be more than the 
local missionaries could control, commenting that ‘this growing group 
[of students] may well become a radical force in the very near future’.41
Operationally, the ACC focused on advocacy, both at the top echelons of 
society and among local citizens. Crossing sectarian divisions, the ACC 
collaborated with Australian Catholic Relief to lobby the government for 
more refugee aid and encourage officials to find a diplomatic solution to 
the conflict. In a joint letter to the prime minister on 4 June 1971, the 
directors of Australian Catholic Relief and the ACC urged the government 
to keep the burgeoning crisis ‘under constant review and to make further 
substantial grants as the opportunities occur’.42 At the local level, the 
ACC dispatched circulars to all parish ministers throughout Australia, 
encouraging them to pray and seek donations from their congregants. 
In one such letter on 9 June 1971, the president of the ACC, Reverend 
David Garnsey, bishop of Gippsland in Victoria, reminded ministers 
41  Bruce Best, Report: ‘East and West of a Disaster, 7 February 1972’ in File: East Pakistan Refugees 
– Relief Action 1972, Box 425.05.110: Projects East Pakistan Relief and Rehabilitation Service 1972, 
Series 425: Commission of Interchurch Aid, Relief and World Service (CICARWS), 1948–1992, 
Sub-fond: Programmes (1911–), Paper Archives of the World Council of Churches, Geneva.
42  ‘Letter. Wm. C. Byrne Executive Director, Australian Catholic Relief and E. H. Arblaster, 
Secretary-Director, Division of World Christian Action, Australian Council of Churches, to the Rt. 
Hon William McMahon, MP, 4 June 1971’ in Folder: Pakistan, East and West, 1964–71, Box 117, 
Records of the Australian Council of Churches, 1911–1990, NLA MS 7645, MS Acc96.075.
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of the imperative of Christian compassion. He wrote, ‘The Christian 
Churches have long felt a special responsibility to care for refugees who 
are forced to place themselves at the mercy of their fellowmen’.43
The ACC was the go-to destination for Christians wishing to volunteer 
their services in the refugee camps in India. The director of ACC, Reverend 
Ted Arblaster, received a number of letters from doctors and nurses, as 
well as Christian leaders, wishing to work on the ground. The rationale 
behind the offers of voluntary service ranged from evangelical to practical. 
Beginning with the evangelical, Mrs Maureen Bomford from Sydney 
wrote to Arblaster on 15 June 1971:
Would the Australian Council of Churches be willing to send me 
to the Prime Minister of Pakistan?
I know that God would be with me, in this undertaking and I am 
confident I could gain guarantee and security for the safe return of 
6 ½ million refugees.
For ten years I have been corresponding to all Prime Ministers, 
including Pakistan, and I have sent at least four letters this year to 
the present Prime Minister. I know that if the Australian Council 
of Churches have faith in me, God would do the rest.
The biggest problems need the shortest way for solution. 
This would have God’s approval.44
Other Christians based their expressions of interest on more practical 
grounds than religious. In a telephone conversation with Ted Arblaster, 
nurse Caroline Clough explained that her background and vocational 
training made her an ideal volunteer. In a scribbled hand-written 
note documenting their telephone conversation, Arblaster noted that 
Ms Clough was born in Calcutta and emigrated in 1947, aged 20. She 
spoke Hindustani (Hindi/Urdu) and was a trained nurse and practised at 
Wollongong’s Port Kembla Hospital. Importantly, Clough had experience 
in nursing cholera, a skill particularly relevant as the refugee camps had 
endured a cholera outbreak that very month. Not wishing to limit her 
43  ‘Letter. The Rt. Rev. David A. Garnsey, Bishop of Gippsland, President, Australian Council of 
Churches to Parish Ministers. 9 June 1971’ in MP’ in Folder: Pakistan, East and West, 1964–71, 
Box 117, Records of the Australian Council of Churches.
44  ‘Letter. Mrs Maureen Bomford to The Rev. E. H. Arblaster, 15 June 1971’ and ‘Letter. The 
Rev. E.H. Arblaster to Mrs Maureen Bomford, 22 June 1971’ in Folder: Pakistan, East and West, 
1964–71, Box 117, Records of the Australian Council of Churches.
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usefulness though, Clough affirmed that she would ‘do anything’ to help 
the refugees in the camps.45 Arblaster also received offers of service from 
doctors Beryl Barber and Peter Bass, as well as (presumably nurses) Misses 
Betty Andersen and Dorothy Platt. Arblaster forwarded the contact 
details of these individuals to the executive secretary of the Australian 
refugee aid organisation Austcare, which was operating a medical clinic 
in a refugee camp.46 However, all requests for volunteering on the ground 
were universally rejected as the refugee camps were well serviced by 
local health professionals in India. The ACC reiterated that Australian 
Christians could help most by offering cash donations and prayers.
Conclusion
This chapter draws our attention to a major event in recent refugee history 
that has largely been forgotten outside of South Asian communities. It is 
hard to believe that a refugee crisis on this scale has been overlooked for 
so long. The declassification of government archives in Western countries 
should facilitate research into this topic. However, government archives 
only provide a limited perspective, outlining bureaucratic machinations 
and policy debates. Though these areas are valuable to historians, 
government sources cannot shed light on the actions of individuals and 
organisations outside of government.
The lack of historical scholarship on the Bangladeshi refugee crisis is 
problematic, as it implicitly leads to the conclusion that this event does not 
matter or warrant remembrance. It also implies that individual Australians 
did not care or do anything to address the suffering of others. Too often, 
the Bangladesh Liberation War and international involvement – if it is ever 
mentioned – is reduced to the charity concert in New York City in August 
1971 that was initiated by Beatle George Harrison. This focus on the 
actions of one celebrity in New York City obscures the actions of an array 
of individual Australians who mobilised, prayed, lobbied government, 
fundraised and travelled to the region to contribute something, anything, to 
aid the Bangladeshi refugees in India. Furthermore, Australian diplomats 
and Christians were active from the early months of the conflict and at 
45  Scribbled note of conversation between the Rev. E H Arblaster and Mrs Caroline Clough, in 
Folder: Pakistan, East and West, 1964–71, Box 117, Records of the Australian Council of Churches.
46  ‘Letter. The Rev. E.H. Arblaster to Mr Parish, Executive Secretary of Austcare, 22 June 1971’ in 
Folder: Pakistan, East and West, 1964–71, Box 117, Records of the Australian Council of Churches.
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the forefront of the broad-based movement to provide aid to Bangladeshi 
refugees. Their commitment to this cause was strong, and in the case of 
the missionaries and the Allens, they stayed in Bangladesh at considerable 
risk to their own safety. Despite government inertia and equivocation, 
Christians and diplomats challenged their political leaders to do more for 




RACE TO THE BOTTOM
Constructions of asylum seekers 
in Australian federal election 
campaigns, 1977–2013
Kathleen Blair
Issues pertaining to asylum seekers have long been the focus of negative 
political and public interest, with such interest intensifying in the lead-up 
to and throughout federal election campaigns. The 1977 federal election 
was the first in Australian history in which both major parties appealed 
to the public’s unease about the arrival of asylum seeker boats. In fact, 
much of the anti–asylum seeker rhetoric to which Australians are now 
accustomed made its first appearance in the 1977 debates. However, the 
arrival of Vietnamese ‘boat people’ at that time became what analysts term 
a political ‘non-issue’.1 It was not until the arrival of the MV Tampa, 
in August 2001, that the long-running debate on asylum seekers and 
refugees was brought to the fore in an election campaign and, arguably, 
impacted the election outcome. A tough approach to asylum seekers has 
been a feature of many federal election campaigns since, culminating in 
2013 with the Liberal Party’s now-infamous slogan, ‘Stop the boats!’, aptly 
summarising both government policy and public attitudes. This chapter 
1  D Butler, ‘Introduction’, in The Australian National Election of 1977, ed. H R  Penniman 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1979), 15.
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explores the use of anti–asylum seeker sentiment in these three federal 
election campaigns, 1977, 2001 and 2013, and, in doing so, charts the 
origins of contemporary anti–asylum seeker discourse.
The arguments made by political leaders across the span of these four 
decades are remarkably similar, with political leaders borrowing from 
both their predecessors and their opponents. Contemporary concerns 
about ‘economic refugees’, ‘queue jumpers’ and ‘illegals’ are not unique 
to the twenty-first century. However, as the number of asylum seekers 
arriving by boat increased exponentially – approximately 2,000 asylum 
seekers arrived in the first wave from 1976 to 1979, compared to almost 
45,000 between 2009 and 2013 – so too did the degree of cruelty in 
the government’s efforts to dispel and exclude asylum seekers. The last 
two decades of Australian politics has seen both major political parties 
engaged in a ‘race to the bottom’, attempting to outdo one another with 
cruel and unusual punishments for those seeking Australia’s protection.
The first ‘boat people’ and the 1977 
federal election
On 27  April 1976, the Kien Giang arrived with the first Vietnamese 
asylum seekers on board.2 The five ‘boat people’ were issued with one-
month temporary visas the day after their arrival and were eventually 
granted permanent residence, without fuss. Neither the government nor 
the media paid much attention to their arrival. However, as more boats 
began to arrive, disquiet about asylum seekers grew among Australians. 
Community attitudes began to shift from indifference to widespread 
concern.3 Fears about the introduction of exotic diseases and the 
effectiveness of the authorities’ surveillance of Australia’s coastline grew 
louder, particularly when a boat was found to have reached Darwin 
unnoticed by the Australian military.4 Amid these increasing concerns, 
Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser announced that the 1977 federal election 
2  Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Australia and Indo-Chinese Refugees, 1976–1980: 
A Chronology (Canberra: The Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 1981), 3.
3  L Riddett, ‘The Gateway and the Gatekeepers: An Examination of Darwin’s Relationship with 
Asia and Asians, 1942–1993’, Journal of Australian Studies 19, (1995): 65–67, doi.org/10.1080/ 
14443059509387237.
4  Klaus Neumann, Across the Seas: Australia’s Response to Refugees: A History (Melbourne: Black Inc., 
2015), 268–69.
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would be held on 10  December. While issues pertaining to refugees 
and asylum seekers were not hotly debated in the first few weeks of the 
campaign, political debate erupted on 21  November when six boats 
carrying 218 people arrived in Darwin in a single day.5
The Labor Party was quick to fuel the fears the public held about asylum 
seekers, attempting to use the issue of boat arrivals for electoral gain. 
Senator Tony Mulvihill, Labor’s acting Immigration spokesperson, 
criticised the Fraser Government for its lack of ‘selectivity on Indo-
Chinese refugees’, implying that at least some of the Vietnamese asylum 
seekers were not ‘genuine’.6 Then Labor Party leader, Gough Whitlam, 
made a complementary argument when he questioned the legitimacy 
of Vietnamese ‘boat people’, arguing that ‘genuine refugees’ should be 
accepted (clearly insinuating that those arriving by boat were not genuine), 
but that the government should not put refugees ‘ahead in the queue over 
people who have been sponsored and who are already coming here’.7 This 
imaginary queue, soon to become one of the most powerful images in 
the anti–asylum seeker discourse, served to distinguish between ‘good’ 
immigrants or refugees and ‘bad’ asylum seekers.8
Arguments about the ‘genuineness’ of refugees arriving by boat centred on 
their supposed wealth and the lack of an appearance of destitution. It was 
argued that some of the refugees were ‘pseudo-refugees’: ‘they just don’t 
look like refugees or people who have suffered or have had the trauma 
of that long trip’.9 The idea that people who were not visibly destitute 
and suffering could not possibly be refugees featured prominently in 
statements made by trade union officials and political leaders.10 Asylum 
seekers were consistently described as ‘illegal immigrants’, aspersions were 
cast on their ‘moral fibre’, and it was argued that they were not refugees 
because of their supposed wealth.11
5  Nancy Viviani, The Long Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in Australia (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1984), 73–74.
6  Tony Mulvihill, 1977, quoted in Rachel Stevens, Immigration Policy from 1970 to the Present 
(New York: Routledge, 2016), 108–9.
7  ‘Hawke: Return Bogus Refugees’, cited in Gerard Henderson, ‘Girt by Sea: Correspondence’, 
Quarterly Essay 6 (2002): 86.
8  Jane McAdam, ‘Australia and Asylum Seekers’, International Journal of Refugee Law 25 (2013): 
435–48, doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eet044.
9  Stack 1977, cited in Neumann, Across the Seas, 271.
10  Viviani, The Long Journey, 78–79; Neumann, Across the Seas, 270–76; Rachel Stevens, ‘Political 
Debates on Asylum Seekers during the Fraser Government, 1977–1982’, Australian Journal of Politics 
and History 58, no. 4 (2012): 530–532, doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2012.01651.x.
11  Neumann, Across the Seas, 270–76.
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The Labor Party were also intent on playing to a latent fear of invasion. 
Labor leaders urged the Fraser Government to ‘make it clear that Australia 
is not going to open the floodgates … We will have to try and find a way 
of showing our sympathy while stopping the flood of what basically are 
illegal immigrants’.12 Labor used the arrival of Vietnamese asylum seekers 
to demonstrate their resolve to enforce Australia’s immigration laws. 
Whitlam argued that Australia needed to increase its border enforcement 
policies to prevent unauthorised immigration, drug trafficking and the 
import of diseases, thereby associating asylum seekers with illegal activity 
and dangerous illnesses.13 To achieve this, he suggested buying new patrol 
boats to guard the Australian coastline.14 Mulvihill also called on the 
Fraser Government to ‘make an example’ of some of the unauthorised 
arrivals: ‘We have to turn a few of them around and send them back to 
South-East Asia under naval escort’.15
In the 1977 election campaign, the Labor Party used several different 
arguments to cast doubt on the asylum claims of boat arrivals. Asylum 
seekers arriving by boat were portrayed as wealthy economic migrants 
attempting to ‘jump the queue’ by entering Australia without authorisation 
and they were unfavourably contrasted with ‘legal’ immigrants and 
‘genuine refugees’.16 Militarised and punitive responses, such as the 
turning back of boats and increasing border security, were proposed. 
Labor was intent on harnessing xenophobic sentiments and the public’s 
fear of invasion for electoral gain.
The Liberal Fraser Government also used the arrival of asylum seeker 
boats to demonstrate to voters that they too could act tough on asylum 
seekers. On 16 November, the immigration department for the first time 
did not immediately grant entry permits to a group of asylum seekers 
and initially did not allow them to disembark their vessel. While the 
department issued them with visas 24  hours later, the initial refusal 
and an accompanying statement by Minister for Immigration Michael 
MacKellar, in which he announced that his department would urgently 
assess the implications of unauthorised entry, suggested the government 
was adopting a tougher approach.17 This ‘tougher’ approach was further 
12  Quoted in ‘Eighth Vessel on Way’, 1977, cited in Neumann, Across the Seas, 270–71.
13  Stevens, ‘Political Debates on Asylum Seekers’, 530–32.
14  Stevens, Immigration Policy, 108–9.
15  Neumann, Across the Seas, 270–76.
16  Ibid., 270–76; Stevens, ‘Political Debates on Asylum Seekers’, 530–32.
17  Neumann, Across the Seas, 269.
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illustrated by statements made shortly after the arrival of the six asylum 
seekers boats on 21  November. Minister for Foreign Affairs Andrew 
Peacock said that Australia could not ‘continue to indefinitely accept 
Asian refugees arriving unannounced by sea’, and that ‘Australia could not 
be regarded as a dumping ground’.18 Fraser himself issued a warning that 
‘some Vietnamese who landed in Australia might have to be deported’.19 
MacKellar reiterated this view by insisting that those who arrive by boat 
unannounced would not necessarily be allowed to resettle in Australia.20
While these statements from Fraser and MacKellar suggest a proposed 
escalation in border enforcement policies and resistance to the 
admission of authorised immigration, numerous examples also exist of 
a more ‘compassionate’ discourse in the 1977 campaign on behalf of the 
Liberal Party. For example, in the initial stages of the campaign, while 
Labor was quick to manipulate public concern over economic issues, 
drawing attention to the supposed economic consequences of accepting 
boat arrivals, MacKellar swiftly challenged these assertions. In  response 
to Whitlam attempting to distort migrant employment figures, 
MacKellar stated:
It is surprising and unfortunate that Mr Whitlam should seek 
to make political capital out of the employment problems of 
the 20,000 refugees, evacuees and Lebanese who have sought 
sanctuary in Australia in the past 18 months  …  These people 
have come to Australia mainly to survive and to build a new life 
out of the tatters of civil war and internal conflict in their former 
countries. The Fraser Government has seen this offer of sanctuary 
as the first priority.21
MacKellar consistently challenged the Labor Party’s attempts to exploit 
the public’s concerns over the economy and boat arrivals throughout 
the campaign. He dismissed allegations that rich migrants were posing 
as refugees to come to Australia, addressed concerns over the high 
levels of unemployment amongst new migrants by contextualising 
18  ‘Peacock Warns’, cited in Neumann, Across the Seas, 273.
19  ‘Fraser Warns Refugees’, Sydney Morning Herald, 26 November 1977.
20  Stevens, Immigration Policy, 109.
21  Michael MacKellar, 1977, cited in Michelle Peterie, ‘“These Few Small Boats”: Representations 




migrant unemployment as a normal stage in the settlement process, and 
highlighted Australia’s responsibility to prioritise the safety of refugees and 
asylum seekers over one’s ability to contribute to the nation’s economy.22
MacKellar appeared intent on placating those anxious about boat arrivals 
and not allowing Labor to exploit the issue. However, he also seemed 
anxious not to appear too critical of those who expressed concern. 
He sought to balance the fears and anxieties of the electorate about border 
security with humanitarian concern: ‘We have to combine humanity and 
compassion with prudent control of unauthorised entry or be prepared 
to tear up the Migration Act and its basic policies’.23 Like many ministers 
both before and after him, MacKellar emphasised the need for border 
control. However, he did not use this discourse to cultivate fear. Instead, 
he sought to justify the Fraser Government’s policy of increasing Australia’s 
refugee intake. For example, when MacKellar announced the decision to 
send immigration officials to Southeast Asia to process asylum seekers, 
he argued it was ‘essential that entry to Australia was controlled’ and 
that assisting ‘the orderly international processing of refugees … [would] 
avoid the need for genuine refugees to make the hazardous voyage to 
Australia’.24 MacKellar was keen to ensure that any action taken by his 
department was ‘leavened with humanity and compassion for the plight 
of genuine refugees’.25
For much of the campaign, the Liberal Party’s statements were merely 
reactive. They spoke out against the unfounded claims made by the Labor 
Party, challenging negative stereotypes as they began to gain momentum. 
However, less than two weeks before election day, the Fraser Government 
went on the offensive. In reference to Mulvihill’s earlier statement, the two 
ministers committed their Liberal Government not to ‘“make examples” 
of boat refugees by indiscriminately turning some of them back’, and not 
to ‘risk taking action against genuine refugees just to get a message across’, 
as doing so ‘would be an utterly inhuman course of action’.26 Viewed 
through the lens of Australia’s contemporary asylum seeker debate, these 
sentiments from the Liberal Party are remarkable. MacKellar’s statements 
22  Peterie, ‘“These Few Small Boats”’, 444–46.
23  Neumann, Across the Seas, 273.
24  Michael MacKellar, 1977, cited in Peterie, ‘“These Few Small Boats”’, 443.
25  Ibid., 443.
26  Joint statement by Andrew Peacock and Michael MacKellar, cited in Neumann, Across the Seas, 
279.
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humanised those arriving by boat, portraying them as needy people who 
were deserving of help, and underlined Australia’s legal and moral duty 
to respond to this ‘human tragedy’.
The 1977 campaign exemplifies a contestation of power in which asylum 
seeker discourses were key. While the Labor Party attempted to convince 
voters that asylum seekers were ‘bad’ and that they should, therefore, vote 
for the party that would expel/reject them, the Liberal Party sought to do 
the opposite. The 1977 campaign was the first in Australian history in which 
the major parties appealed to the public’s unease about unauthorised boat 
arrivals. The 1977 campaign was, however, also the first in which a senior 
government minister advocated a policy response to refugees that was not 
populist, and forcefully asserted the government’s right and responsibility 
to pursue such a response. Despite their efforts, the Labor Party’s attempts 
to make the arrival of boats a key election issue were unsuccessful; political 
scientists agree that the issue of boat arrivals did not influence the election 
outcome.27 When voters were asked to name the issues most important 
to them in the campaign, they nominated unemployment, inflation and 
economic management rather than immigration and border control.28 
However, the language and arguments employed by political leaders to 
justify the exclusion of Vietnamese boat people introduced key phrases 
and ways of speaking about the arrival of ‘boat people’, many of which 
continue to influence contemporary debates on asylum seekers.
The race to the bottom
Since the first sustained arrival of asylum seeker boats, various policies 
have been enacted, slowly legalising and normalising the criminalisation 
and dehumanisation of people seeking asylum. Between 1989 and 1995, 
the second cohort of asylum seekers, mainly from South China and 
Cambodia, arrived. Concern over their uncontrolled and sporadic arrival 
saw the Hawke/Keating Labor Government establish laws for the (often 
prolonged) detention of asylum seekers arriving in Australia; in 1992 this 
detention become mandatory. Gerry Hand, then immigration minister, 
rationalised detention practices on the basis that it would deter prospective 
27  Clem Lloyd, ‘A Lean Campaign for the Media’, in The Australian National Elections of 1977, 
ed. H Penniman (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 1979), 246.
28  R K F, ‘Australian Political Chronicle, July–December 1977: The Commonwealth’, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History 24, no. 1 (1978): 75–80.
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asylum seekers. He was determined to send a clear signal ‘that migration 
to Australia may not be achieved by simply arriving in this country and 
expecting to be allowed into the community’.29
Between 1996 and 2001, the third cohort of people seeking asylum, 
mainly from Iraq and Afghanistan, arrived. The then Liberal Howard 
Government introduced the practice of linking the nominal quota for 
the onshore and offshore programs. They also introduced the Border 
Protection Legislation Amendment Act 1999, which enabled immigration 
and customs officers to board, search and detain vessels in international 
waters. In October 1999, Temporary Protection Visas were introduced 
for asylum seekers arriving in Australia without a valid visa who were 
found to be refugees.30 These legislative measures were designed to protect 
humanitarian resettlement places for refugees who arrived in Australia via 
the humanitarian program or with a valid visa, thereby reinforcing the 
dichotomy between ‘queue jumping’ boat arrivals and ‘genuine’ refugees. 
Further, the government argued that temporary protection removed the 
incentive for asylum seekers to risk their lives at sea while still providing 
effective protection for those who continued to do so. However, the 
policy failed in these deterrence aims. The Australian Government had 
ignored the forces (e.g. persecution and war) that were driving Middle 
Eastern refugees to flee and seek asylum in Australia in the first place. 
As such, rather than declining, the number of asylum seekers arriving by 
boat increased dramatically. These increasing numbers culminated in late 
August 2001, bringing the issue of asylum seekers, for the first time, to the 
forefront of a federal election campaign.
Border protection and the 2001 
federal election
Border protection was a major issue in the 2001 federal election and 
arguably determined its outcome.31 In 2001, Australia experienced 
enormous rises in asylum seeker boat arrivals – 5,516 arrived in 2001 
29  Gerry Hand, 1992, cited in Stevens, Immigration Policy, 126.
30  Hossein Esmaeili and Belinda Wells, ‘The “Temporary” Refugees: Australia’s Legal Response to 
the Arrival of Iraqi and Afghan Boat People’, UNSW Law Journal 23, no. 3 (2000): 224–45.
31  Ian McAllister, ‘Border Protection, the 2001 Australian Election and the Coalition Victory’, 
Australian Journal of Political Science 38, no. 3 (2003): 448, doi.org/10.1080/103611403200013398
5; David Marr and Marian Wilkinson, Dark Victory (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2003).
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alone, almost double the year before.32 Securing Australia’s border 
provoked more political and public attention as a result. Further, from 
late August onwards a series of events resulted in the issue of ‘border 
protection’ dominating much of the campaign. The two most significant 
events were the Tampa crisis and the related debate about how to deal 
with asylum seekers, and the September 11 terrorist attacks (9/11) in the 
United States and its implications for defence and foreign policy. Doubts 
put forward by politicians about the character of people seeking asylum 
in Australia were even more effective following these events. For the first 
six months of 2001, Labor had enjoyed a comfortable poll lead over 
the Liberals.33 However, support for the Labor Party began to dissipate 
after the Tampa crisis and 9/11. In the end, the party that won the 2001 
election had promised to ‘stop the boats’.
On 26 August, a Norwegian freighter, the MV Tampa, rescued 438 people 
seeking asylum whose boat began to sink while en route to Australia. 
On the grounds that the incident took place in Indonesian waters, the 
Australian Government refused the Tampa permission to enter Australian 
territory. After an extended debate and a stand-off lasting several days 
– in which the Tampa, with the 438 asylum seekers, merely floated off 
Australia’s coast – a compromise was reached with New Zealand agreeing 
to take 150 of the asylum seekers. The remainder were sent to a hastily 
established processing centre on the Republic of Nauru, where their 
claims for protection were to be determined.
Throughout the 2001 election campaign, the Australian Government 
constructed the Tampa asylum seekers as a threat to national sovereignty 
and as antithetical to the Australian way of life. In doing so, Howard 
manufactured a shared Australian national identity built on the values of 
generosity and egalitarianism or ‘a fair go’. These values were positioned 
as distinctly Australian and were defined through allusions to the asylum 
seeker. A key feature of Howard’s portrayal of these Australian values was 
the assertion that they were under threat.
32  Janet Phillips and Harriet Spinks, ‘Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976’ (background note, 
Department of Parliamentary Services, 2013), 22.
33  McAllister, ‘Border Protection’, 446; Ian McAllister, ‘The Federal Election in Australia, November 
2001’, Electoral Studies 22 (2003): 382.
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A discourse of ‘Australian generosity’ towards migrants and refugees was 
crucial to Howard’s construction of national identity. To demonstrate this 
generosity, Howard explicitly and repeatedly referred to the generosity 
of Australia’s refugee program and highlighted Australia’s reputation as 
a good international citizen:
Australia has a record in relation to caring for refugees of which 
every member of this House should be proud. No nation in the 
last 50 years has been more generous or more decent in relation 
to refugees than has Australia … But that does not mean that we 
are abandoning in any way our right to decide who comes here; 
nor shall we ever abandon our right to refuse to allow people to be 
landed in this country …34
Howard used the discourse of generosity to work up a positive image 
of Australians as ‘open’ to new arrivals, and conversely, a negative one 
of asylum seekers as threatening Australia’s rights and national interest. 
This contrast acts as a disclaimer for Howard’s subsequent assertion of 
sovereign rights, framing this as ‘we are exercising our rights, but we are 
still generous’. In this conception, Australians are willing to welcome 
those who come through the right channels, with the right intentions, 
into the national space.
Political leaders also used the value of egalitarianism to present practices of 
exclusion and oppression as legitimate and to discredit asylum seekers as 
‘queue jumpers’. Political leaders used the ‘queue’ metaphor to represent 
the offshore immigration application system as a ‘fair go’ and asylum 
seekers arriving in Australia by boat as acting unfairly.35 Claims that 
people seeking asylum by boat should not be allowed into Australia were 
justified on the basis that they had ‘jumped the queue’ and were receiving 
unfair advantages over other migrants and refugees. ‘Jumping the queue’ 
is a violation of impartiality and fairness and effectively positions ‘queue 
jumpers’ as violating these central Australian values.
34  Danielle Every and Martha Augoustinos, ‘Constructions of Australia in Pro- and Anti-Asylum 
Seeker Political Discourse’, Nations and Nationalism 14 (2008): 571, doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129 
.2008.00356.x.
35  See also Danielle Every and Martha Augoustinos, ‘Constructions of Racism in the Australian 
Parliamentary Debates on Asylum Seekers’, Discourse and Society 18 (2007): 411–36, doi.org/10.1177/ 
0957926507077427; Carol Johnson, ‘The 2002 Election Campaign: The Ideological Context’, in 
The Centenary Election, ed. J Warhurst and M Simms (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 
2002), 32–49; Peterie, ‘“These Few Small Boats”’, 433–47.
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Political leaders drew on the idea of Australia as a generous and fair 
nation to construct and contrast two groups – ‘fair Australians’ and ‘unfair 
asylum seekers’.36 On the one hand, Australia was presented as kind and 
charitable and as having a deep-seated value to give a fair go to all. By 
implicit comparison, people seeking asylum by boat were positioned 
as unfair and anti-egalitarian, as morally antithetical to key Australian 
values and even as taking advantage of Australia’s generosity. This positive/
negative contrast is a common strategy in anti-immigration discourses37 
and, in this context, saw Australian values necessitate the rejection of 
asylum seekers. That is, to ensure the ‘fair go’ is maintained, Australia 
could not accept ‘queue jumpers’.
The juxtaposition of these values functions to link inclusive and exclusive 
discourses. Howard consistently encouraged Australians to connect with 
a positive image of themselves as ‘open’ to new arrivals and effectively 
promised to safeguard ‘Australianness’ through the management and 
exclusion of potential threats to Australian values.38 He gave voters 
permission to see their desire to manage immigration flows as a legitimate 
reaction to the threat presented by asylum seekers. Further, given that 
these discourses emerged in an election campaign, he emboldened voters 
to exercise their desire to manage immigration flows by voting for the 
political party that promised to do so.
The Australian public was largely supportive of Howard’s response to 
the Tampa, reflecting both a history of opposition to new arrivals and 
increasing negative public sentiment. An Age poll found that 77 per cent 
of Australians agreed with Howard’s decision to refuse the asylum 
seekers entry to Australia.39 NewsPoll also reported that 50 per cent of 
respondents believed that all boats should be turned back.40 Immediately 
following the incident, the Coalition received a 5  per cent increase in 
36  Every and Augoustinos, ‘Constructions of Australia’, 574.
37  Teun van Dijk, ‘Political Discourse and Racism: Describing Others in Discourse’, in The Language 
and Politics of Exclusion: Others in Discourse, ed. S Riggings (London: Sage, 1997), 31–64.
38  Stephanie Younane Brookes, ‘Exclusion and National Identity: The Language of Immigration 
and Border Control in Australian Federal Election Campaigns, 1903–2001’ (paper presented at the 
Australian Political Science Association Conference, 2010).
39  Katharine Betts, ‘Boat People and Public Opinion in Australia’, People and Place 9, no. 4 (2001): 
41–42.




the polls.41 Public  support for the Howard Government increased even 
further after the September 11 terrorist attacks, with the Liberals achieving 
a 15 percentage point lead over Labor.42
The sense that the Tampa represented an attack on Australia, rather than 
a compounded tragedy for those aboard, continued to escalate through 
to the final days of the campaign. The Tampa affair and the government’s 
subsequent response set the stage for the 2001 election campaign, in 
which the government both generated and capitalised on the public’s 
unease toward asylum seekers, and foregrounded Howard’s now-
infamous declaration: ‘We will decide who comes to this country and the 
circumstances in which they come’.43
On 11 September 2001, two months before election day, a terrorist attack 
on the World Trade Centre Twin Towers and the Pentagon in the United 
States occurred, killing almost 3,000 people and injuring over 6,000 
others, and triggering an international ‘war on terror’. Within 48 hours of 
the terrorist attacks, and in an environment of suddenly and dramatically 
heightened concern over international terrorism, political leaders drew 
an explicit link between asylum seekers and terrorism. Defence Minister 
Peter Reith warned that the unauthorised arrival of boats ‘can be a 
pipeline for terrorists to come in and use your country as a staging post 
for terrorist activities’.44 Howard cautioned: ‘Australia had no way to be 
certain terrorists or people with terrorist links, were not among the asylum 
seekers trying to enter the country by boat from Indonesia’.45 Along with 
Reith, Howard was ‘deliberately inflaming fear’ by conflating the issue of 
asylum seekers with the newly emergent terrorist threat.46 These attacks 
and the Howard Government’s subsequent response catalysed border 
protection and, by extension, asylum seekers as a crucial issue of the 2001 
federal election campaign.
Even when direct relationships were not drawn, Howard and Ruddock’s 
phrasing encouraged the association of asylum seekers with terrorism. In his 
policy launch speech, Howard constructed the arrival of asylum seekers 
41  McAllister, ‘Border Protection’, 44.
42  McAllister, ‘The Federal Election in Australia’, 382.
43  John Howard, ‘Liberal/National Coalition 2001 Federal Election Campaign Launch’ (speech 
delivered at Sydney, NSW, 28  October 2001), Election Speeches, available at: electionspeeches.
moadoph.gov.au/speeches/2001-john-howard.
44  ‘Australia Links Asylum Policy to US Attack’, BBC News, 13 September 2001.
45  David Marr, Panic (Collingwood: Black Inc., 2011), 280–81.
46  Marr, Panic, 233.
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as an issue of ‘national security’ and spoke about the need for Australia 
to ‘protect its borders’ as ‘a proper response to terrorism’.47 As Australia 
was then preparing for involvement in the US military campaign, the 
Howard Government’s discussion of asylum seekers as a defence issue 
conflated them with the enemy of 9/11. Howard highlighted the role of 
the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in intercepting boats, describing it 
as one of their most significant responsibilities,48 and effectively solidified 
the transformation of Australia’s borders to a battlefront. Throughout the 
campaign, a border protection discourse was employed by Howard and 
his party to make the arrival of asylum seekers appear as a challenge to 
the physical safety of Australians, to Australian national identity and to 
national sovereignty.49 These constructions sought to reassure a concerned 
electorate that the government were doing whatever it took to prevent the 
arrival of the so-called threat.
The ‘border protection’ issue further fuelled the government’s electoral 
advantage when, on 7 October, the Olong, a boat travelling to Australia 
from Indonesia with people seeking asylum, became the first to confront 
Operation Relex.50 Official reports detail a series of events in which, after 
attempts to escort the vessel back to Indonesia, the Olong began to sink. 
Men, women and children, supported by life jackets, began jumping for 
their lives into the sea. The navy officers present assisted the 223 passengers 
to life rafts, diving into the water themselves to help the frightened 
passengers. This, however, was not the story the government told to the 
Australian public. Howard and Ruddock accused the asylum seekers of 
‘throwing their children overboard’ in a ‘premeditated’ attempt to pressure 
the Australian authorities to rescue them.51 Images were released, proffered 
as ‘absolute fact’ that asylum seekers threw their children overboard when 
47  Howard, ‘Liberal/National Coalition 2001 Federal Election Campaign Launch’.
48  Peterie, ‘“These Few Smalls Boats”’, 441.
49  Every and Augoustinos, ‘Constructions of Australia’, 574; Every and Augoustinos, ‘Constructions 
of Racism’, 530; Alison Saxton, ‘“I Certainly Don’t Want People Like That Here”: The Discursive 
Construction of “Asylum Seekers”’, Media International Australia 109, no. 1 (2003): 109–20, doi.org/ 
10.1177/1329878x0310900111; Kieran O’Doherty and Martha Augoustinos, ‘Protecting the Nation: 
Nationalistic Rhetoric on Asylum Seekers and the Tampa’, Journal of Community and Applied Social 
Psychology 18 (2008): 576–92, doi.org/10.1002/casp.973.
50  Operation Relex is the name given to the ADF border protection operation conducted between 
2001 and 2006. It formed part of the Howard Government’s response to the Tampa incident and 
enabled the ADF to intercept, detain and turn back boats carrying asylum seekers.
51  Kate Slattery, ‘Drowning Not Waving: The “Children Overboard” Event and Australia’s Fear of the 
Other’, Media International Australia 109 (2003): 93–108, doi.org/10.1177/1329878x0310900110; 




they were really images of adults and children fleeing their sinking vessel 
to save their lives.52 The government’s claim that people seeking asylum 
had thrown their children overboard generated a media frenzy and further 
enabled the Howard Government to demonise asylum seekers.
Throughout the 2001 campaign, people seeking asylum were constituted 
as culturally different and incompatible with Australians. This negative 
discourse was emboldened after the ‘Children Overboard Affair’. 
Campaigning in the aftermath of Tampa and 9/11, Howard described 
Australia’s military support of the United States as a decision to ‘defend 
the values we … hold dear’.53 Howard framed ‘values’ as a battleground 
and constructed those with different beliefs as the enemy. He created 
a benchmark of ‘Australianness’ and portrayed asylum seekers as the 
antithesis of the Australian ‘us’. The Howard Government’s portrayal 
of Australia as a decent country involved an emphasis upon family. 
Howard and Ruddock stressed Australia’s morality by describing both the 
attention the navy paid to women and children during boat interceptions 
and the government’s decision to house a number of women and children 
in ‘alternative’ detention facilities.54 Juxtaposing this representation of 
Australians as family people, in the aftermath of the ‘Children Overboard 
Affair’, asylum seekers were portrayed as abusers of children:
I can’t comprehend how genuine refugees would throw their 
children overboard. I find that it is against the natural instinct, 
people leave a regime, leave a country, flee persecution to give a 
better life and to give a future to their children. Not to put it at 
risk.55
While these threats to children were baseless, the stories told by 
government ministers portrayed asylum seekers as inhumane, barbaric 
‘others’ who did not possess basic human qualities of parental devotion. 
Further, he reserved the qualities of humanity and morality for Australians, 
condemning asylum seekers not only for their violation of Australian ideals 
but for their violation of ‘natural instinct’. In stark contrast to MacKellar’s 
representation of asylum seekers in 1977, in which he suggested that 
52  Reith quoted in O’Brien, ‘Overboard Incident’.
53  Howard, quoted in Peterie, ‘“These Few Small Boats”’, 438.
54  Peterie, ‘“These Few Small Boats”’, 440.
55  John Howard, ‘Press Conference Melbourne’ [interview transcript], PM Transcripts, Department of 
Premier and Cabinet, 8 October 2001, available at: pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-12104.
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Australia’s humanity would be jeopardised if asylum seekers were not 
treated well, Howard and Ruddock cast doubt upon the humanity of 
asylum seekers, effectively dehumanising them.
Howard’s campaign against asylum seekers, together with the events 
of 9/11, was instrumental to his re-election. As Ian McAllister’s analysis of 
the 2001 Australian Election Study (AES) shows, almost one in four voters 
mentioned refugees and asylum seekers, defence or terrorism as their major 
election concern, with the Coalition being, by far, the most preferred 
party to handle these issues.56 In contrast to the 1977 election, which saw 
MacKellar attempt to humanise and contextualise Australia’s boat arrivals, 
in 2001 the Howard Government condemned people seeking asylum for 
not having progressed through the appropriate resettlement channels 
and constructed them as undeserving outsiders that posed a threat to 
Australia’s sovereignty, safety and identity. The Howard Government’s 
fervent campaigning on ‘border protection’ ‘clearly manipulated the 
circumstances of people seeking asylum for electoral gain’57 and, in doing 
so, paved the way for the campaigns conducted by the Liberal Party under 
the leadership of Tony Abbott in 2010 and, again, in 2013.
The 2013 federal election: Stopping 
the boats
The fourth cohort of boats, between 2009 and 2013, saw by far the largest 
number of asylum seekers reach Australian shores – almost 45,000 over 
five years; 30,000 of which arrived in 2012–13.58 For the three years prior 
to the 2013 election, as the number of arrivals continued to increase, 
then-leader of the Liberal Party Tony Abbott engaged his party in a 
longstanding campaign that was largely responsible for focusing the public 
and media’s attention on the arrival of people seeking asylum – keeping 
this issue at the top of the political agenda. While Australians have long 
56  McAllister, ‘Border Protection’, 451.
57  Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, Report of the Senate Select Committee 
on a Certain Maritime Incident (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2002), 478.
58  Phillips and Spinks, ‘Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976’, 22.
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expressed disdain for the arrival of people seeking asylum,59 the Liberal 
Party’s emphasis on this issue saw it increase in importance to voters. The 
2010 AES reports that, when asked how important the issue of asylum 
seekers and refugees was, 37 per cent of voters stated it was ‘extremely 
important’ to them.60 This increased to 46 per cent in 201361 (close to 
the 50 per cent of voters who felt the same way in 2001).62 The majority 
of respondents (41 per cent) also believed the Liberal Party’s policies were 
closest to their own views on this issue – only 19 per cent of respondents 
felt the same way about the Labor Party. Both major parties capitalised on 
this issue in the 2013 federal election campaign, attempting to outdo each 
other in terms of introducing tough asylum seeker policies and, in turn, 
win the support of the voting public.
On 19 July 2013, two weeks before the official federal election campaign 
was announced, and three weeks after regaining leadership of the 
Labor Party by disposing Julia Gillard as prime minister, Kevin Rudd 
announced a Regional Resettlement Arrangement between Australia and 
Papua New Guinea, stating: ‘As of today, asylum seekers who come here 
by boat without a visa will never be settled in Australia’.63 These remarks 
were unprecedented. Neither side of politics had ever stated that asylum 
seekers identified as refugees would be permanently denied resettlement 
in Australia. Rudd acknowledged it was a ‘hard-line’ decision, but argued 
that ‘our responsibility as a Government is to ensure that we have a robust 
system of border security and orderly migration’.64 Despite this policy 
announcement and a subsequent announcement of a similar deal with 
the nation of Nauru, the Labor Party did not actively seek to promote 
their new-found policy stance. During the 2013 campaign, the Labor 
59  See for example, Murray Goot and Ian Watson, Population, Immigration and Asylum Seekers: 
Patterns in Australian Public Opinion (Canberra: Department of Parliamentary Services, 2011); Ian 
McAllister and Sarah Cameron, Trends in Australian Political Opinion: Results from the Australian 
Election Study, 1987–2013 (Canberra: Australian National University, 2014); Betts, ‘Boat People and 
Public Opinion’, 41–42.
60  Ian McAllister, Clive Bean, Rachel Kay Gibson and Juliet Pietsch, Australian Election Study, 
2010 (Canberra: Australian National University, Australian Data Archive, 2011).
61  Clive Bean, Ian McAllister, Juliet Pietsch and Rachel Kay Gibson, Australian Election Study, 
2013 (Canberra: Australian National University, Australian Data Archive, 2014).
62  Clive Bean, David Gow and Ian McAllister, The 2001 Australian Election Study (Canberra: 
Australian National University, Australian Data Archive, 2007).
63  Bianca Hall and Jonathan Swan, ‘Kevin Rudd to Send Asylum Seekers Who Arrive by Boat to 
Papua New Guinea’, Sydney Morning Herald, 19 July 2013.
64  Ibid. This policy position was a reversal of the position Rudd took when first coming into office 
in 2007. Within two months of his first prime ministership Rudd had abolished Howard’s Pacific 
Solution and those asylum seekers who had been sent to Nauru were brought to Australia.
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Party focused on 14 broad election policy pledges that did not refer to 
‘asylum seekers’, ‘boats’ or ‘borders’.65 Labor’s policy to support offshore 
processing and the settlement of asylum seekers in Papua New Guinea 
was aimed at shutting down debate on an issue that was a Coalition 
strength.66 It could be assumed that the policy position they took and 
the limited campaigning they did on this issue was out of a desire to 
neutralise the issue while trying to attract or retain voters sympathetic 
to the Coalition’s position.
In stark contrast to the Labor Party, the Coalition wittingly pursued 
the asylum seeker issue and, with the news media, effectively raised 
its prominence as an election issue.67 Abbott’s Liberal Party, like their 
predecessors, recognised political advantage in campaigning on asylum 
seeker boat arrivals. Within one week of Labor’s policy announcement, 
the Liberal Party responded by releasing their official ‘Operation 
Sovereign Borders’ policy proposal, promising to ‘stop the boats’ by 
taking even tougher action on people seeking asylum.68 Liberal policy 
was primarily framed in terms of border protection and national security. 
They promised a military-led operation against ‘illegal arrivals’, consistent 
with the punitive position of former prime minister John Howard. The 
Coalition identified ‘border protection’ as an election priority in their 
12-point ‘Real Action’ plan and again in their shortened six-point plan, 
which included a pledge to ‘deliver stronger borders’ and ‘stop the boats’. 
In less than a month they released three policy documents: The Coalition’s 
Operation Sovereign Borders Policy, The Coalition’s Policy to Clear Labor’s 
30,000 Border Failure Backlog and The Coalition’s Policy for a Regional 
Deterrence Framework to Combat People Smuggling, cementing not only 
their commitment to ‘protecting Australia’s borders’ but also asylum 
seekers as a key election issue.
65  ‘Australian Labor Campaign Media: Media Releases and Transcripts’ [data resource], 
Pandora, National Library of Australia, viewed 3 October 2017, available at: pandora.nla.gov.au/
pan/22093/20130906-0237/www.alp.org.au/campaign_media.html.
66  See Sara Dehm and Max Walden, ‘Refugee Policy: A Cruel Bipartisanship’, in Double Disillusion: 
The 2016 Australian Federal Election, ed. A  Gauja, P  Chen, J  Curtin and J  Pietsch (Canberra: 
ANU Press, 2018), doi.org/10.22459/dd.04.2018.26, for a discussion of the impact of this political 
bipartisanship in the 2016 election.
67  Andrea Carson, Yannick Dufresne and Aaron Martin, ‘Wedge Politics: Mapping Voter Attitudes 
to Asylum Seekers Using Large-Scale Data During the Australian 2013 Federal Election Campaign’, 
Policy and Internet 8, no. 4 (2016): 478–98, doi.org/10.1002/poi3.128.
68  Liberal Party of Australia and the Nationals, The Coalition’s Operation Sovereign Borders Policy 
(Barton: Liberal Party of Australia and the Nationals, 2013).
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In the 2013 campaign, Abbott’s Liberal Party emulated the arguments 
made by Howard and his government in 2001, actively demonising 
and dehumanising people seeking asylum by boat. Political candidates, 
ranging from shadow ministers to future backbenchers, adopted a threat 
discourse, emphasising that Australia needed to strengthen and secure its 
borders. The arrival of asylum seeker boats was framed yet again as an 
affront to Australian sovereignty and safety and security, with political 
leaders linking these issues, where possible, to broader social issues.
Controlling the arrival of asylum seekers and refugees emerged as an 
important theme, with both the Coalition and Labor emphasising the 
importance of determining and controlling what type of people came 
to Australia and how they arrived. The Coalition’s endorsement of this 
notion of control was cemented in Howard’s infamous campaign speech 
in the 2001 campaign. In the 2013 campaign, there were several instances 
in which Coalition politicians and policy documents directly quoted this 
speech when discussing their promise to ‘stop the boats’. All three policy 
documents variously stated:
It was Prime Minister John Howard who declared that ‘we will 
decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in 
which they come’. This was a statement of national sovereignty 
which underlined the need for Australia to control our borders. 
A  Coalition government will restore real policies that live up 
to this declaration. This is our country and we will decide who 
comes here.69
The Coalition’s consistent references to Howard’s words served to not only 
cement their current commitment to protecting the Australian people 
but also functioned as a reminder that they had never wavered in this 
commitment and had successfully protected it in the past.
Throughout the campaign, Liberal Party candidates were consistent 
in referencing the perceived shortcomings of the Labor Government 
regarding border protection, drawing comparisons between the increased 
number of boat arrivals that occurred under the Rudd/Gillard government 
and the relatively few arrivals under the preceding Howard Government.
69  Liberal Party of Australia and the Nationals, The Coalition’s Policy for a Regional Deterrence 
Framework to Combat People Smuggling (Barton: Liberal Party of Australia and the Nationals, 2013), 7.
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Labor’s border failure is the consequence of Labor’s failed 
policies and failed resolve. Labor weakened Australia’s borders by 
abolishing the proven border protection policy regime established 
by the Howard Government and has provided an open invitation 
to the people smugglers through their six years in office.70
Again, this reference to the ‘Howard era’ served a strategic purpose. 
Candidates typically want their electorate to make voting choices using 
criteria that are based on dimensions favourable to themselves; thus, 
candidates will often raise issues that they or their affiliated party are 
seen to be the ‘owners’ of. Issue ownership posits that the longstanding 
parties hold reputations for their ability to handle certain issues.71 These 
reputations, in turn, provide candidates with credibility over issues 
associated with their party. By increasing the salience of party-owned 
issues, the Liberal Party was able to stack the campaign agenda with issues 
that emphasised their strengths while simultaneously highlighting their 
opponent’s weaknesses.
Unlike in 2001 when the government was forced to deal with events 
that kept the asylum seeker issue in the public eye, in 2013, aside from 
the continued arrival of boats, no such events occurred. As such, the 
Coalition attempted to manufacture concern and interest by focusing on 
the increased number of arrivals and exaggerating the issues associated 
with this influx:
This is a national emergency. When you’ve had almost 50,000 
illegal arrivals by boat, you have a crisis on your borders; and in 
the end, the first responsibility of government is national security. 
If you don’t control your borders, to that extent, you are losing 
sovereignty over your own nation.72
The Coalition used the increased number of arrivals to construct asylum 
seekers as a threat to the national interest and the so-called integrity 
of Australian borders. The issue of protecting and securing/resecuring 
Australia and its border was a core component of the Coalition’s campaign. 
One of the Coalition’s key campaign promises was to deliver a ‘safe, secure 
70  Liberal Party of Australia and the Nationals, Operation Sovereign Borders Policy, 3.
71  David Damore, ‘The Dynamics of Issue Ownership in Presidential Campaigns’, Political Research 
Quarterly 57, no. 3 (2004): 391–97, doi.org/10.2307/3219849.
72  ‘Tony Abbott Transcript – Joint Press Conference’ [press conference transcript], Liberal Party of 




Australia’. This promise of safety and security was then aligned with the 
ubiquitous promise of ‘stopping the boats’. The Coalition effectively 
framed the arrival of asylum seekers as a threat, communicating that 
Australia could not be safe or secure while asylum seeker boats continued 
to arrive on Australian shores. In contrast to the 2001 campaign, in which 
explicit links were drawn between the arrival of people seeking asylum 
by boat and the threat of international terrorism, the 2013 campaign 
saw both major parties engage in this rhetoric in a more discreet manner. 
It could be argued that explicit statements that constructed asylum seekers 
as a threat to national safety were no longer necessary as this narrative was 
already so embedded in public opinion.
The Coalition’s representation of asylum seekers was also determinedly 
militaristic. Terminology such as ‘military-led response’, ‘tactical 
responses’, ‘targeted military operation’ and even ‘Operation Sovereign 
Borders’ explicitly connected people seeking asylum by boat to the 
Australian defence forces. The use of this terminology in conjunction 
with the exaggerated language of ‘border protection crisis’ and ‘national 
emergency’ sought to prime the electorate into a state of concern over boat 
arrivals, with the militaristic language reinforcing the severity of this issue 
and, ultimately, justifying the government’s proposed response.
Another function of the asylum seeker discussion that is more subtle, but 
in its own way more profound, is how the number of boat arrivals is 
amplified, not because of its intrinsic qualities as a threat to sovereignty 
and border security, but because of its usefulness as a broader political 
proxy. The primary issue the 2013 campaign revolved around was the 
management of Australia’s economy. While Rudd focused on Australia’s 
AAA rating and how his government overcame the global financial crisis, 
Abbott emphasised the size of Labor’s debt and deficit in comparison to the 
preceding Howard Government. While these issues were largely spoken 
about as separate to asylum seekers and border control, the Coalition 
conflated the two by discussing the costs associated with the  increased 
boat arrivals:
Between 2007–08 and 2013–14, the budget for managing illegal 
boat arrivals has blown-out by $10.3 billion. This is real money 
that could have been spent on Australian schools, hospitals or 
improving our infrastructure.73
73  Liberal Party of Australia and the Nationals, Operation Sovereign Borders Policy, 3.
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The Liberal Party sought to use the asylum seeker issue as a proxy for 
the broader concerns of the electorate. Issues of diminished access to 
education and healthcare, underfunded infrastructure and unaffordable 
housing etc. all created fertile ground for a national debate by shadow 
play and proxy, whereby asylum seekers were framed as placing additional 
strain on already depleted resources and government services.
The construction of asylum seekers as a threat to resources was also 
prominent in local-level campaigning. Various candidates attempted 
to localise their party’s national campaign by drawing on real concerns 
of their electorate and framing the arrival of asylum seeker boats as 
a challenge to said issues. A prominent example of this was when Liberal 
candidate Fiona Scott related asylum seekers to issues of traffic congestion 
and hospital waiting times:
It’s [asylum seekers] a hot topic here because our traffic is 
overcrowded.
My recommendation is go and sit in the emergency department of 
Nepean hospital or go and sit on the M4, and people see 50,000 
people come in by boat, that’s more than twice the population of 
Glenmore Park.74
Political candidates skirted over important electoral issues and used 
asylum seekers as either a scapegoat or deflection to avoid addressing 
these problems. In doing so, they created a sense of unfair imposition 
by framing the influx of boat arrivals as responsible for one’s economic 
struggles; political leaders both generated and capitalised on these feelings 
of deprivation at the hand of the asylum seeker, effectively communicating 
to their constituents that the easiest way to solve these problems was to 
‘stop the boats’.
One of the most notable features of the rhetoric on asylum seeker boat 
arrivals throughout the 2013 campaign was the reticence of political 
leaders to use categories such as asylum seekers or refugees to describe this 
group. Rather, political leaders consistently used variations of the more 
ideologically loaded ‘illegal boat arrivals’. This language depicts asylum 
seekers who arrive in Australia by boat as illegitimate and, more seriously, 
as criminal. It is important to note also that, by referring to this group as 
74  Fiona Scott, ‘Liberal Candidate Fiona Scott Links Asylum Seekers to Traffic Jams’, ABC News, 
2 September 2013, available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=y9i9OQHkpOM.
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illegal boat arrivals, as opposed to asylum seekers or refugees, political leaders 
sought to sever the linguistic reminder that these people are in fact seeking 
safety and protection. Instead, this choice of terminology disconnects 
them from the reasons for seeking asylum and delegitimises their legal 
entitlements and rights, while simultaneously criminalising their actions 
and positioning them as a threat. This construction again served to justify 
and necessitate the government’s and opposition’s ‘hard-line’ policies.
In contrast, the term ‘genuine’ was used to describe those refugees processed 
overseas and later resettled in Australia. The construction of these two 
distinct groups, ‘genuine refugees’ and ‘illegal boat arrivals’, served to 
reinforce the illegitimacy of the latter:
More than 14,500 desperate people have been denied a place 
under our offshore humanitarian programme because those places 
have been taken by people who have arrived illegally by boat. 
These people are genuine refugees, already processed by United 
Nations agencies, but they are denied a chance of resettlement by 
people who have money in their pocket to buy a place via people 
smugglers.75
The dichotomous categories of ‘illegal boat arrivals’ and ‘genuine refugees’ 
were determined through discussions on the mode of arrival of asylum 
seekers, the notion of a ‘queue’ and the wealth of irregular arrivals, 
thus creating implicit criteria used to delineate between illegitimate and 
undeserving asylum seekers and legitimate and deserving refugees.
The frameworks developed by the Coalition in response to the various 
events that occurred throughout 2001 proved crucial to the Coalition’s 
2013 campaign. However, unlike the 2001 election, in which people 
seeking asylum by boat were explicitly connected to terrorism, had their 
morality questioned and were positioned as being at odds with Australian 
values, the 2013 campaign saw these themes emerge much more obscurely. 
These concerns/fears were already so salient among the population that 
political leaders no longer needed to draw these explicit connections, they 
just needed to gently remind the public that these anxieties were still valid.
75  Liberal Party of Australia and the Nationals, Operation Sovereign Borders Policy, 3.
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Conclusion
Despite Australia’s history of refugee resettlement, opposition to people 
seeking asylum has always existed and has often been the dominant 
discourse. While the events of 2001 mark a significant change in Australia’s 
refugee history, much of the way we talk about asylum seekers began in 
1977. Constructions of asylum seekers as ‘illegal’, ‘queue jumpers’ and 
as a threat to Australia’s sovereignty and security have been in circulation 
since the very first cohort of ‘boat people’. Political leaders have since 
borrowed and built on the language and policies of both their predecessors 
and their opponents, strategically tailoring their arguments to the ‘threat 
of the day’. Constructions of asylum seekers as criminals in the late 
1970s emerged once again in 2001 and were reappropriated after the 
events of 9/11 in which asylum seekers were then portrayed as terrorists. 
This discourse proved so pervasive that by 2013 political leaders merely 
needed to remind their constituents of the supposed security imperatives 
of increased boat arrivals.76
Political leaders have consistently used (or at least attempted to use) the 
respective increase in boat arrivals to their electoral advantage. While 
this was not as effective in the 1977 campaign as it was in 2001 and 2013, 
the debates that emerged set a precedent for future discussions about 
asylum seekers. The misrepresentation of asylum seekers as illegitimate 
and the use of this issue as a proxy for other electoral issues proved useful 
for political parties seeking electoral gain. As such, in pursuit of public 
support, both major political parties have been engaged in a ‘race to the 
bottom’, ensuring that the rhetoric they use and the policies they introduce 
are tougher than their opponents.
76  Sara Dehm and Max Walden’s analysis of the 2016 election reveals yet again the pervasiveness 
of the construction of people seeking asylum as threats to Australia’s security and identity in political 





An oral history project about 
immigration detention
André Dao and Jamila Jafari in conversation
André Dao is a writer of fiction and non-fiction. He is the co-founder of 
Behind the Wire, an oral history project documenting people’s experience 
of immigration detention, a producer of The Messenger podcast and 
coeditor of They Cannot Take the Sky. He is also the deputy editor of New 
Philosopher magazine.
Jamila Jafari is a Hazara from central Afghanistan. Her people’s story 
is a  centuries-long struggle for justice. The Hazaras are an indigenous 
people  of modern-day Afghanistan who can be traced back as early as 
the fourth century. For hundreds of years, the Hazaras lived in their 
independent homeland known as the Hazarajat. In the 1890s, the British 
crown funded the Pashtun King’s first campaign of genocide against the 
Hazara. Sixty per cent of the Hazara population was killed, millions more 
were tortured and sold into slavery and many others fled into exile. Jamila 
came to know about Behind the Wire and wanted to share her story 
to highlight the realities of immigration detention in Australia. She is 





We rarely hear from the asylum seekers and refugees who are the target 
of Australia’s much-debated immigration detention regime. Behind the 
Wire is a multi-platform oral history project that seeks to address this 
imbalance by amplifying the voices of people who have experienced 
immigration detention. The coordinators of the project, who have not 
experienced detention, sought to do so by having lengthy, in-depth 
conversations with ‘narrators’ about their experiences, both inside and 
outside detention. Those conversations were then edited into short stories 
that were collected in a book, They Cannot Take the Sky (Allen & Unwin, 
2017). Some of those stories were also filmed or audio recorded to form 
a museum exhibition of the same name. Throughout the interviewing and 
editing process, the aim was for narrators to feel as much ownership over 
their own stories as possible. In the following conversation, Behind the 
Wire coordinator André Dao speaks with one of the project’s narrators, 
Jamila Jafari, about what it was like for her to share her story.
André Dao (BTW coordinator): The idea for Behind the Wire came 
about in 2014, when Sienna Merope and I started talking about the lack 
of depth and complexity in media representations of asylum seekers and 
refugees in Australia, especially of their experiences in detention. Even 
in the positive stories, there’s so often a predictable narrative, and little 
more than a few soundbites from the person themselves. And there was 
hardly ever any detail about detention itself. We wanted to find a way to 
address that gap, because in our day jobs we were meeting people who 
had been in detention with the most incredible stories, and no platform 
for telling them. So our initial motivation was to find a way to make sure 
these voices – which should be the most important in this conversation – 
were part of the public discussion about immigration detention. We also 
wanted to surprise people who perhaps only had a cursory familiarity 
with Australia’s refugee policies, or subvert their expectations, because 
there’s been so much ink spilt on the ‘issue’ that people have very fixed, 
abstracted ideas about what it means to seek asylum. We hoped that in 
the course of doing this, helping people tell their stories of detention, that 
our narrators would get something out of the process too. But I’ve always 
been hesitant to make assumptions on that front, so I’m hoping that that’s 
something we can explore in this conversation. In particular, Jamila, you 
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were one of the narrators who contacted us about being involved, and I’m 
very interested to know why? And how the experience of telling your story 
matched up with what you were expecting?
Jamila Jafari (BTW narrator): Growing up, I was often disheartened that 
the public had a very narrow perception of who the people in detention 
were and why they had come to Australia. As you’ve discussed, while there 
were personal accounts being broadcast in the media, I also felt that these 
snippets and soundbites were too inadequate to paint an accurate picture 
of people’s refugee experiences. I often thought about what telling the full 
story in its rawest form would entail.
For most of my schooling years, I would dread being asked to write 
creatively by my teachers. What was I supposed to write about? I lacked 
imagination and had nothing to inspire me. Or so I thought.
In the last two years of school, without giving it any forethought, I found 
myself writing about Hazara people and people seeking asylum. I began 
writing short stories about characters, themes and issues that resonated 
with me and were inspired by my lived experience as a Hazara-in-exile. 
In my Year 11 English exam I wrote about my people’s struggle to enlighten 
themselves in a land where target killings created a barrier to accessing 
education. My main character risked death every day to attend school 
because she knew the power of her pen was mightier than her enemy’s 
bombs and bullets. In my Year 12 drama exam I performed a monologue 
about a little girl coming to Australia on a boat.
The feedback I received from those assessments motivated me to keep 
going with my new-found approach. I had once been the girl trying to 
avoid being seen as different but now I wanted my peers to know I was 
one of those ‘boat people’, all in the spirit of inviting dialogue and 
understanding. One day, I asked a close friend of mine, ‘What would 
you have thought about Muslims and boat people if you and I had never 
met?’ She said, ‘I guess I would’ve believed everything my Dad tells me’. 
We both fell silent upon realising the impact our friendship had made.
This became a profound moment for me and it is the reason why I reached 
out to Behind the Wire. I had something to say and I saw that Behind the 
Wire was willing to help me be heard. I was pleased with the team’s ethical 
approach to giving me, as a narrator, the platform to stand up and speak 
out – on my own terms – and to be consulted at every step of the way.
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By sharing my experiences, I don’t expect parliament to unanimously vote 
overnight in closing down the camps, although that would be wonderful. 
I don’t expect xenophobes to hand me flowers and cake because they 
now want to make amends. I simply want to show people my undiluted 
human emotions and experiences and I genuinely believe the change of 
heart will come naturally.
My story writing, my lunchtime conversations with school friends and 
my involvement with Behind the Wire have all been my small way of 
magnifying the human element about how we are treating those who’ve 
come from across the seas in the national conversation. My parents raised 
me to appreciate the power of words and the effect they can have on 
societies. This is my way of trying to effect change.
André: One of the things that struck me throughout the project was how 
working with Behind the Wire was often only one of many ways that 
people talked about these issues. So it’s interesting for me to see that that’s 
the case for you as well, that you’ve spoken with friends and family, as well 
as using more creative forms like short stories and drama.
Actually, the question of form was something we thought about a lot as 
editors. Because the conversations we had with narrators would usually 
go for a few hours – across different days – it was necessary, just from 
a readability point of view, to cut the transcripts down. But then we were 
faced with a dilemma: what could we cut? And of course, length wasn’t 
the only factor – we wanted readers to get some of the raw impact that 
we felt as interviewers sitting down and speaking to people about their 
personal experiences; at the same time we wanted the stories as a whole 
to reflect the diversity of detention experiences, without our preconceived 
ideas of what the ‘important’ details would be.
Our main approach to this challenge was to try and work as closely as 
possible with narrators on the editing of their transcripts. But in practice 
this varied – some narrators said they were happy for us to shape those 
lengthy conversations into more structured narratives, while others were 
closely involved in changes, almost going line by line through their stories. 
Jamila, my memory is that you worked pretty closely with us on your 
story, so I’m interested in hearing how you approached that side of the 
project. Did it feel very different from the ‘telling’ part? And how did you 
go about thinking about what were the important details?
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Jamila: The conversations I had with Zoe Barron, the Behind the Wire 
volunteer who interviewed me, and the transcript that followed, was the 
first time I had a good amount of my refugee experience written down 
on paper. Since Zoe and I had met a few times in relaxed and casual 
settings I felt comfortable sharing more information with her. During 
the editing process, I took out information that I felt was quite personal 
for me. I consciously decided that that sort of information would be best 
relayed in a real-time face-to-face conversation rather than in written texts 
or other media formats.
Having conversations with people about topics that are important to me 
has always been very sacred to me. Ask any of my close friends and they 
will tell you I sometimes cannot stop chatting away! For some parts that 
I had removed, I felt that they were unnecessary as I knew I had gone off 
on a tangent again, which is also why I was happy for the editors to polish 
down some paragraphs into more succinct texts.
André: It’s interesting that you mention face-to-face conversations being 
a better medium for relaying certain kinds of information. That was 
something we tried to keep in mind for another iteration of our project, an 
exhibition at the Immigration Museum in Melbourne. For the exhibition, 
we had the opportunity to use video, so we decided to film some of the 
narrators from the book delivering direct-to-camera monologues taken 
from their longer published stories. The videos were displayed in small 
booths where the audience could sit and essentially be face-to-face with 
someone telling their story.
The feedback we got from audience members was very positive. The 
Immigration Museum said that the exhibition had particularly high 
engagement rates, and lots of people – including school groups – left 
notes about how the videos had impacted on them. Jamila, your videos 
are a great example of how powerful the videos could be – every time 
I watch one of them I’m struck by how much emotion comes through in 
your voice, your mannerisms – even your silences. But I’m also conscious 
that the videos were a big ask for our narrators, and really very different 
to speaking to an interviewer, off-camera, in a lengthy conversation. How 
did you find speaking on camera? Did you have to prepare differently 
than for your conversations with Zoe? And did you feel like the video 
format allowed you to express more? Or was it more of an inhibition?
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Jamila: As I reflect upon that experience now, I realise I didn’t do 
anything drastically different to prepare. Because speaking on camera is 
slightly different to a real-time conversation, I had to bear in mind that 
the audience was not in front of me to listen and ask me further questions. 
Hence why I made sure to include any details I thought someone may 
potentially ask.
Each media format has its own strengths and weaknesses. The power of 
a video is in its ability to capture the things a book cannot: the pitch 
in a  voice, the facial expressions, the silences. In my case, these things 
happened voluntarily and I think it really helped me to say what 
I wanted to.
I had intended to speak in a calm, neutral tone on camera. But when 
I watched the videos for the first time, I was really surprised to find that 
my emotions were so obvious in my voice. Where my voice trembles or 
my pitch rises a viewer can tell when I am anxious or excited. I was slightly 
confronted to realise I was a bit like an open book in those videos. But 
I had to tell myself it was okay to sometimes let myself be honest about 
how my experiences made me feel. It’s not always in the best interests of 
a newsreader to tell the masses how government policies affected my life, 
so if I didn’t allow myself to show emotion, to be human, then who would?
Through these videos, I hope the public is able to get a glimpse, however 
small it may be, of certain elements of my experience and the experiences 
of other people that the mainstream media has been reluctant to broadcast 
for nearly two decades.
The following is an extract from Jamila’s story. She was five years old when 
she fled Afghanistan with her mother and younger brother in 1999. After 
travelling by boat from Indonesia, they were intercepted in Australian waters, 
and were eventually taken to the detention centre in Woomera, South Australia.
The word ‘freedom’
We had the initial interview, and it was in a lovely, clean, air-
conditioned building – really different from the dongas. There 
was a desk, an interviewer, an interpreter, and a chair. Mum sat 
on the chair as she was being interviewed, and my brother and 
I had to sit on the floor. I think they gave us a piece of paper and 
a few coloured pencils to occupy us with. And, I mean, it should 
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have been something enjoyable to do but what was I supposed to 
draw? Razor wire all around me? That’s all I’d seen ever since I’d 
arrived here.
So, once you’ve been initially interviewed, they transfer you over, 
make room for the other new arrivals. The other donga we were 
moved to was much bigger and it had a small living area, a corridor 
and three bedrooms on each side. Each bedroom had two bunk 
beds. So we took one of the rooms there, there were other Hazara 
families in the other rooms. And these other Hazara families, they 
were, I think, the epitome of what detention does to children. 
The psychological effects detention has. The lady, she had quite 
a few children. She had two older boys: one was 14 and the other 
was 12. She had lots of girls as well. When I think of detention, 
what I saw with them are a big part of the memories I have.
Woomera was the most notorious detention centre in Australia. 
There were lots of protests and riots and that sort of thing while we 
were in Woomera. I saw adults and children with their lips sewn, 
bruised and all this stuff. The 14-year-old and the 12-year-old, 
they both had their lips sewn. The mother too.
During one of the riots on 26 January 2000, I was standing 
there and there was arguing going on. There was screaming, 
people screaming out, ‘Freedom! Freedom!’ It was the middle 
of the desert during the really hot season and the conditions 
were just unbearable. I remember the 14-year-old, he had some 
kind of blade. He’d written out the word ‘freedom’, he cut that 
into his skin, his left forearm – I’m sorry this is so graphic – his 
skin’s ripped open, his blood’s dripping, and he’s screaming out, 
‘We want freedom!’
I could never remove that image from my head. It’s so vivid. 
And his voice is … it’s shaking, there’s so much pain in his voice. 
Like, a 14-year-old! Doing that to himself! And all the other 
adults, older children, protesting and screaming out, ‘Freedom, 
freedom, freedom.’ When I think of my childhood, that is one of 
the main words that I remember, like it’s been engraved in me, and 
I have never … I wish I could, I wish I could remove those images 
from my head. But, I can’t. It’s impossible.
After the boy cuts himself, next thing I hear are people screaming 
and crying out because a man has climbed right to the top of the 
fence and then he just jumps off the fence. He lands on a coil of 
razor wire and people are shrieking, they’re crying out. Everyone 
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is so surprised. As he lands, his weight causes the coil to bounce, 
so he bounces a few times like a heartbeat. His arms are all cut 
up because of the razor and he’s bleeding. There’s a documentary 
about him, called ‘The Man Who Jumped’. He didn’t die, but the 
conditions in the detention centre drove him off the edge, literally. 
You wouldn’t do that if you were completely sane, you know?
And those boys, they were so damaged, honestly. They did a lot of 
hectic things but I just admired them so much for their fearlessness, 
their boldness and their bravery. It’s not an easy task to sew your 
lips together, to go on a hunger strike, to then resort to cutting 
into your own flesh. You couldn’t help but admire them for having 
those personality traits in the face of such hopeless times. I think 
there were other people who felt the same way about them, even 








TO DANDENONG VIA 
DENPASSAR
Hazara stories of settlement, 
success and separation
Laurel Mackenzie
The chapter draws on interviews conducted with three post-settlement 
refugee Hazaras living in Victoria who described their journeys from 
Afghanistan to Australia. These interview participants saw themselves as 
having overcome obstacles and hardships to arrive at a place of active 
participation in Australian life. All three interviewees described themselves 
as successful, having achieved their goals of escape, resettlement and – 
in most cases – family reunification. This last is significant as all three 
narratives highlight the importance of family, rather than simply being 
stories of individual effort. The driving motivation of each story’s 
protagonist was clearly to bring their families to safety: individual success 
or happiness in each case is bound up with that of family and community. 
The narratives in this chapter reveal a shared humanity as the people in 
them describe resettlement experiences both as triumphs and difficulties.
Underlying each of these stories is the invisible hand of Australian 
immigration policy, which provides the legal context in which people 
seek asylum in Australia. The experience of coming to Australia is not 
just an experience of emergent immigrant identity, but also includes the 
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shattering encounter with immigration policy that indefinitely detains 
people and causes families to be heartbreakingly separated. Excerpts 
from Salmi’s, Hassan’s and Jahan’s narratives give a sense of how policy 
frameworks manifest in the lived experiences of real people. To further 
emphasise the real-life impact of policy on human lives, their stories 
are framed here in the context of their embodied interviews, drawing 
attention not just to the events contained within the stories, but to the act 
of telling and sharing the stories as part of lived experience.
In 2011, I started making regular weekly visits to the Melbourne 
Immigration Transit Accommodation (MITA) facility, then used to 
indefinitely hold unaccompanied minors, young men under 18 years of 
age who had come alone by boat to Australia to seek asylum, while their 
refugee claims were processed. Along with other visitors, I met members 
of oppressed minority groups including Tamils from Sri Lanka, Banglas 
from Bangladesh, Rohingyas fleeing Burma, stateless Kurds, Syrian 
Palestinians, Afghan Hazaras, and others, including two teenage boys 
from Indonesia who had been picked up on suspicion of being people 
smugglers. These last two were not seeking asylum but were held there 
because there was nowhere else to send them – they were too young to be 
sent to Melbourne Immigration Detention Centre (MIDC), the higher-
security facility reserved for immigration activities specifically defined 
under the Australian criminal code (including visa over-stayers). They are 
not the focus of this chapter – I mention them to illustrate the perceived 
lack of clarity around immigration policy within the detention system. 
Other manifestations of this included the inconsistent yet indefinite 
lengths of sentences, and the unclear processes that determined who was 
awarded visas and why. The two young fishermen were simply sent back 
to Indonesia after a few months.
The young men who remained had strong reasons not to want to be sent 
back to their countries of origin. A common thread ran through many of 
the stories we heard: frequently the head of the family had been killed or 
had vanished in suspicious circumstances, and the rest of the family had 
put their money together to send their eldest son to freedom. The hopes 
of their families rested on the shoulders of many of the young men we 
met – something that I came to appreciate more with repeated visits. 
Their concerns for the future were not just for their own survival, but their 
families and communities as well.
171
8 . FROM DAHMARDA TO DANDENONG viA DENPASSAR
We took in gifts of food and coloured pencils, brought in musical 
instruments and board games, and conducted impromptu English 
classes. The kinds of support we were able to offer seemed futile at times. 
However, the young men detained at MITA told us that these small things 
helped to make them feel less isolated and more socially connected, as the 
processing of their claims dragged on interminably. This finding is reflected 
in research by British criminology researchers into prison and detention 
centre conditions Mary Bosworth and Blerina Kellezi, who recommend 
‘greater communication and interaction with the local community’ as 
a strategy in mitigating the high levels of depression caused by isolation 
within immigration detention centres.1
Over the next couple of years MITA changed. MIDC was nearing capacity, 
so MITA expanded to contain a larger population of inmates than 
just unaccompanied minors. Security was tightened, and higher fences 
were built. A friend and I took clarinet reeds to an Iranian grandfather 
and, with  other activists and advocates, raised enough money to buy 
a  computer for a Palestinian Syrian artist who drew political cartoons. 
One day I registered for a visit and went in by myself to meet a young 
Afghan Hazara man who had just arrived. He beat me at table tennis, 
and we watched the grey Melbourne sky transformed by a rainbow. 
I found myself buoyed by his optimism and sense of hope, the rainbow 
a perfect visual metaphor. Later that year, a friend and I held a celebration 
dinner when two other Hazara men were released from detention. They 
told us their stories, eloquently and passionately. Their stories comprised 
a complex mix of individual adventure, culturally specific references, 
narratives of persecution and flight, and elements of self-reflection 
that implied a  conscious shift towards what it might mean to become 
Australian (rather than Afghan) Hazaras. The seeds of my interest in 
Hazara life stories, and the research project from which the interviews 
in this chapter are drawn, were sown.
1  Mary Bosworth and Blerina Kellezi, Quality of Life in Detention: Results from the MQLD 
Questionnaire Data Collected in IRC Yarl’s Wood, IRC Tinsley House and IRC Brook House, August 2010–




Dandenong: An emerging Hazara centre
In 2015, I knocked on the door of a comfortable house in suburban 
Dandenong. I had arranged to interview Salmi and Hassan, two Hazaras 
who had already expressed interest via email in taking part in my research 
on Hazara transitions from refugee to immigrant status. The interviewing 
stage of my research involved recording the life stories of Hazaras over 
18  years of age, told in English, who had held a permanent visa in 
Australia for more than five years, as per the conditions agreed upon with 
my university’s Human Research Ethics Committee.
It is worth describing Dandenong, since it is the site of the largest 
population of Hazaras living in Australia. Dandenong is a primarily 
working-class suburb with a deep-rooted Labor (centre-left) tradition. 
Located 30 kilometres south-east of Melbourne’s central business hub, on 
the outskirts of the city, the region has a highly multicultural population 
comprising a mix of different ethnic groups, especially from China and 
the Middle East. The City of Greater Dandenong calls itself the ‘City 
of Opportunity’, and identifies as a refugee welcome zone. The city has 
implemented anti-racism policies, and welcoming policies and practices 
including programs for asylum seekers and survivors of torture, language 
learning, cultural centres and more. The local council cites its goal as 
‘building a sustainable future for the community’, and highlights themes 
of progress and inclusivity in its acknowledgement of both Indigenous 
and new migrant histories.2 In one interview I conducted, Dandenong 
was called ‘the place to be’ for new Hazara arrivals: when given the choice 
of resettlement areas, Hazaras selected it based solely on recommendations 
from their social networks.3 In 2017, 2,000 of the 8,000 asylum-seeking 
refugees living in Victoria were located in Dandenong.4 It was described 
to me as the fourth largest Hazara city-based centre in the world, after 
Kabul, Tehran and Quetta.
2  ‘Asylum Seekers and Refugees: Greater Dandenong’s Role’, Greater Dandenong: City of 
Opportunity, 2017. Copy in author’s possession.
3  Laurel Mackenzie and Olivia Guntarik, ‘Rites of Passage: Experiences of Transition for Forced 
Hazara Migrants and Refugees in Australia’, Crossings: Journal of Migration & Culture 6, no. 1 (2015): 
59–80, doi.org/10.1386/cjmc.6.1.59_1.
4  ‘Asylum Seekers and Refugees: Greater Dandenong’s Role’.
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One interview participant had described the Greater Dandenong region 
as home to approximately 10,000 Hazaras. This number is somewhat 
higher than the 2016 Australian census suggests, where Afghanistan was 
selected as ‘country of birth’ by just 4,799 people in the Dandenong region 
(or 3.2 per cent of the local population).5 However, the census figure does 
not provide an accurate representation of the number of Hazaras living in 
Dandenong, for three reasons. Firstly, not all Hazaras would necessarily 
claim Afghanistan as their country of birth: Hazaras have been actively 
involved in fleeing persecution in Afghanistan since at least 1979, and 
members of the younger generations may have been born in Pakistan 
or Iran, or even in Australia. Secondly, people on temporary visas were 
excluded from taking part in the census, and the City of Dandenong 
proudly asserts that it is home to 2,000 asylum-seeking refugees. Any 
Hazaras within this category, living as members of the community while 
on temporary visas, would not have been counted in the census.6 Finally, 
the form of data collection used in the 2016 census caused concerns to 
be raised around privacy, which potentially affected the accuracy of data 
collected from households where trust was already low.7
Although not all Hazaras would have identified Afghanistan as their 
birthplace, it still gives some indication of Hazara numbers to look at 
the numbers of people who gave their birthplace as Afghanistan, since 
no specific data was provided regarding people who identified as being of 
Hazara ethnicity. Compared with other regions in Australia, the number of 
Afghan-born residents in Dandenong was relatively high: across the state 
of Victoria 18,116 people (or 0.3 per cent of the population) identified 
Afghanistan as their country of birth. Overall, 46,799 people across 
Australia (or 0.2 per cent of the overall population) identified Afghanistan 
as their country of birth.8 Linguistically, emerging scholar on Afghan 
languages Asya Pereltsvaig has noted that the number ‘one thousand’ in 
Hazaragi (the Hazara language in Afghanistan) is ‘Hazaar’, which also 
5  ‘2016 Census Quickstats: Greater Dandenong’, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 23  October 
2017, available at: quickstats.censusdata.abs.gov.au/census_services/getproduct/census/2016/quickstat/ 
LGA22670.
6  ‘Microdata: Australian Census and Migrants Integrated Dataset, 2016’, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 17 July 2018, available at: www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@.nsf/0/889792D 645A7CC7 FCA 
2582 CD0015C002?OpenDocument.
7  Senate Economics Reference Committee, 2016 Census: Issues of Trust (Canberra: Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2016), available at: www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/
Economics/ 2016Census/Report.
8  ‘2016 Census Quickstats’.
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historically refers to a mountain tribal grouping in Afghanistan.9 Further, 
the number ‘ten thousand’ appears to serve as a colloquial term for a larger 
population group comprising several tribes, and as a cultural referent for 
a large population group. Despite a lack of clarity around exact numbers, 
it is clear that the Dandenong region is an emerging cultural centre 
for Hazaras.
Meeting Salmi and Hassan
A young woman opened the door to my knock and introduced herself 
as Salmi’s sister, followed by an older woman who Salmi later indicated 
was their (non–English speaking) grandmother. The younger women 
wore jeans, and headscarves in what I took to be a more modern style 
comprising a tube of stretchy fabric, rather than an artfully draped scarf. 
I followed the example set by the pile of shoes at the door and slipped mine 
off. Salmi offered me slippers to wear inside the house, and I followed her 
into a large room ringed with cushions.
Salmi introduced me to Hassan, her father’s business partner. In my visits 
to detention centres and in community contacts beyond, I had grown used 
to meeting Hazara men with refugee experiences who had shifted away 
from more conservative traditions and would shake hands, even exchange 
hugs with women to whom they were not related. Hassan, however, was 
from a generation that still held to the older values. I had forgotten my 
habit of approaching with hands folded at my heart and waiting for the 
other person to make the first move. I reached to shake his hand, and he 
backed away slightly, apologising. It was a slightly awkward start to our 
first meeting. Salmi and I had corresponded via email after my research 
outline had been forwarded to her, but we had not met in person before.
In my interviews, I would strive to indicate via my professional demeanour 
that, as a representative of an academic institution, I understood and 
respected the seriousness of the stories I was about to hear. The academic 
props I carried (papers, recording device and consent forms) were part 
of the performance through which I demonstrated my credibility. 
The familiar flow of carefully chosen words as I talked through the process 
9  Asya Pereltsvaig, ‘Language of the “Mountain Tribe”: A Closer Look at Hazaragi’, Languages of 
the World, 12 December 2011, available at: www.languagesoftheworld.info/student-papers/language-
of-the-mountain-tribe-a-closer-look-at-hazaragi.html.
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describing the research aims and intended outcomes, the ethical guidelines 
that meant participants could withdraw from the research at any time, 
and my well-practised opening question that opened the unstructured 
interview into a space where the participant’s stories took centre stage, all 
served to bolster the identities we were performing in that space. In every 
interview, both the interview participant and I shared a desire to record 
and publish their stories. My aim was to open the space I had access to 
as an early career researcher for more refugee stories to be told, bringing 
perspectives from my social justice activism to my academic work. The 
research participants desired to contribute to the narrative and media 
construction of Hazaras as desirable migrants in Australia. This shared 
goal gave us a common stake in the interviews being conducted and meant 
that social gaffes like my reaching to shake Hassan’s hand were able to be 
overlooked, or reconstructed as an opportunity for education, in pursuit 
of our larger shared aim. Somewhat later in my interviewing process, 
another participant told me he always took part in research and surveys, 
as a way of helping the larger Hazara community, and of giving back to 
the wider Australian community. Similarly, Salmi and Hassan presented 
themselves as deeply invested in the future of the Hazara community in 
Australia.
Cultural and historical identity 
and persecution
We sat on the floor and Salmi placed a tray of wrapped chocolates and 
nuts and sweet tea between us. After I had asked my well-rehearsed 
introductory question, Hassan indicated my zoom recorder, which I had 
placed on the floor between us:
‘It’s going, is it?’
The gesture served to re-establish the context of our conversation and our 
roles as participant and interviewer with a shared aim. He introduced 
himself to the recording and proceeded to tell his story. ‘In the name of 
God, I’m Hassan … I was born in 1969. I’m from Kabul, Afghanistan.’
Hassan’s narrative encompassed not just events from his own experiences, 
but also described the wider political situation, demonstrating links with 
the greater Hazara community. He described how, even when he was eight 
or nine years old, he was aware of the widespread social discrimination 
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against Hazaras. Hazaras were likened to a ‘sewer’, and the word ‘Hazara’ 
itself assumed derogatory meanings. Hazaras were not permitted to sit 
in buses or public cars and were excluded from political process. To 
become a politician or government minister was an unattainable dream 
for a Hazara.
This discrimination appeared as a cultural motif in other interviews 
I conducted, as a larger historical context also emerged, locating the 
Hazaras’ vulnerability as stretching back generations. In Salmi’s and other 
interviewees’ analysis, Hazaras had been positioned as second-class citizens 
since the late 1800s, through events brought to a crux by the genocidal 
attacks on the Hazaras wrought by Emir Shah Abdur Rahman Khan in 
1891, whose rise to power with the aid of British finances meant he was 
now acting with key authorities of the state at his disposal.10
65 per cent of the Hazara people were killed during the Abdur 
Rahman Khan’s regime  …  he wanted to get rid of the Hazara 
people. (Salmi)
She described how Khan sent over 100,000 Pashtun fighters on a religious 
crusade into the Hazara lands in mountainous central Afghanistan, and 
destroyed the Hazara villages, subjugating their inhabitants.
This event was a common motif reflecting a shared history and cultural 
identity. The previous year I had interviewed Jahan, a Hazara community 
leader in Dandenong. Jahan had also located the massacre as significantly 
interwoven into Hazara cultural memory.
People’s lands was grabbed by force, and given it to the other tribe, 
which was Pashtun tribe. People were forced out from their region. 
Hazaras were pushed in towards the central region, and blocked, 
cut off all their supply lines. And Hazaras was economically, they 
were suppressed. (Jahan)
Jahan had explained that, in the century or so following the massacre of 
1891, Hazaras were socially vilified in Afghanistan, given work as farm 
labourers or menials, prohibited from entering university, restricted from 
general education by the limited number of schools in the mountains, 
and more heavily taxed than their Pashtun neighbours.
10  Niamatullah Ibrahimi, The Hazaras and the Afghan State: Rebellion, Exclusion and the Struggle for 
Recognition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 53–86.
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[Since then, Hazaras] may not be accepted in any form of 
government. They are not allowed to study higher education. 
They are not even allowed to enrol in a school. They are not 
allowed to be in a higher ranking, they are not allowed to join the 
military. (Jahan)
Hazara revolts were quashed, and Hazaras were socially cast as second-
class citizens. Until the Communist invasion of 1978, Hazara people 
had been excluded from the education system. Illiteracy had contributed 
to social exclusion and oppression for over 100 years and confirmed in 
majority minds the fitness of Hazaras only for menial labour. The Soviet 
invasion was the beginning of bloody and destructive war in Afghanistan. 
But from 1979 the Communists imposed strict rules around access to 
schools, and Afghan Hazaras had the opportunity again to attend school 
past the fourth grade. Hazara scholar Niamatullah Ibrahimi has argued 
that the  power vacuum within Afghanistan that made the invasion 
possible, as the central government lost control of the country, also gave 
Hazaras the first opportunity for autonomy they had had in decades – a 
chance for self-determination that only ended when the Taliban had firmly 
established themselves across the country in 1998.11 The Communists were 
finally expunged in 1989, in a war in which many Hazaras participated, 
privileging national, ethnic and religious allegiance over identification 
with the Communist invaders. But the ensuing civil war in Afghanistan, 
and subsequent seizure of power by the Taliban (with its fundamentalist 
Pashtun roots), meant that Hazaras again were targeted for persecution. 
It was in the context of this persecution by the Taliban that the interview 
participants in this chapter fled Afghanistan.
Leaving Afghanistan
Born in 1993, Salmi was three years old when the Taliban took Kabul. 
Two years later the Taliban were reported moving throughout the rest 
of the country, circuitously approaching Mazar-i-Sharif as they gathered 
strength in south-eastern villages. By 1998 they had entered her province. 
She did not understand the significance of the news, but her father did, 
and loaded up a truck with provisions – flour, rice and oil – the essentials 
of living. Salmi remembers the day her father heard that the Taliban were 
approaching their village. He sent a message to her mother that the line 
11  Ibrahimi, The Hazaras and the Afghan State, 119.
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of defence had broken and asked her to pack up the things they would 
need to live on. Salmi remembers hurried movement and her confusion. 
‘I  could not understand what was happening. I was asking but they 
were not answering, because they were upset.’ She remembers taking 
things out of their house, and people running on foot from the village – 
‘snapshots of things’.
They left that day with their truck loaded up with provisions, counting 
themselves among the fortunate because they had a car. Salmi remembers 
sitting in the cabin of the truck and looking back into the body of the 
truck space to see it full of people. People travelling on foot would ride 
in the truck for a distance and get out at the next village. Others would 
replace them. Salmi remembers her mother imploring her father not to 
take any more people in – there were too many, they were overcrowding 
the space, slowing the truck down, making it unsafe. Salmi remembers her 
father’s response, which she presented as a kind of family lore, revealing 
the esteem she holds him in:
This is the only time you can show people who you really are. It’s the 
hard times that you can show the true self of yours and show your 
humanity. We can’t say anything to them. Just let them in and they 
will realise when it’s too much and they’ll stop coming in. (Salmi)
They reached Pakistan, but it became clear that her father was still in 
danger. In the most heartbreaking moment in her narrative, Salmi 
described her father’s decision to try and make his way to Australia as 
a refugee. ‘He decided that he’d come to Australia and he left us there in 
Pakistan.’ At this point in her interview Salmi wept as she remembered the 
moment when her father left them behind. In Afghanistan, she had been 
a ‘daddy’s girl’ – young and spoiled – he would do anything for her. In the 
evenings, he would tell her stories. Or there would be visitors, people 
talking late into the night, a feeling of community and life. ‘In Pakistan, 
it was just too quiet for us. There was no Dad.’ Her constructions of 
stability were based around him, and he had left them in Pakistan. Salmi 
remembered his absence keenly – she missed falling asleep to the safety 
of the sound of his voice when he was not there.
We were left on our own, my mum, my older brother was eight 
at the time. My two sisters, one of them was five, my younger one 
was one. We were on our own in Pakistan and life was really hard 
there as well, because in there you know, you need a male person 
to live with you.
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The fact that my Dad wasn’t with us was very hard for all of us. 
Now that I think of it, it would have been the hardest for my 
Mum, because she could understand everything. (Salmi)
The ‘everything’ encompassed the danger and fear that her mother worked 
to protect her children from, while Salmi’s father made his way slowly 
to Australia, traversing a boat journey famous for its frequent fatalities, 
detention and other stages of the refugee determination process in Australia.
Jahan came from a small village in the mountains in Afghanistan where 
the villagers worked for seven or eight months of the year to store food for 
winter, and traded food with other villages – it was not so much a fiscal as 
a barter economy. Around 1995 the Taliban arrived in his area, bringing 
threats and violence.
[The] Taliban came, I can’t recall the dates, it’s like 30 years, 25 years 
ago … But after ’95, or during the ’95 there was Talibans take most 
of regions, then they headed towards central region. (Jahan)
The urban centre of Kabul where Hassan was based was no safer than 
Jahan’s small village in the mountains. By 1995 Hassan was married, with 
a family of his own. He feared for his and his family’s safety, due to the 
ongoing persecution of the Hazara people in Kabul. Finally, he decided 
they would have to leave, and he sought out a people smuggler. With the 
assistance of the people smuggler, who provided documents and access to 
safe houses, Hassan and his family made their way overland to Pakistan, 
then via the people smugglers’ routes to Indonesia.
Like Hassan, Jahan contacted a people smuggler – in our interview Jahan 
had explained, chuckling, that in Australia, in English, the term is ‘people 
smuggler’; but in Pakistan it was just ‘normal business’. Jahan and his 
father made their way to Indonesia on fake passports, travelling at night, 
waiting interminably for connections, not knowing where they were 
going. Finally, late at night, they were taken to a small boat that would 
bring them to Australia. About 36 people were crammed into the boat 
in complete darkness.
I didn’t know whether I was going to make a life from the Dead 
Sea, you know, sea journey. Because our boat was so small, it was 
sort of, you know, flying on the water, sort of as people so many. 
In  the end water was finished, there was no rations there you 
know, there was … terrible, terrible condition. (Jahan)
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In Indonesia, Hassan realised he did not have enough money to pay the 
passage for his family in the people smugglers’ boats. He was forced to 
leave them in a refugee camp in Jakarta, where they lived for the next 
three years. He then endured a harrowing boat journey that he swore he 
would never repeat, not for half the land in Australia.
If now the government takes me there, gives me half of Australia 
for me, I never come back there [the boat journey]. It’s too 
hard. It’s too hard. I know, I had a big storm there and all of us, 
99.9 per cent, we thought we’re going to go and by luck, we are 
alive. In that time, no water, no food and the captain lost the way.
I don’t know what they’re using or they got navigation – I don’t 
know actually. I was – under – down the stairs. Just the people 
talking like that and the captain says, yeah, they’re lost. They went 
back to Indonesia and they took some more water and food and 
again came. It’s all up, took us 14 days. (Hassan)
Reaching Australia: Curtin Detention 
Centre in 1999
On reaching Australia, Hassan and Jahan were both detained at Curtin 
Detention Centre. Jahan recalled how the guards seemed to delight in 
telling detainees stories of the dangers of the Australian outback, where 
crocodiles and carnivorous kangaroos abounded, and snakes whose bite 
would kill in two seconds. He related this to the policy changes at the time. 
He arrived in October 1999, when Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs) 
were being introduced to replace the Permanent Protection Visas (PPVs) 
that had previously been automatically granted once an applicant was 
identified legally as a refugee. TPVs provided far fewer rights – including 
work rights – than the older PPVs. They expired after three years, 
provoking criticisms of refoulement.12 The shift exacerbated the already 
tense atmosphere inside Curtin. According to Jahan, the guards would try 
to scare the asylum seekers to deter escape if anyone was tempted to try 
their luck in the non-existent Australian underground instead of waiting 
for a limited and expiring visa.
12  Mary Crock, Seeking Asylum Alone: A Study of Australian Law, Policy and Practice Regarding 
Unaccompanied and Separated Children (Australia: Federation Press, 2006).
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[In 1999], law was changing, and that’s why they told us to not go 
out, never escape, otherwise you will be dead in jungle, you can’t 
make it, and kangaroo might eat you off, and crocodile might you 
know grab your leg, you know, or snake might bite you – and 
they’re so deadly you will be dead in two seconds. (Jahan)
Issues at Curtin at that time included overcrowding, indefinite detention, 
the extremely limited English classes that were offered to detainees, 
children in detention, delays in processing, including communicating 
the results of refugee determination hearings, and more. This had started 
to attract the attention of human rights groups. Busloads of protestors 
arrived from across the country to shout and wave placards outside the 
gates. Conditions continued to worsen, and Jahan recalled tents being 
used as a solution to overcrowding. In the Western Australian desert heat, 
this solution was potentially fatal.
I vividly remember … in the start there was some 100 people … And 
they were feeding us well, because we were few people. Then they 
reached to 500 and 1,000 people, and everything went badly. 
And there was hardly much food provided, there was hardly no 
utilities, it was very hard you know. And after that people were 
transferred to the tents, and that in the 44, 45-degree heat of 
Western Australia – it was hard to survive there. (Jahan)
Jahan had come from a different kind of desert. In his mountainous 
village, rain was at least possible. Here he found himself in a place of red 
earth, poisonous animals and almost unendurable heat.
We were never exposed to this kind of heat, you know, this kind of 
country. I remember, when I was putting my feet first on the land, 
I remember that the land was very red. I’ve never seen such a red 
land, you know, I said what kind of land is that, you know, have 
I come in Mars or somewhere, you know. (Jahan)
In the year 2000 the Human Rights Commission conducted a review of 
Immigration Detention Centre facilities across the country, which was 
published the following year. Recommendations included the amendment 
of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to guarantee rights to detainees including:
the right not to be arbitrarily detained, to have access to 
information and legal assistance, the right to humane treatment 
and the rights of children to special protection  …  If detainees 
are deprived of their basic rights, a situation of distress, anxiety 
and grievance is created, which all too often results in the protests 
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and violence we have seen over the previous year  …  I wish to 
emphasise that many of the problems in immigration detention 
facilities are significantly heightened by prolonged detention. 
The government must look seriously at a solution to long term 
detention as a matter of urgency.13
By the end of 1999 Jahan received the news that his refugee claim had been 
accepted, and he had been granted a TPV. At first, he didn’t believe it – he 
had started to mistrust the system, as the guards at Curtin had enjoyed 
toying with the inmates, giving false information about, for  instance, 
the dangers that waited outside:
I remember Christmas ’99. When I was given the news that I was 
accepted as a refugee. As asylum seeker, as a refugee. That I’d be 
going out. First I didn’t believe, I said, they’re lying, they’re trying 
to punish us here, you know, I don’t know, let us rot in here, you 
know. (Jahan)
Once he was able to accept the news it became a high point of his narrative 
– he had surmounted the obstacles, he had been recognised as a refugee, 
and he was on his way to freedom.
And I was happy then! 25th, Christmas ’99, it was good news 
for me. That’s what sometimes I do. You know, like Christmas. 
It’s lovely, you know. That was one of the good news, that my life 
was saved. (Jahan)
Policy in 1999: TPVs and family separation
In October 1999 immigration law changed to admit new classes of 
visas.14 Until then, if applicants were identified as refugees, then they were 
automatically given permanent visas. In 1999 the Howard Government 
introduced TPVs, which removed access to social services and the 
guarantee of attaining permanent residency. According to political scientist 
Don McMaster, TPVs were clearly a response to a political issue, the 
13  Australian Human Rights Commission, A Report on Visits to Immigration Detention Facilities by 
the Human Rights Commissioner 2001 (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2001), available at: 
www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/report-visits-immigration-detention-facilities-human-rights-
commissioner-2001#major.
14  Crock, Seeking Asylum Alone.
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arrival of refugees by boat directly to Australia.15 These arrivals, although 
numerically insignificant, were constructed as a problem, generating 
media hysteria and becoming a major electoral issue. People arriving in 
Australia by plane or people with expired visas were not subject to TPVs, 
but were usually granted Bridging Visas which included work rights and 
other benefits. TPVs granted their holders access to some medical and 
welfare services (not necessarily including English classes), no family 
reunification and no travel outside of Australia. TPV holders could work, 
however their immigration status excluded them from permanent jobs. 
TPV holders were eligible for a small Special Benefit from the Red Cross 
(an allowance later taken over and administered by social security benefits 
provider Centrelink), but not the slightly more substantive JobSeeker 
allowance. Despite the provision in the 1951 Refugee Convention that 
explicitly prohibits refoulement, TPVs expired after three years and were 
not renewable: they could only be applied for afresh. This meant that 
TPV holders lived constantly in fear of their visas not being renewed and 
being sent back to the country they had fled. TPVs have thus been linked 
conclusively with mental illnesses such as stress and depression.16
Australia has a long tradition of enacting strictures on immigrants, based 
on its self-construction as white, which has bled into its restrictive refugee 
policies. Indigenous scholar and critical race theorist Aileen Moreton 
Robinson has written on the phenomenon of the ‘white possessive’ that 
is useful in unpacking this level of discrimination. Australia was classified 
as Terra Nullius on settlement; explicitly locating the assumption of white 
colonial ownership over the empty space – and, by implication, ownership 
over the Indigenous people already living there.17 This assumption of 
white ownership of the land and the constructed identity of Australia 
later extended to migration policies as well. The Immigration Restriction 
Act was one of a suite of policies that aimed to promulgate a concept of 
a white Australia between Federation and the start of World War II.18 As 
political scientist James Jupp has pointed out, non-British immigration 
15  Don McMaster, ‘Resettled Refugees: Temporary Protection Visas: Obstructing Refugee 
Livelihoods’, Refugee Survey Quarterly 25, no. 2 (2006): 135–45, doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdi0131.
16  Crock, Seeking Asylum Alone.
17  Aileen Moreton-Robinson, The White Possessive: Property, Power, and Indigenous Sovereignty 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), 5, doi.org/10.5749/minnesota/ 97808166921 
49. 001.0001.
18  Ien Ang and Jon Stratton, ‘Multiculturalism in Crisis: The New Politics of Race and National 
Identity in Australia’, TOPIA: Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies 2 (1998): 22–41.
REFUGEE JOURNEyS
184
was strongly discouraged.19 La Trobe University lecturer in politics 
Gwenda Tavan has argued that, rather than being controversial, this policy 
direction had strong popular support.20 It was finally dismantled following 
World War II due to increasing international and domestic pressure, but 
this underlying worldview that positioned a white ownership of the land 
has persisted into current immigration policies.21 These precedents can 
be seen to effect the political construction of non-white immigrants as 
a problem to be dealt with: local debates around whether immigrants 
should simply integrate or assimilate completely to Australian values are 
exacerbated in the case of undocumented migrants whose identity claims 
are tenuous to begin with.22
Jahan and Hassan were released into the community on TPVs. It could 
have been worse. By 2001 TPVs were refused if an applicant had spent 
more than seven days in another country on their way to Australia, in 
Pakistan, say, or Indonesia. The Human Rights Commission’s investigation 
in 2001 had also found that TPVs contribute to stress and post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD).23 In 2008 TPVs were abolished, partly because 
of human rights objections, and partly because they were found to be 
administratively inefficient and expensive, requiring a complete reappraisal 
of the applicant refugee status at their expiration every three years. TPVs 
were reintroduced in 2014.24
Hassan was aware that the new class of visa did not guarantee him the 
security he had hoped for.
In that time I was a TPV and I had a lot of problems … I stayed 
nine months in [detention] camp and when I was released I was 
working in a meat factory. (Hassan)
19  James Jupp, ‘Politics, Public Policy and Multiculturalism’, in Multiculturalism and Integration: 
A  Harmonious Relationship, ed. Michael Clyne and James Jupp (Canberra: ANU E  Press, 2011), 
41–52, doi.org/10.22459/mi.07.2011.02.
20  Gwenda Tavan, ‘The Dismantling of the White Australia Policy: Elite Conspiracy or Will of the 
Australian People?’, Australian Journal of Political Science 39, no. 1 (2004): 109–25, doi.org/10.1080
/1036114042000205678.
21  Moreton-Robinson, The White Possessive.
22  Jupp, ‘Politics, Public Policy and Multiculturalism’.
23  Australian Human Rights Commission, A Report on Visits to Immigration Detention Facilities.
24  ‘Temporary Protection Visas’, Asylum Seeker Resource Centre, 2018, available at: www.asrc.org.
au/resources/fact-sheet/temporary-protection-visas/.
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While Hassan worked through the three years of his TPV in an abattoir, 
his family in Jakarta were interviewed and identified as refugees, granted 
UNHCR refugee classification, and put on a waiting list to come to 
Australia. Hassan’s TPV did not allow for family reunification, but his 
strategy was to earn enough to bring them to Australia – then, since 
they were already formally classified as refugees, his legal status would 
also change, under Australia’s family reunification policy at the time. 
It was a good plan. It contained risks: his family’s processing might take 
longer than he could stay in Australia on a TPV. His TPV might expire. 
He might fail the reapplication and get sent back to Afghanistan. But 
compared to what some individuals and families were able to organise, it 
was relatively secure.
I was working there for three years. Since my family [were going 
to] come here, I thought I have to start some business because 
I was sure in that time, when my family come here the lawyer told 
us if one of us be a refugee, directly all family will be refugees. 
(Hassan)
This meant working 15-hour days in the abattoir to send money to his 
family, who still wanted more. The condition of his TPV that he found 
hardest was that it prevented him leaving Australia. He could not go to his 
family. While he was on a TPV he knew two men in similar visa situations 
who hanged themselves: it had become too hard, he explained, not having 
any power over their own lives, not being able to make decisions about 
the future, and not knowing if – or for how long – they would get to 
stay in Australia. With his family always on his mind, he sent money to 
Indonesia, as much as he could. His friends advised prudence, but he 
could not refuse his family.
I remember my son messaged me from Indonesia. ‘Dad, the 
money’s finished.’ As much I had, I send to them. Even Salmi’s 
father – he’s my best friend – like not friend, like brother – and he 
said, ‘don’t teach them like that’. I said, ‘the only thing I can do 
for them is the money, nothing else. I can’t go see them. I can’t 
do anything. It doesn’t matter, they will be happy, I will be happy’. 
(Hassan)
He worried about his family constantly. His own problems, uncertainty 
around his future, not knowing if he was going to get to stay in Australia 
or if he would be sent back to Afghanistan; if his visa would be refused, 
renewed or if he would attain permanent residency, all centred on his 
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family, waiting in Indonesia. He phoned them every week. But time 
continued to pass, and after a while, his youngest daughter did not know 
who he was when he phoned. More than once he got in his car and drove 
to a quiet place where he could cry, without adding to the strain and 
tension he knew his roommates were also experiencing.
My daughter was like five, six years old and when I was talking 
with her, it was hurt me, yeah. My wife, she crying at that time. 
I said, I can’t do anything.
[Years later] my daughter when she came here – one day 
I  remember. I was driving and she said, ‘Dad, when I  …’ she 
was in Jakarta and she thought she hasn’t got any father. I told 
her, ‘yeah, I was talking with you’. She said, ‘yeah, I thought my 
Mum going to trick on me, give somebody else to talk like that’. 
It was very hard and I was crying that time. She said, ‘why are you 
crying?’ I said, ‘don’t say anything no more’. It hurt me seriously. 
(Hassan)
As in Salmi’s story of being the daughter left behind, in Hassan’s narrative 
the sadness came through clearly. The parallel narratives show both sides 
of the effects of the enforced family separation, as family members on 
both sides of the ocean waited hopefully for the TPV to expire, while 
dreading the other outcomes possible under the policy regulations.
On his release from Curtin, Jahan was put on a bus for a three-day journey 
across the country to Queensland. There he was able to take a 25-day 
English class donated to the newly arrived group of refugees by a private 
provider. The English teacher and his daughter found the refugees some 
paid work around their house, so they had some source of income. 
He stayed with a friend for a few months, and by March 2000 had found 
work in a factory as a process worker. Jahan was eager and excited for his 
life to begin – he could see so many possibilities, some of which were just 
about to become realities. He happily bought a Ford Festiva. He described 
his life as taking off. But his visa imposed limitations on him in terms of 
access to work and services – and the threatened penalties for breaching 
its conditions (being returned to detention) were very real.
Um … here government as well says that you’re not entitled to 
nothing. Because your visa is TPV, 788 or something. No … 785. 
Visa class. This is a piece of rubbish. You’re not entitled to 
anything. So we might as well chuck it somewhere, somewhere in 
all the surf. (Jahan)
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In 2003, Jahan ran into a legal quagmire. He had been on a TPV for 
three years and needed to submit an entirely new application. He had 
been given to believe that after three years his subclass 785 TPV would be 
automatically upgraded to a subclass 866 PPV – whether this was based 
on his arrival exactly coinciding with the shift from TPVs to PPVs is not 
clear. But the process dragged in time. He waited for his PPV to arrive 
– at first hopefully, since with it he would be able to live properly, which 
to him entailed enrolling in more English classes, finding longer-term 
employment and starting the family reunification process to bring his 
family over. The significance of these elements of a life properly lived came 
from the historical exclusion of Hazaras from education and work rights 
in Afghanistan. He had hoped that in Australia he would be able to live 
fully with the human rights of a recognised member of society. But time 
passed, and his visa did not appear. He waited more and more anxiously.
2003, I was very anxious. You know, waiting for that visa, you 
know, to come. It never came. Because, that 785 visa, it’s preventing 
me from everything. I’m in Australia, but I’m sort of lost. I’m in 
Australia but I can’t do anything. I’m in Australia but I can’t study 
English. So that’s everything is blocked here. I wanted to go to 
school to learn. Why I want to learn? Because in Afghanistan we’ve 
been suppressed, we’ve been depressed, we’ve been deprived of our 
rights, you know, to study higher education. (Jahan)
Finally, a letter arrived. Immigration had written to inform him that his 
entire claim for ongoing protection had been rejected, because he had 
missed an interview. He protested that he had never received the interview 
letter. Immigration insisted that it had been sent. Someone suggested that 
it may have been eaten by snails – which Jahan now, years later, has built 
into his story. Similar to the wild animals that had circled Curtin, this 
newest threat that might result in him being sent back to Afghanistan 
was represented by an animal force. The language in which he framed this 
threat locates it as a random, unpredictable event – even within the policy 
strictures that he had to follow, there was still room for the inexplicable 
and unexpected to happen.
I don’t know, [maybe] it’s been eaten by a mouse, it’s been eaten by 
snails, you know? (Jahan)
From here Jahan was required to lodge an appeal against the decision 
with the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The complications facing 
asylum seekers lodging appeals with the RRT (and other versions of this 
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tribunal in Europe and the UK) have been investigated and documented 
by numerous international scholars in refugee policy studies, including 
University of Geneva refugee specialist Michel-Acatl Monnier, Sri Lankan 
academic Professor E Valentine Daniel, John Knudsen at the University 
of Bergen and Professor Michael Welch in the Criminal Justice program 
at Rutgers University. Some of the issues facing refugees in these situations 
involve different cultural notions of credibility, where the different cultural 
meanings between looking someone in the eye and looking at the ground 
can have life and death implications.25
Jahan had a lawyer, who had helped him prepare a 25-page dossier 
documenting his protection claim. His documents were in order, his story 
checked out, and he won his case.
Okay. When I went to RRT there was, a lawyer was representing 
my case as well. RRT generally – they say that they’re impartial. 
But I can see that they’re working straight under the hand of 
the government. Because that is another body set up from the 
government, by the government. They think that they are 
independent, but I don’t think they are independent. Because all 
their words are so negative towards asylum seekers. Because many 
of the things they said is just people lying, you know. I don’t know.
And in fact there was a twenty-five page statement from my side, 
presented, sent on my behalf, to the RRT. Twenty-five pages. 
Am I here on murder trial on what? (Jahan)
The assumptions around credibility can be seen in the general disbelief 
towards refugee narratives that Jahan had felt in his tribunal hearing. 
He knew he was in the right, that he had come to Australia legally, his 
life in danger, and that it was a bureaucratic error that his claim had 
been rescinded. But there were mixed messages everywhere. The legal 
system declared first that he was a refugee and then that he was not. 
And the Australian Government’s position around Afghanistan as a safe 
destination also changed. In 2003 the Australian Government had signed 
a memorandum of understanding with Afghanistan stating that Hazaras 
25  E  Valentine Daniel and John Chr Knudsen, Mistrusting Refugees (California: University 
of California Press Berkeley, 1995); Michel-Acatl Monnier, ‘The Hidden Part of Asylum Seekers’ 
Interviews in Geneva, Switzerland: Some Observations about the Socio-Political Construction of 
Interviews Between Gatekeepers and the Powerless’, Journal of Refugee Studies 8, no. 3 (January 1, 
1995): 305–25, doi.org/10.1093/jrs/8.3.305; Michael Welch, ‘The Sonics of Crimmigration in 
Australia: Wall of Noise and Quiet Manoeuvring’, British Journal of Criminology 52, no. 2 (2012): 
324–44, doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azr068.
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could now return safely to Afghanistan. But this formal agreement about 
Afghanistan’s safety was not reflected in the reality that Jahan perceived. 
Thousands of Hazaras still held valid TPVs, which he saw as implicitly 
contradicting the government’s position around Afghanistan’s safety. And 
in this political context, where Hazaras were assured that they would be 
safe in Afghanistan, his case before the RRT was successful. His need for 
protection had been found to be legitimate. He was again classified as 
a refugee, which meant that he was – again – in the position of waiting 
for the PPV to arrive that would replace his TPV.
And in fact the next day they sent me a letter that says, 
‘congratulations, you have been accepted as a refugee’, you know? 
‘Your case is still valid.’ (Jahan)
But by 2005 Jahan was still on a TPV. By now he had waited more than 
four years, and the prohibition on leaving Australia while on a TPV 
grew harder to bear as the years passed. He worried about his family left 
behind, and did what he could to send them money, and plan for their 
eventual reunion in Australia when he was granted a permanent visa. 
He had learned how Australian migration law worked – there was a time 
limit of five years in which he could apply for family reunification. But 
he could not apply for this while still on a TPV. He needed to wait until 
he was upgraded to a different visa. He had won his case at the RRT and 
should have been granted a PPV. His anxiety grew. The five years passed. 
It was too late.
There is a migration clause that says that when you come here as 
refugee, within first five years you have to sponsor your family. 
After five years then you lose that privilege, you may no longer 
sponsor your family. So first five years you have the right to family 
reunion, after the first five years you forfeit that right. So from – 
I was initially told that within three years, you will be able to get 
your permanent visa. Then is stretched to four years, four and 
a half years.
I did apply for family reunion, but under the TPV you got to 
understand, you don’t have the right to apply for family reunion. 
It’s only under the permanent 866 visa, that you have the right 
to apply for family reunion. So I lost the family reunion there. 
By the time when I become citizen it was already 2007. I got my 
citizenship, when I went to apply, they say, ‘sorry, this no longer 
applies to you. Because you’ve forfeited that five years term’. And 
I could say nothing. But I think this is a discriminatory policy. 
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Because whenever you make a policy, you make sure that the 
people who is being affected by that policy, it is fair, it is just, and 
it is catering to the people who is a minority in this society. (Jahan)
In 2007 he applied for citizenship and became an Australian citizen – but 
he had been unable to apply for family reunification. The snails and sharks 
of policy had got him. But he kept going. He could now work legally too, 
so he could send more money back to his family. His family were now 
living in Pakistan, since it hadn’t been safe for them any longer back in the 
village. However, having his citizenship, which meant that he could both 
work and, now, study, was also the beginning of a time of exhaustion for 
Jahan. Working during the day and studying at night, his teachers would 
ask him, ‘what’s wrong with you?’ He would show up exhausted, and sleep 
in lectures. But after two years he was awarded his diploma in business 
management.
Even though Jahan endured the five-year wait to bring his family over and 
was ultimately unable to, he presently locates himself as an immigrant 
success story. He has married in Australia, lives in Dandenong, owns 
a business and is involved in politics – he is happy and successful. But he 
also campaigns nonstop for the rights of refugees, particularly Hazaras. 
He has willingly shouldered the responsibilities of community advocacy 
that seem to accompany being a first-generation Hazara refugee migrant 
in Australia. His story, told with grace, humour and verve, illustrates 
the passion and intelligence he has brought to his own transition to an 
Australian Hazara identity. But underlying this is the responsibility, the 
Hazara need to give back, and the assumed responsibility for his people that 
characterises all the Hazara narratives in this piece. A communitarian sense 
of self prevents true happiness while other members of one’s community 
are still suffering or in danger, which shows in Jahan’s continual efforts on 
behalf of Hazara people.
Like Hassan’s, Salmi’s story ended more happily – after the five years of 
waiting in Pakistan, her family was reunited in Australia. This infused her 
construction of Australia as safe – both in terms of Australia itself, but also 
associated with the presence of her father:
The feeling was really good and it was reassuring that we don’t 
have to live away from my dad anymore and that we don’t have to 
worry about anything else anymore. We are safe and everything is 
good and we’re living with my dad. (Salmi)
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Years later her father has continued to be a guiding presence in her life. 
He had always told her stories, a habit he had continued in their weekly 
phone conversations when she waited in Pakistan. When they were finally 
reunited, his stories spanned larger than his time in Australia, going 
back to the history of the Hazara people since the time of Abdur Khan; 
the social persecution and isolation of the Hazaras in Afghanistan, the 
exclusion of Hazaras from good schools, preventing their education; 
stories of Hazara women being sold for 20 paisa (less than one rupee); and 
other narratives that form part of modern Hazara political and cultural 
identity. In the context of her father’s narrative, she was able to construct 
a political reading of her own forced abandonment by her father when 
she was six. This traumatic event, which scarred both father and daughter, 
would also become formative in Salmi’s idea of herself as a force for 
change, influencing the choices she would make as she started to emerge 
as a community leader herself.
Hassan also described Australia as safe; though he longingly described 
Afghanistan as an absent mother. But it wasn’t any longer a place where 
he could imagine raising a family. Hassan also framed his narrative as one 
of success, as he described the opportunities available to his children in 
Australia that there would not have been in Kabul.
My country is like my mum. I can’t change my mum with like 
a pretty girl because my mum is my mum. I know I love Australia 
for a lot of things. [There are] facilities here and it’s safe here and 
I got a job here – everything is all right.
I’m very happy, not only for myself, of course more for my family. 
My daughter, she is 18  years old now. She finished the school 
now. My son is around 25 and just last week he finished Uni and 
he studied as a civil engineer. If they had been in Afghanistan, 
no chance to study. (Hassan)
Conclusion: Lived effects of policy
Salmi, Hassan and Jahan all actively contribute to the creation of a 
popular understanding and social construction of Hazaras as one of 
Australia’s newest migrant communities. This was a key motivation for 
all of them to speak with me – they are all invested in creating an image 
of Hazaras as desirable migrants in Australia. As part of this, and as part 
of their emergent migrant identity, they are also involved in the creation 
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of a new migrant space within the Australian imaginary for Hazaras. This 
was demonstrated through their stories, but also through the embodied 
settings in which our interviews took place: the living room of Salmi’s 
father’s house, and in the various cafes around Dandenong where 
Jahan’s social capital was demonstrated through his connections with his 
community. The embodied description of the interviewing process gives 
a sense of the relationships within the particular space of the interview: 
impelled by the shared motivation to communicate, their stories became 
a way of contributing to a more multicultural Australia as relationships 
and cultural differences were implicitly negotiated within the space of the 
interviews themselves.
All three interview participants described themselves as successful members 
of the Hazara community living in Dandenong. They all evinced a great 
deal of pride in Hazara culture in their narratives. But there was hardship 
in the narratives as well. Although both Hassan’s and Salmi’s fathers were 
able to reunite their families, they had to endure years of heartbreaking 
separation and backbreaking labour to do so. And Jahan was not able to 
achieve this goal. The limitations on his visa and the timeframe in which 
he was able to apply for family reunification clashed – and he was not 
able to reunite his family, which is a key desire that underscores many 
Hazara narratives.
These stories are also stories of the lived effects of policy. In all of these 
stories the Australian policy context provides an invisible structure that 
guides the course of their narratives. The trials the interview participants 
had to face were not just in the form of fleeing from their oppressors, 
negotiating with people smugglers and surviving the journeys over the 
sea. Australian immigration policy forms the context within which these 
narratives unfold. The progression of legal statuses attained by Hassan, 
Salmi’s father, Salmi and Jahan describe the barriers and strictures that 
defined the choices available to them. In this way, the lived experiences 





The insidious evolution of Australia’s 
asylum seeker regime since 1992
Savitri Taylor1
I have been thinking and writing about Australia’s asylum seeker policies 
for over 25 years. When I started back in 1991, the asylum seeker policies 
now espoused by the major parties would have been inconceivable to 
most politicians on all sides – but here we are. Explaining how we got here 
requires me to start further back in time than 1991. It requires me to start, 
in fact, with the drafting of the founding document of the Australian 
political and legal system – the Constitution. From there, I consider 
two key features of contemporary asylum seeker policy – mandatory 
detention, which was introduced in 1992, and offshore processing, which 
was initially introduced in 2001. I end the chapter by reflecting on the 
lessons of our past for our future.
1  Associate Professor, Law School, La Trobe University. Part of this chapter is based on Savitri 
Taylor, ‘How Did We Get Here? A Reflection on 25 Years of Australian Asylum Seeker Policy’, 
Law and Justice: La Trobe Law School Blog, 25 February 2016, available at: law.blogs.latrobe.edu.
au/ 2016/02/25/how-did-we-get-here-a-reflection-on-25-years-of-australian-asylum-seeker-policy/. 




The Australian obsession with immigration and border control pre-dates 
Federation, with a major motivator for Federation being the desire to 
achieve uniformity in such control across the Australian continent.2 
Constitutional enshrinement of parliament’s unqualified power to 
legislate with respect to ‘naturalization and aliens’3 and ‘immigration and 
emigration’4 was taken as a matter of course through all the constitutional 
conventions from 1891.5 By contrast, proposals made at those conventions 
to include due process and equal protection clauses in the Constitution 
were fervently and successfully opposed.6 As Eve Lester explains in her 
excellent book, Making Migration Law, rejection of such clauses was:
intended to ensure that the Commonwealth could discriminate 
on account of race and colour. This purpose is articulated by 
a  number of delegates during the constitutional conventions, 
including Sir John Forrest and (most doggedly) Isaac Isaacs. Other 
delegates made clear their concerns that above all the provision 
should not prevent discrimination against non-Europeans.7
This was the original sin.
Mandatory detention
Julie Macken identifies the introduction of mandatory detention by the 
Labor Government as ‘the stone that began the avalanche’.8 Looking back 
over 25 plus years, I agree. What particularly struck me as I was reading 
Macken’s piece was a quote from Neal Blewett’s memoir, A Cabinet Diary. 
Neal Blewett, who was then minister for social security, had a meeting on 
2  Mary Crock and Laurie Berg, Immigration, Refugees and Forced Migration: Law, Policy and 
Practice in Australia (Sydney: Federation Press, 2011), 24–26.
3  Australian Constitution, s 51(xix).
4  Ibid., s 51(xxvii).
5  Eve Lester, Making Migration Law: The Foreigner, Sovereignty, and the Case of Australia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 115.
6  Ibid., 116.
7  Ibid.
8  Julie Macken, ‘The Long Journey to Nauru’, New Matilda, 12  January 2016, available at: 
newmatilda.com/2016/01/12/the-long-journey-to-nauru/.
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30 March 1992 with Peter Staples, then the minister for aged, family and 
health services, and Gerry Hand, then the minister for immigration. In 
his diary entry about the meeting, Blewett said:
A 9 pm meeting with Hand and Staples on the asylum-seekers’ 
benefit. Hand wanted nothing to do with any ameliorative stance. 
He was for interning all who sought refugee status in camps, 
mostly at Port Hedland, where they would be fed and looked after. 
This is a nonsensical proposal – politically unsellable to the liberal 
constituency, impossible in practice (if any significant number 
of refugees took up the option his department would collapse) 
and financially irresponsible – if it worked it would cost more 
than the other options. It was obviously [Hand’s] intention that if 
Staples provided an asylum-seekers’ benefit, or I the charity option 
or a modified asylum-seekers’ benefit, we would have to take 
responsibility for the measure. His left-wing mate Staples accused 
Hand of ‘abdicating responsibility for his own shit’. So Staples 
and I decided to call his bluff and accept his lead as Immigration 
Minister. It will be interesting to see the cabinet response to 
his proposals.9
What Macken does not mention in her piece is that mandatory detention 
as we know it today was not introduced all at once; it was introduced 
bit by bit. In late 1989, Australia started experiencing its second wave 
of people arriving by boat (mostly Cambodian nationals). There were 
changes made to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in 1989 that allowed 
immigration officials to detain ‘illegal entrants’ (as they were called at 
the time) until their immigration status was resolved and, as a matter of 
administrative policy, that is what happened. The next step was the one 
foreshadowed by Gerry Hand in his meeting with Blewett and Staples. 
In May 1992, the Labor Government, with the support of the Coalition, 
procured the passage of the Migration Amendment Act 1992 (Cth). This 
legislation labelled the unauthorised boat arrivals as ‘designated persons’ 
and provided for their mandatory detention. In his second reading speech, 
Gerry Hand said that the legislation was ‘only intended to be an interim 
measure’ and was designed ‘to address only the pressing requirements of 
the current situation’.10 That original legislation also imposed a 273-day 
limit on the duration of detention, though there were circumstances in 
which the clock would stop ticking.
9  Neal Blewett, A Cabinet Diary: A Personal Record of the First Keating Government (Adelaide: 
Wakefield Press, 1999), 83.
10  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 5 May 1992, 2370.
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The most fateful step came with the passage of the Migration Reform Act 
1992 (Cth) in late 1992. The Act was passed with Coalition support and 
came into effect on 1 September 1994. It divided non-citizens into two 
categories: those with a visa (who were called ‘lawful’) and those without 
a visa (who were called ‘unlawful’). It then provided that ‘unlawful 
non-citizens’ had to be detained until granted a visa or removed from 
the country. The 273-day time limit that applied to the previous version 
of mandatory detention was dropped. The legislation also introduced 
the bridging visa regime. Unlawful non-citizens who met certain criteria 
could be granted a bridging visa pending the granting of a substantive visa 
or departure from the country. The grant of a bridging visa made them 
lawful non-citizens and enabled their release from detention. The bridging 
visa criteria were such that if a person had become unlawful by overstaying 
they could get one with ease but if they had entered the country without 
a visa it was almost impossible to get one.
In 2004, the question of whether a person could be held in immigration 
detention indefinitely ended up before the High Court of Australia.11 
Mr Al-Kateb was a stateless Palestinian who was born and spent most of his 
life in Kuwait. He arrived in Australia without authorisation and thereby 
became an unlawful non-citizen subject to detention. After failing in his 
application for a protection visa, Mr Al-Kateb made a written request to be 
removed from Australia. However, the Department of Immigration12 was 
unable to find any country prepared to allow him entry. The High Court 
majority (Justices Callinan, Hayne, Heydon and McHugh) held that the 
relevant provisions of the Migration Act, by providing that detention of 
an unlawful non-citizen must continue ‘until’ the occurrence of one 
of, at that time, three specified events (that is, grant of a visa, removal or 
deportation),13 had the effect of unambiguously authorising the indefinite 
detention of unlawful non-citizens in the unfortunate position of neither 
qualifying for the grant of a visa nor, in practice, being removable/
deportable from Australia in the foreseeable future. Having decided the 
question of statutory interpretation, the majority judges had to consider 
whether the statutory provisions were, as argued by the appellant, 
constitutionally invalid. All four majority judges held that the provisions 
11  Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37.
12  The Department of Immigration ceased to exist on 20 December 2017, with its functions being 
merged into the new Department of Home Affairs. The correct name at the time is used throughout 
this chapter.
13  A fourth specified event was added when the regional processing arrangements were introduced.
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were constitutionally valid, being an exercise of  the power conferred 
on the Australian Parliament by section 51(xix) of the Constitution to 
legislate with respect to aliens, which did not infringe the separation of 
powers between the parliament, the executive and the courts provided for 
by Chapter III of the Constitution.
Given that the minority judges (Chief Justice Gleeson and Justices 
Gummow and Kirby) were able to interpret the Migration Act provisions 
in favour of liberty for Mr Al-Kateb, the majority judges were, in fact, 
making an interpretive choice that hinged on their internalisation of the 
(white) nationalist ideology written into the Constitution itself. As Greta 
Bird points out, the language they used was telling.14 For example, Justice 
Callinan (para. 301) referred to the undesirability of giving Mr Al-Kateb 
‘special advantages because he has managed illegally to penetrate the 
borders of this country over those who have sought to, but have been 
stopped before they could do so’. The majority judges were perfectly aware 
that the conclusion at which they had arrived was incompatible with 
human rights principles, but they insisted that any remedy lay elsewhere.
The mandatory detention regime was vigorously opposed from the outset 
by many civil society organisations. Increasing media scrutiny from 
2000 also had an effect on public opinion.15 In 2005, the then Coalition 
government introduced residence determinations (colloquially known as 
‘community detention’) to appease members of its own backbench who 
had started rebelling against the harshness of mandatory detention.16 
The relevant Migration Act provisions – which are still in effect – give 
the minister for immigration a personal and non-compellable power 
exercisable ‘in the public interest’ to make a determination that a specified 
person is to reside in a specified place and comply with certain conditions 
instead of being detained in the manner usually required by the Migration 
Act.17 The purpose of the power is to enable the de facto release18 into 
14  Greta Bird, ‘An Unlawful Non-Citizen Is Being Detained or (White) Citizens Are Saving the 
Nation from (Non White) Non-Citizens’, University of Western Sydney Law Review 9 (2005): 87–110.
15  Savitri Taylor, ‘Achieving Reform of Australian Asylum Seeker Law and Policy’, Just Policy 24 
(2001): 41–54.
16  Savitri Taylor, ‘Immigration Detention Reforms: A Small Gain in Human Rights’, Agenda: 
A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform 13 (2006): 49–62, doi.org/10.22459/AG.13.01.2006.04.
17  Migration Act 1958 (Cth) pt 2 div 7 subdiv B ss 197AA–197AG.
18  As a matter of legal technicality, individuals subject to a residence determination are regarded 
as being nevertheless in ‘immigration detention’.
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the community of unaccompanied minors, families with children and 
particularly vulnerable adults. As at 26 April 2018, there were 457 people 
(including 180 children) in community detention in Australia.19
Another reform introduced in 2005 was the conferral on the minister for 
immigration of a personal and non-compellable power exercisable ‘in the 
public interest’ to grant any kind of visa the minister thinks appropriate to 
a person in immigration detention, even if the person does not fulfil the 
criteria for grant of a visa of that kind.20 In November 2011, in the face 
of large numbers of so-called unauthorised maritime arrivals, the Labor 
Government started using this power to grant Bridging Visa Es to most of 
them21 in order to relieve pressure on detention facilities. The Coalition 
Government continued the practice when it took office in September 
2013. As at 26  April 2018, there were 18,027 unauthorised maritime 
arrivals (including 3,038 children) living in the Australian community on 
Bridging Visa Es.22
Despite the positive reforms made over time to law and policy, as at 
26 April 2018, according to the Department of Home Affairs’ statistics, 
there were 1,369 people (including seven children) in Australia’s 
immigration detention facilities. They had been detained an average of 
434 days with 264 people having been in detention for over 730 days.23 
As at 26 April 2018, the longest serving detainee had endured 3,970 days 
(i.e. over 10 years) in detention.24 The fundamental problem remains the 
continued existence of the legal machinery of mandatory detention, with 
the non-compellable exercise of ministerial discretion being the only road 
out for many. Politicians, and the courts, have made it clear that this is 
a problem and a solution that remain within the purview of Australia’s 
elected representatives.
19  Department of Home Affairs, Immigration Detention and Community Statistics Summary 
(Canberra: Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, 26 April 2018), available at: www.
homeaffairs.gov.au/research-and-stats/files/immigration-detention-statistics-26-april-2018.pdf.
20  Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 195A.
21  Chris Bowen, ‘Bridging Visas to be Issued for Boat Arrivals’, media release, 25 November 2011, 
available at: pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/67564/20120320-0000/www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/cb/ 
2011/ cb180599.htm.
22  Department of Home Affairs, Immigration Detention and Community Statistics Summary.
23  Ibid.
24  Evidence to Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee (SLCALC), 
Committee Hansard, 21 May 2018 (evidence of Mr Outram, Australian Border Force Commissioner).
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Offshore processing
From the legal device of ‘excised offshore places’ to the establishment of 
detention centres in other countries with which Australia has had colonial 
relationships, the history of offshore processing is vital to understand if 
we are to comprehend the fullness of successive Australian governments’ 
approaches to managing the arrival of refugees.
Excision
In September 2001, in the wake of the Tampa incident25 and in the shadow 
of the terrorist attacks in the United States, the Coalition Government 
with the support of Labor procured amendments to the Migration Act 
that defined Christmas Island, Ashmore and Cartier Islands and Cocos 
(Keeling) Islands to be ‘excised offshore places’ and allowed for the making 
of regulations designating other parts of Australia to be ‘excised offshore 
places’. The 2001 amendments also specified that an unauthorised arrival 
who became an unlawful non-citizen by entering Australia at an ‘excised 
offshore place’ was an ‘offshore entry person’. The amendments then went 
on to provide for two things. First, a purported visa application made by 
an offshore entry person who was an unlawful non-citizen in Australia was 
invalid unless the minister for immigration exercised a personal and non-
compellable power to allow such an application to be made.26 Second, an 
offshore entry person could be kept at an excised offshore place or taken 
to any ‘place outside Australia’, including a ‘declared country’.27
In July 2005, regulations were adopted that effectively designated all parts 
of Australian territory with the exception of the mainland and Tasmania 
to be ‘excised offshore places’.28 In 2006, the Coalition Government tried 
to go a step further by extending the statutory bar on protection visa 
applications to all unauthorised maritime arrivals regardless of where they 
25  In late August 2001, 433 asylum seekers were rescued from a sinking boat by the Norwegian 
freighter MV  Tampa. The Tampa headed for Christmas Island, but was informed by Australian 
authorities that the rescued people would not be allowed to disembark there. The Pacific Solution was 
an outcome of the government’s desperate attempts to resolve the ensuing standoff.
26  Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 46A.
27  These amendments were made by the Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 
2001 (Cth) and the Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) 
Act 2001 (Cth).




first entered Australia. However, Australian civil society organisations 
mobilised successfully against the Bill intended to accomplish this 
purpose.29 The Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation 
Committee (SLCALC) inquiry into the Migration Amendment 
(Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 received 137 submissions 
but only the Department of Immigration’s submission supported 
the Bill.30 The committee’s majority report, written by government 
parliamentarians, recommended that the Bill should not proceed, or in 
the event that it did proceed, should be very significantly amended to 
respond to concerns raised during the inquiry and should include an 
18-month sunset clause.31 The minority and dissenting reports written by 
the non-government parliamentarians on the committee differed only in 
their refusal to contemplate an alternative to a complete abandonment of 
the Bill. The Bill passed the House of Representatives on 10 August 2006, 
but three government MPs crossed the floor and two abstained from 
voting.32 Although the Coalition had a one-seat majority in the Senate, 
the prime minister was forced to withdraw the Bill when it became clear 
that at least one Liberal senator was willing to cross the floor to defeat it.33
The ‘Pacific Solution’
By authorising the taking of ‘offshore entry persons’ to ‘declared 
countries’, the 2001 amendments to the Migration Act enabled the lawful 
implementation of the Pacific Strategy (colloquially known as the ‘Pacific 
Solution’) – or so it was thought at the time.34 In the same year, Nauru 
and Papua New Guinea (PNG) were designated as declared countries 
after their governments had been persuaded to enter into Memoranda 
of Understanding (MoUs) allowing offshore entry persons to be taken to 
Australian-controlled facilities in their territory to have any protection 
29  Savitri Taylor, ‘Australia’s Pacific Solution Mark II: The Lessons to be Learned’, UTS Law Review 
9 (2007): 106–24.
30  The Bill was introduced into the House of Representatives on 11 May 2006. On the same day, 
the Senate referred the Bill to the SLCALC for inquiry and report by 13 June 2006. The deadline for 
submissions was 22 May 2006. The submissions received by the inquiry are available at: www.aph.
gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Completed_
inquiries/2004-07/migration_unauthorised_arrivals/submissions/sublist.
31  SLCALC, Provisions of the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 
(report, 2006), paras 3.208–3.217.
32  Ross Peake, ‘Asylum Bill in Trouble as Senators Waver’, Canberra Times, 12 August 2006, 3.
33  Ibid.
34  As explained in the next section, the lawfulness of the first iteration of the Pacific Solution was 
later cast into doubt by the High Court’s decision in Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration 
and Citizenship.
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claims considered by Australian Department of Immigration officers. 
It  was Coalition Government policy that those found to be refugees 
would only be resettled in Australia as a last resort if no other country was 
willing to take them.35
The first iteration of the Pacific Solution remained in place from 2001 to 
2008. During this period, 1,637 people were taken to Nauru or PNG.36 
One of them died and another 483 returned voluntarily to their country 
of origin.37 The remaining 1,153 people were resettled in Australia (705), 
New Zealand (401), Sweden (21), Canada (16), Denmark (6) and 
Norway (4).38
The false spring
In February 2008 the newly elected Labor Government closed down the 
processing facilities in Nauru and PNG. In retrospect it seems to have 
done so only because the number of unauthorised boat arrivals had 
dwindled substantially since 2001,39 leading Labor to believe that they 
were no longer a political problem. In 2009, unauthorised boat arrivals 
increased dramatically.40 Most of those arriving on the boats fell into the 
definition of ‘offshore entry persons’ and therefore needed ministerial 
permission to make a visa application. The government took the boat 
arrivals to Christmas Island to have their protection claims determined 
there by the so-called Refugee Status Assessment/Independent Merits 
Review (RSA/IMR) process, which was a separate and inferior process to 
the protection visa application process. Only those found to be refugees 
were given ministerial permission to apply for a protection visa. In Plaintiff 
M61/2010E & Others v the Commonwealth of Australia and Others,41 
however, the High Court held that the RSA/IMR process was not lawful.
35  Savitri Taylor, ‘The Pacific Solution or a Pacific Nightmare: The Difference between Burden 
Shifting and Responsibility Sharing’, Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal 6 (2005): 1–43.
36  Janet Phillips, ‘The “Pacific Solution” Revisited: A Statistical Guide to the Asylum Seeker Caseloads 
on Nauru and Manus Island’ (Background Note, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 




39  Janet Phillips, ‘Boat Arrivals and Boat “Turnbacks” in Australia since 1976: A Quick Guide to 
the Statistics’ (Research Papers 2016–17, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, updated 
17  January 2017), available at: www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/
Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1617/Quick_Guides/BoatTurnbacks.
40  Ibid.
41  [2010] HCA 41.
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On 25 July 2011, Australia and Malaysia entered into a legally non-binding 
Arrangement on Transfer and Resettlement. The arrangement provided 
for the transfer to Malaysia of up to 800 persons arriving irregularly in 
Australia by boat after the date of signing. It also stated that, in exchange 
for Malaysia’s assistance, Australia would resettle, over a period of four 
years, 4,000 UNHCR recognised refugees living in Malaysia at the 
time of signing. Minister for Immigration Chris Bowen then purported 
to make Malaysia a ‘declared country’ using the legal machinery created to 
implement the Pacific Solution.
Under Migration Act section  198A, ‘offshore entry persons’ could be 
taken to any country that the minister for immigration had declared, 
in writing, to meet three criteria: that it provided asylum seekers with 
access ‘to effective procedures for assessing their need for protection’ 
and protected them pending determination of their refugee status, that 
it provided protection to refugees pending their voluntary repatriation 
or resettlement, and that it met ‘relevant human rights standards in 
providing that protection’. The orthodox interpretation of the provision 
at the time was that the minister’s declaration did not have to be true as 
long as the minister believed it to be true. However, acting on behalf of 
a man who was to be transferred to Malaysia pursuant to the arrangement 
with that country, a team of pro bono lawyers coordinated by the Refugee 
and Immigration Legal Centre swung into action. The team, which had 
also been responsible for the successful M61 litigation, challenged the 
orthodox interpretation of section 198A in the High Court and won.42
In Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship,43 a High 
Court majority (Justice Heydon dissenting) held that section  198A 
required that a declared country, at a minimum, be bound under 
international law or their own national laws to provide the protections 
it specified to asylum seekers and refugees. Since Malaysia did not meet 
the minimum requirements of section 198A, the High Court’s decision 
invalidated the declaration that the minister had purported to make in 
respect of it. The reasoning of the majority in M70 cast retrospective 
doubt on the lawfulness of the Pacific Solution and prospective doubt on 
the government’s ability to take asylum seekers to any country in which 
they would receive less protection than they would in Australia.
42  Caroline Counsel, ‘M70 – The End of Offshore Processing?’, LIV President’s Blog, 2 September 
2011, available at: www.liv.asn.au/LIVPresBlog/September-2011/M70-the-end-of-off-shore-processing.
43  [2011] HCA 32.
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The decisions in M61 and M70 were read by some as a shift by a now 
differently composed High Court bench away from Al-Kateb and towards 
a more rights-oriented jurisprudence. And to some extent they were 
correct. However, because the shift was accomplished through the vehicle 
of statutory interpretation (i.e. purporting to give effect to the presumed 
intention of parliament), parliament was handed a trump card. Parliament 
could now continue to do the work of shaping legislation to circumvent 
the courts.
Back to the future
In March 2012, in the wake of its High Court losses in M61 and M70, 
the Labor Government announced that it would no longer have a parallel 
processing system for unauthorised boat arrivals. Instead, it would lift 
the statutory bar on visa applications as a matter of course, enabling such 
individuals to apply for a protection visa from the outset.44 However, 
Labor was not happy with the situation in which it found itself and, in 
June 2012, Prime Minister Gillard sought advice on how to ‘stop the 
boats’ from an Expert Panel.45
In its report released on 13  August 2012, the Expert Panel made 
22  recommendations. One of its recommendations was that all 
unauthorised maritime arrivals, regardless of where they first entered 
Australia, should be prevented from applying for a protection visa. This 
was what the Coalition Government had unsuccessfully attempted to do 
in 2006. In response to the Expert Panel report, the Labor Government 
made the same attempt and succeeded. The Migration Amendment 
(Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Act 2013 (Cth) 
entered into force on 1 June 2013.
The Expert Panel also recommended that the government should procure 
the passage of legislation overturning the High Court decision in M70. 
It promptly did so. The amendments made to the Migration Act by 
Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) 
Act 2012 (Cth) give the minister for immigration the power to designate 
44  Chris Bowen, ‘New Single Protection Visa Process Set to Commence’, media release, 19 March 
2012, available at: web.archive.org/web/20120321130512/www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/cb/2012/ 
cb184344.htm.
45  The panel consisted of a former chief of the Defence Forces, Angus Houston, a former secretary 




a country as a ‘regional processing country’. Migration Act section 198AD 
provides that an unauthorised maritime arrival detained in the migration 
zone must be taken to a regional processing country unless the minister 
for immigration exercises a personal non-compellable power under 
section 198AE to exempt the person from being transferred.
Another two recommendations of the Expert Panel were to enter into new 
asylum seeker processing arrangements with Nauru and PNG.46 The panel 
described the establishment of such arrangements as a ‘necessary circuit 
breaker to the current surge in irregular migration to Australia’.47 Again, 
the government implemented the recommendations with expedition and 
immediately thereafter the minister for immigration, acting under new 
Migration Act section  198AB, designated Nauru and PNG as regional 
processing countries in September and October 2012, respectively.
In the case of Plaintiff S156/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border 
Protection,48 the plaintiff tried to argue that Migration Act sections 198AB 
and 198AD were not supported by any constitutional head of power and 
were therefore invalid or, in the alternative, that the minister’s designation 
of PNG as a regional processing country was not valid. The High Court 
held that sections  198AB and 198AD were supported by the ‘aliens’ 
head of power in section 51(xix) of the Constitution. It also held that 
the designation of PNG as a regional processing country was perfectly 
valid. This was just as well for the government, because it was clear that 
the standards of treatment received by the people transferred to Nauru 
and PNG had fallen egregiously short of human rights standards from 
the outset.49 The decision in S156 was an acknowledgement by the High 
Court that parliament had played the trump card handed to it in M70. 
It also underscored that, as intended by the drafters, the Constitution 
enabled parliament to deal with aliens exactly as it pleased.
46  The Expert Panel also recommended that the transfer provisions of the Malaysian Arrangement 
should be implemented, after the government had negotiated better human rights safeguards and 
accountability provisions with Malaysia. Theoretically, the minister for immigration could have done so 
after designating Malaysia as a regional processing country. However, any such designation would have 
been disallowed by the Senate because the Coalition opposed implementation of the arrangement for 
reasons that had more to do with political obstructionism than principle. By contrast, the Coalition had 
consistently advocated for a return to the Pacific Solution.
47  Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers, Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers (Canberra: 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, August 2012), para. 3.45.
48  [2014] HCA 22.
49  See Ken McPhail, Robert Nyamori and Savitri Taylor, ‘Escaping Accountability: A Case of 
Australia’s Asylum Seeker Policy,’ Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 29 (2016): 947–84, 
doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-03-2014-1639 and sources cited therein.
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On 19 July 2013, not long after replacing Julia Gillard as prime minister 
following an internal challenge, Kevin Rudd held a joint press conference 
with Peter O’Neill, the prime minister of PNG. At the press conference, 
it was announced that asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat after 
that date would have ‘have no chance of being settled in Australia as 
refugees’.50 The MoUs with Nauru and PNG were subsequently updated 
to facilitate the implementation of what Rudd admitted was ‘a very hard-
line decision’ intended to deter people smuggling.51 I will return to this 
history of ‘processing’ in PNG and in Nauru below.
Operation Relex and Operation Sovereign Borders
In the aftermath of the Tampa incident, the Howard Coalition Government 
instituted Operation Relex to prevent unauthorised arrivals from entering 
Australian waters. Between October and December 2001, four vessels 
were intercepted at sea by the Australian navy and escorted back towards 
Indonesia.52 The navy also attempted to turn back three other vessels 
in 2001. All sank at some point during the course of interception and 
were towed back towards Indonesia, though mercifully all but two of the 
passengers were successfully rescued. The fifth and final tow back of the 
Howard Government period took place in November 2003.53
The Abbott Coalition Government came into power in September 2013 
on a platform that included a pledge to put an end to the resurgence of 
boat arrivals. Immediately upon taking office, the Coalition Government 
implemented the military-led Operation Sovereign Borders, which 
involved, among other things, the turn-back of unauthorised maritime 
arrivals to their most recent country of departure (usually Indonesia) or, 
in the case of those arriving directly from their country of origin, handing 
back to country of origin authorities. In theory, an exception is made 
for those found in a screening interview to have prima facie protection 
claims. Unauthorised maritime arrivals screened-in pursuant to this 
process are supposed to be taken to a regional processing country instead 
50  Kevin Rudd, ‘Transcript of Joint Press Conference’, Press Office, Prime Minister of Australia, 
19  July 2013, available at: webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/20130730234007/pandora.nla.gov.au/
pan/79983/20130731-0937/www.pm.gov.au/press-office/transcript-joint-press-conference-2.html. 
51  Ibid.
52  Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, Report of the Senate Select Committee 
on a Certain Maritime Incident (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2002), para 2.74.
53  Savitri Taylor, ‘Towing Back the Boats: Bad Policy Whatever Way You Look at It’, The Conversation, 




of being turned back or handed back. Between the commencement of 
Operation Sovereign Borders and 21 May 2018, 800 people on 32 boats 
had been intercepted at sea.54 Of those only two people had been 
screened-in – both in 2014.55 In addition, 157 Sri Lankan passengers on 
a vessel departing from India, which was intercepted in late June 2014,56 
were transferred to Nauru on 2 August 2014 after a brief sojourn on the 
Australian mainland.57 These individuals had not actually been screened-
in; rather, Australia had tried but failed to convince Indian or Sri Lankan 
authorities to take them. In any event, the screen-in figures give rise to 
the strong inference that the screening process is, at best, unreliable or, at 
worst, cynical window-dressing.
The Nauru arrangement
As of August 2018, the arrangement with Nauru58 means that ‘unauthorised 
maritime arrivals’ can be transferred to Nauru for processing of asylum 
claims by the Nauruan Government. As mentioned above, the most 
recent transfer took place in 2014. In theory, the processing centre in 
Nauru in which those transferred were detained until October 201559 and 
in which some still reside,60 is run by the Nauruan Government. However, 
54  Evidence to SLCALC, Committee Hansard, 21 May 2018 (evidence of Air Vice Marshal Osborne).
55  One passenger out of 41 arriving on a boat from Sri Lanka in late June 2014 was screened-
in but elected to be repatriated with the others: Scott Morrison, ‘Australian Government Returns Sri 
Lankan People Smuggling Venture’, media release, 7  July 2014, available at: webarchive.nla.gov.au/
gov/20140801014043/www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/sm/2014/sm216152.htm. Another passenger 
out of 38 arriving by boat from Sri Lanka in mid-November 2014 was also screened-in: Scott Morrison, 
‘People Smuggling Venture Returned to Sri Lanka’, media release, 29 November 2014, available at: 
webarchive.nla.gov.au/gov/20141215053228/www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/sm/2014/sm219651.
htm. Interestingly, Air Vice Marshal Osborne’s evidence to the SLCALC on 21 May 2018 was that only 
one person had been screened-in during the period.
56  Department of Immigration, Annual Report 2014–2015 (Australian Commonwealth 
Department of Immigration, 2015), 209.
57  Scott Morrison, ‘Transfer of 157 IMAs from Curtin to Nauru for Offshore Processing’, media 
release, 2  August 2014, available at: webarchive.nla.gov.au/gov/20141215053416/www.minister.
immi.gov.au/media/sm/2014/sm216855.htm.
58  Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Nauru and the Commonwealth of Australia, 
Relating to the Transfer to and Assessment of Persons in Nauru, and Related Issues, signed 3 August 2013, 
available at: dfat.gov.au/geo/nauru/pages/memorandum-of-understanding-between-the-republic-of-
nauru-and-the-commonwealth-of-australia-relating-to-the-transfer-to-and.aspx.
59  The processing centre in Nauru was made an open centre in October 2015: Joyce Chia and 
Asher Hirsch, ‘Did “Ending” Detention on Nauru Also End the Constitutional Challenge to 
Offshore Processing?’, The Conversation, 9  October2015, available at: theconversation.com/did-
ending-detention-on-nauru-also-end-the-constitutional-challenge-to-offshore-processing-48667.
60  As at 21  May 2018, 253 people resided in the processing centre: evidence to SLCALC, 
Committee Hansard, 21 May 2018 (evidence of Ms Newton, Department of Home Affairs).
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all the work is done by organisations contracted, instructed and paid by 
the Australian Government. These arrangements have been challenged 
by successive court cases. All, however, have failed, with the government 
changing the relevant legislation to deal with any breaches, or potential 
breaches, identified by the High Court.61
The PNG arrangement
Similarly, the current MoU with PNG62 provides for the transfer of 
‘unauthorised maritime arrivals’ to PNG for processing of asylum claims 
by the PNG Government. The most recent transfer to PNG took place in 
2014.63 As in the case of the processing centre in Nauru, the processing 
centre on Manus Island in PNG, which until recently was used to house 
those transferred, was run, in theory, by the PNG Government. However, 
as in the case of Nauru, all the work was done by organisations contracted, 
instructed and paid by the Australian Government.
On 26  April 2016, the PNG Supreme Court ruled that amendments 
to the PNG Constitution intended to enable the detention of those 
transferred at the processing centre were invalid and that such detention 
was therefore unconstitutional and illegal.64 Following this, the PNG 
Government made the decision that the Manus Island processing centre 
would be closed. In April 2017, the two governments agreed to work 
towards a closing date of 31 October 2017. When this date came around, 
despite resistance by centre residents,65 the foreshadowed closure of the 
Manus Island centre took place as planned.
61  See, for example, Nicole Hasham, ‘High Court Finds Offshore Detention Lawful’, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 3 February 2016, available at: www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/high-court-finds-
offshore-detention-lawful-20160203-gmk5q6.html.
62  Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Independent State of Papua New 
Guinea and the Government of Australia, Relating to the Transfer to, and Assessment and Settlement in, 
Papua New Guinea of Certain Persons, and Related Issues, signed 6 August 2013, available at: dfat.gov.
au/geo/papua-new-guinea/pages/memorandum-of-understanding-between-the-government-of-the-
independent-state-of-papua-new-guinea-and-the-government-of-austr.aspx.
63  Evidence to SLCALC, Committee Hansard, 21 May 2018 (evidence of Air Vice Marshal Osborne).
64  Namah v Pato [2016] PGSC 13.
65  This resistance is described and its rationale explained in Behrouz Boochani, ‘A Letter from 





The MoU with PNG provides that ‘Transferees’ recognised by it as refugees 
will be settled in PNG or elsewhere but not in Australia. As at 22 May 
2017, only 38 recognised refugees had chosen to settle in PNG.66 The 
MoU with Nauru also provides for the possibility that ‘Transferees’ 
recognised by it as refugees will be settled in that country, subject to the 
case-by-case agreement of the Nauruan Government. Thus far, however, 
the most that Nauru has been prepared to grant to those whom it has 
recognised as refugees is permission to remain in Nauru for 20 years.67
According to The Guardian:
Over the past five years, Australia has approached dozens of 
countries – including Kyrgyzstan – offering millions of dollars and 
other inducements in exchange for resettling some refugees from 
Australia’s camps.68
Thus far it has only had two successes.
On 26 September 2014, the Australian Government signed a four-year 
MoU with the Cambodian Government providing for the voluntary 
resettlement in Cambodia of people recognised as refugees by Nauru.69 
As at the time of writing, seven refugees had resettled in Cambodia70 but 
four of them had subsequently returned to their countries of origin.71
On 13  November 2016, the Australian Government announced that 
unauthorised maritime arrivals, who had already been transferred to 
Nauru or PNG, would be considered for refugee resettlement in the 
66  Evidence to SLCALC, Committee Hansard, 22 May 2017 (evidence of Ms Newton, Department 
of Immigration).
67  Department of Immigration, Answer to Question Taken on Notice  AE17/213, Additional 
Estimates Hearing: 27 February 2017, available at: www.aph.gov.au/~/media/Committees/legcon_
ctte/estimates/add_1617/DIBP/QoNs/AE17-213.pdf.
68  Ben Doherty, ‘Australia’s Refugee Deal “a Farce” after US Rejects All Iranian and Somali Asylum 
Seekers’, Guardian, 8  May 2018, available at: www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/may/ 08/ 
australias-refugee-deal-a-farce-after-us-rejects-all-iranian-and-somali-asylum-seekers.
69  Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the 
Government of Australia, Relating to the Settlement of Refugees in Cambodia, signed 26  September 
2014, available at: www.refworld.org/docid/5436588e4.html.
70  Evidence to SLCALC, Committee Hansard, 21 May 2018 (evidence of Ms Geddes, Department 
of Home Affairs).
71  Erin Handley, ‘Nauru Refugee Quietly Arrives’, Phnom Penh Post, 25 May 2017, available at: 
www.phnompenhpost.com/national/nauru-refugee-quietly-arrives.
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United States by officials of that country upon referral by UNHCR.72 
As at 21  May 2018, the United States had accepted 372 refugees for 
resettlement and actually resettled 249 of them (165 from Nauru and 
84 from PNG).73 However, it had also vetted and refused resettlement to 
a further 121 recognised refugees, including 70 Iranians.74
Since the recommencement of offshore processing, three refugees have 
managed to arrange resettlement for themselves in Canada.75 Australia has 
so far resisted taking up a longstanding offer from New Zealand to resettle 
150 refugees in case those resettled in New Zealand take advantage of the 
Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement to relocate to Australia at a later date.76 
However, it has not entirely closed the door on the offer.77
As at 21 May 2018, 939 of the people, including women and children, 
transferred by Australia to Nauru were still in Nauru.78 As at the same date, 
716 of the people transferred by Australia to PNG were still in PNG.79 
A further 460 people, who had previously been transferred to Nauru 
or PNG, were in Australia after being brought there for the purpose of 
medical treatment.80 Individuals in this last group are expected to return 
to Nauru or PNG as the case may be upon completion of treatment, 
though they often refuse to do so.
It is not clear exactly how many of the 2,115 people still subject to the 
offshore processing arrangements as at 21  May 2018 were recognised 
refugees. However, given the recognition rates of 87 per cent in Nauru 
72  Peter Dutton, ‘Joint Press Conference with the Prime Minister, Maritime Border Command, 
Canberra’ [transcript], The Hon Peter Dutton MP Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, 
13 November 2016, available at: web.archive.org/web/20170307202401/www.minister.border.gov.
au/peterdutton/Pages/press-conference-with-the-minister-for-immigration-and-border-protection-
maritime-border-command.aspx.
73  Evidence to SLCALC, Committee Hansard, 21 May 2018 (evidence of Ms Geddes, Department 
of Home Affairs).
74  Ibid.
75  Ibid. (evidence of Mr Pezzullo, Secretary, Department of Home Affairs).
76  Ibid.
77  Peter Dutton, ‘Doorstop Interview, Parliament House’ [transcript], The Hon Peter Dutton 
MP Minister for Home Affairs\Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, 24  May 2018, 
available at: web.archive.org/web/20180821025013/minister.homeaffairs.gov.au/peterdutton/Pages/
Interview-Parliament-House.aspx.
78  Evidence to SLCALC, Committee Hansard, 21 May 2018 (evidence of Ms Newton, Department 
of Home Affairs).
79  Ibid. (evidence of Ms Geddes, Department of Home Affairs).
80  Ibid. (evidence of Ms Dunn, Department of Home Affairs).
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and 74 per cent in PNG,81 the majority would be. Even if the United 
States allocates the remainder of the 1,250 resettlement places it has put 
on the table, a large number of refugees will be left without the prospect 
of a durable solution in the foreseeable future.
A reflection
Australia did not get to where it currently is all at once but step by 
incremental step. Some of those steps were taken by Labor governments, 
others were taken by Coalition governments, but except for a period from 
2004 to 2007 when the Coalition controlled both houses of parliament, 
the legislative steps at least could not have been taken without the support 
of non-government politicians. The most insidious thing about every step 
taken was that it became the new normal and brought the next step into 
the realm of conceivable. The upshot was that most politicians in the 
two major parties were able, at every crucial point along the 25-plus-
year journey, to rationalise taking just that one step more for the sake of 
winning or at least not losing the ongoing struggle for political power.
It is possible through litigation to get Australian courts to adjudicate on 
the lawfulness of executive action and to award enforceable remedies 
for breaches of the law. As illustrated above, however, in the migration 
jurisdiction the usual reaction when the government of the day does not 
agree with a judicial decision is to seek passage of legislation overturning 
the decision as a precedent for the future. Usually, too, the government 
is able to muster the parliamentary numbers necessary to succeed in such 
attempts. The only scenario in which the courts have the upper hand 
is in the interpretation of the Australian Constitution. However, as 
interpreted by the courts, the Constitution does not place many limits on 
the executive government or the parliament. So far, just about everything 
that the government and parliament have done in relation to asylum 
seekers and refugees has passed the constitutionality test. My depressing 
conclusion is that the stain of Australia’s original sin remains, tainting 
the present and future. Because of Australia’s constitutional beginnings, 
Australians cannot rely on their existing legal and political structures to 
deliver them from evil.
81  Australian Border Force, ‘Operation Sovereign Borders Monthly Update: October 2017’, 
Australian Border Force Newsroom, 14 November 2017, available at: newsroom.abf.gov.au/channels/
Operation-Sovereign-Borders/releases/a4e1949e-3a4b-4750-bc65-cda9b3a668d1. These percentages 
are from 31 October 2017, on which date the Australian Government stopped updating the statistics.
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USES AND ABUSES OF 
REFUGEE HISTORIES
Klaus Neumann1
In recent years, scholars with an interest in the history of refugee 
policies have often noted the lack of historical analysis in discussions of 
current issues of forced displacement.2 Such complaints are increasingly 
unfounded. In scholarly debates about displacement and protection, and 
in discussions about public policy, historians and their skills are now 
sought after rather than ignored. The discipline of history has become 
an essential part of what is variously called forced migration studies or 
refugee studies. This collection is but one of several recent edited books 
1  The research for this paper was partially funded by the Australian Research Council 
(DP160101434). The research for and writing of this chapter was completed in 2018.
2  See, for example, Tony Kushner, Remembering Refugees: Then and Now (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2006), 1; Philip Marfleet, ‘Refugees and History: Why We Must Address the Past’, 
Refugee Survey Quarterly 26, no.  3 (2007): 136–48, doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdi0248; Peter Gatrell, 
‘Refugees – What’s Wrong with History?’ Journal of Refugee Studies 30, no. 2 (2017): 170–89. In 2006, 
Martin Jones analysed the profiles of staff and doctoral students of the four leading centres for refugee 
research at the time and found that only four out of 121 researchers self-identified as historians. 
See Martin Jones, ‘Review of Refuge Australia: Australia’s Humanitarian Record’, Refuge 23, no. 1 (2006): 
104 n. 21, doi.org/10.25071/1920-7336.21348. Many of those then writing about the silence of the 
historical profession, myself included, identified as historians and were busily contributing historical 
analyses to refugee studies; see, for example, Klaus Neumann, ‘Refugees: The Silence of the Historians’, 




and special issues that attest to this trend.3 Historians are also increasingly 
comparing and contrasting current and past responses to refugees. 
In 2018, for example, Pertti Ahonen and Tony Kushner compared British 
public responses to the 1938 German and Austrian refugee crisis with 
those to the mass arrival of refugees in Europe in 2015 and 2016.4 While 
there is broad agreement that the origins of the current refugee regime 
lie in the early twentieth century, even historians specialising in earlier 
times have been able to convincingly relate their research to twenty-first-
century questions. Elena Isayev, Benjamin Gray and Susanne Lachenicht, 
for example, have recently discussed practices up to two millennia apart, 
and highlighted the relevance of a study of responses to strangers in 
the ancient Greek and Roman worlds and in early modern Europe for 
a critical understanding of current issues.5
There are many reasons why historians investigate past responses to forced 
migration. Some do so because they expect their analyses to contribute 
to an understanding of topical issues or provide evidence in support of 
particular strategies for addressing these issues. Some believe that other 
historical developments need to be reinterpreted in the contemporary 
context of forced migrations. Others have identified refugee history as 
a field that thus far has attracted comparatively little academic research, 
and which therefore still offers plenty of opportunities for scholars 
to make their name. It is not my intention to deem some motivations 
worthier than others; rather, I wish to point out that there is a wide range 
of reasons that compel historians to be interested in refugee issues. By 
3  Matthew Frank and Jessica Reinsch, eds, Refugees in Europe, 1919–1959: A Forty Years’ Crisis? 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2017); Peter Gatrell and Liubov Zhvanko, eds, Europe on the Move: Refugees in 
the Era of the Great War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017); Fernando Puell de la Villa 
and David García Hernán, eds, War and Population Displacement: Lessons of History (Brighton: Sussex 
Academic Press, 2018); J Olaf Kleist, ed., History of Refugee Protection, special issue, Journal of Refugee 
Studies 30, no. 2 (2017); Dan Stone, ed., Refugees Then and Now: Memory, History and Politics in the 
Long Twentieth Century, special issue, Patterns of Prejudice 52, no. 2–3 (2018).
4  Pertti Ahonen, ‘Europe and Refugees: 1938 and 2015–16’, Patterns of Prejudice 52, no. 2–3 
(2018): 135–48, doi.org/10.1080/0031322x.2018.1433006; Tony Kushner, ‘Truly, Madly, Deeply 
… Nostalgically? Britain’s On–Off Love Affair with Refugees, Past and Present’, Patterns of Prejudice 
52, no. 2–3 (2018): 172–94, doi.org/10.1080/0031322x.2018.1433014.
5  Elena Isayev, ‘Between Hospitality and Asylum: A Historical Perspective on Displaced Agency’, 
International Review of the Red Cross 99, no. 1 (2017): 75–98, doi.org/10.1017/s1816383117000510; 
Benjamin Gray, ‘Exile, Refuge and the Greek Polis: Between Justice and Humanity’, Journal of Refugee 
Studies 30, no.  2 (2017): 190–219, doi.org/10.1093/jrs/few027; Benjamin Gray, ‘Citizenship as 
Barrier and Opportunity for Ancient Greek and Modern Refugees’, Humanities 7, no. 3 (2018): 72, 
doi.org/10.3390/h7030072; Susanne Lachenicht, ‘Learning from Past Displacements? The History 
of Migrations between Historical Specificity, Presentism and Fractured Continuities’, Humanities 7, 
no. 2 (2018): 36, doi.org/10.3390/h7020036.
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comparison, public interest in the history of forced displacement tends to 
be prompted by the idea that history had either or both of two functions: 
to provide lessons and/or to make sense of the present.
Those looking for lessons expect historians to tell them about possible 
courses of action that ought to be avoided (because similar courses of 
action proved to be harmful or unsuccessful in the past), and others that 
should be pursued (because comparable approaches proved beneficial or 
were successful in earlier times). Such expectations are informed by the 
assumption that the past and the present are sufficiently similar to transfer 
insights gained by studying the former to the latter. Historians are partly 
to blame for this misconception. In order for their work to be considered 
socially useful, some of them refer to the past as if it were a repository 
of precedents.6 The search for lessons is also guided by the illusion that 
human beings would be inclined to make rational decisions based on 
precedent if only they knew enough about the past. This is surprising 
because there is ample evidence to suggest that humankind has not been 
inclined to desist from repeating harmful courses of action.7
Many historians also claim that their discipline allows them to situate 
the present on a linear trajectory that reaches from the past to the future. 
Take, for example, the webpage of Monash University’s History Program, 
which tells prospective students that ‘historical studies tells us where we 
came from, who we are, and where we’re heading’.8 Or take the eminent 
social historian Peter Stearns, who, in a 1989 document published on the 
website of the American Historical Association, says: ‘History helps us 
understand change and how the society we live in came to be … The past 
causes the present, and so the future’.9
***
6  For example, Jo Guldi and David Armitage, The History Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014).
7  See, for example, Bill Fawcett, ed., Doomed to Repeat: The Lessons of History We’ve Failed to Learn 
(New York: William Morrow, 2013).
8  ‘History’, School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, 
available at: www.monash.edu/arts/philosophical-historical-international-studies/history.
9  Peter N Stearns, ‘Why Study history?’, American Historical Association, 1998, available at: www.
historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/historical-archives/why-study-
history-(1998). In the text published by the American Historical Association, the first sentence of this 
quote has been capitalised, but this appears to be a formatting error.
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Narratives that supposedly tell us ‘where we came from [and] who we 
are’ are often used to underwrite particular policies and practices in the 
present. The more coherent and seamless the narratives are, the better they 
are suited for such a purpose. In Australia, the narrative that more than 
any other has been employed to shore up current responses to refugees 
and asylum seekers depicts Australia as a traditionally generous and 
compassionate society. Australian governments have repeatedly used this 
narrative domestically to suggest that current policies and practices ought 
to be seen as yet another instantiation of generosity and compassion, as if 
a break with a supposedly long-established tradition was inconceivable.10
The claim that Australia has always been generous and compassionate 
could also be used to dismiss criticism of specific instances in which 
Australia’s approach is characterised by a lack of generosity and 
compassion. The following example illustrates this point. A report by the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, which was tabled at the 37th session of the 
United Nation’s Human Rights Council (to which Australia had just been 
elected for three years) in February 2018, observed that, in response to the 
arrival of increasing numbers of irregular migrants:
many States have initiated an escalating cycle of repression and 
deterrence to discourage new arrivals involving measures such 
as the criminalization and detention of irregular migrants, the 
separation of family members, inadequate reception conditions 
and medical care and the denial or excessive prolongation of status 
determination or habeas corpus proceedings, including expedited 
returns in the absence of such proceedings. Many States have even 
started to physically prevent arrivals, whether through border 
closures, fences, walls or other physical obstacles, through the 
externalization of their borders and procedures or extra-territorial 
‘pushback’ and ‘pullback’ operations, often in cooperation with 
other States or even non-State actors.11
10  See, for example, in relation to Australian refugee and asylum seeker policies: Klaus Neumann, 
‘Oblivious to the Obvious? Australian Asylum-Seeker Policies and the Use of the Past’, in Does History 
Matter? Making and Debating Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Policy in Australia and New Zealand, 
ed. Klaus Neumann and Gwenda Tavan (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2009), 59–60, doi.org/ 10.22459/ 
dhm.09.2009.03.
11  Nils Melzer, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, UN Doc A/HRC/37/50 (23 November 2018) para 7.
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In conclusion, the report noted that the primary cause for the abuse 
suffered by migrants was neither migration itself nor organised crime, but 
rather states’ growing tendency ‘to base their official migration policies 
and practices on deterrence, criminalization and discrimination rather 
than on protection, human rights and non-discrimination’.12
It is common for the authors of such reports to be coy about the identity of 
state parties, and hence it is unsurprising that the report did not mention 
Australia. In fact, it did not name any of the 47 members of the Human 
Rights Council, which then included countries that have a human 
rights record far worse than Australia’s, such as Kyrgyzstan and China. 
Yet Australia’s foreign minister, Julie Bishop, felt sufficiently provoked by 
the report’s veiled criticism to counter it by a reference to history:
There are many who believe that what we have done in turning 
back the boats and imposing very strong border protection laws is 
the right thing to do … What we are doing is what every sovereign 
government should do – protect our borders and determine our 
immigration flows. Australia has one of the proudest records 
of bringing in refugees. Since the Second World War, 865,000 
people have come to Australia on refugee and humanitarian visas. 
Every year we resettle 18,750 people on refugee visas. We’ve 
taken 12,000 additional refugees from Syria. It is a record that 
Australians should be proud of and it is certainly one that I am 
prepared to have scrutinised by the Human Rights Council and 
any other nation around the world.13
Bishop wielded history as a weapon, although she had not been called 
upon to respond to somebody else’s interpretation of Australia’s past. 
Her position is remarkably similar to that of some refugee advocates 
who have also suggested that Australia was traditionally generous. Rather 
than using a record of past generosity to gloss over current failings, or 
implying that strong border protection laws are a necessary corollary, 
some refugee advocates have characterised the present as an aberration, 
while otherwise agreeing with the kind of narrative offered by Bishop, and 
its patriotic premises.14
12  Ibid., para 66.
13  Julie Bishop, interview with Fran Kelly on ABC RN Breakfast, 27  February 2018, available 
at: www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/julie-bishop/transcript-eoe/abc-rn-breakfast-interview-fran-
kelly-0. Bishop responded to the report’s advance unedited version.
14  For example, Klaus Neumann, ‘Providing a “Home for the Oppressed”? Historical Perspectives on 




Elsewhere I have critiqued the idea that Australia has been traditionally 
generous when responding to refugees and asylum seekers, without, 
however, trying to suggest that the grand narrative about Australia’s 
generosity needs to be replaced by one about Australian racism, fear of the 
other and lack of hospitality.15 Here, I would like to take a different tack 
and briefly tell three stories that could disrupt grand narratives that tell 
us ‘where we came from, who we are, and where we’re heading’. They are 
also useless in that they don’t provide ready-made lessons for the present.
***
As I began writing this chapter, newspapers around the world were drawing 
attention to the 80th anniversary of the Évian conference, which had 
been initiated by US President Franklin Roosevelt.16 From 6 to 15 July 
1938, the representatives of 32 countries – 10 from Europe, 20 from 
the Americas, and Australia and New Zealand – met in Évian-les-Bains 
on the shores of Lake Geneva to discuss the Jewish refugee crisis. The 
conference became notorious because it was spectacularly unsuccessful. 
The Dominican Republic, then led by the dictator and Hitler admirer 
Rafael Trujillo, was the only one of the countries represented at the 
French spa that offered to admit a contingent of Jewish refugees.17 All 
other countries were determined to keep their borders closed, or at least 
not to increase their intake of refugees.
One statement more than any other has come to symbolise the supposed 
lack of compassion for refugees. The Australian delegate Thomas Walter 
White, the minister for trade and customs in the conservative Coalition 
Government of Joseph Lyons, said that: ‘It will no doubt be appreciated 
also that as we have no real racial problem, we are not desirous of importing 
15  Klaus Neumann, Refuge Australia: Australia’s Humanitarian Record (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004).
16  About the conference, see, most recently, Paul R Bartrop, The Evian Conference of 1938 and 
the Jewish Refugee Crisis (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Raphaël Delpard, La conference de la 
honte: Évian, juillet 1938 (Paris: Michalon, 2015); Jochen Thies, Evian 1938: Als die Welt die Juden 
verriet (Essen: Klartext, 2017). See also Wolfgang Benz, Claudio Curio and Heiko Kauffmann, 
eds, Von Evian nach Brüssel: Menschenrechte und Flüchtlingsschutz 70 Jahre nach der Konferenz von 
Evian (Karlsruhe: Loeper, 2008), which brings together a discussion of the Évian conference and 
a discussion of asylum in the early twenty-first century.
17  About the racism that informed Trujillo’s decision, and the outcome of his offer, see Hans-Ulrich 
Dillmann and Susanne Heim, Fluchtpunkt Karibik: Jüdische Emigranten in der Dominikanischen 
Republik (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2009).
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one by encouraging any scheme of large-scale foreign migration’.18 These 
words are regularly quoted when the Évian conference is mentioned, 
particularly in the context of discussions about current responses 
to refugees and asylum seekers, not just in Australia. They are also 
prominently displayed at the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial in Israel.
In Australia, at least, the position of the Australian Government at Évian 
was initially not widely perceived as problematic, not least because 
a critical account would have sat uneasily within a narrative emphasising 
‘traditional’ Australian generosity. In 1976, New South Wales Liberal 
Senator Peter Baume said in the Senate:
I cannot forget that in 1938 there was a conference at a town 
called Evian and that Australia was one of the few nations in 
the world willing to give entry permits to the refugees of those 
days … We established then the kind of honourable tradition in 
matters of refugees of which I am very proud.19
More recently, however, embarrassment about White’s words prompted 
Stuart Robert, a Liberal National Party politician who represents the 
Queensland seat of Fadden in Federal Parliament, to put forward a motion 
that condemned the indifference of White and the Lyons Government, 
and included an apology, although its addressee was not specified: 
Today this parliament, as representative of all political parties and 
the people of Australia, issues a profound apology and says sorry 
to the people for the indifference shown by the parliament in 1938 
that worsened the impact of the Holocaust.20
The motion, which had bipartisan support, also suggested that a request 
be made to the Yad Vashem memorial authority to have the text of the 
parliamentary apology displayed next to White’s words. The apology 
and the proposed plaque could be interpreted as an attempt to restore 
Australia’s  reputation as a caring nation, rather than as a form of 
symbolic reparation.
18  T W  White, quoted in Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, Proceedings of the 
Intergovernmental Committee, Evian, July 6th to 15th, 1938: Verbatim Record of the Plenary Meetings of 
the Committee: Resolutions and Reports (Chambéry: Imp. réunies de Chambéry, 1938), 20.
19  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates (hereafter: CDP), Senate, 19  October 1976, 1271 
(Peter Baume). Baume made a similar claim four years later: CPD, Senate, 27 August 1980, 441 (Peter 
Baume).
20  CDP, Representatives, 26 March 2018, 2613 (Stuart Robert).
REFUGEE JOURNEyS
218
I would like to suggest that moral indignation about White’s words, which 
are taken to be emblematic of Australian indifference towards the plight of 
German and Austrian Jewish refugees, usually thwarts a closer look at what 
happened at Évian and in its aftermath. What could such a look entail? 
For a start, it should be remembered that the delegates at Évian could 
not have known what we know today, namely that 6 million Jews were 
murdered in the Holocaust. Unlike most of today’s public commentators 
writing about the Évian conference, contemporary observers did not 
believe that the situation of Jews in Germany was the only pressing issue. 
A preliminary report published by John Hope Simpson in July 1938 to 
inform international diplomatic discussions identified the ‘imminent 
danger of new refugee movements’.21 He did not only have Germany 
and Austria in mind but also countries in Eastern Europe, particularly 
Poland and Romania, whose governments were openly anti-Semitic, 
and Spain. Hope Simpson did not believe that large-scale international 
resettlement schemes were a realistic answer to the situation in Eastern 
and South-Eastern Europe.
White represented Australia at Évian not because he was responsible for 
Australia’s immigration policy but because he happened to be in Europe 
at the time as part of a high-level delegation that tried to negotiate a new 
trade deal with the United Kingdom. While it is true that some of those 
responsible for Australian refugee policies and some key staff in the relevant 
government agency, the Department of the Interior (the immediate 
predecessor of the Department of Immigration), were anti-Semitic, the 
same could not be said of White. It is also true that the government of 
avowed pacifist Joseph Lyons supported an appeasement strategy towards 
the German Reich, but White himself was not in favour of appeasement.22 
He was also not a sympathiser of Nazi Germany. Before arriving in Évian, 
he toured Germany as a guest of the German Government ‘to learn 
something of its present state under the Hitler regime’, as he put it in 
his diary.23 He admired the new Tempelhof airport and enjoyed a night 
at the opera, but otherwise was appalled by what he recognised as signs 
of a ruthless dictatorship. In a letter after his return to Australia, White 
21  John Hope Simpson, Refugees: Preliminary Report of a Survey (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1938), 190.
22  Christopher Waters, Australia and Appeasement: Imperial Foreign Policy and the Origins of World 
War II (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 94.
23  Thomas Walter White, ‘1938 Overseas Diary TWW’, entry for 1 July 1938, Sir Thomas Walter 
White papers, National Library of Australia MS 9148, series 7, folder 41.
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wrote that Germany was marked by ‘regulations, restrictions, uniforms 
and hidden terrorism’.24 His observations contrasted with those of his 
United Australia Party and Cabinet colleague Robert Menzies, whose 
views of the Nazi regime were ambivalent; he too had been a member of 
the Australian trade delegation in the United Kingdom and had visited 
Germany in July 1938.25
In his speech at the Évian conference, White said that Australia would 
not  admit additional migrants from Europe, but as chair of the Sub-
Committee on the Reception of Those Concerned with the Relief of 
Political Refugees from Germany including Austria, he sought the views 
of NGOs assisting refugees. The document that reports the findings of 
that sub-committee recognised that the situation of German and Austrian 
Jews was desperate.
White attended only the first four days of the 10-day diplomatic 
gathering at Évian and then returned to Australia; he had no direct say 
in the outcome of the conference. In any case, White was not the driving 
force behind Australia’s eventual response to the persecution of German 
and Austrian Jews. The man who more than anybody else influenced 
that response was the former Australian prime minister and then high 
commissioner in London, Stanley Melbourne Bruce. He had represented 
Australia at the League of Nations and would have been a more obvious 
choice as leader of the Australian delegation. He too visited Évian in the 
second week of July 1938 – not in an official capacity but ‘incognito’, to 
consult with Alfred Stirling, a senior London-based diplomat who led 
the Australian delegation after White’s departure. It is not known what 
Stirling and Bruce discussed.
Three months before the Évian conference, Bruce had warned the Australian 
Government to avoid gestures that might encourage mass expulsions of 
Jews from Eastern European countries.26 However, in November 1938, 
a couple of weeks after the Reichskristallnacht pogroms in Germany 
and Austria, he convinced the Australian Government (which  by then 
24  White to Atchison, 10  October 1938, quoted in Christopher Waters, ‘Understanding and 
Misunderstanding Nazi Germany: Four Australian Visitors to Germany in 1938’, Australian Historical 
Studies 41, no. 3 (2010): 375, doi.org/10.1080/1031461x.2010.493950.
25  See Waters, ‘Understanding and Misunderstanding Nazi Germany’, 348–69; Rowan Cahill, 
‘A Forgotten Address’, Overland, 15 June 2017, available at: overland.org.au/2017/06/a-forgotten-
address/.
26  Stanley Melbourne Bruce to Prime Minister of Australia, 5 April 1938, National Archives of 
Australia (hereafter: NAA) A981, REF 4 PART 1.
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no longer included White) to announce the establishment of a quota 
for refugees.27 Bruce wanted a quota of 30,000 over three years; the 
Lyons Government agreed to half that number. While the government’s 
instructions about the composition of that quota were problematic,28 the 
quota itself was comparatively generous – not in relation to the overall 
need for resettlement places, but when compared with the number of 
German and Austrian refugees admitted in other non-European countries 
such as Canada and New Zealand. The decision of the Lyons Government 
in 1938 also compares favourably with the Australian response to other 
refugee crises, including the Syrian refugee crisis of 2015.29
A nuanced account that highlights the contradictory behaviour of 
historical actors, does not view the past through the telescope of the present 
and is attentive to the possibility that much of the past is unknowable, 
has little value for commentators who winnow the past for lessons or 
are primarily interested in genealogies. A simplistic narrative about the 
Évian conference allows the drawing of parallels between Western nations’ 
responses to refugees in 1938, and the global North’s response to refugees 
in the past few years. The Évian conference is interpreted as a precedent 
with catastrophic consequences, suggesting that the global North’s current 
policies of containment and deterrence might have similar results. Such 
a narrative implies that those meeting at Évian were somehow responsible 
for the Holocaust. While the governments of some of the countries 
represented at Évian – for example, France and Hungary – later aided 
and abetted in the Jewish genocide, it was Germany, rather than the 
32  countries that sent delegations to Évian, that was responsible for 
the Holocaust.
***
27  Stanley Melbourne Bruce to Prime Minister of Australia, 21  November 1938, NAA A433, 
1943/2/46. White had resigned as minister on 8 November 1938, after learning that he had been 
demoted in a Cabinet reshuffle. See John Rickard, ‘White, Sir Thomas Walter (1888–1957)’, 
Australian Dictionary of Biography, 2002, available at: adb.anu.edu.au/biography/white-sir-thomas-
walter-12013.
28  See Klaus Neumann, Across the Seas: Australia’s Response to Refugees: A History (Melbourne: Black 
Inc., 2015), 38–39.
29  In 2015, the Abbott Government agreed to the resettlement of 12,000 refugees from Syria and 
Iraq – comparatively fewer than the 15,000 refugees over three years announced in 1938, both when 
considering the number of Syrians requiring resettlement (compared to the number of Austrians and 
Germans requiring resettlement in 1938), and when considering the size of the Australian population 
in 1938, compared to its size in 2015.
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Countries in the global North have long tried to draw on colonies or 
former colonies to warehouse refugees. For example, since at least 
2004, Italian governments have tried to reach agreements with their 
Libyan counterparts to prevent migrants in Libya from crossing the 
Mediterranean. As a result of the most recent agreement, signed between 
Italy and its former colony on 2 February 2017 and subsequently backed 
by the European Union, Italy has trained and funded Libyan militias to 
operate a so-called coastguard to intercept migrants at sea and return 
them to Libya, where they are kept in detention centres and exposed 
to human rights violations, including murder, rape and torture.30 There 
are other examples. In 1940 the British deported Jewish refugees from 
Palestine to Mauritius.31 In 1972 the Heath Government was hoping to be 
able to settle Indian Ugandan refugees in the Solomon Islands.32 The US 
Government has used its Cuban possession Guantanamo Bay to detain 
Haitian and Cuban refugees.33 The most infamous recent example is that 
of Australia, and its use of two former territories, Papua New Guinea 
and Nauru, to establish so-called regional processing centres to incarcerate 
asylum seekers and refugees.
Much like Thomas Walter White’s much-quoted sentence about his 
government’s decision not to invite large-scale immigration has been used 
to establish a genealogy reaching from 1938 via 1992 (the introduction of 
mandatory detention) and 2001 (the Tampa affair) to the present, a line 
might be drawn from the exploitation of formerly phosphate-rich Nauru 
under Australian colonial rule to the use of impoverished postcolonial 
Nauru as a kind of twenty-first-century penal colony.34 In this genealogy, 
30  Andrea de Guttry, Francesca Cappone and Emanuele Sommario, ‘Dealing with Migrants in 
the Central Mediterranean Route: A Legal Analysis of Recent Bilateral Agreements Between Italy 
and Libya’, International Migration 56, no.  3 (2018): 44–60, doi.org/10.1111/imig.12401. The 
Italian approach has to be seen within broader European attempts to prevent irregular migrants from 
reaching Europe and to set up facilities to hold, and possibly process, non-European asylum seekers 
in countries outside Europe. See David Scott FitzGerald, Refuge Beyond Reach: How Rich Democracies 
Repel Asylum Seekers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), Chapter  9, doi.org/10.1093/
oso/9780190874155.001.0001.
31  Geneviève Pitot, Le shekel mauricien: L’histoire des détenus juifs à l’île Maurice: 1940–1945 
(Port Louis: Vizavi, 2014).
32  Klaus Neumann, ‘“Our Own Interests Must Come First”: Australia’s Response to the Expulsion 
of Asians from Uganda’, History Australia 3, no. 1 (2006): 10.12, doi.org/10.2104/ha060010.
33  Azadeh Dastyari, United States Migrant Interdiction and the Detention of Refugees in Guantánamo 
Bay (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781316181584.
34  For a recent example, see Julia C Morris, ‘Violence and Extraction of a Human Commodity: 




Nauruans feature only as extras: they are coerced into surrendering their 
island to allow the mining of phosphate, and have little choice but to 
agree to Australia’s request to accommodate asylum seekers and refugees, 
now that Nauru’s assets have been depleted. Here, I would like to disrupt 
this genealogy with a story featuring Nauruan agency and Australia’s 
willingness to take responsibility for the displacement of the atoll’s 
population.
In 1960, Dudley McCarthy, a senior Australian bureaucrat, visited 
Nauru to reassure Nauruans that Australia would find a new home for 
them once Nauru’s phosphate had been exhausted (and the atoll had 
become uninhabitable as a result of the mining operations).35 He told 
representatives of the then 2,600 indigenous Nauruans on behalf of the 
Australian Government:
We ask you to live with us; to become part of us and to allow us to 
become part of you; to accept completely and absolutely without 
reservations of any kind all the privileges which we ourselves 
achieved with painful struggle for our own people; to share with 
us common responsibilities; to build your homes on our land 
without restriction as to how much of that land you can ultimately 
acquire for yourselves as individuals except the restrictions which 
are imposed by the system of justice which we will share and by 
the abilities of each individual; to make complete and unrestricted 
use of all our centres of learning and development; to accept 
the opportunity to gain for yourselves the highest offices in our 
country; to rest as securely under our protection as the most 
powerful and the most humble of our own people alike rest 
securely; to mix your blood with ours if you wish; to inherit with 
us everything of which we ourselves are the inheritors.36
He also assured his audience that ‘You can preserve your traditions or 
national pride in any proper ways which seem fit to you’.37 In his speech, 
he mentioned neither Australian citizenship and the means of acquiring it 
nor a values statement that immigrants would be required to sign. He did 
not refer to the protracted process that is designed to select only the most 
35  The following draws on Neumann, Across the Seas, 182–87, and Gil Marvel Tabucanon and 
Brian Opeskin, ‘The Resettlement of Nauruans in Australia’, Journal of Pacific History 46, no.  3 
(2011): 337–56, doi.org/10.1080/00223344.2011.632992.
36  ‘Minutes of a special meeting of the Nauru Local Government Council with the Acting 
Administrator and D. McCarthy  …  on Monday, 5th December, 1960’, NAA A452, 1961/3157 
PART 1, p. 6.
37  Ibid., p. 7.
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suitable among the refugees who want to settle in Australia. Instead he 
said: ‘We ask you … to become part of us and to allow us to become part 
of you’.
The Nauruans were then considered to be prospective environmental 
refugees (although that term was not yet being used). In more recent 
times, the Australian Government has rejected suggestions that it would 
be responsible for resettling Pacific Islanders – such as the inhabitants of 
the island nations of Nauru, Tuvalu and Kiribati – if they were to become 
displaced due to rising sea levels. Back in 1962, however, Australian Prime 
Minister Robert Menzies told Queensland Premier Frank Nicklin:
The availability of a source of cheap rock phosphate at Nauru 
has been of very great importance to the primary industries of 
Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand and there is a 
clear obligation on the Governments of these countries to provide 
a satisfactory future for the Nauruans.38
In 1963 the Menzies Government offered to resettle the Nauruans on 
Curtis Island, whose land area is well in excess of that of Nauru and which 
is within easy reach of the Queensland town of Gladstone. The government 
was not deterred by opposition to its plans from both Australians then 
living on Curtis Island and the Queensland Government. It was not 
swayed either by the prospect of breaching the then still sacrosanct White 
Australia policy. The following year, Cabinet authorised the purchase 
of Curtis Island, and agreed that the Commonwealth’s powers under 
sections  51 and 52 of the Constitution be used to acquire the land if 
the Queensland Government was not willing to sell it. The Nauruans, 
however, wanted more than the resettlement Dudley McCarthy had 
offered them: they also insisted on political sovereignty. This was not 
something the Menzies Government was willing to countenance, and 
therefore, much to its surprise, the deal fell through.
***
In 2004, the Melbourne Age published a feature article by writer and 
filmmaker Paul Berczeller that promised to tell ‘the real story behind 
Steven Spielberg’s The Terminal ’.39 In that film, Tom Hanks plays Viktor 
38  Menzies to Nicklin, 22 January 1962, NAA A452, 1961/3157 PART 1.
39  Paul Berczeller, ‘A Man in Limbo’, Age, 13 September 2004, A3, 1 and 4–5. The Age feature was 
first published in the Guardian (Paul Berczeller, ‘The Man who Lost his Past’, Guardian, 6 September 
2004, available at: www.theguardian.com/film/2004/sep/06/features.features11).
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Navorski, a citizen of the fictive Eastern European Republic of Krakhozia, 
who arrives at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York only to find that 
events in his home country have rendered him stateless, and prevent him 
from either returning home or entering the United States.40 Navorski is 
then forced to spend nine months in the airport’s transit area. The Age 
article revealed that the film was based on a real story, that of Iranian man 
Merhan Karimi Nasseri, who spent 18 years in the transit area of Charles 
De Gaulle Airport near Paris.41
Nasseri’s story had been told many times before, in feature films, 
documentaries and magazine articles, including in Berczeller’s own film 
From Here to Where.42 The Age editor responsible for placing Berczeller’s 
article may not have remembered Nasseri’s case; he obviously did not 
recall either that 13 years earlier another man had spent several months in 
the transit lounges of airports in Asia, Europe and South America because 
of a botched Australian attempt to deport him.
On 18  February 1991, the Australian authorities deported a Cuban 
national by the name of Francisco Vazquez, who, four years earlier, had 
been sentenced to two years in prison for assault.43 In one sense, the case 
– the criminal deportation of a non-citizen – is hardly noteworthy. But 
there were several complicating factors. First, Vazquez had been resettled 
in Australia as a refugee. Second, the Cuban authorities were unwilling 
to take him back. And third, Vazquez was fearful of being deported to 
Cuba. The immigration department, however, was not troubled by these 
complications. ‘He was deported as a criminal and he has to take his 
chances’, a spokesman for the department told a journalist. ‘Deporting 
someone doesn’t necessarily mean we deport them to another country. 
We put them on an aircraft and having left, the book is closed.’44
40  The Terminal [film], directed by Steven Spielberg (United States of America: 2004).
41  The story has been told in: Sir Alfred Mehran and Andrew Donkin, The Terminal Man (London: 
Corgi, 2004).
42  From Here to Where [film], directed by Paul Berczeller (Netherlands, 2002). The first feature film 
about Nasseri appeared in 1993 (Tombés du ciel [film], directed by Philippe Lioret (France, 1993)).
43  The following draws on Klaus Neumann and Savitri Taylor, ‘“He has to Take his Chances”: The 
Resettlement of a Refugee in Australia and his Deportation to the Country he had Fled, 1980–1992’, 
History Australia 16, no. 3 (2019): 459–79, doi.org/10.1080/14490854.2019.1636672.
44  Quoted in Janet Fife-Yeomans, ‘Deportee Faces Life of Endless Airports’, Sydney Morning 
Herald, 7 March 1991.
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Vazquez was booked to fly from Sydney to Havana via Singapore and 
Moscow. In Moscow, the authorities refused to let Vazquez board a plane 
to Cuba, and returned him to Singapore. The Australians then booked 
him on another flight to Havana, this time via Rome and Madrid. He got 
as far as Madrid, and then returned to Rome, where he was issued with 
a new ticket to Cuba, this time via Caracas. When that attempt also failed, 
the Italian authorities compelled Singapore Airlines to return Vazquez to 
Singapore, where he arrived on 2 March. He was not allowed to leave the 
airport, as the Singaporean immigration authorities did not deem him to 
possess the required travel document.
For the next four months, the Singaporean and Australian governments 
argued over whose responsibility Vazquez was. On 22 May, Singapore’s 
immigration department instructed Singapore Airlines to return Vazquez 
to Australia. As the Australian Department of Immigration served notice 
on the airline ‘not to move the aircraft unless Mr Vazquez “is on that plane 
for the purposes of his removal out of Australia”’, Singapore Airlines flew 
Vazquez back to Singapore on the same day.45
On 7  June, Singapore gazetted regulations that made it possible to 
ground a plane at Singapore Airport, if its captain refused to take on 
board a passenger whom the airline in question had previously brought 
to Singapore without authorisation. In Australia, both sides of politics 
were alarmed by the prospect that these regulations would be used to 
procure the return of Vazquez to Australia on a Qantas flight. On 13 June 
1991, Shadow Minister for Immigration Philip Ruddock released a media 
statement in which he said:
This action by the Singaporean Government puts Australia’s 
deportation laws at grave risk. There is a provision in our law for 
criminal deportation for those who are found guilty of serious 
offences committed here in Australia. If we are forced, by other 
countries, to accept them back into Australia, our whole system of 
control is jeopardised.46
At the time of passage of the Singaporean regulations, the Migration 
Amendment Bill 1991 was before the Senate, awaiting resumption of 
the second reading debate. According to Gerry Hand, the immigration 
45  High Commission of the Republic of Singapore to Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Canberra, 29 May 1991, Annex, NAA A9737, 1991/1765 PART 1.




minister in the Hawke Government, the new legislation was part of 
a ‘continuing process of fine tuning the major and far-reaching reforms’ 
made by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989.47 The 1989 
Act had replaced a system of largely discretionary decision-making to 
minimise the scope for judicial intervention.
The immigration department, after being made aware of Singapore’s 
intention to return Vazquez, saw the opportunity to amend the Migration 
Amendment Bill then before parliament to have legislation in place 
designed to ensure his detention upon arrival in Australia. On 21 June, 
the second reading debate on the Migration Amendment Bill 1991 
resumed in the Senate, with the government moving amendments in 
anticipation of Vazquez’s return. The Explanatory Memorandum tabled 
with the Senate amendments justified them as follows:
The Government is  …  concerned about certain persons who 
have been deported from Australia under the Act and who 
may be returned by the authorities of another country to 
Australia … It is intended that these persons should not be capable 
of using judicial review to secure their release and entry into the 
Australian community.48
In the House of Representatives, Philip Ruddock announced that the 
federal opposition ‘enthusiastically endorse[d]’ the Senate amendments 
and the ‘Government’s intention to send a clear signal that Australia has 
control over its own borders’.49 He also offered the opposition’s support 
for further amendments ‘to limit the capacity of the courts to make 
decisions in that area’.50 For the Australian Democrats, its leader Janet 
Powell also supported the amendments ‘in recognition of the need for 
the Government to be in control of the question of who does or does not 
enter this country’.51 The Bill was amended as proposed, and passed on 
21 June.
When Singapore returned Vazquez to Australia on 9  July 1991, the 
new legislation allowed for Vazquez’s detention until his departure 
from Australia. ‘Technically, Mr Vazquez has not re-entered Australia’, 
47  CPD, Representatives, 17 April 1991, 2846 (Gerry Hand).
48  Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment Bill 1991.
49  CPD, Representatives, 21 June 1991, 5269 (Philip Ruddock).
50  Ibid., 5270.
51  CPD, Senate, 21 June 1991, 5294 (Janet Powell).
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a representative of the immigration department was quoted as saying.52 
The government lobbied Spain, the United States and Venezuela to 
accommodate Vazquez, but its requests were knocked back. Vazquez 
himself unsuccessfully applied to be admitted for residence to Spain, 
Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Colombia and Ecuador. In September 
1991 he went on hunger strike. He sent a note to his solicitor saying: 
‘I cry for help, can you save me?’53 She could not. In early 1992, the 
government was eventually successful in persuading Cuba to agree to the 
return of its citizen. On 21 February 1992, Vazquez flew out of Sydney 
on travel documents provided by Cuba, reaching Havana two days later.
There had been no public outcry when Vazquez was kept in prison for 
more than two years after serving his sentence, while the government was 
trying to secure his deportation, nor when he was deported in February 
1991, and then returned to Long Bay Gaol in July 1991. His deportation 
in February 1992 was barely noted. His status as somebody who had 
come to Australia as a refugee seemed to amount to little, at least in 
public debate.
The story of Francisco Vazquez draws attention to an aspect of the 
prerogative that the government ought to decide whether a non-citizen 
may enter the country or remain in it, that has been comparatively 
uncontroversial. Vazquez’s story would not easily lend itself to be turned 
into a Hollywood movie – or an ABC miniseries, for that matter. Yet from 
today’s vantage point, the response to Vazquez is still surprising. He came 
to Australia as a refugee, and was to be returned to a communist country 
at a time when the Cold War was not yet just a distant memory. Is it not 
surprising that his case – and, in particular, the amendment of legislation 
specifically to ensure that he could be detained indefinitely and that his 
detention could not be challenged in the courts – did not attract more 
attention at the time? Is it not equally surprising that Australians may 
know about Merhan Nasseri, but have never heard about Vazquez?
From today’s vantage point, the single-mindedness with which the Hawke 
Government prosecuted the Vazquez case may also come as a  surprise, 
given that the dictum ‘we decide who comes to this country and the 
circumstances under which they come’ is nowadays mostly traced back to 
52  Jennie Curtin, ‘Jail is the Only Place that will take Deportee’, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 July 
1991.




John Howard’s pitch to voters during the 2001 federal election campaign, 
and the origins of Australia’s current border control policies tend to 
be associated with Hawke’s successor Paul Keating, if not, once again, 
with the Howard Government’s response to the arrival of the Tampa 
off Christmas Island. Vazquez’s story makes it more difficult to think 
of current Australian Government policies as an anomaly that began in 
2001.
***
All three stories have the potential to unsettle views of the past and the 
present that are indebted to a notion of history whereby past, present 
and future are on a linear trajectory, and which assume that there is an 
inexorable progression along that trajectory.
The past-becomes-the-present-becomes-the-future variety of history 
privileges pasts that can be seen to form the nucleus of the present. Not 
only does such history pay scant attention to presumed cul-de-sacs, it is 
also often content with truncated genealogies that ostensibly suffice to 
establish how the present came into being. At the end of the day, a history 
that does only that risks becoming an apology of the present. A history 
that does only that makes it harder for us to envisage futures that are not 
already contained in the present. Some pasts are ostensibly inconsequential 
in that they did not turn into the present. But these ‘dead ends’, once 
rendered as history, might retain some currency. In my previous work 
about postcolonial histories in Papua New Guinea, I termed accounts of 
such pasts ‘the trash of history’.54 Such trash can be unwieldy, awkward, 
even subversive.
In grand narratives that chart Australian history from the Immigration 
Restriction Act 1901 via the Tampa affair to the creation of the Department 
of Home Affairs in 2017, or from the arrival of 843 Displaced Persons 
aboard the Heintzelman in 1947 via the resettlement of Indochinese 
refugees in the late 1970s and early 1980s to the Abbott Government’s 
decision in 2015 to admit an additional 12,000 Syrian and Iraqi refugees, 
54  Klaus Neumann, ‘Starting from Trash’, in Remembrance of Pacific Pasts: An Invitation to Remake 
Histories, ed. Robert Borofsky (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2000), 62–77, doi.org/ 
10.1515/9780824864163-006.
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the Menzies Government’s invitation to the Nauruans to settle in 
Australia, as a group, preserving their ‘national pride’, with all the rights 
and privileges of Australian citizens, constitutes precious trash.
The three stories I told could be interpreted as attempts to set the record 
straight. They could be seen as attempts to point out that in order to 
understand Australia’s response to the refugee crisis in 1938 we ought 
to focus on Bruce’s politicking behind the scenes, rather than White’s 
infamous line; that we ought to be wary of accounts that don’t accord 
agency to the Nauruans; and that deportation policies and practices in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s may tell us as much about border protection as 
the introduction of mandatory detention and the Tampa affair.
Yet this is not simply an argument for more nuanced accounts. Not least 
Australia’s history wars taught me that a dispute over what happened, 
based on an interpretation of ‘historical evidence’, may well be 
counterproductive – unless it is accompanied by a discussion about what 
history is, how it produces truth effects, what it is for, who benefits from 
it and why it is done.55 When contributing to such a discussion, historians 
may want to reflect on how they respond to public expectations about 
the usefulness of their craft. Are they perhaps too readily drawing lessons, 
explaining the present or writing accounts that could easily be slotted into 
patriotic narratives of the nation?
Personally, I wish that disputes over what happened – for example, over 
the precise number of Indigenous people killed by European settlers in 
Van Diemen’s Land – were accompanied by the search for a historical 
practice that does not shore up the present but that produces histories 
that are unsettling, disrupting notions of a seamless progression from the 
status quo ante to the status quo. Such histories may even allow for futures 
to be imagined that are not yet contained in the present, and which are 
attentive to pasts that did not culminate in the present.
55  This is not the place to revisit the issue of the history wars, during which many of Keith 
Windschuttle’s opponents too readily accepted his premises about how historical truth is produced. 




Rachel Stevens and Jordana Silverstein1
According to recent United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) figures, there are currently 70.8  million forcibly displaced 
people worldwide, a statistic that includes 41.3 million internally displaced 
people, 25.9 million refugees and 3.5  million asylum seekers.2 If such 
people were a country of their own, the nation of the forcibly displaced 
would be the twenty-first largest country in the world by population 
size. To put this ranking into context, this nation would be larger than 
the United Kingdom or France, and just a smidge behind Thailand. 
Despite the sheer number of refugees in the modern world, discourse and 
debates surrounding their existence and experiences remains strikingly 
restricted. The stated purpose of this collection of essays is to open a space 
for thinking about the histories, presents and futures for refugees and 
asylum seekers. Through rigorous and accessible analyses, the authors in 
this volume hope that readers will come away with an appreciation of the 
multiplicity of refugee stories, which proscribes any simplistic narrative of 
refugee journeys.
This collection is deliberately designed to bring together the writings of 
practitioners and academics from different disciplinary backgrounds. 
The scope of the book is broad, covering the sweep of twentieth and early 
twenty-first century refugee history, and while focused on Australia, is 
mindful of international trends and the inherent transnational nature 
of refugee journeys across national borders. The methodologies and 
1  This chapter was written with funding provided by the Australian Research Council Laureate 
Research Fellowship Project FL140100049, ‘Child Refugees and Australian Internationalism from 
1920 to the Present’.




backgrounds of the authors also vary and include legal scholars, historians, 
sociologists, journalists and former refugees who have since resettled 
in Australia. What we have, then, is a collection of diverse accounts 
tied together by a shared interest in promoting rigorous and accurate 
public discussions on, with and by refugees. With distinct chapters all 
telling a  specific story, how then can we make sense of this collection? 
What should readers take away from the essays?
Legal scholars and practitioners Eve Lester (Chapter 1) and Savitri Taylor 
(Chapter  9) provide us with the complex and essential legal backdrop 
for understanding the approach of the Australian Government to the 
resettlement, or exclusion, of refugees and asylum seekers. By outlining 
the modern refugee protection framework, Lester astutely notes that 
Australia’s approach to refugee resettlement has long been situation 
specific and highly differentiated. Both the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol were born out of the Cold War and in the shadow 
of the Holocaust. These historical factors influenced who was defined 
as a refugee, how they were resettled and on what basis. Lester also 
observes that the notion that receiving states resettle refugees for purely 
humanitarian reasons is overly simplistic. Indeed, state actions are mostly 
guided by utilitarian factors (such as the need for labour or the desire 
to entrench colonial settlement of Aboriginal land) and geopolitical 
interests, with the refugee appearing as a ‘secondary consideration’. 
Savitri Taylor, meanwhile, draws our attention to the long legal roots of 
the mandatory detention regime. With anxieties about migration dating 
back to the mid-nineteenth century, Australia’s colonial founding fathers 
devised a national constitution that bestowed on the Federal Government 
absolute authority over matters relating to naturalisation and aliens, and 
by extension, emigration and immigration. With what Taylor has dubbed 
the nation’s ‘original sin’, the Constitution has allowed politicians from 
both major parties to withstand some juridical challenges to the legality 
of detaining asylum seekers. Some may wonder: how on earth is the 
indefinite offshore detention of people seeking asylum legal? Well, in this 
case, domestic constitutional law overrides international law (and moral 
expectations), granting the nation’s political leaders a legal defence to 
imprison indefinitely refugees on Pacific islands.
One of the important contributions this collection makes is that the 
experiences of former refugees are provided space. As we mentioned in 
the introduction, so much ink is used writing about refugees; it is vitally 
important that academic works allow room for refugees to speak for 
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themselves. In this volume we work towards that, often going partway 
with a researcher as intermediary. Melanie Baak (Chapter  2) explores 
what it means in Australia to be labelled a refugee and if one can ever 
shed this descriptor. While some refugees of European backgrounds can 
potentially vanish into whiteness, and thus maybe enjoy all the privileges 
this entails, refugees who are visibly different often remain haunted by the 
label and stereotyped as someone in deficit and in need of assistance. Baak 
argues that we should ‘rehumanise’ refugees by hearing their stories in all 
their complexity, and through this, repair broken dignity. In Chapter 7, 
Behind the Wire journalist André Dao joins narrator Jamila Jafari to reflect 
on the unique benefits and challenges of creating a multi-platform oral 
history project for public consumption. Rather than being relegated to 
an object to be analysed, the Behind the Wire team explicitly maintain 
the subjectivity and agency of their narrators. In this ‘behind the scenes’ 
examination of the processes involved in creating refugee stories, Jafari 
acknowledges the tension between wanting to share her story but not 
wanting to share too much. Laurel Mackenzie (Chapter 8) continues this 
exploration by discussing the narratives of three Hazara refugees, living in 
Dandenong, south-east of Melbourne. The Hazaras represent one of the 
country’s newest migrant communities, but beyond community circles, 
little is known of their experiences of fleeing Afghanistan. Mackenzie 
demonstrates that Salmi, Hassan and Jahan understand their journey 
through the prism of their family. Rather than focusing on individual 
perspectives, these Hazaras stress the importance of securing safety 
for all family members and the devastation that is felt when families 
remain separated.
The flipside to any discussion about the experiences of refugees is an 
examination of perceptions of refugees. Two chapters in this book 
unpack how refugees are portrayed and, importantly, who benefits 
from such depictions. Ann-Kathrin Bartels (Chapter 4) examines media 
portrayals of asylum seekers in West Germany during the 1980s. With 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia and collapse of communism throughout 
Eastern Europe, West Germany rapidly became a major recipient country 
of immigrants, ushering in a period of heightened tensions surrounding 
national identity and xenophobia. Bartels argues that public debates 
around asylum seekers are driven by the politics of fear and (racially 
defined) notions of nationhood. These drivers help create a perception 
of threat, whether that be over jobs, standards of living, values or culture. 
These forces are presently at play throughout Western Europe and even 
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Scandinavian countries, once considered the bedrock of liberalism 
and tolerance of marginalised others. Kathleen Blair (Chapter  6) also 
considers the political and electoral gains politicians seek by scapegoating 
asylum seekers in Australia. Looking at three federal election campaigns 
in 1977, 2001 and 2013, Blair documents the remarkable consistency 
in the derogatory language employed to describe asylum seekers. While 
terms such as ‘queue jumper’ and ‘bogus asylum seeker’ have been in the 
political discourse for over 40 years, what is new is the effectiveness such 
rhetoric has on shaping electoral outcomes.
Lastly, three chapters in this collection seek to challenge existing orthodoxies 
in refugee histories. Jordana Silverstein’s chapter on Australian imaginings 
of Vietnamese and Timorese child refugees in the 1970s and 1980s draws 
our attention to the ways in which categorisation itself is a problematic 
process (Chapter 3). When so much public discourse has been focused on 
releasing children from detention, Silverstein’s chapter presents a sharp 
reminder of how bureaucracies seek to control children and silence them as 
well. Her reflections on the ethics of accessing sensitive welfare case notes 
on children – who by now would only be in middle age – is an important 
reminder to historians that even declassified government archives contain 
material that may cause harm. In Chapter  5, Rachel Stevens considers 
Australian responses to the East Pakistani refugee crisis in 1971, an event 
largely forgotten by those outside of South Asian communities. Although 
it is widely acknowledged that history writing is a highly selective process, 
Stevens asks: Why is it that some atrocities (and the ensuing exodus of 
people) are remembered and memorialised while others are forgotten? 
Do  we only write about and remember the migrations in which the 
refugees resettled in the West? Does the refugee need to have some impact 
on us if we are to acknowledge them? In the final chapter, Klaus Neumann 
(Chapter  10) extends this reflection on historical practice, challenging 
us to avoid the temptation of trying to make lessons out of the past or 
forcibly create a linear narrative to understand our current world. Instead, 
Neumann argues, we should produce histories that are unsettling, and 
even unwieldy, as this is how we can imagine futures not yet contained in 
the present.
The 10  chapters in this collection cover much ground but they are 
connected by a single theme: resistance. In terms of the representations 
of refugees, we encourage readers to challenge stereotypes and ways of 
categorising groups of people. With refugee policies, we hope readers find 
in this volume a nuanced understanding of the legal apparatus that enable 
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policies of mandatory detention to continue, and with this knowledge, 
be empowered to challenge the legal foundations of the refugee detention 
regime. We also encourage readers to resist the dehumanisation of refugees 
and provide ample space for refugees and former refugees to tell their 
stories, in all of their messy complexity. There needs to be an appreciation 
that their refugee journey is just one part of their lived experience.
What we have, then, is a collection of essays that provoke thought, 
challenge assumptions and defy neat narratives. We are also left 
wondering, almost inevitably, what is next? It is here that we find ourselves 
often stuck. If many of the origins of refugee movements are caused by 
state actions, how can the solution also lie with state actors? If mobility 
is a human reality, why do states remain in perpetual opposition to the 
refugee journey? We don’t pretend to offer the answers, but we do hope to 




Adichie, Chimamanda Ngozi. ‘The Danger of a Single Story’. Talk presented at 
TEDGlobal 2009. Available at: www.ted.com/talks/chimamanda_adichie_the 
_ danger_of_a_single_story/transcript.
Ahluwalia, Pal. ‘When Does a Settler Become a Native? Citizenship and Identity 
in a Settler Society’. Pretexts: Literary and Cultural Studies 10, no. 1 (2001): 
63–73. doi.org/10.1080/713692599.
Ang, Ien and Jon Stratton. ‘Multiculturalism in Crisis: The New Politics of Race 
and National Identity in Australia’. TOPIA: Canadian Journal of Cultural 
Studies 2 (1998): 22–41. doi.org/10.3138/topia.2.22.
Arendt, Hannah. ‘We Refugees’. In Altogether Elsewhere: Writers on Exile, edited by 
M Robinson. Boston: Faber and Faber, 1994.
Baak, Melanie. ‘Murder, Community Talk and Belonging: An Exploration of 
Sudanese Community Responses to Murder in Australia’. African Identities 9, 
no. 4 (2011): 417–34. doi.org/10.1080/14725843.2011.614415.
Baak, Melanie. Negotiating Belongings: Stories of Forced Migration of Dinka Women 
from South Sudan. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2016. doi.org/10.1007/978-
94-6300-588-3.
Baak, Melanie, Emily Miller, A  Sullivan and Kathleen Heugh. ‘Improving 
Educational Outcomes for Students from Refugee Backgrounds in the South 
Australian Certificate of Education Project: A Case Study of Two Catholic 
Schools’. University of South Australia, 2018. Available at: apo.org.au/node/ 
136916.
Bakewell, Oliver. ‘Research Beyond the Categories: The Importance of Policy 
Irrelevant Research into Forced Migration’. Journal of Refugee Studies 21, 
no. 4 (2008): 432–53. doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fen042.
Banivanua Mar, Tracey. Decolonisation and the Pacific: Indigenous Globalisation and 




Bartrop, Paul R. The Evian Conference of 1938 and the Jewish Refugee Crisis. 
Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
Bashir, Bashir and Amos Goldberg. ‘Deliberating the Holocaust and the Nakba: 
Disruptive Empathy and Binationalism in Israel/Palestine’. Journal of Genocide 
Research 16, no. 1 (2014): 77–99. doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2014.878114.
Bates, Laura, Diane Baird, Deborah J Johnson, Robert E Lee, Tom Luster and 
Christine Rehagen. ‘Sudanese Refugee Youth in Foster Care: The “Lost Boys” 
in America’. Child Welfare Journal 84, no. 5 (2005): 631–48.
Bauman, Zygmunt. Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts. John Wiley & Sons, 
2013.
Bird, Greta. ‘An Unlawful Non-Citizen Is Being Detained or (White) Citizens 
Are Saving the Nation from (Non White) Non-Citizens’. University of Western 
Sydney Law Review 9 (2005): 87–110.
Bleiker, Roland, David Campbell, Emma Hutchison and Xzarina Nicholson. 
‘The  Visual Dehumanisation of Refugees’. Australian Journal of Political 
Science 48, no. 4 (2013): 398–416. doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2013.840769.
Bloch, Alice and Shirin Hirsch. ‘“Second Generation” Refugees and 
Multilingualism: Identity, Race and Language Transmission’. Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 40, no. 14 (2017): 2444–62. doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2016. 
1252461.
Boochani, Behrouz. ‘A Letter from Manus Island’. Saturday Paper. 9 December 
2017. Available at: www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/news/politics/2017/ 12/09/ 
letter-manus-island/15127380005617.
Boochani, Behrouz. No Friend but the Mountains: Writing from Manus Prison. 
Translated by Omid Tofighian. Sydney: Picador, 2018.
Bose, Sarmila. Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War. London: 
Hurst Publishers, 2011.
Brough, Mark, Don Gorman, Elvia Ramirez and Peter Westoby. ‘Young Refugees 
Talk About Well-Being: A Qualitative Analysis of Refugee Mental Health 
from Three States’. Australian Journal of Social Issues 38, no. 2 (2003): 193–208. 
doi.org/10.1002/j.1839-4655.2003.tb01142.x.
Butler, Judith. Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? 2nd ed. London: Verso, 2010.
Chimni, B S. ‘The Birth of a “Discipline”: From Refugee to Forced Migration 




Colic-Peisker, Val. ‘“At Least You’re the Right Colour”: Identity and Social 
Inclusion of Bosnian Refugees in Australia’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies 31, no. 4 (2005): 615–38. doi.org/10.1080/13691830500109720.
Colic-Peisker, Val. ‘The “Visibly Different” Refugees in the Australian Labour 
Market: Settlement Policies and Employment Realities’. In Refugees, Recent 
Migrants and Employment: Challenging Barriers and Exploring Pathways, edited 
by S McKay. New York: Routledge, 2009. doi.org/10.4324/9780203890745.
Crock, Mary. Seeking Asylum Alone: A Study of Australian Law, Policy and Practice 
Regarding Unaccompanied and Separated Children. Sydney: Federation Press, 
2006.
Crock, Mary and Laurie Berg. Immigration, Refugees and Forced Migration: Law, 
Policy and Practice in Australia. Sydney: Federation Press, 2011.
Damousi, Joy. ‘The Campaign for Japanese-Australian Children to enter Australia, 
1957–1968: A History of Post-War Humanitarianism’. Australian Journal of 
Politics and History 64, no. 2 (2018): 211–26. doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12461.
Dellios, Alexandra. Histories of Controversy: The Bonegilla Migrant Centre. 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2017.
Dhanji, Surjeet. ‘Welcome of Unwelcome? Integration Issues and the Resettlement 
of Former Refugees from the Horn of Africa and Sudan in Metropolitan 
Melbourne’. The Australasian Review of African Studies 30, no.  2 (2009): 
152–78.
Due, Clemence. ‘“Who Are Strangers?”: “Absorbing” Sudanese Refugees into 
a White Australia’. ACRAWSA E-Journal 4, no. 1. (2008). Available at: acrawsa.
org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/CRAWS-Vol-4-No-1-2008-1.pdf.
Fawcett, Bill, ed. Doomed to Repeat: The Lessons of History We’ve Failed to Learn. 
New York: William Morrow, 2013.
Gatrell, Peter. ‘Refugees – What’s Wrong with History?’ Journal of Refugee Studies 
30, no. 2 (2017): 170–89. doi.org/10.1093/jrs/few013.
Gatrell, Peter and Liubov Zhvanko, eds. Europe on the Move: Refugees in the Era 
of the Great War. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017.
Gordon, Avery F. Ghostly Matters: Hauntings and the Sociological Imagination. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008.
Gray, Benjamin. ‘Citizenship as Barrier and Opportunity for Ancient Greek 




Gray, Benjamin. ‘Exile, Refuge and the Greek Polis: Between Justice and Humanity’. 
Journal of Refugee Studies 30, no.  2 (2017): 190–219. doi.org/ 10.1093/ jrs/
few027.
Green, Michael and André Dao, eds. They Cannot Take the Sky: Stories from 
Detention. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2017.
Guldi, Jo and David Armitage. The History Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014.
Hahn, Hans Henning and Eva Hahn. ‘Nationale Stereotypen. Plädoyer für eine 
historische Stereotypenforschung’. In Stereotyp, Identität und Geschichte. 
Die Funktion von Stereotypen in gesellschaftlichen Diskursen, edited by Hans 
Henning Hahn, 17–56. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2002.
Halpern, Jodi and Harvey M Weinstein. ‘Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and 
Reconciliation’. Human Rights Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2004): 561–83. doi.org/ 
10.1353/hrq.2004.0036.
Higgins, Claire. Asylum by Boat: Origins of Australia’s Refugee Policy. Sydney: 
NewSouth Publishing, 2017.
Hyndman, Jennifer. Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of 
Humanitarianism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
Ignatieff, Michael. ‘The Refugee as Invasive Other’. Social Research: An International 
Quarterly 84, no. 1 (2017): 223–31.
Jupp, James. ‘From “White Australia” to “Part of Asia”: Recent Shifts in Australian 
Immigration Policy Towards the Region’. International Migration Review 29, 
no. 1 (1995): 207–28. doi.org/10.2307/2547002.
Jupp, James. From White Australia to Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration. 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2002. doi.org/10.1017/cbo978 1139 
19 5034.
Jupp, James. Immigration. 2nd ed. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Kevin, Catherine and Karen Agutter. ‘The “Unwanteds” and “Non-Compliants”: 
“Unsupported Mothers” as “Failures” and Agents in Australia’s Migrant Holding 
Centres’. The History of the Family 22, no. 4 (2017): 554–74. doi.org/10.1080/ 
1081602X.2017.1302891.




Kumsa, Martha Kuwee. ‘“No! I’m Not a Refugee!” The Poetics of Be-Longing 
among Young Oromos in Toronto’. Journal of Refugee Studies 19, no.  2 
(2006): 230–55. doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fel001.
Kushner, Tony. Remembering Refugees: Then and Now. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2006.
Lester, Eve. Making Migration Law: The Foreigner, Sovereignty, and the Case of 
Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
Limbu, Bishupal. ‘Illegible Humanity: The Refugee, Human Rights and the 
Question of Representation’. Journal of Refugee Studies 22, no.  3 (2009): 
257–82. doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fep021.
Ludwig, Bernadette. ‘“Wiping the Refugee Dust from My Feet”: Advantages and 
Burdens of Refugee Status and the Refugee Label’. International Migration 
54, no. 1 (2016): 5–18. doi.org/10.1111/imig.12111.
Lueck, Kerstin, Clemence Due and Martha Augoustinos. ‘Neoliberalism and 
Nationalism: Representations of Asylum Seekers in the Australian Mainstream 
News Media’. Discourse & Society 26, no. 5 (2015): 608–29. doi.org/10.1177/ 
0957926515581159.
Mackenzie, Laurel and Olivia Guntarik. ‘Rites of Passage: Experiences of 
Transition for Forced Hazara Migrants and Refugees in Australia’. Crossings: 
Journal of Migration & Culture 6, no.  1 (2015): 59–80. doi.org/10.1386/
cjmc.6.1.59_1.
Malkki, Liisa H. ‘National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the 
Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees’. 
In Culture, Power Place: Explorations in Critical Anthropology, edited by Akhil 
Gupta and James Ferguson, 52–74. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1997. doi.org/10.1215/9780822382089-002.
Malkki, Liisa H. Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology 
among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1995. doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226190969.001.0001.
Malkki, Liisa H. ‘Refugees and Exile: From “Refugee Studies” to the National 
Order of Things’. Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995): 495–523. doi.org/ 
10.1146/annurev.an.24.100195.002431.
Malkki, Liisa H. ‘Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and 




Mares, Peter. Not Quite Australian: How Temporary Migration is Changing the 
Nation. Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2016.
Marlowe, Jay M. ‘Beyond the Discourse of Trauma: Shifting the Focus on Sudanese 
Refugees’. Journal of Refugee Studies 23, no. 2 (2010): 183–98. doi.org/ 10.1093/ 
jrs/feq013.
McBrien, J Lynn. ‘Educational Needs and Barriers for Refugee Students in the 
United States: A Review of the Literature’. Review of Educational Research 75, 
no. 3 (2005): 329–64. doi.org/10.3102/00346543075003329.
McKinnon, Sara L. ‘Unsettling Resettlement: Promblematizing “Lost Boys of 
Sudan” Resettlement and Identity’. Western Journal of Communication 72, 
no. 4 (2008): 397–414. doi.org/10.1080/10570310802446056.
McMaster, Don. ‘Resettled Refugees: Temporary Protection Visas: Obstructing 
Refugee Livelihoods’. Refugee Survey Quarterly 25, no. 2 (2006): 135–45. 
doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdi0131.
McPhail, Ken, Robert Nyamori and Savitri Taylor. ‘Escaping Accountability: 
A Case of Australia’s Asylum Seeker Policy’. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal 29 (2016): 947–84. dx.doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-03-2014-1639.
Miller, Emily, Tahereh Ziaian and Adrian Esterman. ‘Australian School Practices 
and the Education Experiences of Students with a Refugee Background: 
A  Review of the Literature’. International Journal of Inclusive Education 
(2017): 1–21. doi.org/10.1080/13603116.2017.1365955.
Moreton-Robinson, Aileen. The White Possessive: Property, Power, and Indigenous 
Sovereignty. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015. doi.org/ 
10.5749/ minnesota/9780816692149.001.0001.
Neumann, Klaus. Across the Seas: Australia’s Response to Refugees: A History. 
Collingwood: Black Inc., 2015.
Neumann, Klaus. ‘Among Historians’. Cultural Studies Review 9, no. 2 (2003): 
177–91. doi.org/10.5130/csr.v9i2.3571.
Neumann, Klaus. ‘Oblivious to the Obvious? Australian Asylum-Seeker Policies and 
the Use of the Past’. In Does History Matter? Making and Debating Citizenship, 
Immigration and Refugee Policy in Australia and New Zealand, edited by Klaus 
Neumann and Gwenda Tavan, 47–64. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2009. doi.org/ 
10.22459/dhm.09.2009.03.
Neumann, Klaus. ‘“Our Own Interests Must Come First”: Australia’s Response 




Neumann, Klaus. ‘Providing a “Home for the Oppressed”? Historical Perspectives 
on Australian Responses to Refugees’. Australian Journal of Human Rights 9, 
no. 2 (2003): 1–25. doi.org/10.1080/1323238X.2003.11911103.
Neumann, Klaus. Refuge Australia: Australia’s Humanitarian Record. Sydney: 
UNSW Press, 2004.
Neumann, Klaus. ‘Starting from Trash’. In Remembrance of Pacific Pasts: 
An Invitation to Remake Histories, edited by Robert Borofsky, 62–77. Honolulu: 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 2000. doi.org/10.1515/9780824864163-006.
Neumann, Klaus and Sandra M Gifford. ‘Producing Knowledge About Refugee 
Settlement in Australia’. In Critical Reflections on Migration, ‘Race’ and 
Multiculturalism, edited by Martina Boese and Vince Marotta, 120–36. 
London: Routledge, 2017. doi.org/10.4324/9781315645124-7.
Neumann, Klaus and Savitri Taylor. ‘“He has to Take his Chances”: 
The Resettlement of a Refugee in Australia and his Deportation to the Country 
he had Fled, 1980–1992’. History Australia 16, no. 3 (2019): 459–79. doi.org/ 
10.1080/ 14490854.2019.1636672.
O’Hanlon, Seamus and Rachel Stevens. ‘A Nation of Immigrants or a Nation 
of Immigrant Cities? The Urban Context of Australian Multiculturalism’. 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 63, no. 4 (2017): 556–71. doi.org/ 
10.1111/ ajph.12403.
Ong, Aihwa. Buddha is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003.
Persian, Jayne. Beautiful Balts: From Displaced Persons to New Australians. Sydney: 
NewSouth Publishing, 2017.
Phillips, Melissa. ‘Convenient Labels, Inaccurate Representations: Turning 
Southern Sudanese Refugees Into “African-Australians”’. Australasian Review 
of African Studies 32, no. 2 (2011): 57–79.
Rajaram, Prem Kumar. ‘Humanitarianism and Representations of the Refugee’. 
Journal of Refugee Studies 15, no.  3 (2002): 247–64. doi.org/10.1093/jrs/ 
15.3.247.
Ramsay, Georgina. ‘Central African Refugee Women Resettled in Australia: 
Colonial Legacies and the Civilising Process’. Journal of Intercultural Studies 
38, no. 2 (2017): 170–88. doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2017.1289904.
REFUGEE JOURNEyS
244
Ryu, Minjung and Mavreen Rose S Tuvilla. ‘Resettled Refugee Youths’ Stories 
of  Migration, Schooling, and Future: Challenging Dominant Narratives 
About Refugees’. The Urban Review (2018): 1–20. doi.org/10.1007/s11256-
018-0455-z.
Saxton, Alison. ‘“I Certainly Don’t Want People Like That Here”: The Discursive 
Construction of “Asylum Seekers”’. Media International Australia 109, no. 1 
(2003): 109–20. doi.org/10.1177/1329878X0310900111.
Schrover, Marlou and Willem Schinkel. ‘Introduction: The Language of Inclusion 
and Exclusion in the Context of Immigration and Integration’. Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 36, no. 7 (2013): 1123–41. doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2013. 
783711.
Silverstein, Jordana. ‘“The Beneficent and Legal Godfather”: A History of the 
Guardianship of Unaccompanied Immigrant and Refugee Children in 
Australia, 1946–1975’. The History of the Family 22, no. 4 (2017): 446–65. 
doi.org/10.1080/1081602X.2016.1265572.
Silverstein, Jordana. ‘“I Am Responsible”: Histories of the Intersection of the 
Guardianship of Unaccompanied Child Refugees and the Australian Border’. 
Cultural Studies Review 22, no. 2 (September 2016): 65–89. doi.org/10.5130/
csr.v22i2.4772.
Soguk, Nevzat. States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
Stevens, Rachel. Immigration Policy from 1970 to the Present. New York: Routledge, 
2016.
Stevens, Rachel. ‘Political Debates on Asylum Seekers during the Fraser 
Government, 1977–1982’. Australian Journal of Politics and History 58, no. 4 
(2012): 526–41. doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2012.01651.x.
Strang, Alison and Alastair Ager. ‘Refugee Integration: Emerging Trends and 
Remaining Agendas’. Journal of Refugee Studies 23, no. 4 (2010): 589–607. 
doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feq046.
Swain, Shurlee. ‘Beyond Child Migration: Inquiries, Apologies and the 
Implications for the Writing of a Transnational Child Welfare History’. 
History Australia 13, no. 1 (2016): 139–52. doi.org/10.1080/14490854.2016. 
1156212.
Tavan, Gwenda. ‘The Dismantling of the White Australia Policy: Elite Conspiracy 
or Will of the Australian People?’ Australian Journal of Political Science 39, 
no. 1 (2004): 109–25. doi.org/10.1080/1036114042000205678.
245
SELECT BiBLiOGRAPHy
Taylor, Savitri. ‘Achieving Reform of Australian Asylum Seeker Law and Policy’. 
Just Policy 24 (2001): 41–54.
Taylor, Savitri. ‘Australia’s Pacific Solution Mark II: The Lessons to be Learned’. 
UTS Law Review 9 (2007): 106–24.
Taylor, Savitri. ‘Immigration Detention Reforms: A Small Gain in Human 
Rights’. Agenda: A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform 13 (2006): 49–62. 
doi.org/10.22459/AG.13.01.2006.04.
Taylor, Savitri. ‘The Pacific Solution or a Pacific Nightmare: The Difference 
between Burden Shifting and Responsibility Sharing’. Asian-Pacific Law and 
Policy Journal 6 (2005): 1–43.
Taylor, Savitri. ‘Towing Back the Boats: Bad Policy Whatever Way You Look 
at It’. The Conversation. 12  June 2013. Available at: theconversation.com/
towing-back-the-boats-bad-policy-whatever-way-you-look-at-it-15082.
Wills, Sara. ‘Between the Hostel and the Detention Centre: Possible Trajectories 
of Migrant Pain and Shame in Australia’. In Places of Pain and Shame: Dealing 
with ‘Difficult Heritage’, edited by William Logan and Keir Reeves, 263–80. 
Florence: Taylor and Francis, 2008. doi.org/10.4324/9780203885031.
Zetter, Roger. ‘Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic 
Identity’. Journal of Refugee Studies 4, no. 1 (1991): 39–62. doi.org/10.1093/
jrs/4.1.39.
Zetter, Roger. ‘More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an 
Era of Globalization’. Journal of Refugee Studies 20, no. 2 (2007): 172–92. 
doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fem011.
Zetter, Roger. ‘Refugees and Refugee Studies – A Label and an Agenda’. Journal 
of Refugee Studies 1, no. 1 (1988): 1–6. doi.org/10.1093/jrs/1.1.1.

